The educational and labour market expectations of adolescents and young adults by Jerrim, John
University of Southampton Research Repository
ePrints Soton
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other 
copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial 
research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be 
reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing 
from the copyright holder/s. The content must not be changed in any way or sold 
commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the 
copyright holders.
  
 When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g.
AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", University of Southampton, name 
of the University School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk
 University of Southampton 
Faculty of Law, Arts & Social Sciences 
School of Social Sciences 
 
 
The educational and labour 
market expectations of adolescents 
and young adults 
 
by 
 
John Jerrim 
 
 
Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
January 2011 
2 
 
Abstract 
 
Understanding why some suitably qualified young adults go on to enter higher 
education and others do not has been the subject of extensive research by a number of 
social scientists from a range of disciplines. Economists suggest that young adults’ 
willingness to invest in a tertiary qualification depends upon what they believe the 
costs and benefits of this investment will be. On the other hand, sociologists stress 
that an early expectation of completing university is a key driver of later participation 
in higher education. Children's subjective beliefs of the future (their “expectations”) 
are a consistent theme within these distinctively different approaches. Researchers 
from both disciplines might argue that children's low or mistaken expectations (of 
future income, financial returns, their ability to complete university) might lead them 
into making inappropriate educational choices. For instance, young adults who do not 
have a proper understanding of the graduate labour market may mistakenly invest (or 
not invest) in tertiary education. Alternatively some academically talented children 
may not enter university if they do not see it as realistic possibility, or that it is 'not for 
the likes of them'. I take an interdisciplinary approach within this thesis to tackle both 
of these issues. Specifically, I investigate whether young adults have realistic 
expectations about their future in the labour market and if disadvantaged children 
scoring high marks on a maths assessment at age 15 believe they can complete 
university. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Contents 
 
Page 
List of Tables  4 
List of Figures 7 
Declaration of Authorship 9 
Acknowledgements 10 
1. Thesis introduction 11 
          1.2 The role of adolescents' expectations in economic models of schooling choice 13 
          1.3 The Breen and Goldthorpe model of educational choice 18 
          1.4 The role of adolescents' expectations in sociological models of schooling choice 21 
          1.5 Overview 25 
2. Wage expectations of UK students: How do they vary and are they realistic? 28 
           2.2 Current literature and research questions 30 
           2.3 Data on wage expectations 34 
           2.4 Proximity to graduation 43 
           2.5 University prestige, ability and family background 48 
           2.6 Data on realised wages 51 
           2.7 Comparison of expected and actual wages 60 
           2.8 Discussion 72 
           2.9 Conclusion 74 
3. Who has realistic income expectations: Students or workers? 77 
           3.2 Literature and research questions 81 
           3.3 Data 86 
           3.4 Prediction of age 30 income 102 
           3.5 Results 110 
           3.6 Discussion and conclusion  136 
4. Disadvantaged children’s “low” expectations: Is the UK really so different to other 
industrialized nations? 139 
           4.2 Motivation  142 
           4.3 Data 153 
           4.4 Results 173 
             4.5 Results - The expectations of high ability disadvantaged children compared to  184 
                                 their advantaged, but less talented, peers 
            4.6 Summary and policy discussion for the UK 194 
           4.6 Conclusion 196 
5. Thesis conclusion 199 
6. References 207 
7. Appendices 214 
           7.1 Appendices chapter 2 214 
           7.2 Appendices chapter 3 225 
           7.3 Appendices chapter 4  257 
4 
 
List of Tables 
  
 
Page 
2. Wage expectations of UK students: How do they vary and are they realistic? 
            Table 2.1 Sample selection rules 36 
           Table 2.2  Peaks in the distribution of expected wage 39 
           Table 2.3  Distribution of expected wage for a selection of groups 43 
           Table 2.4  Regression results 44 
           Table 2.5  Student response to whether they believe ‘the growing number of graduates will      46 
 
make it hard to get a graduate job’ 
            Table 2.6  Response to whether students have considered getting a temporary job  46 
           Table 2.7a  Sample selection rules for full-time students 52 
           Table 2.7b  Sample selection rules for part-time students 52 
Table 2.8 Predicted probability of responding to DLHE salary question for a set of hypothetical 
individuals based on a probit model   56 
           Table 2.9a  Comparison of full-time students in the SIES and DLHE samples  58 
           Table 2.9b  Comparison of part-time students in the SIES and DLHE samples  59 
           Table 2.10  Comparison of average salary in the SIES, DLHE and LFS for full-time students  63 
           Table 2.11  Comparison between mean expected and mean actual wages for full-time       65 
 
students, based on background characteristics 
            Table 2.12a  Comparison between expected and actual mean wages for subject groups  67 
           Table 2.12b  Comparison between expected and actual median wages for subject groups  67 
           Table 2.13a  Comparison between average expected and average actual wages of men in  70 
 
each subject group 
            Table 2.13b  Comparison between average expected and average actual wages of women  71 
 
each subject group 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
  
Page 
3. Who has realistic income expectations: Students or workers? 
            Table 3.1  Logistic regression of item non-response to question on income expectation 90 
           Table 3.2 Timescale used to report salary 94 
           Table 3.3 Missing data on expected income and reported salary 95 
           Table 3.4 Logistic regression of missing full-time wage history 96 
           Table 3.5 Summary statistics showing the NELS sample composition, before and after the  98 
 
exclusion of missing expectations and wage data 
            Table 3.6 Average, annual (real) wage growth rates for young workers: Rubenstein and Weiss  105 
           Table 3.7 Predicted mean age 30 NELS wage compared to the mean age 30 Current  107 
 
Population Survey (CPS) wage 
            Table 3.8 Proportion of 20 year olds expecting to enter each profession by age 30, and the 112 
 
proportion who have actually entered that profession by age 26 
            Table 3.9 Proportion of 20 year old students expecting to enter each profession by age 30, 115 
 
and the proportion who have actually entered that profession by age 26 
            Table 3.10 Proportion of 20 year old workers expecting to enter each profession by age 30, 118 
 
and the proportion who have actually entered that profession by age 26 
            Table 3.11 Ordinary least squares regression results comparing the accuracy of students’ income  123 
 
expectations to workers 
            Table 3.12 Robustness tests of accuracy of income expectations, using regression specification 3 132 
           Table 3.13 Logistic regression results comparing how realistic students’ occupational  134 
 
expectations are to workers 
 4. Disadvantaged children’s “low” expectations: Is the UK really so different to other industrialized 
nations? 
            Table 4.1  Sample sizes and missing expectations data across the OECD countries 155 
           Table 4.2 Distribution of highest parental education across OECD countries 160 
     Table 4.3 Distribution of highest parental occupation (ISEI index) across countries 163 
           Table 4.4 Distribution of the number of books in the home across OECD countries 165 
           Table 4.5 Difference between advantaged and disadvantaged children's plans to complete higher 
education , before and after controlling for differences in age 15 test scores 172 
           Table 4.6 Difference between the expectations of advantaged and disadvantaged children after 
controlling for differences in age 15 test performance  180 
           Table 4.7 Distribution of ESCS measure of family background across countries 186 
           Table 4.8  Percentage of 15 year olds from the top and bottom quartile of the ESCS distribution 
who are in the top quintile of the national math’s ability distribution 189 
           Table 4.9 
 
Difference between the expectations of disadvantaged children scoring a high mark on the 
PISA maths assessment versus advantaged children with a mark around the national average 193 
 
 
 
6 
 
Appendix Tables.   Page 
           Table A2.1 Conversion between net and gross parental income 216 
           Table A2.2  Interval regression results 219 
           Table A2.3  Results for probit model of non-response 221 
           Table A2.4  Comparison between the average graduate salary reported by HESA and the  224 
 
average graduate salary used in this chapter 
            Table A3.1  Sampling frame and selection probabilities NELS age 18 and 20 follow-up 227 
           Table A3.2 Sampling frame and response rates – NELS age 20 follow-up 228 
           Table A3.3 Average, annual (real) wage growth rates for young workers:  Rubenstein and Weiss 232 
 
estimates 
            Table A3.4 Chow test to investigate whether wage growth is similar for young men between  241 
 
the ages 23 and 26 for the NELS and NLSY surveys 
            Table A3.5 Estimated age coefficients from prediction method 2 (fixed effects  242 
 
regression model) 
            Table A3.6 Predicted average annual real wage growth rates for young American men between  243 
 
the ages 26 and 30 
            Table A3.7 Predicted annual wage at age 30 for NELS sample members  244 
           Table A3.8 Predicted mean age 30 NELS wage compared to the mean age 30 Current    245 
 
Population Survey (CPS) wage 
            Table A3.9 Distribution of unearned income by marital status, for those reporting a value  249 
 
above zero  
            Table A3.10 Distribution of unearned income at age 26 in the NELS and NLSY, for those  250 
 
reporting a value greater than 0 
            Table A3.11 OLS regression results comparing how realistic students are to workers  254 
 
(Prediction “Method 1a” using CPS wage growth estimates) 
            Table A3.12 OLS regression results comparing how realistic students are to workers  255 
 
(Prediction “Method 1b” using PSID wage growth estimates) 
            Table A3.13 OLS regression results comparing how realistic students are to workers 256 
 
(Prediction “Method 1c” using NLSY wage growth estimates) 
           Table A3.14 Expected wages at age 30 in the NELS (raw figures as reported by students) 257 
           Table A4.1  Country by country estimated coefficients  262 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 List of Figures 
    Page 
1. Introduction 
             Figure 1.1 Economic model of schooling choice 13 
           Figure 1.2 Wisconsin model of status attainment  22 
           Figure 1.3 Status attainment framework, combining Morgan (1998) with Sewell et al (1970) 24 
2. Wage expectations of UK students: How do they vary and are they realistic? 
            Figure 2.1 Distribution of log expected starting wage 39 
           Figure 2.2 Kernel density estimates of actual versus expected log wages 61 
           Figure 2.3 Kernel density estimates of expected and actual starting salaries, by subject group 68 
3. Who has realistic income expectations: Students or workers? 
            Figure 3.1 Distribution of expected income at 30 for young US males 92 
           Figure 3.2a Distribution of actual income at age 26 for young US males 100 
           Figure 3.2b Distribution of log actual income at age 26 for young US males 100 
        Figure 3.3 
Data on expected income and actual wages that can be observed for one particular 
individual in the NELS 103 
           Figure 3.4 Illustration of wage prediction method 1 for ID 7286532 in the NELS 104 
           Figure 3.5 Illustration of wage prediction method 2 for ID 7286532 in the NELS 106 
           Figure 3.6 Comparison of wage prediction methods for ID 7286532 in the NELS 108 
           Figure 3.7 Distribution of log expected and log predicted income at age 30  110 
           Figure 3.8 Distribution of log expected and log predicted income at age 30 for students 114 
           Figure 3.9 Distribution of log expected and log predicted income at age 30 for workers 117 
           Figure 3.10 Difference between expectations and realisations: Workers compared to students  125 
 
in different subjects 
            Figure 3.11 Difference between expectations and realisations: Specifications 3 and 4  129 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
List of Figures continued 
    Page 
4. Disadvantaged children’s “low” expectations: Is the UK really so different to other industrialized nations? 
            Figure 4.1 The (private) internal rate of return to obtaining a bachelors degree across  143 
 
a selection of OECD countries 
 Figure 4.2 A model linking family background to children’s aspirations, expectations and 146 
 
outcomes, based upon Chowdry et al (2009) 
            Figure 4.3 Proportion of children expecting to obtain a degree versus actual graduation rates 158 
           Figure 4.4 Estimated difference between advantaged and disadvantaged children's plans 174 
 
to complete higher education (based on model 1) 
            Figure 4.5 Estimated difference between advantaged and disadvantaged children's plans to complete higher 177 
 
education, before and after controlling for differences in age 15 test scores 
            Figure 4.6 Estimated difference between advantaged and disadvantaged children's plans to complete  182 
 
higher education, controlling for difference in age 15 test scores, before and after 
including a school level fixed effect 
            Figure 4.7 Predicted log-odds of a high scoring disadvantaged native girl expecting to complete  191 
 
university versus an average scoring advantaged native girl  
            Figure 4.8 Predicted probability of a high ability disadvantaged native girl expecting to complete  194 
 
university versus an average scoring advantaged native girl  
 7. Appendix Figures 
            Figure  A3.1 Observable wage and income expectation data for ID 7286532 in the NELS 229 
          Figure  A3.2 Illustration of  wage prediction method 1 for ID 7286532 in the NELS 231 
          Figure  A3.3 Illustration of  wage prediction method 2 for ID 7286532 in the NELS 234 
          Figure  A3.4 Log median wages in the NELS and NLSY between the ages 23 and 26 239 
          Figure  A3.5 Comparison of wage prediction methods for ID 7286532 in the NELS 247 
          Figure  A4.1 Predicted probability of a high ability disadvantaged girl expecting to complete  330 
 
university versus an advantaged girl of average ability (alternative specification) 
 
   
   
   
 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
Declaration of Authorship 
 
I, John Jerrim, declare that the thesis entitled “The educational and labour market 
expectations of adolescents and young adults” and the work presented in the thesis 
are both my own, and have been generated by me as the result of my own original 
research. I confirm that: 
 
 this work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research 
degree at this University; 
 where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any 
other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been 
clearly stated; 
 where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly 
attributed; 
 where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With 
the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work; 
 I have acknowledged all main sources of help; 
 where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have 
made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed 
myself; 
 
 
 
 
 
Signed: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
Date: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
10 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
Firstly, I would like to thank all members of my supervisory team (John 
Micklewright, Sylke Schnepf and Dave Holmes) for all their help, hard work and 
advice. Likewise, I would like to thank Tim Smeeding, Karl Scholz and Jane Cooley 
for their warmth and hospitality during my two month stay in Madison, where I was 
putting together the finishing touches on this thesis. Bob Michael also deserves 
special thanks, for reader through a provisional draft of my third chapter and making a 
series of useful suggestions. Feedback received from other University of Southampton 
staff during the course of this work has been critical to both the development of my 
own skills and each of the chapters included in this work. Otherwise, special thanks 
goes to my family and friends who supported me over the last three years, especially 
my loving girlfriend Jackie. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction: 
The educational and labour market 
expectations of adolescents and 
young adults 
Whether to invest in higher education is one of the most important decisions that 
young people make. Such an investment can offer substantial financial rewards; the 
UK government often cites work that suggests graduates earn, on average, £100,000 
more over their lifetime than if they entered the labour force upon finishing their A-
Levels (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 2008). Yet completing higher 
education is also becoming more expensive. At the time of writing, the £3,000 cap on 
university tuition fees is under review, with many parties expecting it to be lifted. 
Hence educational decisions typically made at age 18 are having ever greater financial 
implications, with increasing responsibility being placed onto relatively inexperienced 
shoulders.  
 
Many social scientists claim that adolescents' subjective beliefs about the future (their 
“expectations”) are a central determinant of such choices. From the one side, 
economists suggest that young adults’ willingness to invest in a tertiary qualification 
depends upon what they expect the costs and benefits of this investment to be. On the 
other, sociologists and social psychologists stress that an early expectation of 
completing university is a key motivational factor behind actual later attainment. 
Recent theories have emerged that integrate both of these views. In any case, social 
scientists from a broad range of disciplines might argue that children's low or 
mistaken expectations (of future income, financial returns or chances of completing 
12 
 
university) could lead them into making an inappropriate educational choice. For 
instance, young adults who do not have a reasonable understanding of the graduate 
labour market may mistakenly invest (or not invest) in tertiary education. 
Alternatively some academically talented children may not enter university if they do 
not see it as realistic possibility, or that it is 'not for the likes of them'.  Under both 
scenarios, such mistaken decisions are likely to be detrimental for output, and 
possibly inequality, within the UK.  
 
Policymakers should therefore carefully consider children's expectations when 
designing their educational initiatives. For instance, any scheme to create a market 
place within UK higher education will only be efficient if students are realistic about 
the future, understanding the economic costs and benefits of the different options that 
are available. Likewise, if the current university tuition fee cap is to be lifted, then this 
cannot be allowed to create a perception amongst disadvantaged children that higher 
education is the preserve of the rich. In other words, it is vital for policymakers to 
ensure that young adults are making well informed human capital investment 
decisions and that all those who can benefit from higher education believe it is an 
obtainable goal, regardless of their family background. 
 
But are young adults capable of making such rational assessments of the future, and 
do they hold enough information to make such complex decisions?  I take an inter-
disciplinary approach to provide an insight into these issues. Specifically, I investigate 
whether young adults are realistic about their future in the labour market and if 
children from disadvantaged backgrounds are less optimistic about their prospects of 
completing university than their more affluent peers. I begin in this introduction by 
describing economic and sociological theories of schooling choice and the role that 
expectations play within these frameworks. This includes a description of how social 
scientists measure children's beliefs about the future and incorporate such factors into 
their empirical models of educational choice. A brief review of existing studies 
follows, accompanied by a discussion of the contribution that this thesis makes to the 
wider literature. To conclude, I will provide an overview of the findings from this 
work, along with a summary of what they imply for educational policy in the UK. 
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1.2. The role of adolescents' expectations in economic models of schooling choice 
 
In an economic framework, a central determinant of young adults' educational choice 
is what they expect the financial returns of this investment to be (R
e
). Indeed, several 
studies have tried to assess how important this factor is for children's decisions 
regarding higher education (Willis and Rosen 1979, Berger 1988, Kaufmann and 
Attanasio 2009, Arcidiacono et al 2010, Montmarquette et al 2002). In such work, 
expected returns are usually decomposed into the higher wages an individual expects 
to receive over their working lifetime (as a result of this human capital investment) 
less the expected costs of completing this extra level of education. The latter consists 
of both direct (e.g. tuition fees) and indirect (e.g. foregone income/ opportunity costs) 
components. All figures are typically adjusted to take into account the time value of 
money (i.e. a discount rate, r, is applied).  Economists also recognise that adolescents' 
tastes or “preferences” play an important part in their educational behaviour. For 
instance, an individual who enjoys studying will be more likely to continue their 
investment in education for a given level of financial return (i.e. education has both 
investment and consumption value for them). However, such preferences are usually 
unobservable to the analyst; hence economists include a set of other exogenous 
variables (X) into their models to try and take children’s educational tastes into 
account.  A graphical representation of this framework can be found in Figure 1.1.  
 
Figure 1.1 Economic model of schooling choice 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
  
 
 
Notes: 
1 Source –authors own diagram 
Expected returns to 
education (R
e
) 
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Gender 
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In empirically implementing this framework, economists usually set up a statistical 
model as illustrated (algebraically) below: 
 
C = f(X, R
e
)  
     



 
t
t
te
kct
e
jct
te
kct,
e
jct, rCoCorWW
0
,,
t
0t
e )1/()1/(   R  
 
Where: 
C = The educational choice (e.g. whether to go to university or not) 
X = A set of characteristics that capture children's educational preferences (e.g. 
gender, family background, ability) 
eR  = The expected returns to that educational choice  
r = Discount rate (i.e. time discounting) 
e
jct,W  = Expected income received in year t under educational choice j (e.g. go to 
university) 
e
kct,W  = Expected income received in year t under educational choice k (e.g. do not go 
to university) 
e
jctCo , = Expected costs (direct and indirect) associated with educational choice j in 
year t (e.g. forgone income, tuition fees) 
e
kctCo , =  Expected costs (direct and indirect) associated with educational choice k in 
year t (e.g. forgone income, tuition fees) 
j = choice j (e.g. go to university) 
k = choice k (e.g. do not go to university) 
t = time, starting at the point the investment is made (t=0), running until the costs and 
benefits of the human capital investment end  
 
This clearly demonstrates the theoretical importance of expectations in economic 
models of schooling behaviour; a child is thought to be more likely to continue their 
schooling (ceteris paribus) the greater the financial return they expect to this 
investment. Yet, despite its central role in such models, economists have rarely 
attempted to measure children’s expected returns to education. Consequently, 
15 
 
subjective measures of R
e
 generally do not appear in economists' empirical models of 
schooling behaviour. Rather, information collected “ex-post” (after the decision has 
been made) is typically used to make inferences about the decision making process 
itself.  In other words, subjective measures of young adults' expected returns to 
education (R
e
) are generally not available (because they are not collected), so 
economists estimate the actual returns to education (R
a
) instead and incorporate this 
into their models of schooling choice
1
. Berger (1988) and Willis and Rosen (1979) are 
two well known examples that use this strategy. Hence the model set out above is 
rarely estimated; rather economists typically prefer the specification: 
  
C= f(X, R
a
)  
 
     



 
t
t
ta
kct
a
jct
ta
kct,
a
jct, rCoCorWW
0
,,
t
0t
a )1/()1/(   R  
 
where: 
 R a  = The “actual” returns to that educational choice  
a
jct,W 
 = “Actual” income received at time t under educational choice j (e.g. go to 
university) 
a
kct,W  = “Actual” income received at time t under educational choice k (e.g. do not go 
to university) 
a
jctCo , = “Actual” costs (direct and indirect) associated with educational choice j in 
year t (e.g. forgone income, tuition fees) 
a
kctCo , = “Actual” costs (direct and indirect) associated with educational choice k in 
year t (e.g. forgone income, tuition fees) 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Note that this quantity (the actual returns to education) must be estimated from the data. When doing 
so, economists face the well known problem of not observing what a child would go on to earn under 
the counter-factual (one does not know what a child who went to university would have earned had 
they not made this investment). I will not go into detail about this problem here, as it has already 
received much attention in the literature (see Angrist and Krueger (1991), Card (1995) and Dickson 
(2009)). Yet it is worth remembering that it is not a trivial problem to estimate this value (Ra) in itself. 
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A critical assumption that is therefore invoked in most economic studies of 
educational choice, particularly ones which attempt to estimate the impact of 
children’s expected returns on their schooling behaviour, is: 
 
  R    R ae   
 
where: 
  = random error, assumed to be mean zero and independent of all other covariates 
(X) that are included in the model  
 
This is sometimes called the “rational expectations” hypothesis. It states that if young 
adults have “full information” (that they fully understand the cost and benefits of 
different educational options), and process this information “rationally” (they can use 
it to make reasonable predictions of the future), then there should only be random 
differences between their expectations and later realisations.  In other words, 
economists usually assume that there are no systematic differences between children's 
ex-ante labour market expectations and their later ex-post realisations
2
. This 
assumption has recently been criticised in the literature (Manski 2004): 
 
“If experts disagree on the returns to schooling, is it plausible that youth have 
rational expectations? I think not” 
 
but has remained the subject of relatively little empirical research (particularly outside 
the US). Indeed, due to the dearth of data on young adults’ financial expectations, no 
study has been able to confirm whether the assumption above (that R
e
 = R
a  
+ ), vital 
to the inferences made in many economic models of schooling behaviour, is credible.  
 
Yet there is a growing desire amongst economists to understand whether young adults 
are realistic about their prospects in the labour market. Hence a small but developing 
literature, briefly reviewed below, has considered whether children hold realistic 
expectations of future wages (rather than returns) at one particular point in time 
                                                          
2
 If this assumption is violated, then R
a 
can be thought of as an error prone measure of
   
R
e
. This in turn 
violates the error-in-variables assumption of regression analysis, with the estimated effect of the returns 
to education on schooling choice becoming biased. 
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(rather than the discounted value of all future streams). In other words, although not 
being able to show if: 
 
  R    R ae     ═›       



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t
t
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e
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e
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0
,,
t
0t
)1/()1/(  
      =  
          



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t
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t
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)1/()1/(  
 
is a credible assumption, one can get a grasp of whether young adults have a 
reasonable understanding of a related (and, indeed, much simpler) issue: 
 
 
a
jcx,t
e
jcx,t WW  
 
where x = some specified point in the future 
 
Despite the limitations of this approach, such studies still provide an intriguing insight 
into the methodological framework described above. For instance, if wage 
expectations differ systematically from realizations (i.e. some groups make better 
predictions of the future than others) then, although not falsifying the assumption 
that   R    R ae  , it is at least consistent with academics like Manski's doubts.  To 
put this another way, if even the accuracy of young adults' wage expectations differs 
between groups at just one point in time, then a question mark must surely also hang 
over the assumption that there are no systematic differences in the accuracy of their 
expected returns. Furthermore, if groups who probably hold quite detailed and 
specific labour market information (e.g. students with access to public pay scales, 
those about to graduate, the labour market active) make better predictions of future 
income than those with relatively little, broad information (e.g. university freshmen, 
art students) then this would be consistent with the idea that some young adults do not 
fully understand their future career prospects when making their educational choices. 
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However, even analysis of young adults' wage expectations is relatively rare within 
the literature. To my knowledge, there are only four published studies in Europe 
(Wolter 2000, Webbink and Hartog 2004, Wolter and Zbinden 2002 and Brunello et al 
2004), and six in the US (Smith and Powell 1990, Betts 1996,  Blau 1991, Carvajal et 
al 2000, Rouse 2004,  Dominitz and Manski 1996). The conclusions drawn from this 
work have been largely inconsistent. Some indicate that students “overestimate the 
university wage premium” (Brunello et al 2001). Others suggest that “expected wages 
after graduation at university are rather accurate” (Wolter 2000), while Webbink and 
Hartog go a step further, boldly entitling their paper: “Can students predict their 
starting salary? YES!”.  
 
1.3 The Breen and Goldthorpe model of educational choice 
 
 The model of educational choice laid out in section 1.2 is, of course, just one 
(disciplinary-specific way) of conceptualising the university decision making process. 
Valuable alternatives have been developed by leading academics from other 
disciplines, which provides key insights from other perspectives. This sub-section is 
devoted to one particularly important framework that has been widely studied in the 
sociological literature (the Breen and Goldthorpe 1997 model) which is also based 
upon rational choice. 
 
The origins of this model stem from the above authors’ desires to explain a widely 
cited empirical finding by sociologists – that in most developed countries, there has 
been ‘little change in socio-economic inequality of educational opportunity’ over time 
(Breen 2001, Blossfeld and Shavit 1993). Many other international comparisons of 
social class fluidity have reached a similar conclusion (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992), 
although there are some who might disagree (Ganzeboom et al 1989)
3
.  
 
Nevertheless, in 1997 Breen and Goldthorpe published a paper in which they tried to 
explain this finding. Breen (2001) describes a simplified version of this framework, 
and states the original model had three key components: 
 
                                                          
3
 In other work, Breen (2004) has called for more balanced view regarding social fluidity versus 
absolute mobility 
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1. That there are points in all educational systems where young people must 
choose between options with differing levels of risk 
 
2. That individuals strive to obtain a minimum threshold of educational 
attainment this is acceptable to them. They thus attempt to minimize the 
probability of not reaching this level 
 
3. Young people hold subjective beliefs surrounding the probability of success in 
each of these risky educational options 
 
The second of these points is perhaps the most central to the model proposed by 
Breen and Goldthorpe. In particular, they assume that children choose a minimum 
threshold of education so that they maximise their chances of securing at least the 
same class position as their parents. By implication this means that, as young people 
from different social classes differ in terms of the point where this minimum 
education threshold is located, they will end up making different schooling choices. 
This is the sociological theory of “relative risk aversion”, which stresses the costs of 
not obtaining at least the same class position as ones parents. Breen (2001) goes on to 
say that this is a special case of “prospect theory” put forward by Kaheman and 
Tversky (1979). In particular, the model empthasises that individuals tend to see 
outcomes as a gain or loss relative to some reference point (e.g. their parents).  
 
On top of relative risk aversion, Breen and Goldthorpe state two further mechanisms 
give rise to class differences in educational attainment. The first is that there exists 
“primary effects”, meaning that when making educational decisions (such as whether 
to go to university) advantaged and disadvantaged children will differ in terms of their 
measured academic ability. They will, consequently, also differ in their views on the 
probability of educational success (e.g. they have differing subjective probabilities of 
their ability to successfully complete higher education). Secondly, children from the 
higher social classes will have access to greater financial resources to meet their 
educational costs (that will, for example, limit their entry into higher education). 
This brief overview has meant to give the reader an alternative perspective to human 
capital theory when thinking about the university decision making process. Testing 
this model is beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet the framework laid out above has a 
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number of implications for the work that I shall present. In particular: 
 
 A large part of the following two chapters will focus on a specific aspect of 
human capital theory and the importance of expected future wages and 
economic returns in the educational decisions of young adults. This section 
has served as an important reminder that this is just one of several frameworks 
in which one may work – and that academics from other disciplines have 
produced valuable research where it is other factors that take a central role 
 
 Expectations of the future are not only important in economics, but also other 
disciplines. Indeed, subjective beliefs about future outcomes play an important 
part in the Breen and Goldthorpe model (Breen 2001 states that differences in 
expectations of success accentuates the relative risk aversion effect) 
 
 Leading on from the point above, it is not only expectations of future wages 
that are likely to be important (as often emphasised in human capital theory), 
but also other subjective views such as the probability of educational success. 
 
Indeed, I shall expand on the last of these points in the section that follows. In this I 
describe another model of educational decision making from the sociological and 
social-psychological literatures, where expectations of the future again play a key role 
in young peoples’ scholarly attainment.  
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1.4 The role of adolescents' expectations in sociological models of schooling 
choice 
 
A key difference between traditional economic and sociological approaches to 
schooling behaviour is that the former emphasize the role of children's expectations 
(in terms of earnings returns), while the later identify aspirations (in terms of 
educational and occupational goals), as the key driver of educational attainment. 
Although occasionally confused in the literature, these are two distinct (but 
interlinked) concepts. Sociologists sometimes refer to educational expectations as 
“realistic aspirations” (Gutman and Akerman 2008) – a realistic assessment of the 
level of schooling a child believes they will achieve. This is supported by Morgan 
(1998) who states that adolescents' educational expectations are not “irrational 
fantasies”, but are rather “grounded in reality and logical thinking”. On the other 
hand, educational aspirations are typically thought of as what children would like to 
do; their desired goals and ambitions. Specifically, aspirations are thought to reflect 
children's 'motivational orientation' (Morgan 2005), which drives the effort they put 
into their schooling and willingness to complete a tertiary qualification. 
 
 
A particularly famous sociological theory, which emphasises the importance of 
children's aspirations for their later educational attainment, is the Wisconsin model of 
status attainment (Sewell et al 1970). This is set out in Figure 1.2. Without going into 
the finer details of this model, children’s aspirations play a vital part in determining 
educational and occupational outcomes
4
. In one dimension, high academic 
performance is (partly) converted into educational attainment through children’s 
desire to complete more schooling. Yet, in another dimension, educational aspirations 
are a vital (though indirect) link between socioeconomic background and attainment. 
Specifically, children from advantaged backgrounds tend to perform better 
academically than their disadvantaged peers, while also receiving more 
encouragement from “significant others” (teachers, parents, peers) to continue their 
investment in education. This has a subsequent (positive) effect on their educational 
                                                          
4
 I have not presented the full model of Sewell et al (1970) for brevity. In particular a further outcome 
(occupational attainment) is specified within this model which is also partly determined by the 
aspirations children hold for the future. 
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aspirations, which drives their high attainment. Disadvantaged children, with lower 
levels of academic performance and less encouragement, do not hold as high 
aspirations for the future and thus do not generally reach such advanced levels of 
schooling. 
 
Figure 1.2 Wisconsin model of status attainment  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
1 Source: Sewell et al (1970), adaption of Figure 2 
 
The sole focus of this thesis, however, is children's expectations (their realistic 
appraisals of the future, not their hopes and dreams). How does this fit into 
sociological theory?  
 
Since regaining favour in sociological research during the 1990’s, a group of 
contemporary status attainment researchers have begun to develop the original models 
of Sewell and his co-authors. A key part of this movement is Stephen Morgan 
(Morgan 1998, 2004, 2005, 2007) who claims (Morgan 1998) that “there have always 
been some rational expectations within theory of status socialization” in the sense that 
young adults are assumed to base educational decisions partly upon logical (i.e. well-
informed and efficient) cost-benefit calculations of their future. He points, for 
example, to the survey questions used to capture children's aspirations in empirical 
representations of the model above. These typically take the form: 
 
Socio-economic 
status 
Mental Ability 
Academic 
Performance 
Influence of 
Significant Others 
Educational 
Aspirations 
Educational 
Attainment 
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 “how far do you expect to go in school?” 
 
Rather than capturing children’s aspirations, Morgan argues that responses represent 
educational expectations, and that these have a rational core, reflecting children’s 
logical thoughts about their future
5
. Thus he moves away from educational 
aspirations, and towards children's expectations, as the causal mechanism within the 
status attainment framework. He sums up in Morgan (2005): 
 
“educational expectations have an effect on educational attainment (or whatever 
outcome is modelled) and not just as a mediator for the indirect effects of prior 
variables” 
 
In Figure 1.3, I incorporate the developments of Morgan (1998) into the status 
attainment model shown in Figure 1.2. The most obvious alteration is that it is now 
educational expectations, rather than aspirations, that help determine children's 
schooling outcomes. However, an additional point of interest is that Morgan includes 
children's expected returns to education as one of the drivers of these educational 
plans
6
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Indeed, in Morgan (1998) he suggests that children’s reported educational expectations vary with the 
marginal costs and benefits of the available human capital investments (similar to the definition of 
expectations applied by economists) and that this provides evidence of rational thoughts.  
6
 I have not included the determinants of the expected returns to education in this framework for 
brevity. 
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Figure 1.3 Status attainment framework, combining Morgan (1998) with Sewell 
et al (1970) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
Notes: 
1 Source: Authors own diagram, based upon models presented by Sewell et al (1970) and Morgan 
(1988) 
 
 
This model plays an important role in motivating the fourth chapter of this thesis. 
Specifically, coming from a disadvantaged background (low socio-economic status 
and little encouragement from one’s parents, teachers and peers) leads to lower 
educational expectations, which reduces motivation in school and increases the 
chances of engaging in risky teenage behaviour (drinking, drug use and early sexual 
activity). This eventually means that children who once performed the same 
academically may not go on to achieve the same level of education because of 
differences in such beliefs. As there is likely to be constant feedback between 
expectations and attainment (so that lower expectations leads to lower attainment, 
which leads to continued low expectations, and so forth), establishing both the 
strength and direction of such relationships has proven to be methodologically 
challenging. Nevertheless, if this theory is correct (that childhood expectations really 
do have a causal influence on later attainment) then enhancing disadvantaged 
Socio-economic 
status 
Mental Ability 
Academic 
Performance 
Influence of 
Significant Others 
Educational 
Expectations 
Educational 
Attainment 
 Returns to 
Education 
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children’s educational expectations should be a pressing concern for any group 
attempting to widen access to university or promote social mobility. Specifically, 
disadvantaged children's low educational expectations may be part of the reason why 
they are less likely to complete higher education and enter professional jobs than their 
advantaged peers (even if they are equally academically talented).  
 
Based on such theories, governments across the world have introduced policies to try 
and ensure children hold high expectations for the future and aim for university from 
an early age. These schemes are particularly prevalent in the US, with examples 
including the “Gear-up” and “I have a dream” programmes. Yet similar initiatives 
have emerged during the last decade in the UK. This includes the “Gifted and 
Talented” scheme, which give disadvantaged children near the end of compulsory 
schooling (around age 16) the chance to interact with professionals and to be 
“mentored” by current university students. However, although there seems particular 
concern amongst policymakers in these two countries, I have seen little evidence to 
suggest that the socio-economic gap in expectations is bigger here than in other parts 
of the developed world. Thus, we do not know whether this is a specific reason why 
disadvantaged children tend not to participate in higher education in Britain and 
America, or a more general barrier to university across many different nations. 
 
1.5. Overview 
 
The following two chapters contribute to the small literature on young adults' 
subjective labour market expectations. Specifically, I begin by considering the wage 
expectations of university undergraduates from England and Wales; to my knowledge 
the first such study to take place in the UK. In this chapter I show how students' 
expectations vary, before considering whether the beliefs they hold are, on average, 
realistic. I contribute to the existing European literature by making a more reliable 
comparison of expectations and realisations, and in attempting to represent a wider 
student population. My main finding is that, on average, UK undergraduates 
overestimate their starting salary by around 10-15%. Yet those who take Art, 
Humanities and Social Science courses hold particularly unrealistic labour market 
expectations, overestimating their starting wage by almost 20% (£3,500). This is in 
comparison to maths and education students, where the figure is closer to 5% (£900). 
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Of particular note, I find that undergraduates who are about to enter the labour market 
hold more realistic expectations than their peers who have just begun university. I 
discuss how this may be related to the different costs that young adults face in 
accessing details about future possible careers. In other findings, I suggest that the 
accuracy of UK students' wage expectations is unrelated to their gender or ethnicity, 
but that it may be associated with the quality of institution they attend. Nevertheless, I 
stress the need to provide all young adults with detailed, yet accessible, labour market 
information to ensure that they are making well informed educational decisions. 
 
I build on this work in my third chapter by using US panel data to investigate whether 
20 year old American men hold realistic expectations of their annual income at age 
30. This adds value to my second chapter by considering whether results hold within a 
different setting and over a longer time horizon, and whether young adults with direct 
experience of the labour market hold more realistic expectations than their student 
peers. I also exploit the longitudinal structure of the data to overcome methodological 
problems that hinder comparisons of expectations and later realisations in the existing 
literature. Moreover, due to the rich nature of this data, I am able to explore whether 
young adults' are also unrealistic about other aspects of the labour market – such as 
their future occupation. My results suggest that, on average, 20 year old American 
men make poor predictions of both their income and occupation at age 30 and that, on 
average, young adults in the labour force hold just as unrealistic expectations as their 
peers enrolled in higher education. Consistent with my findings for the UK, I estimate 
that young adults who graduate from a mathematical discipline overestimate their 
future income by an average of just 7%, compared to over 60% for those who studied 
Art, Humanities or Social Sciences. There is little to suggest that these results differ 
between those from advantaged and disadvantaged backgrounds, but I do find large 
and statistically significant differences between ethnic groups, and that the accuracy 
of young adults' labour market expectations is associated with their ability in 
mathematics. 
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In chapter four, I investigate the proportion of 15 year old children who expect to 
complete higher education and how this varies amongst socio-economic groups. This 
work is closely linked with educational policy in the UK; particularly schemes like 
AIMHIGHER that explicitly attempt to raise disadvantaged children's expectations of, 
and perceptions about, going to university. I contribute to the existing literature by 
exploring this topic across all the OECD countries, rather than in just a single national 
setting. Consequently, I am able to place the educational expectations of young adults 
in the UK into an internationally comparable perspective. My results show that there 
are large differences between advantaged and disadvantaged children's educational 
plans, and that this holds true across all countries in the developed world. I find that 
only part of this divide in children’s expectations can be explained by differences in 
their test performance at age 15 and the schools that they attend. However, perhaps 
my most concerning finding is that a large proportion of 15 year olds who score 
highly on an internationally recognised assessment do not expect to complete 
university. In both England and the US, an advantaged child of scoring around the 
national average on this test is more likely to expect to complete higher education 
than a disadvantaged child achieving a mark in the top quintile. Indeed, I predict that 
less than one in two disadvantaged English children who score in the top quintile of 
the PISA maths test distribution believe they will obtain a bachelor’s degree. Yet the 
same is true across many industrialised nations, with little evidence that the socio-
economic gap is atypically big in the UK compared to other members of the OECD. 
Nevertheless, I argue that English policymakers still have a need to encourage 
disadvantaged children into higher education, although I suggest that widening access 
schemes should perhaps start at young ages.  
 
I conclude with a summary of my findings in chapter five, reiterating the main 
conclusions that I draw and possible directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Wage expectations of UK students: 
How do they vary and are they 
realistic? 
 
 
 
“The contempt of risk and the presumptuous hope of 
success are in no period of life more active than at the 
age at which young people choose their professions.” 
  
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776), Page 109 
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The returns to education have been widely explored in England and Wales. Some 
recent studies suggest students in particular subjects receive, over their lifetime, poor 
financial returns to their investment in university education (Vignoles 2007). The fact 
students still decide to enter university and take these courses is often explained by 
the value of non financial benefits, such as the joy of learning and experiencing 
independence. However, an often overlooked possibility is that students may be 
unrealistically optimistic about their future opportunities when deciding to go to 
university, as noted by Adam Smith in the quote above. This chapter investigates the 
variations in students’ expectations and whether these expectations are in line with 
wages in the graduate labour market.  
 
This topic has a small literature within Continental Europe, although no recent 
academic research on students’ wage expectations has been conducted within the UK. 
These existing European studies are severely limited by their reliance on convenience 
samples drawn from a small number of subjects and institutions, with results unlikely 
to generalise to the wider student population. The first part of this chapter attempts to 
address this issue by using data designed to be nationally representative (the 
Department for Education and Skills Student Income and Expenditure Survey) to 
estimate a model of students’ wage expectations. I test the hypothesis that students 
near the beginning of their course expect significantly higher wages than those about 
to graduate, and investigate the impact of several characteristics relating to students 
and their institutions.  
 
The second half of the chapter considers whether students hold realistic wage 
expectations. Existing European studies use of unrepresentative samples causes 
particular difficulty in comparing students’ wage expectations to the actual earnings of 
graduates. A highly selective cross sectional survey on wage expectations is usually 
compared with historical data on graduate wages. Almost no attention is paid to 
whether the surveys are comparable, with problems such as selectivity, induced by 
convenience sampling or non-response bias, largely ignored.  This severely hinders 
the existing studies assessment of how realistic students are. In comparison, this study 
compares the wage expectations from a national survey of students to average 
realisations of groups from the same cohort, drawn from an attempted census of all 
graduates, providing a better basis for comparison. The comparability of the two data 
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sources is discussed, with the results checked for robustness using the Labour Force 
Survey. I find that, on average, full-time students overestimate their first salary after 
university, though this varies with the subject that they study. 
 
The chapter begins by reviewing the current literature and describing the available 
datasets. A model of UK students’ wage expectations follows in section 2.3, with 
discussion of results in relation to the seniority of the student and various background 
characteristics. The final two sections compare students’ expectations with actual 
graduate wages, before a discussion of what the findings imply for European higher 
education policy. 
 
2.2 Current literature and research questions 
 
There have been a small number of studies investigating students’ wage expectations 
across America and Continental Europe. A common theme is that students who are 
further through their course have lower wage expectations than those at the beginning, 
reflecting better knowledge of their own ability and chances in the graduate labour 
market. Betts (1996) finds that students do not gather information until a late stage. 
He therefore concludes that students near the beginning of their course have 
reasonably poor labour market knowledge. Brunello et al (2001) show a similar 
pattern in their study; students further through their course tend to not only expect 
lower wages, but are also less optimistic about their employment prospects. This begs 
the question, will the difference in wage expectations, based on the seniority of the 
student, remain once views of employability have been controlled for? Indeed will the 
same pattern be observed within the UK at all, using data designed to be 
representative of the undergraduate population? 
 
A topic that has received rather less coverage is the role that university prestige plays 
in students’ wage expectations. Smith and Powell (1990) took samples from two 
institutions in America that differed in quality. Students at the elite university were 
found to have higher wage expectations, conditional on their prior high school rank. 
Brunello et al (2001) looked at the expected wage gain in relation to university status, 
and found that only tighter admission criteria had a significant impact on 
expectations. However neither study draws their sample from a large number of 
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institutions within one country. The UK is a particularly interesting setting for such 
research, with the number of universities having grown dramatically since 
government expansion of the higher education sector in 1992, creating large variation 
in terms of standards and prestige. Moreover, previous research in the UK suggests 
that the quality of an institution may influence graduates’ salaries. For instance, 
Chevalier and Conlon (2003) find a premium of going to a prestigious UK university 
above and beyond the influence of ability. They conclude that this presents an 
economic argument for these institutions being allowed to charge higher tuition fees. 
However do students expect such a premium in their wages?  
 
Many studies have also considered how wage expectations vary between students 
from different family backgrounds. Webbink and Hartog (2004) found students from 
high income families expect significantly more than those from poorer backgrounds, 
but that they are also more likely to overestimate their future wage. Smith and Powell 
(1990) also found this positive association between parents’ income and students’ 
wage expectations. One piece of work conducted in the UK by Williams and Gordon 
(1981) looked at the impact of socio-economic variables on the wage expectations of 
students at the end of compulsory education
7
. However they found that socio-
economic status had little direct influence on students’ expected lifetime gain from 
going to university. Other variables typically investigated include gender, age and the 
education and occupation of parents. However less attention has been paid to 
differences based on characteristics such as ethnicity.  For instance, do ethnic 
minorities anticipate some form of discrimination in the labour market and therefore 
lower their wage expectations?  
 
Some of these existing studies go onto make a rough comparison between students’ 
expectations with wages in the graduate labour market. For instance, Wolter (2002) 
shows that students tend to overestimate their wage with a degree. Smith and Powell 
(1990) suggest students are well informed about average wages, but tend to 
overestimate their own returns. The one known European study that uses longitudinal 
data, by Webbink and Hartog (2004), comes to a different conclusion; students can 
                                                          
7I know of two studies based within the UK to have considered students’ wage expectations. One is by 
Williams and Gordon (1981) and the second by Bosworth and Ford (1985). Also Brunello et al (2001) 
contained some information from the University of Sterling and University of Essex, though the sample 
sizes were very small. 
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accurately predict their starting salary. However a difficulty encountered in most of 
this work is that the authors compare a highly selective convenience sample of 
students’ expectations with historical data on graduate wages. The characteristics of 
the two samples covered in each survey are usually not even discussed, even though 
the sampling designs mean that they relate to very different, and possibly 
incomparable, populations. Even Webbink and Hartog (2004) advise caution 
generalising results in their longitudinal survey, due to the highly selective nature of 
follow-up.  Moreover, their study compares the salary students expect in their first job 
to the wages of graduates who have been employed for up to three years post 
university (the wage they are receiving after three years in employment). As such, no 
paper thus far convincingly illustrates whether students’ expectations are realistic. 
Indeed there is some disagreement. Whereas Webbink and Hartog (2004) boldly label 
their paper ‘Can Student’s Predict their Starting Salary? YES!’, Betts (1996) 
concludes that, on average, students overestimate their starting wage by 10%, while 
Brunello et al (2001) suggest the figure could be even higher than this. This chapter 
hopes to resolve this conflict by comparing two surveys that cover largely comparable 
populations with issues of non-response and comparability addressed directly and 
checked against an additional data source. 
 
The results have substantial policy implications for Europe’s higher education sector. 
In particular, as noted in the introduction to this thesis, young people may be entering 
university based on unrealistically high expectations of their prospects upon 
graduation. This may be exacerbated by government policy that highlights the 
magnitude of possibilities that students will have on graduation, which may actually 
never materialise. A further possibility is that students are willing to take on high 
levels of debt because they believe their future wages will enable repayment of their 
student loans. Gustman and Stafford (1972) show that the higher the income 
expectations of students, the more they tend to consume. However if their 
expectations are unrealistic, students may over consume during university, leading to 
difficulties and debt in later life. In concluding this chapter, I thus argue that 
policymakers need to provide young adults with more information about the graduate 
labour market so that such situations do not arise. 
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On the basis of the international literature and current policy interest, the research 
questions to be explored in this chapter are as follows: 
 
1. Do students who are further from graduation have greater wage and employment                           
    expectations? 
 
2. Do students at elite universities have significantly higher wage expectations than              
those at less prestigious institutions?  
 
3. Are parental income and ethnicity associated with students’ wage expectations? 
 
4. Do students have realistic expectations? Do students who are studying a subject                                                                                   
directly leading to a career have more realistic wage expectations than their peers                    
who are likely to enter the wider graduate labour market? 
 
To my knowledge, this chapter provides the first study of students’ wage expectations 
in Europe using data designed to be representative of a national undergraduate 
population. The first question follows much of the existing research, but extends the 
analysis to show how students’ views of their employment prospects influence their 
wage expectations. On the other hand, the second question has received little attention 
in the existing literature, due to the reliance on convenience samples taken from a 
small number of institutions
8
. Question three attempts to look at some previously 
neglected variables such as differences in wage expectations between ethnic groups. 
Finally, I investigate whether students are realistic, the first such study conducted in 
the UK. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 The definition of ‘elite’ in this work is whether the institution belongs to the ‘Russell Group’; a self-
selected alliance of 20 research-intensive universities. For further details see 
http://www.russellgroup.ac.uk/ 
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2.3 Data on wage expectations 
 
One reason why more research has not been done in this area is the lack of available 
data. The Association of Graduate Recruiters Graduate Career Survey is one possible 
source. However this study only targets the “top 30” UK universities, and therefore 
does not cover the whole UK student population, leading to an unrepresentative 
sample
9
. Several methodological problems also exist with the sampling strategy used 
and with the reliability of responses. An alternative is the 2004/5 Student Income and 
Expenditure Survey (SIES). This study was carried out using face-to-face interviews 
between January and March 2005 by the Institute of Employment Studies and the 
National Centre for Social Research on behalf of the then Department for Education 
and Skills.  
 
The purpose of the survey was to generate a representative sample of all higher 
education students in England and Wales, in order to investigate income and 
expenditure patterns. One strength of using this dataset is that it contains detailed 
information on a number of potential explanatory variables. This allows analysis of 
potential sources of variation in wage expectations that have been neglected in 
previous studies.  Information is provided on the students’ current year of study and 
the length of their course, providing valuable information regarding the first research 
question. The number of universities included in the survey provides a large sample of 
students from a range of institutions. This allows a detailed investigation across both 
universities and subjects within one country; a further topic with little coverage in the 
existing literature. There is also information on students’ background, including 
ethnicity, social class and previous schooling. Other controls such as gender and 
whether the student is classed as ‘dependant’, meaning they are in full-time education 
and had their parents’ income taken into consideration when applying for student 
support, are included
10. For ‘dependant’ students, there is also an approximate 
measure of family income, though it can only be taken as a proxy due to the way this 
data has been collected and recorded
11
. Unfortunately some other important 
                                                          
9A “top 30” university in this case is defined by the Association of Graduate Recruiters. The majority of 
universities included in the survey are Russell Group institutions, known for their excellence in 
research.  
10
 Full details are given in Appendix 2.1 about the survey definition of this variable. 
11
 Further details are given in Appendix 2.2 
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information is missing; in particular there is no indicator of student ability.  
 
A complex sampling design was used to ensure a representative cross-section of 
students was selected (I allow for this complex survey design by making the 
appropriate adjustment to the standard errors in all figures that I present). Universities 
were sampled using a probability design based on the size of the institution. There 
was also stratification by region and whether it was a “Pre-1992” or “Post-1992” 
university
12
. A sample of 80 universities, from a population of 132, was drawn, with 
probability proportional to size. In total, 69 universities agreed to take part with the 
intention of contacting 240 randomly selected students from each institution. Separate 
samples of full-time and part-time students were drawn, with special previsions made 
for those institutions with medical schools
13
. 25 Further Education Colleges (other 
degree awarding institutions) were also approached, with 19 entering the final sample. 
From each of these institutions, 60 students were randomly selected. Across all 
institutions, a total of 16,524 students were selected to take part. These students were 
each mailed an initial “opt-in” questionnaire, where they were asked to provide some 
basic information. 7,548 (45%) opt-in questionnaires were returned, with 5,810 (35%) 
agreeing to participate in the study. In total 4,570 names were issued with 3,548 
interviews achieved
14
. I choose to drop students who did not report their expected 
starting salary, along with those studying at further education colleges or for 
qualifications other than at degree level. I exclude a further 142 (5%) observations 
where the expected starting salary was below £8,000
15
.
 
The final dataset contains 
2,659 observations, with the sample selection rules presented in Table 2.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 A “post-1992” university is an institution that achieved university status in 1992 or later. This date 
marks a major change in the UK higher education sector, when several polytechnic institutions were 
given degree awarding powers. This increased the number of students at universities dramatically. 
13
 Further details can be found in the 2004/2005 SIES technical report (Finch et al 2006b) 
14
 Another institution that mainly involves part-time distance learning, The Open University, was in the 
original dataset but was dropped as these students did not give details on their wage expectations. 
15
 Almost a quarter of these values were at £1, and thus largely reflect illogical answers. Results were 
also checked for robustness using £3,000 as the minimum allowed expected salary. When this is done, 
all the substantial conclusions in the following sections remain intact. 
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Table 2.1 Sample selection rules 
 
Rule 
Sample 
remaining 
Initial sample 3,548 
Observations where salary expectations missing dropped 3,375 
Further Education colleges dropped 3,170 
"Other" degrees dropped 2,791 
Expectations below £8,000 dropped 2,659 
Notes:  
1 This table illustrates observations dropped from the analysis because of item non-response or my 
sample selection criteria. It does not include information on unit non-response, which is described in 
the text above. 
2 The selection rules are applied cumulatively, hence the final figure of 2,659 refers to when all four 
selection rules are applied (i.e. I drop 173 observations from missing expectations data, then a further 
205 where respondents attend further education colleges (and so forth)).  
3 Source: Authors calculations from the SIES data 
 
 
The level of non-response is not negligible, and obviously has implications for the 
generalisability of results. Those that take part in the survey could be systematically 
different to those who opt out. To address this, the survey organisers modelled the 
probability of student response using the rich data available on the sampling frame 
and other auxiliary information. These data included the students’ age, gender, 
previous qualifications (e.g. the number of A-Levels sat), quality of institution they 
attend and whether their parents went to university, amongst other things. Estimates 
from this model were used to create sampling weights that attempt to correct for the 
probability of a student being selected and responding. A second stage of weighting 
was also conducted to ensure the sex and age profile of students matched that of 
Higher Education Statistics Authority records
16
. It is evident that significant effort has 
been put into investigating and correcting any bias in the sample, to ensure it 
represents the student population in England and Wales (though it should be noted 
that the use of sample weights can only correct estimates in terms of observable 
characteristics). Nevertheless, the SIES 2004/2005 report (Finch et al 2006a) proceeds 
to state that: 
 
 
                                                          
16
 Weights were calculated as the inverse of the probability of being both selected and responding to the 
survey, and were the product of five conditional probabilities. Further details are provided on non-
response and weighting in the 2004-2005 Student Income and Expenditure technical report (Finch et al 
2006b). 
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“As can be seen, this was an ambitious methodology but one which succeeded in 
producing the objective of a nationally representative student sample for interviews.” 
(P 10) 
 
Indeed, in comparison to most of the studies on wage expectations discussed in 
section 2.2, the SIES data has the advantage that it is designed to draw a 
representative sample from the population of students, rather than relying on a simple 
convenience sample. Moreover, data is drawn from around 70 institutions across the 
whole spectrum of subjects, whereas most of the existing research can only boast a 
handful of subjects from a couple of universities. Although non-response does cause 
some limitations, it is reasonable to say the SIES is more likely to be representative of 
the wider student population than any previous study and therefore provides a better 
source for analysis.  
 
Another critical part of the survey is how students report their wage expectations. 
They were each asked the following question: 
 
“What sort of salary do you expect to be earning in the first job you take once you 
have graduated?” 
Interviewer comments: If not sure of the exact amount, please give your best estimate. 
 
Students are asked for their expected salary, to be recorded in an open text field, 
allowing precise estimates to be made. This is interpreted as students giving the mean 
of all possible outcomes they face. In other words, it is assumed that students are 
providing the arithmetic mean for the entire distribution of all possible outcomes
17
. A 
further issue is that the question asks students about the first job they take after 
university. Students are not asked explicitly whether they expect this to be full-time or 
part-time work, or if this will be temporary while they look for a job directly related 
to their career aspirations. Nevertheless, Manski (1996) suggests that students 
interpret questions regarding future salary expectations on the assumption that they 
will be in full-time employment. Thus it seems reasonable to assume expected salary 
                                                          
17
 Ideally, a precise definition would be provided to the students as Manski (2004) suggests when 
eliciting students’ median expectation of their future wage distribution. However I feel my assumption 
that students are providing the arithmetic mean for the entire distribution of all possible outcomes they 
face is reasonable reflection of how students would interpret the question posed. 
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corresponds to students’ first full-time job after university.  
 
When interpreting the data it is also assumed that students are providing a gross, 
yearly figure. Although ideally this would be made explicit in the question, it seems 
reasonable to assume students would report figures in this way, as it is the standard 
method of advertising salaries in the UK. Assumptions must also be made about how 
students deal with inflation when forming their wage expectations. The most common 
assumption is that students do not consider inflation, and are thus reporting in 2005 
prices, as discussed in Wolter and Zbiden (2002) and Brunello et al (2001). This is the 
approach also taken in this chapter. 
 
Brunello et al (2001) and Dominitz and Manski (1996) also note that respondents tend 
to round their estimates to questions surrounding expectations to the nearest 5 or 0. 
The histogram of expected salaries in Figure 2.1, along with the data presented in 
Table 2.2, shows that the distribution of log expected wages is broadly symmetric, 
though there is bunching of estimates to the nearest £1,000. Large spikes are 
especially prelevant at multiples of £5,000 (for instance £15,000, £20,000 and 
£25,000), with other instances at £12,000 and £18,000 (equivalent to a salary of 
£1,000 and £1,500 per month). Brunello et al (2001) go on to say that there is no 
evidence to suggest students do not take care when completing their questionnaire
18
. 
However no existing study tries to take this explicitly into account.  This chapter goes 
a stage further and checks the robustness of results to this heaping in the data. A 
description of the techniques used can be found in Appendix 2.3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 Manski (2004) finds a similar phenomenon when eliciting individuals subjective probabilities, where 
individuals round to the nearest 5% or 10%. 
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Figure 2.1 Distribution of log expected starting salary 
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Notes: 1 Source – SIES. Sample size 2,659 
Table 2.2 Peaks in the distribution of expected starting salary 
Expected salary £000 Frequency % 
8 22 1.4 
10 75 2.7 
12 129 4.7 
13 43 1.6 
14 68 2.5 
15 304 11.1 
16 115 4.2 
17 135 4.9 
18 364 13.3 
19 92 3.4 
20 473 17.2 
21 37 1.4 
22 70 2.6 
23 35 1.3 
24 40 1.5 
25 202 7.4 
26 30 1.1 
27 26 1.0 
28 49 1.8 
29 10 0.4 
30 126 4.6 
35 28 1.0 
40 16 0.6 
50 8 0.3 
1 Refers to unweighted figures, 2 Source – SIES 
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A final point that often concerns economists when using subjective data is that 
respondents have little incentive to report their expectations accurately. A recent study 
by Botelho and Pinto (2004) tested this issue in an experimental setting, and found 
financial incentives have little impact on the accuracy of students’ reported 
expectations. Moreover Manski (2004) puts over compelling evidence on the 
measurement and use of expectations in economic research. These studies conclude 
that economists’ scepticism of subjective data is largely unwarranted. 
 
I proceed by using this data to explore the factors associated with students’ wage 
expectations via a multivariate OLS regression model. The purpose of this model is to 
attempt to answer research questions one to three. Ideally, one would want to control 
for all the factors that potentially confound the relationship between students’ wage 
expectations and the variables of interest (i.e. the variables that relate to the research 
questions I have posed). So, for instance, one would want to try and control for 
student ability, as more talented pupils should expect to achieve higher wages, but my 
also disproportionately come from certain groups (e.g. households with higher 
income). Likewise, to explore differences between whites and ethnic minorities, one 
would want to account for the different social positions and educational choices made 
by these groups. Hence the need to include various background characteristics into the 
model, such as age, gender, subject and university entry qualifications. One may also 
want to include some subjective measures of respondents’ views on the graduate 
labour market into the model. For instance, certain groups (e.g. those in their final 
year) may not be as positive about their chances of employment (because, for 
example, the realities of the labour market have struck them) which mean they lower 
their wage expectations. It may also be of interest to see how results differ with and 
without the inclusion of such subjective factors, in order to gain a better 
understanding of why wage expectations might vary between certain groups. Yet, on 
the other hand, it may be that those with higher wage expectations also hold higher 
reservation wages, which makes them less optimistic about their post university 
prospects (making this variable potentially endogenous). Hence whether one includes 
variables like “students’ views on the labour market” into the model also depends 
upon concerns about endogeneity (and the limitations that this puts on the inferences 
one can draw). Taking the above into account, I estimate several different 
specification of the regression model below: 
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Log(Wij) =α  + βXi + ψPi + ۳Uj + λVi + ξij 
 
with W = Student’s expected wage 
 X = Vector of background characteristics (e.g. gender) 
P = Vector of dummy variables reflecting how many years left to completion 
of their course (i.e. their “proximity to graduation”). Reference - final year. 
U = A vector of dummy variables reflecting university type (Ref: – Post-
1992). 
V = A vector containing two sets of dummy variables reflecting student’s view 
on their employability (described in more detail below). 
 ξ = error 
 i = for individual i 
 j = for university j 
 
In this model, “Proximity to graduation” is a set of dummy variables reflecting how 
many years the student has left until the end of their course (1 year, 2 years or in their 
final year as the reference). University type refers to the quality of university the 
student attends. This is defined as either “Russell Group” (old, research intensive 
institutions), “other Pre-1992” (old but generally smaller and less research intensive 
institutions) or “Post-1992” (modern, teaching based institutions), with the latter as 
the reference group. The vector V refers to two variables that capture students’ views 
on their employability. Specifically, they were asked to what extent they agree with 
the statement that ‘the growing number of graduates will make it hard to get a 
graduate job’, which I code into three categories (agree, neutral and missing) and 
include into the regression as a set of dummy variables (‘agree’ as the reference). 
Students are also asked about their post-university plans, where they were provided 
with various options (e.g. get a career job, take temporary work, further study, travel). 
I recode this information to create four groups indicting what the respondent has 
considered doing after they graduate: get a career job (reference), take temporary 
work, undecided between career job and temporary work, further study or travel. 
Other variables include the total income of the student, how much the student earned 
from work that academic year and their highest qualification upon entry to university 
(A-levels, GNVQ, other). 
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Three specifications of this model will be fitted. Specifically, I will exclude the vector 
Vi that refers to students views of their employability in the first specification, and 
then include it in the second
19
. In these two initial models, I will allow for the 
complex survey design (clustering and stratification) by making the appropriate 
adjustment to the estimated standard errors. In the final specification, I will then 
estimate a fixed effect model to test the robustness of previous results (and as an 
alternative way of dealing with the complex survey design employed in the SIES)
20
. 
In all specifications, the error term is assumed to be normally distributed. Summary 
statistics for the explanatory variables, and their relationship with wage expectations, 
are presented in Table 2.3 (this, and all the following analyses, use the sample weight 
provided in the SIES dataset
21
). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 One may suggest the variables in matrix Vi are potentially endogenous. In this model, I assume that 
if individuals are less optimistic about the labour market, they will lower their wage expectations. 
However, another possibility is that students who expect higher wages, and who possibly also have a 
higher reservation wage, limit their labour market opportunities and are therefore less optimistic about 
their post university prospects. Leaving Vi out of the first specification gives an indication of results if 
one considers this possible endogeneity to be a problem. 
20
 I note that, in doing so, certain parameters from the initial specifications (e.g. the dummy variables 
relating to university type and university location) will drop out of the model and not be estimated 
21
 Table 2.3 contains the unweighted sample size, while the summary statistics are provided using the 
weights. The weights have a substantial influence on the gender composition, increasing the proportion 
of men from 33% to 46%. 
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Table 2.3 Distribution of expected wage for a selection of groups 
 
Category 
Observations 
(Unweighted) 
P90 
(£000) 
P10 
(£000) 
Mean 
(£000) 
Median 
(£000) 
Standard 
deviation 
(£000) 
Proximity to graduation       
Final year 916 25.0 12.0 18.1 18.0 6.4 
1 year  728 25.0 12.5 18.6 18.0 6.2 
2 or more years  1,015 26.0 13.0 19.4 19.0 7.7 
Gender       
Male 854 27.0 13.0 19.5 19.0 7.5 
Female 1,805 25.0 12.0 18.1 18.0 6.5 
University type       
Russell 593 30.0 13.0 20.0 20.0 7.3 
Other Pre-1992 502 25.0 12.0 18.0 18.0 7.1 
Post-1992 1,564 25.0 12.0 18.4 18.0 6.5 
Parents income (£ per 
annum)       
Below 20,000 356 23.0 12.0 17.0 17.0 5.4 
20,001-40,000 559 23.0 12.0 18.0 18.0 6.1 
40,001+ 635 25.0 12.0 18.8 18.0 6.3 
Dependant student/ No 
data
1 
1,109 29.5 15.0 20.0 19.5 7.8 
Ethnic Group       
White 2,260 25.0 12.0 18.5 18.0 6.9 
Asian 134 28.0 12.0 19.9 20.0 6.5 
Black 110 30.0 14.0 20.9 20.0 7.4 
Mixed 155 30.0 14.0 20.0 19.0 6.2 
All groups  2,659 28.0 12.5 18.6 18.5 6.5 
Notes:   
1 See Appendix 2.2 for further details on parental income 
2 The sample size given is unweighted. The summary statistics are provided after applying the SIES 
sample weights 
3 Source: Authors calculations from the SIES data. Sample size 2,659 
 
           
2.4. Proximity to graduation 
 
A number of existing studies have found junior students to be more optimistic than 
those nearing graduation. Betts (1996) concluded that students lowered their 
expectations due to “learning effects”, where individuals discover more about their 
ability and the labour market as they move through tertiary education. Brunello et al 
(2001) found similar results, identifying senior students to be less optimistic about 
wage levels and employment prospects. The initial research question follows these 
studies and asks if students further from the labour market are more positive about 
their employment prospects and have higher wage expectations. This is then extended 
by investigating whether wage expectations still differ after controlling for students’ 
views on their post graduation prospects. 
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Full results are provided in Table 2.4. The first specification follows the traditional 
approach in the literature and does not contain students’ views of their employability 
after university (V) as explanatory variables. These are then included in the second 
specification
22
. Finally, I also include a university level fixed effect. 
 
Table 2.4a Regression results  
 
  Specification 1 Specification 2 
Fixed effects 
(Specification 2)  
  Coefficient 
Standard 
error Coefficient 
Standard 
error Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Future plans (Ref: Career job only)          
Temporary job only - - -0.224* 0.026 -0.219* 0.025 
Either a career or temporary job - - -0.126* 0.033 -0.116* 0.031 
Further study or travel - - -0.007 0.013 -0.006 0.013 
Hard to get graduate job (Ref: Agree)          
Neutral - - 0.013 0.018 0.015 0.017 
Disagree - - 0.056* 0.014 0.054* 0.013 
Missing - - 0.078* 0.031 0.069* 0.031 
Proximity to graduation (Ref: Final year)          
1 year 0.030* 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.009 0.014 
2 or more years 0.066* 0.017 0.034* 0.017 0.031 0.017 
University type (Ref: Post-1992)          
Other Pre-1992 -0.006 0.019 -0.003 0.017 - - 
Russell group 0.074* 0.020 0.065* 0.019 - -    
Parents earnings (Ref: Below £20,000)          
£20,001-£40,000  0.053* 0.022 0.046* 0.021 0.045* 0.021 
£40,001+ 0.071* 0.024 0.065* 0.022 0.058* 0.022 
Independent student or missing data 0.119* 0.030 0.094* 0.029 0.094* 0.029 
How parents earns (Ref: Work)          
Benefits -0.052 0.046 -0.054 0.042 -0.063 0.042 
Investments 0.118* 0.031 0.109* 0.028 0.117* 0.029 
Ethnic group (Ref: White)          
Black/Asian 0.064* 0.025 0.063* 0.024 0.059* 0.024 
Mixed/Other 0.033 0.024 0.025 0.024 0.018 0.023 
Notes:     
1 * Indicates significance at the 5% level 
2 Results have been split into two tables. Table 2.4a contains variables directly relating to the research 
questions posed, while 2.4b contains the other control variables. 
3 A chow test was conducted, but provided no evidence that, the results should be reported separately 
for men and women.  
4 A fixed effects model has also been developed for specification 1. All substantial results remain in 
place, though the coefficient for students one year away from graduation is reduced to 0.025 and is 
outside the range of statistical significance. 
5 Where a dash appears in the fixed effect specification, it indicates that the parameters were not 
estimated due to colinearity  
6 Source: Authors calculations based on the SIES data. Sample size in all regressions is 2,659. 
Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of students’ expected wages 
 
 
                                                          
22
 The results and interpretation presented in this section are robust to each of the subsequent 
specifications used, including the introduction of fixed effects. 
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Table 2.4b Regression results continued         
 
  Specification 1 Specification 2 
Fixed effects 
 (Specification 2)  
 Coefficient 
Standard 
error Coefficient 
Standard 
error Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Total income          
Mean centred (per £10,000) 0.038* 0.017 0.038* 0.018 0.030* 0.018 
Study mode (Ref: Full-time)          
Part-time student -0.047 0.026 -0.044 0.025 -0.039 0.026 
Earnings from work          
Mean centred (per £10,000) 0.026 0.022 0.026 0.021 0.030 0.020 
Part-time student *Earnings from work 0.166* 0.032 0.152* 0.031 0.150* 0.030 
Subject area (Ref: Medicine)          
Allied To Medicine -0.206* 0.033 -0.192* 0.031 -0.201* 0.029 
Sciences -0.271* 0.033 -0.215* 0.031 -0.225* 0.030 
Maths, Computer Science -0.209* 0.037 -0.171* 0.038 -0.194* 0.037 
Engineering, Technology -0.170* 0.034 -0.153* 0.033 -0.166* 0.029 
Architecture, Building -0.233* 0.034 -0.209* 0.034 -0.210* 0.034 
Social Studies -0.233* 0.032 -0.189* 0.030 -0.199* 0.027 
Law -0.172* 0.044 -0.135* 0.041 -0.154* 0.041 
Business  -0.230* 0.034 -0.182* 0.034 -0.184* 0.033 
English, Languages, Classics -0.302* 0.039 -0.247* 0.037 -0.260* 0.034 
History, Philosophy -0.326* 0.042 -0.264* 0.043 -0.277* 0.042 
Arts -0.362* 0.037 -0.322* 0.035 -0.321* 0.033 
Education -0.220* 0.032 -0.202* 0.030 -0.225* 0.028 
Combined -0.275* 0.039 -0.229* 0.038 -0.242* 0.037 
Other -0.309* 0.054 -0.268* 0.051 -0.265* 0.049 
Entry qualification (Ref: A-levels)          
GNVQ/AVCE -0.060* 0.023 -0.068* 0.024 -0.064* 0.023 
Other -0.010 0.015 -0.017 0.015 -0.016 0.015 
Age          
Mean centred 0.013* 0.005 0.014* 0.005 0.015* 0.005 
University location (Ref: Other England)          
London   0.091* 0.018 0.093* 0.020 - - 
Wales  -0.057* 0.022 -0.059* 0.021 - - 
Gender (Ref: Male)          
Female -0.053* 0.013 -0.053* 0.013 -0.050* 0.012 
University dummies - - - - X X 
Constant 10.032* 0.042 10.041* 0.041 10.034* 0.061 
Notes:     
1 * Indicates significance at the 5% level 
 2 X indicates that university dummy variables have been included but values not reported 
3 Source: Authors calculations using the SIES data. Sample size in all regressions is 2,659. Dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of students’ expected wages 
 
 
Initial results, using the first specification, support the existing studies. Students one 
year away from graduation expect around 3% more on average than final year 
students, while those two or more years away expect around 7% more.  
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An interesting extension is whether students who are further from the labour market 
also hold more positive views on their employability after university. Two variables 
within the SIES shed some light on this issue. Firstly, respondents were asked whether 
it will be hard for them to get a graduate job. In particular, students were asked to 
what extent they agree or disagree with the statement: 
 
 ‘The growing number of graduates will make it hard to get a graduate job’ 
 
Secondly, students were asked about their post university plans, including whether 
they have considered taking a temporary job
23
. These two questions provide a 
reasonably good indication of student views on their employability. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 
contain cross-tabulations between these variables and how close the student is to 
graduation
24
. 
 
Table 2.5 Student response to whether they believe ‘the growing number of 
graduates will make it hard to get a graduate job’ 
 
  Final year % 1 year % 2+ years % 
Strongly agree or agree  56.5 46.4 48.0 
Neutral  14.5 15.4 16.4 
Strongly disagree or disagree  26.5 34.6 33.2 
Observations 916 728 1,015 
Notes: 1 Source: Authors calculations using the SIES dataset. Total sample size is 2,659.  
 
 
Table 2.6 Response to whether students have considered getting a temporary job  
 
  Final year % 1 year %  2+ years % 
No  90.6 94.9 98.1 
Yes  9.4 5.2 1.9 
Observations 916 728 1,015 
Notes: 1 Source: Authors calculations using the SIES dataset. Total sample size is 2,659. 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
  Students were asked if they planned to get a job related to their future career, a temporary job, 
continue studying or go travelling. They could identify more than one option; therefore this gives a 
rough indication of students’ future plans. 
24
 I also estimated a set of logistic and ordinal regressions to investigate the association between 
students’ background characteristics and the responses to these two questions.  However, cross-
tabulations have been presented rather than the results from these models for ease of interpretation, 
with little evidence lost in relation to the research question posed. 
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Both sets of results indicate final year students generally hold more negative views. 
Only 2% of students who are two or more years away from graduation considered 
taking a temporary job after university, compared to nearly 10% of those in their final 
year. This could be interpreted in several ways. It is suggested that final year students 
are less positive about their labour market prospects. However an alternative 
explanation could be that these students are looking to delay the coming of the “real 
world”. Yet, Table 2.5 shows that a large proportion of final year students, compared 
to those one or two years away, agree or strongly agree that the growing number of 
students will make it hard to get a graduate job. The combined evidence does indeed 
suggest final year students are less optimistic about the graduate labour market. This 
may be due to the fact that they probably know more about their expected grade, and 
link this to their employability
25
. Alternatively, given the survey is conducted between 
January and March, they may well have already started their hunt for a graduate job, 
and have thus far been unsuccessful.  
 
A question that is ignored in the current literature is whether, after controlling for 
views on employability, students at the beginning of their course still expect a higher 
starting wage than those in their final year? The two additional variables, analysed in 
the cross-tabulations, are included in the second model specification. The impact of 
being further from graduation on wage expectations has been significantly reduced. 
Students who are a year away from graduation now only expect wages 1.4% higher 
than their final year peers; a difference that is not statistically significant. Previously 
students two years or more away from graduation expected a 7% premium compared 
to final years. This almost halves to 3.5% when their future plans and opinions about 
the graduate labour market are taken into consideration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 Indeed a recent paper by Chevalier et al (2009) indicates that first year undergraduate students over-
estimate their ability. It could be that as students move through university they learn more about their 
ability and alter their expectations on the receipt of this new information. 
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This pattern could represent either a cohort or age effect. Given that other research 
offers similar results, it seems reasonable to suggest this represents a changing of 
students’ views as they progress through university, rather than a difference between 
particular cohorts. At first, it seems there is a large difference in wage expectations 
between year groups. However students appear to differ in their views of the labour 
market in at least two aspects, namely their employability and the wages on offer.  
Once views of employability have been controlled for, the difference in wage 
expectations appears to be reasonably small.  
 
2.5 University prestige, family background and ethnicity 
 
I begin this section by exploring how students’ wage expectations vary with the 
quality of institution they attend. One fundamental drawback in the existing literature 
is the lack of available data drawn from a range of institutions within one country. 
Convenience sampling, generally of small sizes, also makes research on background 
characteristics rather limited. On the other hand, the SIES contains information from 
students at almost 70 institutions, making it possible to look into the association 
between wage expectations and institutional quality. Moreover, the UK is a 
particularly interesting setting to investigate the effect of institution on wage 
expectations, due to its large and expanding higher education sector and the drive to 
widen participation. My hypothesis is that those studying at older, more prestigious 
universities have higher wage expectations. Caution is required, however, when 
interpreting the results that follow. In particular, due to the SIES data not containing 
any information on students’ academic history, I can not separate out the “effect” of 
institutional quality on wage expectations from the ability of the students who attend. 
In other words, the parameter estimates for the institutional dummies presented in 
Table 2.4 will suffer from omitted variable bias. I can therefore only show the 
association between going to a higher quality institution and wage expectations, and 
not the causal effect of the former on the latter. 
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 When exploring this association, I divide universities into three broad groups: Post-
1992, Pre-1992 and Russell Group institutions (this is one common way to classify 
higher education providers in the UK). The first group refers to institutions that 
gained their university status after 1992 and are generally not research intensive. They 
also tend to admit, on average, students with lower university entry scores (i.e. lower 
A-Level grades). The latter two groups gained their university status before 1992, are 
generally more research intensive and tend to admit students with higher levels of 
academic attainment. The “Russell Group” institutions are a particular subset of this 
“Pre-1992” groups, referring to a self-selected alliance of the UK’s largest and most 
prestigious institutions (e.g. it includes Oxford, Cambridge, Warwick, London School 
of Economics etc). It is this group of institutions that I take to indicate the highest 
quality.  
 
The results from the Table 2.4 indicate that students at other Pre-1992 universities 
expect very similar wages to those at Post-1992 institutions. This is despite the fact 
that the former tend to admit higher ability students and generally have a better 
reputation within the UK higher education sector. However, as expected, students at 
Russell Group universities expect significantly more than the other groups – roughly 
7% more in their first salary after finishing university. Yet I again remind the reader 
that this result needs to be interpreted carefully. Specifically, as there is no measure 
available on students’ academic ability, these estimates will suffer from omitted 
variable bias. Consequently, these results only show the association between 
institutional quality and wage expectations (unconditional on “ability”), rather than a 
causal “effect”.     
 
Next, I turn to the background of the student, in particular the association between 
students’ wage expectations and their socio-economic background (measured via 
parental income) and ethnicity
26
. Regarding the former, it is hypothesised that parents 
are a critical source of labour market information, and thus that students’ wage 
expectations will increase with family income. For the latter, ethnic minorities may, 
for example, expect to suffer some form of discrimination in the labour market and 
                                                          
26
 It should be remembered that information available on parental income is likely to suffer a non-
trivial degree of measurement error. Further details are available in Appendix 2.2.   This information is 
also only available for those classed as “Dependant” students (59% of the total). 
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thus, ceteris paribus, have lower expectations. Alternatively, Rouse (2004), notes that 
ethnic minorities in the US tend to be overly ambitious. Is this the same in the UK? 
 
The results in Table 2.4 are consistent across all specifications and support the 
hypothesis that students from richer backgrounds have higher wage expectations. All 
groups presented expect significantly more than those with parents earning below 
£20,000. There is also a monotonic trend; the higher the income group, the greater the 
wage expectation
27
.  It could be that students from a rich background expect this high 
salary in order to maintain a high standard of living. Alternatively as university 
participation rates have increased over time, students may use their parents’ income as 
a lower bound, and expect a higher salary due to their better education. Another 
possibility is that students may think their parents have connections in the labour 
market that will help them secure a lucrative job. However this variable could also be 
reflecting unobserved factors, such as parents’ influence on intelligence and work 
ethic, which are also correlated with wage expectations. 
 
On the other hand, the hypothesis that students from a minority background may 
expect to suffer some form of discrimination in the labour market does not seem to 
hold. Results suggest that Black and Asian students expect a significantly higher 
starting wage than white students
28
. This conclusion holds within all specifications. 
Hence it seems that ethnic minorities do not expect to suffer discrimination in the 
graduate labour market. Indeed quite the opposite appears to be true, these groups 
tend to be more optimistic about their future earning potential than their white peers. 
 
 
                                                          
27
 Out of the 1838 dependant students, 164 (9%) did not report a figure for parents income. These 
students had higher wage expectations than the highest category included in the regression (those with 
parents earning over £40,000).  A logistic regression, not presented, was carried out to investigate if 
certain groups are more likely to not report a figure for parents’ income. The results of the logistic 
regression suggested that students who have parents generating most of their income from pensions or 
investments are less likely to report a figure. To the extent that this exhibits wealth, for instance early 
retirement or being able to live off investments without working, the result fits quite well with the 
observed pattern; the better off the students’ parents, the higher their wage expectations. 
28
 The Black and Asian groups were combined due to small sample sizes within each. In initial 
regressions the two groups were entered separately, producing similar coefficient estimates and 
standard errors, significantly different from Whites at the 10% level. A test was performed of whether 
Black and Asian have equal regression coefficients, resulting in the null hypothesis not being rejected  
(one should, however, exercise caution when interpreting this lack of significance precisely because of 
the small number of observations within the two groups).  
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2.6 Data on realised wages 
 
The preceding analysis illustrates that there are quite large differences in students’ 
wage expectations. Yet this may simply reflect the different labour market 
opportunities that students face. On the other hand, it may be that certain groups of 
students hold unrealistic wage expectations and significantly overestimate starting 
salary. Manski (2004) describes various ways in which expectations and realisations 
can be compared, with longitudinal data the most direct method of comparison. 
Unfortunately, there is almost no suitable panel data available across Europe and none 
in the UK
29. Thus attention is turned to Manski’s second method; using repeated cross 
sectional surveys to evaluate average expectations and realisations. Therefore a 
second data source is needed that contains information on wages in the graduate 
labour market for the same cohort of students. Data on graduate wages, corresponding 
to the same year, is drawn from the Higher Education Statistics Authority (HESA) 
Destination of Leavers Survey (DLHE). This section describes the additional data 
source and methods for comparing the two surveys.  
 
The DLHE is an attempted census of all 2004-2005 graduates’ employment 
circumstances, including their current salary, six months after completing university. 
Students are contacted directly by the institution they studied at by postal 
questionnaire, with non-respondents followed up in a telephone interview. This results 
in a survey response rate of around 80%. The results are then linked with 
administrative data about the student collected by HESA, providing a rich source for 
analysis. Variables within the dataset include socio-economic status, university 
entrance (UCAS) score, degree classification, subject of study and where the student 
lived while at university. 
 
The target of this survey is obviously a great deal wider than that of the SIES. Several 
sample selection procedures, available in Table 2.7, were applied to the data to ensure 
the two sources were comparable.  
                                                          
29
 Even the one longitudinal study by Webbink and Hartog (2004) suffers quite substantial 
methodological problems. Their study suffers both high non-response to the survey and missing data on 
the wage variables. Moreover they show that the missing wage data comes disproportionately from 
groups who are likely to have lower wages in the graduate labour market. Likewise, they compare 
university students’ starting salary expectations to the wages of graduates with up to three years labour 
market experience.  
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Table 2.7a Sample selection rules for full-time students 
 
Sample selection rules 
DLHE 
(realisation) 
sample size 
SIES 
(expectations) 
sample size 
Start  256,507 2,659 
England & Welsh universities only 224,226 2,659 
First degree only  180,911 2,393 
Salary above £8,000 178,491 2,339 
Employed within UK only 168,673 2,339 
Over 24 excluded 145,517 1,923 
 Doing "something else" (e.g. further 
study/travel) excluded 117,660 1,923 
Only those working full-time  87,327 1,923 
Missing salary data excluded 45,906 1,828 
Medics excluded 44,436 1,666 
Final              44,436                 1,666 
Notes:  
 1 “First degree” in the DLHE survey means excluding those in postgraduate study and foundation 
courses. The SIES collected expectations data only from those doing a first degree or a foundation 
course and not from postgraduate students.  
2 Source: Authors calculations using the DLHE and SIES dataset. 
 
Table 2.7b Sample selection rules in the DLHE for part-time students 
 
Sample selection rules 
DLHE 
sample size 
Start 2006 prices 59,965 
Start 2005 prices 59,965 
England & Welsh universities only 52,606 
Postgraduate students excluded 28,416 
Salary above £8000 28,416 
Employed within UK only 27,353 
 Doing "something else" (e.g. further study/travel) 
excluded 24,219 
Missing salary data excluded 9,842 
Medics excluded 9,834 
Notes: 1 Source: Authors calculations using the DLHE dataset. 
 
 
As in the SIES, only students who attended a university in England and Wales were 
considered. The data was also restricted to only those students who had finished their 
first undergraduate degree; with those completing postgraduate study, or university 
courses below the level of bachelors degree, excluded.
30
 It is assumed that 
respondents to the SIES were reporting their first wage expected after their 
undergraduate degree. However it is impossible to rule out the possibility that some 
                                                          
30
 In the UK this includes HND, HNC, foundation and access courses, amongst others. These are 
generally thought of as a qualification below degree level. 
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students reported their wage expectation under the assumption that they were going to 
continue in full-time education and gain a post graduate qualification. Only students 
who reported salaries of £8,000 or more and were working full-time are included
31
. 
Since students were asked for their full-time annual equivalent wage, £8,000 was 
identified as the lower bound for logical responses due to minimum wage laws in the 
UK
32
. The same rule is also applied to the SIES data, so that only expected and actual 
wages above £8,000 are considered. Moreover, to limit the potential influence of 
previous labour market experience, and to target the particular group of interest, in 
both surveys the sample was restricted to those below the age of 25. This has also 
been done so that an additional data source, the labour force survey, can be used as a 
check for robustness of results
33
. Finally, Medical students have been excluded from 
many parts of the analysis (i.e. when I investigate average expectations and realisation 
across all students) due to the different proportion of these students in the SIES 
compared to the DLHE
34
. I do, however, return to this group (medics) when looking 
at breakdowns by subject (later in this section). 
 
The DLHE has many features that make it a strong candidate to compare with the 
SIES data.  The information was collected in January 2006 and specifically refers to 
graduates who were final year students in 2004-2005 when the SIES was conducted. 
However in this analysis, to ensure a reasonable sample size, wage expectations from 
students in all year groups are used
35
.  It is again assumed that students in all years 
report their expectations in current (2005) prices
36’37. 
                                                          
31
 Dominitz and Manski (1996) shows that students tend to report their expectations conditional on 
working full-time. 
32
 The adult minimum wage at this time was £5.05. Assuming the minimum amount of time required in 
a full-time job is 30 hours per week, for 52 weeks a year, this generates a full-time annual income of 
around £7,900. Only around 1% of observations were dropped from the DLHE using this sample 
selection rule, with 2% dropped from the SIES.  
33
 The wording used in the labour force survey means only those under 25 can be considered. This is 
discussed later in this section. 
34
 Initial analysis, not presented, suggested a difference in the proportion of medical students contained 
in the two surveys (8% of the SIES compared to 2% of the DLHE). Thus medical students will be 
excluded in many parts of the analysis, due to the difference between the two surveys and the quite 
different labour market these individuals face. 
35
 Indeed it may be argued that I am not using repeated cross sectional surveys in the strictest 
definition. In part, I am assuming that all students in the SIES face the same distribution of actual 
wages, represented by the salary recorded for the graduating 2004/05 cohort. However it seems highly 
likely the distribution of graduate wages will remain stable considering the short space of time.  Manski 
(2004) discusses this assumption in more detail. 
36
 Since the SIES was conducted in early 2005, while the DLHE recorded actual wages in 2006, an 
adjustment has been made for inflation. The wages in the DLHE were scaled back to 2005 prices using 
the Retail Price Index (2.8% for the year in question). 
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The questions posed in each survey also relate closely to one another: 
 
SIES 
“What sort of salary do you expect to be earning in the first job you take once you 
have graduated?” 
Interviewer comments: If not sure of the exact amount, please give your best estimate. 
 
DLHE 
“What was your annual pay to the nearest thousand £, before tax?”  
If you were employed less than a year or were part-time, please estimate your pay to the full-time 
annual equivalent. 
 
The SIES asks about salary expectations in students’ first job after graduation and the 
DLHE records information on salary sixth months after finishing university. In the 
vast majority of cases, the difference between these two definitions is likely to be 
minimal. Previously it was stated that students in the SIES are thought to provide 
estimates of a gross, annual salary. The DLHE survey asks students to provide an 
estimate for their full-time equivalent annual wage before tax, providing a closely 
matched definition. A final issue is that the DLHE survey asks students for their wage 
to the nearest thousand, while expectations in the SIES were recorded in an open text 
cell
38
. However section 2.3 described how students’ expectations tend to bunch 
around the nearest thousand, meaning this is unlikely to induce any substantial bias. 
 
Yet, for all the benefits of the DLHE, there are some difficulties with response rates 
and the selectivity of respondents. Although the DLHE is an attempted census of 
graduates, there is quite a large degree of non-response to the question about salary
39
. 
Moreover, the salaries for those students who go into postgraduate courses, or those 
                                                                                                                                                                      
37
 Ideally, students would have been formally instructed not to consider inflation in the wording of 
questions, as in Dominitz and Manski (1996). They report that students generally adhere to this, and do 
not consider inflation in their wage expectations. Moreover Brunello et al (2001) use similar wording 
to the SIES, in that students are not directly informed how to deal with inflation. They also assume 
students report their expectations in current prices, and find inconsistencies in their data with the idea 
that respondents make an adjustment to their responses to try and account for inflation. 
38
 The mid-point of this band has been used for all subsequent analysis. The top band in the DLHE was 
£50,000 and above (which I treat as £60,000). However, after the sample selection rules in Table 2.7 
have been applied, only 0.1% of observations were in this category, with this choice having negligible 
impact on results. 
39
 For the sample selection criteria described above, 87,327 individuals are in full-time work and have 
responded to the survey. Of these, 45,906 (53%) report a salary. 
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that are unemployed, are also unobserved. To illustrate the potential difficulty this 
may cause, after the sample selection procedures have been applied, 145,517 
observations remain. Of these only 45,906 (32%) individuals are in the labour market 
and report their salary. Missing data is either due to self-selection out of the labour 
market, not responding to the survey or missing salary information. As a result, there 
may be a selectivity problem when comparing the two surveys. Differences recorded 
could be a result of who is responding to each of the surveys, rather than actual 
differences between students’ expectations and realisations. A further issue maybe that 
certain groups have higher drop out rates than others, leading to different proportions 
recorded in each survey. For instance students from lower socioeconomic 
backgrounds may be more likely to drop out of university. Therefore one would 
observe a higher proportion of this group in the SIES, with data recorded during 
university, than the DLHE, with data recorded for graduates.  
 
Perhaps the greatest worry is that the missing realised salary data in the DLHE comes 
disproportionately from groups who are earning a particularly high or low wage, 
creating bias in my estimate of the average graduate starting salary. To investigate this 
further, a probit regression for the item non-response to the salary variable has been 
conducted
40
. Results can be found in Appendix 2.4, while Table 2.8 uses the model 
results to illustrate the predicted probability of certain hypothetical groups responding 
to the question regarding salary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40
 Here only item non-response is considered and not unit non-response to the entire questionnaire, 
though it should be remembered the overall response rate to the questionnaire is around 75%.  
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Table 2.8 Predicted probability of responding to DLHE salary question for a set 
of hypothetical individuals based on a probit model (see Appendix 2.4) 
 
  Person A "good prospects" Person B 
Gender Male Male 
Degree class 1st 1
st
 
University type Russell Group Russell Group 
Work status Full-time Full-time 
Subject Engineering Engineering 
Ethnicity White White 
Disability None None 
Graduate job Graduate level Non-graduate job 
University location England  England  
Term time accommodation Away from parents’ home Away from parents’ home 
Tariff (mean=300) 430 (1 S.D above mean) 430 (1 S.D above mean) 
Home location London London 
Degree a job requirement? Formal requirement Not required 
Type of job  Managerial Managerial 
Probability of responding 76% 62% 
 
  Person C Person D "poor prospects" 
Gender Male Female 
Degree class 2.2 3
rd
 
University type Russell Group Post-1992 
Work status Full-time Full-time 
Subject Art Art 
Ethnicity White Black 
Disability None Yes 
Graduate job Non-graduate job Non-graduate job 
University location England  Wales 
Term time accommodation Away from parents’ home Away from parents’ home 
Tariff (mean=300) 430 (1 S.D above mean) 170 (1 S.D below mean) 
Home location London North East 
Degree a job requirement? Not required Not required 
Type of job  Administrative  job Administrative  job 
Probability of responding 45% 31% 
Notes:   
1 Calculated using the probit model in Appendix 2.4. 
2 Words in italics illustrate how the hypothetical individual is different to “person A” (who has “good” 
labour market prospects). 
3 Source: Authors calculations using the DLHE dataset. Total sample size in the regression was 87,327. 
Dependent variable in the regression model these figures were based upon was a binary indicator of 
whether the graduate reported their salary (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did). 
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Person A has the characteristics of someone with excellent labour market prospects 
and thus expected to be a high wage earner. They have a good degree from a top 
university and are now in a graduate job. This individual has a 76% chance of 
responding to the salary question in the DLHE. Individuals B and C illustrate the 
impact of certain characteristics on salary response rates. Person B only differs from A 
in that he is in a non-graduate job, yet there is only a 62% chance of him responding. 
When I add further characteristics that are likely to mean lower wages in the labour 
market, such as gaining a 2.2 in Art and now being in an administrative job, the 
probability of responding drops to 45%. Person D is someone who is likely to have a 
particularly difficult time in the graduate labour market. Her probability of responding 
is just 31%, compared to 76% for someone who is likely to be a particularly high 
earner. This clearly illustrates that, if anything, the DLHE is likely to provide an 
upwardly bias estimate of the true graduate wage. To investigate this further, response 
weights were created by calculating the inverse of the predicted probability of 
students responding to the salary question. When these were applied to the individuals 
data, the estimated average graduate wage, for full-time students, fell from £16,455, 
to £15,996 (a drop of 3%)
41,42
.  
 
The selected SIES and DLHE samples, for those who reported wages, were then 
compared in terms of characteristics that could be observed within both populations. 
The results are shown in Table 2.9, both with and without the response weights for the 
two surveys applied
43
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41
 Response weights have also been calculated for part-time students.  
42
  It should be noted this is significantly lower than the official figure HESA publishes. Appendix 2.5 
fully documents why this is the case, and how the figures presented here are calculated. 
43
 The SIES response weight refers to those described earlier in section 2.3 (contained in the dataset 
provided). The DLHE weight refers to those I have created via the probit model just described. 
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Table 2.9a Comparison of full-time students in the SIES and DLHE samples 
(weighted proportions in brackets)
 
 
  SIES %  DLHE %  
Gender * 
  Male 33.2 (46.5) 38.9 (41.4) 
Female 66.8 (53.5) 61.1 (58.6) 
Ethnicity * 
  White 86.0 (86.7) 88.3 (87.8) 
Asian 5.7 (5.6) 8.0 (8.4) 
Black 2.9 (2.4) 1.6 (1.8) 
Mixed/Other 5.5 (5.4) 2.1 (2.0) 
University group  
  Russell Group 22.9 (28.4) 23.4 (22.7) 
Other Pre-1992 20.6 (18.9) 21.4 (20.3) 
Post-1992 56.5 (52.8) 55.2 (57.0) 
Social class (parents  occupation) * 
  Managerial/Professional 58.9 (60.0) 56.7 (56.3) 
Intermediate 20.9 (20.1) 28.6 (28.4) 
Routine/Manual 20.3 (19.1) 14.7 (15.3) 
Living arrangement  
  Parental home 21.9 (19.4) 21.2 (22.4) 
Living away from home 78.1 (80.6) 78.8 (77.6) 
Subject* 
  Allied To Medicine 5.5 (4.5) 7.0 (6.3) 
Sciences 9.5 (10.4) 8.7 (8.1) 
Maths, Computer Science 5.8 (6.6) 9.3 (8.9) 
Engineering, Technology 4.0 (5.0) 5.1 (4.7) 
Architecture, Building 1.7 (2.0) 1.6 (1.7) 
Social Sciences 13.7 (13.9) 10.1 (9.7) 
Business 8.5 (8.8) 14.6 (14.1) 
Languages 6.1 (5.8) 8.7 (8.5) 
History 4.7 (5.3) 4.8 (5.0) 
Art 13.9 (13.3) 8.8 (11.6) 
Education 8.2 (6.9) 5.8 (5.6) 
Combined 4.2 (3.9) 0.6 (0.5) 
Psychology 1.9 (1.4) 4.1 (4.0) 
Sports Science 1.7 (1.7) 3.2 (3.1) 
Law 5.0 (5.2) 2.5 (2.6) 
Mass Communication 3.0 (2.9) 3.3 (3.7) 
Other   2.6 (2.4) 1.8 (1.9) 
Observations 1,666 44,436 
Notes: 
1 Proportions when weights are used are reported in brackets. The weights used in the SIES correct for 
unit non-response and ensures the age-sex profile of the sample matches that of the student population. 
2 These are described in section 2.3. The DLHE weights refer to non-response weights I have 
calculated to take into account missing data for graduates’ salary. These are based on the probit model 
in Appendix 2.4.  
3 Social class given for the 20,156 (46%) observations with data available in the DLHE 
4 DLHE and SIES figures are for those who reported wages and after sample selection procedures have 
been applied 
5 Medics have been excluded after initial analysis showed a greater number in the SIES than DLHE 
6 * Indicates whether chi-squared test (of differences in proportions between surveys) is statistically 
significant at 5% level.  
7 Source: Authors calculations using the DLHE and SIES dataset. Sample size in the former was 
44,436 and 1,666 in the latter 
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Table 2.9b Comparison of part-time students in the SIES and DLHE samples 
(weighted proportions in brackets) 
 
SIES % DLHE %  
Gender*   
 Male 33.1 (46.3) 42 (43.4) 
Female 66.8 (53.6) 58 (56.6) 
Ethnicity*   
 White 87.7 (89.4) 90.9 (88.9) 
Asian 4.1 (2.0) 4.2 (4.9) 
Black 3.6 (4.1) 3.5 (4.3) 
Mixed/Other 1.4 (4.1) 1.4 (1.7) 
University group*   
 Russell Group 12.1 (5.6) 3.4 (4.5) 
Other Pre-1992 15.5 (11.1) 27.6 (19.0) 
Post-1992 72.3 (83.3) 69 (76.5) 
Subject*   
 Medicine 3.3 (2.9) 0.1 (0) 
Allied To Medicine 11.2 (8.4) 16.6 (18.4) 
Sciences 3.1 (4.0) 3.3 (3.0) 
Maths, Computer Science 5.6 (6.4) 6.9 (6.9) 
Engineering, Technology 8.6 (16.9) 8.9 (8.2) 
Architecture, Building 5 (6.7) 5.7 (6.1) 
Social Sciences 9.6 (6.8) 11.1 (8.9) 
Business 8.1 (9.0) 10.9 (11.0) 
English, Languages 2.8 (2.4) 1.7 (1.8) 
History 4.1 (2.8) 3.0 (3.2) 
Art 4.0 (4.6) 1.2 (2.0) 
Education 21.8 (18.0) 14.4 (16.3) 
Combined 3.9 (3.3) 9.2 (7.0) 
Psychology 0.4 (0.3) 2.5 (2.1) 
Law 3.7 (3.3) 2.6 (2.5) 
Mass Communication 0.9 (0.6) 0.6 (0.1) 
Other   3.9 (3.8) 1.6 (1.6) 
Observations 784 9,842 
Notes: 1 See notes to the table above 
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There are some differences in the social class and gender composition of the two 
surveys, though the use of the SIES weights (see section 2.3) alters the proportions of 
the latter quite significantly. For social class, there is a problem with missing data in 
the DLHE, which is likely to be causing some mismatch between the two surveys. 
However, even with this difficulty, the differences in observable characteristics are not 
of great magnitude (although statistically significant due to the large sample size). For 
example, 46% of the SIES is male, compared to 41% in the DLHE. Alternatively, 
53% of the SIES sample attended a Post-1992 university, compared to 57% of the 
DLHE. To check robustness, estimates are presented both with and without the 
sampling weights, to analyse the sensitivity of results. 
 
One further issue is that although the populations appear broadly similar in terms of 
characteristics that are observable in both surveys, there may still be differences in 
characteristics that are unobservable. These characteristics could go unmeasured in 
either, or both, of the datasets. As a further check for robustness, the UK Labour Force 
Survey will be used as an alternative source of information on graduate wages. 
 
2.7 Comparison of expected and actual wages 
 
Two methods are used to compare students’ average wage expectations with the 
average actual wage. Firstly I calculate the ratio of the mean (median) expected to 
actual wage. The second method is to graphically represent the distributions, via 
kernel density estimates, of the actual and expected wage to identify differences. 
 
Do students have realistic expectations? 
 
I initially investigate whether students overestimate wages in the graduate labour 
market at the population level. The SIES and DLHE samples were divided into full 
and part time students, with summary statistics and kernel density estimates reported 
in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2 Kernel density estimates of actual versus expected log wages 
Full-time students 
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Notes:   
1 Kernels and ratios are estimated with unweighted data 
2 Figure in brackets denotes when both SIES and DLHE weights are applied to data 
3 The kernel density estimates have used the default smoothing applied by Stata. 
4 Authors diagrams produced using the DLHE and SIES dataset. Sample size in the DLHE is 44,436 
for the full-time diagram and 9,842 in the part-time diagram. Sample size in the SIES is 1,666 in full-
time diagram and 784 in the part-time diagram 
 
                                                          
44
 For part-time students, the sample selection rules differ slightly, to ensure adequate sample sizes. In 
particular, students of all ages and those doing “other” types of university courses, though not higher 
degrees, are included. Table 2.7b gives further details. 
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The ratio of the mean (median) expected salary to actual salary for part-time students 
is 1 (0.95), suggesting that, on average, part-time students have realistic expectations. 
Furthermore, the kernel density estimate illustrates how closely the distributions of 
part-time students’ expectations and actual wages match. However a different 
conclusion is reached when looking at the results for full-time students. The kernel 
density estimate of students’ expected wage appears to be to the right of the estimate 
for actual wages, especially near the lower tail, suggesting overestimation by students. 
This overestimation is also illustrated by the ratio of average expected to average 
actual salary in Table 2.10. Expectations are around 10% (£1,600) higher than average 
wages in the graduate labour market, using the means, and 12% (£1,900) higher using 
the medians. However when using the sampling weights to correct for non-response, 
the overestimation appears even higher at around 14% (£2,200). This means that 
students (on average) overestimate starting wages by over half the yearly fee now 
charged in the UK for university tuition
45
. Indeed, I find that this result holds under 
several robustness tests, including different sample selection rules to those presented.  
Moreover, in all estimates, expectations are statistically significant to actual wages at 
the 5% level. Thus there seems sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that, on 
average, full-time students have unrealistic expectations of future wages.  
 
As a check for robustness, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) has been used as an 
alternative data source for wages of recently qualified graduates. I use data from 10 
quarterly surveys, running from September 2005 to March 2008. These dates were 
chosen as they relate to when the students covered in the SIES would have graduated 
and entered the job market. Moreover, from the September 2005 survey onwards, 
respondents were asked the question: 
“Which, if any of these qualifications did you gain in the last 12 months?” 
 
With one of the response options being: 
 
“Degree level qualification including foundation degrees, graduate membership of a 
professional institute, PGCE, or higher” 
                                                          
45
 These particular students would have actually paid an upfront tuition fee of around £1,200 per year. 
Tuition fees changed for students starting after 2005 to a maximum of £3,000 per year, payable after 
graduation. 
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Respondents were also asked what their highest qualification is. I begin by restricting 
the LFS sample to respondents who hold a bachelors degree, and who were obtained 
this qualification in the past twelve months. Moreover, as per my previous selection 
rules for the SIES and DLHE, I restrict the LFS sample to those individuals who are 
under 25, working full-time and earning over £8,000 a year. Gross weekly wages are 
used from respondents in their fifth, and final, wave of the survey, and scaled up to 
the annual equivalent
46
. For those surveys conducted between 2006 and 2008, wages 
have been deflated to 2005 prices using the Retail Price Index, under the previously 
stated assumption that students report expectations in today’s (2005) prices47. The 
final sample size is 194 observations
48
. Although this is a reasonably small number of 
observations, the LFS remains a useful resource to check whether results are robust. 
My findings are presented in Table 2.10. 
 
Table 2.10 Comparison of average salary in the SIES, DLHE and LFS for full-
time students (weighted estimates in parentheses) 
 
  
SIES expected 
wage £000  
DLHE actual 
wage £000 
LFS actual 
wage £000 
Ratio 
SIES:DLHE 
Ratio 
SIES:LFS 
Mean wage 18.1 (18.3) 16.4 (16.0) 16.1 1.10 (1.14)* 1.13* 
Median wage 18.0 16.0 15.1 1.12* 1.19* 
Observations 1,666 44,436 194     
Notes:    
1 SIES weighted by those provided in the dataset to correct for unit non-response. DLHE weights are those 
calculated in section 2.7 that correct for item non-response to the salary question. 
2 * Indicates that the ratio is statistically different from 1 (where average expectations equals average 
realisations) at the 5% level (using a two sample t-test, assuming independent samples). Equality of 
medians tested using the Wilcoxon rank sum-test. However, this latter test does not take into consideration 
the complex survey design 
3 Authors calculations using the DLHE, SIES and LFS dataset. Sample size in DLHE was 44,436, 
SIES 1,666 and LFS 194. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
46
 Respondents to the LFS are asked for their wages in the first and fifth wave. However since I am 
using 10 consecutive waves, there would be a problem of double counting people if wage data was 
taken from both wave one and five. For instance, someone who was in wave 1 during September-
December 2005 would be in wave five during September-December 2006, and hence have their wages 
recorded twice. Hence only wages in wave five are used. 
47
 Even without this assumption, the ratio of expected to actual median wage is 1.15 using the labour 
force survey. 
48
 Two outlying observations have been dropped due to their large influence on the mean wage in this 
small dataset. These individuals had wages over two times bigger (over £80,000) than the next largest 
observation (£40,000), and were over six standard deviations higher than the mean. Robustness was 
checked by including these two observations, with all the substantial results remaining intact (see the 
following footnote) 
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The estimate for mean starting wages from the LFS is £16,073 (standard error £370), 
very close to that recorded in the DLHE (£16,455), particularly after the DLHE has 
been weighted for non-response (£15,996). Consequently, the ratio of the means from 
the SIES to LFS (1.13) is only slightly larger than when comparing the means from 
the SIES to the DLHE (1.14). The difference when considering the median is, 
however, slightly larger (1.12 for SIES:DLHE compared to 1.19 for SIES:LFS)
49
. 
Moreover the difference between the average SIES expected salary and the average 
LFS wage is statistically significant, even with the limited sample size. Hence it 
appears that the preceding results are indeed robust to the data source used. 
 
Does the realism of students’ wage expectations vary by background 
characteristics? 
 
Previously, I illustrated how students’ wage expectations vary with several 
background characteristics. An interesting question is whether students who expect 
higher wages actually secure this premium in the labour market, or are they, on 
average, more unrealistic? This proves challenging methodologically without 
longitudinal data. The samples selected in the SIES and DLHE can be restricted 
further, for example to look at men and women separately, though this can obviously 
only be done for characteristics observable in both surveys. Hence factors such as 
parental income cannot be explored.  Moreover there are likely to be further 
compositional issues, similar to those discussed in Table 2.9, particularly with the 
reduced sample sizes. This, coupled with the non-response in the DLHE, limits my 
ability for a more in-depth analysis.  Nevertheless, Table 2.11 provides results, though 
these should largely be treated as indicative rather than definitive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49
  Note with the outliers the mean salary is £16,749, and the median £15,163. With the outliers 
trimmed to £50,000 the salary is £16,420 and mean ratio 1.10, while the median remains at 1.19. Even 
with including these trimmed outliers, there is still a statistically significant difference between the 
average expected and average LFS salary. 
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Table 2.11 Comparison between mean expected and mean actual wages for full-time 
students, based on background characteristics (weighted estimates in parentheses) 
 
  
Mean expected 
wage £000 
Mean actual 
wage £000 Ratio 
All full-time students     
Final year 17.4   (17.7)   16.5   (16.0) 1.06   (1.10)* 
1 year  17.9   (18.2)     16.5   (16.0) 1.09   (1.14)* 
2 or more years 18.8   (18.9)     16.5   (16.0) 1.14   (1.18)* 
Ethnic group    
Black/Asian 19.2   (19.6) 17.3  (17.2) 1.11   (1.14)* 
White 17.9   (18.1) 16.1  (15.8) 1.12   (1.13)* 
Mixed 18.6   (19.0) 16.8  (16.9) 1.11   (1.13)* 
University type    
Russell Group 19.2   (19.4) 17.3  (17.1) 1.11   (1.13)* 
Other Pre-1992 17.6   (17.8) 16.6  (16.5) 1.06   (1.08)* 
Post-1992 17.8   (17.9) 15.6  (15.4) 1.14   (1.16)* 
Gender    
Male 18.7  (18.9) 16.9  (16.6) 1.11   (1.14)*   
Female 17.8  (17.8) 15.8  (15.6) 1.12   (1.14)* 
 Notes:  
1 See notes to Table 2.9 for more details on the weighted estimates.  
2 Excludes medical and part-time students, due to different proportions found within the two sources. 
3 For all variables the mean expected and actual salary are significantly different at the 5% level   
 Social class has not been investigated due to a large amount of missing data in the DLHE for this 
variable. 
4 Indicates the ratio is significantly different from 1.0 at the 5% level (using a two sample t-test, 
assuming independent samples) 
5 Authors calculations using the DLHE and SIES dataset. Sample size in the former was 44,436 and 
1,666 in the latter. 
 
Table 2.11 illustrates that junior students are less realistic than their peers who are 
approaching the labour force. Whereas final year students tend to overestimate their 
starting salary by only 6%, on average, those who have just entered university 
overestimate by around 14%. An important implication is that students who have just 
made the decision to invest in university education have especially inflated 
expectations. In the introduction to this thesis, I explained the importance of students 
understanding the graduate labour market when making their educational decisions. 
However this analysis indicates that students are not even particularly aware of 
starting salaries when making their human capital investments. In other results, there 
is little evidence that students at Russell Group universities are any less realistic than 
those at Post-1992institutions, who overestimate on average by 14% and 11% 
respectively. However students at other Pre-1992 universities appear to be much more 
accurate, overestimating by only 6%, on average. Similarly, there is no evidence to 
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suggest differences based on gender or ethnicity, with overestimation by each group, 
on average, of around 11%. 
 
Does the accuracy of students’ wage expectations depend on the subject they 
study?  
 
Though full-time students seem to be too optimistic, on average, in their wage 
expectations, those in certain subjects may have access to better information on 
wages, and thus make better predictions. It is hypothesised that students who are 
studying a subject leading to a particular career will be more realistic, as they are 
likely to research specific jobs and have better knowledge of the labour market they 
face. Alternatively students who take language and art based courses are likely to 
enter a far more general labour market, with less certainty about their future career 
prospects. Results are provided in Table 2.12, with kernel density estimates for 
various subjects shown in Figure 2.3
50
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
50
 Again, there may be some compositional issues surrounding the two surveys that may hamper 
comparison. Caution is thus advised when interpreting the results, though I believe the general pattern 
to hold. 
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Table 2.12a Comparison between mean expected and mean actual wages for full-
time students by subject groups (weighted estimates in parenthesis) 
 
Subject 
Sample size 
SIES 
(expectations) 
Mean expected 
wage £000 
Mean actual 
wage £000 Ratio  
Medicine 162 26.5   (25.8) 28.8   (28.5) 0.92  (0.91)  
Education 137 17.9   (17.9) 17.5   (17.4) 1.02  (1.03) 
Engineering, Maths, Computer Science 164 19.5   (19.2) 18.4   (17.5) 1.06  (1.10) 
Allied To Medicine 92 18.9   (19.0) 17.1   (16.7) 1.10  (1.14) 
Social Sciences 230 18.5   (18.9) 16.6   (16.4) 1.11  (1.17) 
Art 238 16.3   (16.4) 14.4   (14.2) 1.13  (1.15) 
Business, Management 143 18.4   (18.9) 16.3   (16.1) 1.13  (1.17) 
History, English & Languages 232 17.5   (17.7) 15.3   (15.1) 1.15  (1.17) 
Psychology, Sports Studies, Combined, Other 204 17.7   (17.7) 15.3   (15.3) 1.15  (1.16) 
Sciences 161 18.3   (18.2) 15.8   (15.7) 1.16  (1.16) 
Law 83 20.7   (20.6) 14.8   (14.8) 1.35  (1.39) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.12b Comparison between median expected and median actual wages for 
subject groups 
 
Subject 
Median 
expected £000 
Median Actual 
£000 Ratio  
Medicine 26.0 28.7 0.91 
Education 18.0 18.0 1.00 
Allied To Medicine 18.0 17.0 1.06 
Art 15.0 14.1 1.06 
Engineering, Maths, Computer Science 20.0 18.0 1.11 
Social Sciences 18.0 16.0 1.12 
Psychology, Sports Studies, Combined, Other 17.0 15.1 1.13 
History, English, Languages 18.0 15.1 1.19 
Sciences 18.0 15.1 1.19 
Business, Management 18.0 15.1 1.19 
Law 20.0 14.1 1.42 
Notes:  
1 See notes to Table 2.9 for more details on the weighted estimates 
2 For all variables the mean expected salary is significantly different from mean actual salary at the 5% 
level, except for Education 
3 “All full time students” excludes Medical students 
4 Law is somewhat of an outlier, due to the large number of students continuing into postgraduate 
training (hence only those with quite low wages are observed in the DLHE). Excluding this group from 
the aggregate analysis has little influence on the overall result 
5 Authors calculations using the DLHE and SIES datasets 
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Figure 2.3 Kernel density estimates of actual versus expected log wages, by 
subject group 
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The results show that, on average, there is overestimation in all subjects, except 
Medicine, where there is some evidence of underestimation
51
. Law also appears as an 
outlier, with especially large overestimation. One possibility may be that students 
wishing to enter a legal profession have to complete additional study at a Law school 
after university. Therefore the vast majority will not be in the labour market yet and 
their wages unobserved; there is the problem of selectivity. Those that have entered 
work straight from their course are likely to be in a much less lucrative position than 
Law graduates who continue their legal training and later enter the profession
52
.  
 
As hypothesised, students who are studying a subject that directly leads to a career 
have more realistic wage expectations. Medicine and Education both appear at the top 
of the table, and suggest these groups are (on average) very close, or even 
underestimate, their future wage. In contrast to the hypothesis, students in subjects 
Allied to Medicine appear no better than the average. However during the period 
studied, the number of positions available for newly qualified physiotherapists and 
nurses was particularly low. Thus these students, may have struggled to find jobs in 
their desired fields and thus had to compete in the more general graduate labour 
market. 
 
The kernel density estimates in the upper panel of Figure 2.3 illustrate how closely the 
distributions for actual and expected salaries match for Education and Engineering, 
Maths and Computer Science. A comparison to the distributions for Business and 
Management, and History, English and Languages, clearly illustrates the superior 
estimates made by those in the former groups. Interesting patterns also occur between 
the subjects that lead to the more general labour market. Those subjects where the 
errors seem to be largest generally involve language, rather than technical, skills. For 
example, the Social Sciences, Language and Business courses mainly involve writing 
essays, while subjects teaching more mathematical skills, such as Computer Science 
and Engineering, appear to contain more realistic students. Science can be identified 
as an exception to the discussion above; it is a course that develops technical skills, 
but whose students appear unrealistic. This could reflect students believing that they 
                                                          
51
 Expected salaries are significantly different from actual wages in all cases, except for education. This 
suggests sampling variability is not responsible for the observed differences. 
52Excluding this group from the analysis for “All full-time students” does not substantially change the 
results. 
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will receive a high wage because they have chosen to take on a traditionally 
challenging subject. In reality, however, the technical skills they have built up may be 
required by relatively few employers, or they end up in a field unrelated to their 
degree. This may mean they suffer an unanticipated need to retrain in an unrelated 
discipline and have to accept a lower starting salary, or perhaps move into a non-
graduate job. 
 
One may be tempted to suggest that the very different gender composition of subjects 
is leading to these differences in overestimation. Table 2.13 provides the ratio of 
average expected to actual wages broken down by subject and gender. 
 
Table 2.13a Comparison between mean expected and mean actual wages of men 
in each subject group 
 
Subject 
Sample 
size SIES 
Mean 
expected 
wage £000 
Mean actual 
wage £000 Ratio  
Medicine 55 27.5 29.0   0.95 
Education 21 18.3 17.2   1.06 
Engineering, Maths, Computer 
Science 115 19.6 18.7   1.04   
Allied To Medicine  16 19.9 16.7 1.19* 
All full-time students (excluding 
Medicine)  559 18.7 16.9 1.11* 
Social Sciences 74 19.7 18.1 1.09* 
Art 71 16.7 14.8 1.13* 
Business, Management  60 18.9 17.1 1.10* 
History, English, Languages  60 18.5 15.5 1.19* 
Psychology, Sports Studies, 
Combined , Other  63 17.3 16.4   1.05 
Sciences  56 18.1 16.5 1.10* 
Law  23 20.9 15.9 1.31* 
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Table 2.13b Comparison between mean expected and mean actual wages of 
women in each subject group 
 
Subject 
Sample size 
SIES 
Mean 
expected 
wage £000 
Mean actual 
wage £000 Ratio  
Medicine  107 26.0 28.6 0.91* 
Education 115 17.8 17.8  1.00 
Engineering, Maths, Computer 
Science 49 19.1 18.1   1.06 
Allied To Medicine  76 18.7 17.0 1.10* 
All full-time students 
(excluding Medicine)  1,125 17.8 15.8 1.12* 
Social Sciences 156 17.8 16.1 1.10* 
Art 167 15.8 14.7 1.08* 
Business, Management  83 18.0 15.9 1.13* 
History, English, Languages  172 17.1 15.6 1.10* 
Psychology, Sports Studies, 
Combined, Other  141 17.7 15.1 1.18* 
Sciences  105 18.3 15.8 1.16* 
Law  60 19.8 14.7 1.34* 
Notes:   
1 SIES sample size refers to unweighted data 
2 Sample size for men and women in SIES differ substantially due to differential response rates. See 
Section 2.3 and Table 2.9 for further details 
3 * Indicates ratio is statistically different from 1 at the 5% level (using a two sample t-test, assuming 
independent samples) 
4 Authors calculations using the DLHE and SIES dataset. Total sample size in the former was 44,436 
and 1,666 in the latter. 
 
Again, due to the small sample sizes in particular subjects, these results are indicative 
rather than definitive. Nevertheless the results do seem to suggest similar patterns for 
men and women. Both, on average, underestimate in Medicine, and overestimate in 
the Sciences, Business and Language based subjects. In many instances, when the 
ratios do differ for men and women, this can probably be explained by the small 
sample size. This is the case for Education and subjects Allied to Medicine, 
particularly for men. On the other hand, there is a tentative suggestion that men and 
women, on average, have less accurate expectations when they are studying a subject 
traditionally associated with the other gender. For instance, men appear to 
overestimate, on average, more than women in the Arts and Languages. Meanwhile 
women make worse estimates in the Sciences.  
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2.8 Discussion 
 
This research has been limited to a single estimate of future wages made by students 
relating to one specific time in the future. How much I can say about the realism of 
students about their future earnings over the course of their whole lifetime is therefore 
quite restricted. Nor do I have students’ views of the counterfactual; what they would 
expect to earn had they not gone to university. This study has also only considered the 
financial aspects of studying for a degree, and not the non-monetary benefits of 
university to both the individual and society. Nevertheless, the findings suggest that 
students have a tendency to, on average, overestimate future wages and that, 
consequently, one must at least begin to question whether they are making well 
informed human capital investment decisions. Indeed, the fact that certain groups can 
predict future wages (on average) better than others may suggest economists’ 
assumption of there being no systematic differences between young adults’ 
expectations and later realisations may be based on a rocky foundation. 
 
Of course, it is still possible for university to be a good investment, even under such 
conditions. Many individuals will still find higher education both a financially and 
culturally profitable experience, even if they do not obtain the wage they once 
expected. Nevertheless it is equally plausible that by overestimating future wages, 
some students may mistakenly choose to go to university, who will not receive the 
benefit they expected on enrolment. The UK Class of 99’ report by Purcell, Elias, 
Davies and Wilton (2005) illustrates such feelings in qualitative research, as shown 
below: 
 
 ‘I would have still ended up in the position I’m in now if I would have carried on 
working full-time…. I applied for over two hundred jobs, I felt this degree was a total 
waste of time; I was a self-funding student, which was a waste of money. I’m still 
paying for it now, I’m a single parent and to be honest it was the biggest waste of time 
and money that I’ve ever spent’. 
 
……..everyone tells you if you do a degree the world will be your oyster, you’ll earn 
loads of money. No’. Page 194 
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Other aspects of this research may also have importance for higher education policy. 
Students build up debt while at university, when income is low, and expect to pay this 
back when they have a job after graduation. Gustman and Stafford (1972) also show 
that students with higher wage expectations tend to consume more at university.  
From an economic point of view, students are using credit markets, in part, to smooth 
their consumption over time.  However, if students overestimate their future wage, 
they may also be overestimating their ability to pay back the money they borrowed. 
This may lead to students taking on too higher levels of debt that they later struggle to 
repay, due to the fact they are not in as well a paying job as expected. It may also 
mean they are willing to take on debt to pay for high tuition fees when entering 
university, but regret this decision in hindsight when paying back the money is harder 
than they once expected.  
 
Another important issue is how this relates to widening access schemes proposed by 
European governments, and in particular the UK target of getting half of all school 
leavers to experience higher education. The benefits of university are widely 
promoted by governments, and in particular career prospects, to encourage individuals 
to continue their education. However, this practise could enhance students’ unrealistic 
expectations (which certainly seem to be the case in the quote above) if the fruits of 
the graduate labour market are over-empathised. For example, a recent UK 
government publication as part of the AIMHIGHER programme discusses various 
careers children could enter if they obtain a degree, including becoming a “Hotel 
Manager”53. It suggests a degree in Leisure and Tourism as a possible qualification, 
and that their “potential earnings” are around £80,000 (presumably meaning per year, 
at the peak of one’s career). Although this is possible, this seems a very high figure to 
actively promote.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
53
 See http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/corporate/migratedD/publications/H/HigherEd-DontStop 
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A related point is whether students are being given accurate information about salaries 
and employment prospects from the various available sources. For instance, the UK 
media reported that the average graduate starting salary in 2005 was £22,000
54
. But 
this was based on the average salary offered by just 226 of the UK’s highest paying 
graduate employers
55
.  Moreover this research has illustrated the non-response bias in 
the salary figures within the DLHE;  often quoted by the media and government 
ministers as the “true” graduate wage. This information may well have an impact on 
students’ views of the graduate wage and inflate their expectations to unrealistic 
levels. More information for students on the distribution of starting salaries, and their 
likely place on the scale, is required to make sure that individuals are making well 
informed decisions when continuing their university education. 
 
2.9. Conclusion 
 
This chapter set out to explore heterogeneity in UK students’ wage expectations and 
to identify whether they held “realistic” views of the graduate labour market. In doing 
so, this provides the first study in Europe to explore wage expectations using data that 
is designed to be nationally representative of the UK student population. The results 
highlight: 
 
 Wage expectations vary significantly based on how far the student has 
progressed through university, though this is largely explained by their 
differing views on employment opportunities. 
 
 Students’ idiosyncratic characteristics play an important role in determining 
their wage expectations.  
 
 Quality of the institution is associated with students’ wage expectations, 
although this could be reflecting the fact better institutions admit students of 
higher ability   
 
                                                          
54
 See http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2005/jan/06/highereducation.uk1, who lead with the 
headline “value of a degree now £22,000 per year” 
55
 See http://www.agr.org.uk/Content/AGR-Graduate-Recruitment-Survey-2005-Winter-Review for 
further details 
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 While part-time students seem realistic in their wage expectations, those 
studying full-time tend, on average, to overestimate their starting salary by 
around 10 - 15%. 
 
Specifically, this chapter shows how, as students’ progress through university, their 
views on life as a graduate change. Final year students are less optimistic about their 
ability to land a “career job” and their starting salary. This indicates that students 
probably learn about their own ability and the labour market through their time in 
higher education, and that prospects may not be as bright as they once expected.  
There also appears to be a significant difference based on family income, with 
students from high income backgrounds expecting a greater salary than their low 
income peers. However the initial hypothesis that students from ethnic minority 
backgrounds may expect some form of discrimination in the labour market, and 
therefore predict a lower wage, is rejected. Ethnic minorities actually expect a higher 
salary than their white peers (even after conditioning on the student they study, views 
on the labour market and quality of institution they attend). 
 
The second half of the chapter turned to whether such wage expectations are realistic. 
The only other study to use a balanced sample (collecting data from students in a 
range of subjects and institutions), Webbink and Hartog (2004), concludes that 
students can accurately predict their starting salary. My results suggest the exact 
opposite; on average full-time students overestimate wages in the graduate labour 
market. In some cases, I find this to be quite severe. Students who have just entered 
university overestimate their starting salary by almost 20%. On the other hand, part-
time students and those studying a subject leading to a particular career expect 
salaries reasonably close to the observed wages. There are three explanations for why 
I find this result. Firstly, I can not completely rule out the possibility that selectivity of 
response is generating part of the observed gap between expectations and realisations. 
However, I have very carefully checked the quality of my data, and performed several 
robustness tests, to minimize the impact of this on my results. A second possibility is 
that students are not “rational”. They may be quite knowledgeable about the graduate 
labour market, but are unable to use this data to accurately form predictions of their 
future wage. Alternatively, my final explanation is that students simply do not hold 
enough information to predict their future earnings. This is perhaps the most 
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compelling argument, given the other results in this chapter. For instance, the superior 
predictions of university seniors could be driven by a greater incentive to collect 
information as the labour market approaches. This group may also have lower costs of 
acquiring such information, due to their close interaction with recent graduates. 
Similar arguments can be made for other groups who make relatively good 
predictions. For instance education students may be realistic about future wages 
because national pay scales provide them with relevant and accurate labour market 
information at a very low cost. 
 
If this final explanation is correct, then why do students not collect such information 
in the first place? It may be that for the majority of students, the costs of acquiring 
such information are simply too high. To ensure young adults are making well 
informed choices regarding higher education, I advise policymakers to lower this cost 
by increasing the availability and detail of data on graduate wages. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Who has realistic income 
expectations: Students or workers? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Many have argued that attitudes of investors in human capital 
are very different from those of investors of physical capital 
because the former tend to be younger, and young persons are 
especially prone to overestimate their ability and chance of good 
fortune” 
 
 
 
 
Becker (1993) Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special 
Reference to Education (Third Addition), page 93 
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Economic models of schooling choice are often based on the assumption that young 
adults have a realistic idea of what their future income will be. This assumption can 
be decomposed into two parts. The first is that young adults hold “full information” – 
that they understand the economic benefits of the different educational options 
available. The second is that they hold “rational expectations”; that they are able to 
use this information efficiently to produce realistic assessments of the future. If this is 
true for all members of the population, then there should be no systematic differences 
(on average) between individuals’ apriori expectations and later realisations.  
 
It is under these assumptions that economists often use realised (“ex-post”) income 
data to estimate how young adults’ expected financial returns to education influence 
their schooling choices. Notable examples include Berger (1988), Willis and Rosen 
(1979) and Boudarbat (2004). They all find that expected returns have a large and 
statistically significant effect on young adults’ decisions, whether this is to enter 
higher education at all or the specific subject they take. However, these results are 
heavily reliant on the strong assumptions described above. If these are violated, then 
one may question the robustness of such results.  
 
In chapter 2 I illustrated that UK students, on average, overestimate their starting 
salary. Yet I also found that the accuracy of labour market predictions varies 
substantially between different groups. In particular, those who probably held the least 
labour market information were, on average, the least realistic. This has raised some 
question marks over whether the assumptions described above hold. However, this 
analysis was limited by the fact I only considered the accuracy of students’ 
expectations in a single setting over a short time horizon.  From an economic 
perspective, it is lifetime income, rather than starting salaries, that influences people’s 
decisions. An interesting extension of the work completed in chapter 2 is therefore 
whether students in other settings, and over longer time horizons, are just as 
unrealistic about their future income. 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
Moreover in chapter 2 I only considered the expectations of young adults in higher 
education.  Indeed, all other studies, that I am aware of, have done the same; those 
who have chosen to enter the labour market straight from school have typically been 
ignored. Yet this group is both relatively large in size and of substantial interest.  In 
particular, workers may have the opportunity to collect valuable information about the 
labour market from their employers, colleagues and the job search process itself. A 
student trying to access the same information may face much higher costs. If both 
groups are “rational”, processing all the information that they hold efficiently, one 
would expect workers’ additional information to translate into more accurate 
expectations.  On the contrary, one may argue that students are less myopic than their 
peers who enter the labour force, and thus less readily discount their future income. 
Consequently, they may have more incentive to collect information about long-term 
labour market outcomes and hence hold more realistic expectations. Likewise, it 
maybe that children who invest in higher education are focused on one particular 
career, while 20 year olds in the labour force perhaps move somewhat haphazardly 
between different types of  job. Thus it may be that students seek out more specific 
and relevant information than their working peers, leading to a more realistic 
assessment of future labour market opportunities.  
 
Indeed this argument may hold true for some groups of students, but not for others.  
Those studying Education, Nursing or Engineering are being trained for specific jobs. 
With career councillors widely available in almost all Higher Education institutions, 
these students are probably well informed about the graduate labour market. On the 
other hand, someone in a course not leading to one particular career, such as Arts, 
Humanities, Languages or Social Sciences, may only have a  vague idea  about the 
type of job they will pursue. Thus these students receive only quite broad, low quality 
labour market information and will thus be prone to either under or overestimation of 
their future income. Indeed, I have already found some evidence of this in the 
previous chapter. Nevertheless, the discussion above illustrates the interesting insights 
that a comparison between different groups of students and workers might bring. 
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At present, such topics have received very little attention in either America or Europe. 
There are some small scale US studies that compare students’ expectations to actual 
labour market outcomes. However, these suffer methodological difficulties, and 
results can not be generalised to the wider student population. Furthermore students 
are generally treated as a homogeneous group. There is little discussion of the 
association between dropping out of college, idiosyncratic ability, subject being 
studied and the accuracy of future expectations. Of particular note, no comparison is 
made to the expectations of their peers in the labour force.  I make a significant 
contribution to the small US literature by using a detailed, nationally representative 
sample of both students and young workers to consider how the factors listed above 
influence the accuracy of 20 year old men’s income expectations ten years into the 
future.  
 
My results suggest that the US student population over-estimate their future income. 
However, unlike existing studies, I show that this result only holds for certain groups; 
I find that some students actually make quite good long range predictions, 
overestimating their income ten years into the future by (on average) less than 10%. 
Moreover, I find that differences between students and workers are not as pronounced 
as one may expect; under certain conditions, students actually hold more realistic 
expectations than their peers in the labour force. 
 
I begin in section 3.2 by reviewing the current literature on income expectations and 
motivating the need for this research. In sections 3.3 and 3.4 I describe the National 
Education Longitudinal Survey (NELS) data. This is followed in section 3.5 by my 
analysis of young adults’ labour market expectations. I conclude with a discussion of 
my key findings, and argue that either young adults do not hold enough labour market 
information to predict their income at age 30, or simply choose not to incorporate it 
into their expectations. 
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3.2 Literature and research questions 
 
To my knowledge, there are six published US studies that investigate students’ 
income expectations. The first to consider this topic was Smith and Powell (1990). 
They asked 400 students at two mid-western universities how much they expect to 
earn when they graduate and after 10 years in the labour market. Respondents were 
quite realistic about pay in their first job, but overestimate wages in 10 years time. 
Betts (1996) asked 1,000 students at the University of California to predict wages for 
a hypothetical individual under several different scenarios. He finds that students 
quite accurately predict the wages of young workers, but overestimate the pay of 
those with ten or more year’s labour market experience. Blau and Ferber (1991) 
collected data from 351 students studying in the Business faculty at the University of 
Illinois. Again, students seem quite realistic about starting wages, but become 
progressively unrealistic over long time horizons. Carvajal et al (2000) analyse the 
expected starting salary of 219 Business students at Florida International University. 
They find over-estimation of around 10%. Rouse (2004) investigates the wage 
expectations of 69 high school seniors from the Baltimore City Public School 
District
56
. She finds these high school seniors to be quite unrealistic about their future 
income at age 30. Dominitz and Manski (1996) take a different approach. They asked 
110 Madison students several questions to try and not only capture individuals’ 
expectations, but also their uncertainty about future outcomes. They find that male 
students are reasonably realistic, but girls less so. 
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 Rouse (2004) also uses the NELS data analysed in this paper. In particular, she compares the NELS 
expected income data to external estimates on actual wages drawn from the 1990 Census. I analyse the 
NELS data in greater depth than Rouse, and focus on a set of quite different hypotheses. In particular, 
she is concerned with differences between ethnic groups, where my concern is the accuracy of students 
expectations compared to workers.    
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These studies suggest that students have a reasonably good understanding of starting 
salaries, but are less realistic about their future income over longer time horizons. 
However, this relatively small literature is somewhat limited by the scope and design 
of the aforementioned studies. Data are typically: 
 
(a) Collected from students at just one (or at most two) universities 
(b) Drawn via convenience sampling, rather than a probabilistic method 
(c) Over-represent students from mathematical subjects (Economics, Finance, 
Engineering) and under represent those studying Art 
(d) Of limited sample size 
 
This causes several methodological problems. Firstly, as samples are often drawn 
from one university and a handful of subjects, it is difficult to generalise results to the 
wider US student population. This leads to problems when the authors try to assess 
whether students hold “realistic” expectations. Wage expectations, drawn from a 
highly selective survey, are compared to data on national graduate wages from an 
external data source, such as the Current Population Survey (CPS) or Census. The 
wage expectation and realisation data often represent two populations that could differ 
in all manner of characteristics. This may clearly bias any assessment of whether 
expectations are realistic. Secondly, small sample sizes mean that the wage 
expectation data suffers from quite large sampling error. But, as data are usually 
drawn via convenience sampling, reliable standard errors can not be calculated. Hence 
the true extent of sampling error on results actually often goes unknown. 
 
In addressing my first research question, I attempt to overcome these limitations by 
analysing the income expectations of a large, nationally representative sample of 
American adults using NELS 1988 data. As this survey was designed to be nationally 
representative, my results should generalise to the wider US student population. 
Furthermore, as expectations and realisations are collected from the same individual 
over time (i.e. this is a panel dataset), my results should also be driven less by the 
composition and selectivity of the sample than the small scale studies cited above. 
Moreover, as the NELS data was collected using a large, probability based sample 
design I can adequately demonstrate the influence that sampling variation has on my 
estimates. In summary, my first research question is: 
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Q1. Do 20 year old male students in the US, on average, have realistic 
expectations of their income at age 30?  
 
However students in countries like the USA, with its large and diversified higher 
education system, are not a homogeneous group. The accuracy of their labour market 
expectations is probably related to the subject they study, whether they actually 
graduate from university and their underlying cognitive ability. For instance, young 
adults who begin, but do not complete, university probably form their expectations 
based on the belief that they will obtain a degree. They may not adequately account 
for the possibility of dropping out, and hence (ex-post) their expectations will appear 
overly ambitious
57
. Similarly, given the results for the UK in chapter 2, one may 
suspect the accuracy of students’ expectations to vary substantially with the subject 
they study.  Indeed, as noted in the introduction, students studying certain subjects 
may hold more information about the labour market than others. This may be because 
they are already being trained to enter a specific job (teacher, nurse, engineer) and 
hence collect specific and detailed information compared to their peers entering the 
more general graduate labour market. Alternatively, it may be that wages within these 
jobs, or the wages of previous graduates from similar disciplines, have quite low 
variability. Hence students within these subjects face less uncertainty than some of 
their peers. In either case, one might expect to find similar patterns to those observed 
in the UK, where students studying mathematical and vocational subjects make better 
predictions than their peers in more creative disciplines. Such details have rarely been 
discussed in the US literature, hence my second research question: 
 
Q2. Do students in the US who drop out of university hold particularly 
unrealistic labour market expectations? Are maths and vocational students more 
realistic about their future income than those studying more creative subjects?  
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 This is something that I shall go on to explore in section 3.5. 
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As the reader may have noted, all the studies reviewed focus on students at university. 
I do not know of any work that investigates the expectations of young adults who 
have chosen to enter the labour market rather than continue their education
58
. Apriori, 
one may expect young workers to hold more realistic expectations than students, as 
they probably have greater access to relevant labour market information. For instance, 
they will have contact with older workers who, either formally or informally, pass on 
sector-specific details of future pay and progression. Alternatively, organisations 
themselves could make information on career progression and pay freely available to 
their staff. Another factor is that workers have been through the job search process at 
least once. They should have found out about wages and career opportunities during 
this time. Indeed, these individuals may have held unrealistic expectations before this 
experience, but actually going out and trying to find a job may have taught them the 
realities of their employment opportunities
59
. Many university students would not 
have had a similar experience of searching for a full-time job, and may still be holding 
onto their unrealistic expectations. Self-selection into the labour market or higher 
education may also play a role. Educational attainment is linked to migration (see 
Borjas 1999). The less educated (who have self-selected into work) are more likely 
than students to stay in their age 20 location. Workers therefore gather information 
about wages in the local labour market that they incorporate into their expectations. 
Students, on the other hand, may well expect to work in other areas of the country. 
The local labour market will be less informative for many of them. Hence one would 
expect the labour market to have more salience to those who are already actively 
employed
60
.  
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 Dominitz (1998) assesses the accuracy of American workers’ wage expectations. However he does 
not specifically investigate the expectations of young workers, or how realistic they are compared to 
students. He also focuses on wage expectations for the year ahead, whereas this paper looks over a 
longer time horizon.  
59
 Recent work in the sociological literature by Morgan (2005) depicts young adults as “Bayesian 
learners”. In particular, he illustrates the accuracy of a “fast” and “slow” learner’s expectations over 
time. Morgan suggests the difference between fast and slow learners could be to do with the different 
timing of key life events. This could include entry into the labour market, a period when young adults 
should receive a lot of information that will lead them to quickly (and more accurately) updating their 
expectations. 
60
 Counter-arguments to this hypothesis have been presented in the introduction to this chapter. 
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Based on these discussions, my third and fourth (inter-related) research questions are: 
 
Q3. Can 20 year old US workers, on average, make realistic predictions of their 
income at age 30? 
 
Q4. Do 20 year old US workers, on average, make better predictions of their 
income at age 30 than their peers in higher education? 
 
Although these hypotheses are similar, they do pertain to slightly different things. In 
particular, it is possible that both workers and students overestimate their future 
income (reject the null hypothesis of no difference between expectations and 
realisations in Q1 and Q3) but for workers to still make better predictions than 
students (reject the null hypothesis that students and workers are equally unrealistic in 
their labour market expectations in Q4). 
 
This work adds significantly to the literature reviewed at the start of this chapter. I 
know of no other study that analyses nationally representative data on young adults’ 
income expectations. Moreover, to my knowledge, I am also the first author to use 
panel data to compare income expectations and realisations over a 10 year time 
horizon. Thus I can more accurately compare students’ expectations to later 
realisations, with my results being more likely to generalise to the wider US 
population. I am also able to tackle several new and interesting hypotheses that put 
the existing work on students’ expectations into a wider context.  
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3.3 Data 
 
To address these research questions, a nationally representative data source is required 
that follows young adults from their initial predictions of future income to their later 
success in the labour market. This needs to follow an entire cohort of young adults 
and not just those who continue on to university. One source is the National 
Educational Longitudinal Survey (NELS) from the US. This study’s aim was to 
provide data about adolescents at critical points in their development and later into 
their careers using a nationally representative sample of adolescents. Children were 
initially interviewed in 1988 when the majority were 14 years of age. They were then 
followed up four further times, at ages 16, 18, 20 and 26. Parents and teachers of the 
pupils also completed the first three rounds of the survey. 
 
In the first wave (age 14), a two-stage stratified sampling design was employed, with 
schools as the primary sampling unit, and probability of selection (of schools) 
proportional to size. 1,052 schools participated in the survey, including some 
oversampling of private institutions. A random sample of 26 students was then 
selected from each school. 26,432 students were eventually selected with 24,599 
taking part (93%). In each of the next two waves (age 16 and 18) students who 
participated in the initial survey were followed up. The sampling process added some 
newly selected students (1,043 at age 16 and 244 at age 18) 
61
. This was done to 
create a valid probability sample (a nationally representative cross section) of students 
in each of the respective years. In total, 20,923 18 years olds took part in the third 
wave. The fourth wave took place when students were 20 years old. To reduce costs, a 
sub-sample was selected based on demographic characteristics and response history. It 
is important to note that this reduction is not the result of sample attrition, but from a 
conscious effort of the survey design to limit burden and cost
62
.  This led to the age 20 
sampling frame being reduced to 15,964 individuals. In total, completed responses 
were available from 14,915 (93%) 20 year olds. Further details are given in Appendix 
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 These students were not randomly selected, but drawn from schools where there were other second 
and third wave respondents. More details can be found in Appendix 3.1 and page 56 of Curtin et al 
(2002). 
62
 Around 5,000 individuals were dropped from the study. 2,000 of these were classed as “poor 
responders”, who were basically excluded because of the low chance of future contact. Hence it may be 
more appropriate to consider these 2,000 observations as non-respondents. The other 3,000 individuals 
dropped were not classified as poor responders, but excluded purely to lower costs. Further details are 
given in Appendix 3.1. 
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3.1. The final survey took place when most sample members were 26. Data are 
available for 12,144 individuals (76% of the age 20 sub-sample). 
 
There are obviously some issues of non-response due to sample attrition. One way to 
help correct for differential response rates in terms of observable characteristics is the 
use of survey weights. The NELS dataset contains a cross-sectional weight for those 
who took part in the final survey, and various panel weights. Unfortunately a panel 
weight is not provided for those who completed the final two surveys (ages 20 and 
26). Instead a panel weight is available for those who had completed the final three 
surveys (ages 18, 20 and 26)
63
. This refers to the population of high school seniors in 
1992. The National Centre for Education Statistics describes this panel weight: 
 
This is the second, third, and fourth follow-up panel weight, which applies to the 12th 
grade cohort. It applies to fourth follow-up respondents (i.e. 2000) who were also 
respondents in the second and third follow-up rounds (i.e., 1992, 1994). It estimates 
longitudinal parameters that describe the population of spring 1992 12
th
 graders. 
 
This weight shall be used in all subsequent analyses to help adjust for unit non 
response and over sampling of certain minority groups. Therefore, the population I am 
describing in this analysis is those who were high school seniors in 1992
64
. 
 
A vital question is how respondents were asked to report their future income 
expectations. When respondents were 20 years old, they were asked: 
 
“What do you expect your total annual income to be when you are 30 years old?” 
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 Around 98% of those who responded at 26 also responded at ages 18 and 20. 
64
 Some young adults drop out of school before this point (senior high school year). Consequently, I 
may not be representing this quite small sector of the US population. This is further highlighted where I 
compare the NELS sample to CPS data in Appendix 3.2. 
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This question is comparable to those asked in the other major studies of students’ 
labour market expectations
65
. Respondents are clearly asked to predict their future 
income. However this raises several issues about how people actually respond to this 
type of question. Do they take into account inflation? Do they report gross or net 
earnings? Is this conditional on having a full-time job? To shed some light on these 
issues, it is important to consider the ordering of survey questions. Indeed directly 
before they were asked for their income expectations, respondents were given the 
following question: 
 
“What was YOUR total income from all sources, before taxes, in 1993? [i.e. the year 
prior to interview] This figure should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, 
interest, unemployment compensation, grants, financial aid, scholarships, government 
assistance (AFDC) and all other income” [Capitalisation in original question] 
Write in dollar amount, write in 0 if no income $....................................................... 
 
I assume that respondents follow the same criteria to the above when reporting their 
income expectations. For example, I assume respondents use their answer to the 
question above as a reference point for their income expectation and answer with 
current prices in mind. Indeed, this assumption is consistent with the existing 
literature. Therefore all reported expectations are assumed to be in 1994 prices. It is 
also quite clear that respondents should be reporting gross (pre-tax) figures. The 
question also asks for total annual income. This would suggest respondents should not 
only take into account future wages, but other sources of income such as receipts from 
benefits or interest payments when reporting their expectations.  Another point to note 
is that the question on income expectation asks for the respondent’s (“your”) expected 
income. This is made even clearer in the preceding question, with “your” in bold, 
capital letters. It seems that the respondent should only be considering their own, 
personal income, and not their partner’s or other family members’. 
 
 
                                                          
65
 For instance, Webbink and Hartog (2004) phrase their question “How much will your net starting 
salary be after graduation?” Betts (1996) asks students the question "Below, please circle your estimate 
of the national average for annual starting salaries”. Bruenllo et al (2001) ask “What do you expect to 
earn right after finishing your degree (first degree possible at your university). State an approximate 
amount per month (net, i.e. after paying taxes)?” 
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Dominitz and Manski (1994) state that both men and women respond to questions on 
income expectations conditional on holding a full-time job. This seems a reasonable 
assumption for male respondents. However women may expect to have children and 
be out of the labour force, or working part-time, by the time they are 30. Alternatively 
women may report their expectation based on working full-time, but by the time they 
are 30 and have a child, self-select out of the labour market or into part-time jobs. 
Hence any comparison of women’s expectations to later realisations has additional 
complications. In particular, I do not know how or whether women incorporate 
selectivity out of the labour force (due to childbearing) into their expectations. I could 
proceed by assuming that their reported figures are conditional on working full-time 
(as suggested by Dominitz and Manski). Yet even then I would face the non-trivial 
task of trying to control for this self-selection in the observed income data. Thus, 
although I note the potential interest in this issue, and that the problems discussed 
above are perhaps solvable, I focus on only the 5,782 male responses in this analysis 
for brevity.  
 
From the initial sample of 5,782 male observations I exclude 633 respondents with 
missing expectations data from the analysis. A further 39 observations are excluded 
when an individual reported expected income below $6,000. On the assumption of 
full-time working, stated above, figures below this level would violate minimum 
wage laws in the USA. Another 71 observations were dropped where expectations 
were over $250,000. In total, 743 (13%) male observations have been excluded due to 
difficulties with the income expectations data.  
 
I investigate the characteristics of those excluded with a logistic regression of item 
non-response. The results, presented as odds ratios, can be found in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 Logistic regression of item non-response to question on income 
expectation 
Notes: 
1 The Socio-economic status index is a continuous variable constructed by the survey organisers using 
data on the respondents’ father's education level, mother's education level, father's occupation, mother's 
occupation, and family income. The higher this index score (or the higher the quartile), the more 
privileged the child’s background.  
2 An odds ratio greater than 1 means a greater chance of non-response relative to the reference. 
3 “Wage at 26” is a continuous variable that records how much the respondent was earning from 
employment when they were aged 26. The estimated odds ratio shows how non-response increases 
with a $10,000 increase in the wage that was earned. 
4 “Missing” dummy variables are included when the respondent has not provided information on a 
covariates. I do not present their results for brevity.  
5 “Maths ability” is a continuous variable based upon respondents’ scores in a test of their cognitive 
mathematical ability taken at age 18. The estimated coefficient in the table above shows how a one 
standard deviation increase in maths ability influences the propensity to not respond.  
6 * Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level 
7 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS dataset. Sample size in all specifications was 5,782. 
Dependent variable was a binary variable, taking a value of 0 if the respondent did not report their 
income expectation and 1 if they did 
 
  Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 
 
Odds 
ratio 
Standard 
error 
Odds 
ratio 
Standard 
error 
Odds 
ratio 
Standard 
error 
Socio-economic status index (Ref: Lowest quartile)       
Second quartile 0.85 0.22 0.85 0.21 0.86 0.20 
Third quartile 0.58* 0.16 0.56* 0.16 0.59 0.16 
Top quartile 0.62 0.16 0.59* 0.16 0.62 0.16 
Family income parents reported when respondent 
was age 18 (Ref: Bottom quartile)       
Second quartile 0.47* 0.11 0.48* 0.11 0.48* 0.11 
Third quartile 0.40* 0.10 0.41* 0.11 0.40* 0.10 
Top quartile 0.24* 0.07 0.22* 0.07 0.22* 0.07 
Race (Ref:  White)       
American Indian or Alaska Native 4.52* 2.69 4.13* 2.17 3.16* 1.44 
Asian or Pacific Islander 1.44 0.67 1.16 0.56 1.39 0.59 
Black, not Hispanic 0.80 0.25 0.75 0.23 0.68 0.20 
Hispanic or Latino 1.27 0.26 1.24 0.26 1.24 0.28 
More than one race 0.52 0.18 0.54 0.18 0.50 0.18 
Reported health problems at 20 (Ref: Yes)       
No  1.00 0.28 1.17 0.37 1.45 0.46 
Labour force status at 20 (Ref: Student who does 
not have a job)       
Student who also has a job 0.84 0.20 0.77 0.19 0.83 0.20 
Working only 1.93* 0.46 1.76* 0.41 1.76* 0.42 
Not student or working 2.64* 0.73 2.28* 0.65 2.20* 0.65 
Housing tenure at 26 (Ref: Homeowner)       
Rent from someone, not a relative - - 1.13 0.23 1.14 0.23 
Rent from a relative - - 1.03 0.31 0.97 0.29 
Live in residence without paying rent - - 1.77* 0.44 1.50 0.39 
Wage at age 26  - - - - 1.01 0.06 
Maths ability - - - - 0.97 0.09 
Drop out of university (Ref: No)       
Yes - - - - 1.07 0.28 
Observations 5,782   5,782   5,782   
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It seems that respondents from the wealthiest backgrounds are the most likely to 
report their expected income. Similarly, young adults of American Indian descent are 
less likely to report their expected income than Whites. Of importance for my 
substantive research questions, it appears that 20 year old students are more likely to 
respond than their peers in the labour force. More reassuringly, there is no association 
between wages recorded at age 26 and missing expectations data. In other words, it is 
not the case that those who reported particularly high or low wages at age 26 are the 
individuals who did not report their salary expectations
66
. Likewise, it does not seem 
to be the case that missing expectations data is related to the respondents’ maths 
ability or whether they are a student who drops out of university before they complete 
their degree
67
. 
 
Nevertheless Table 3.1 does indicate some self selection into the study. If those who 
choose to take part are more (or less) realistic than those who do not, I would 
underestimate (or overestimate) the difference between average expectations and later 
realisations. Likewise, the fact that workers are more selective about taking part than 
students could introduce bias when I consider which of these groups are more realistic 
(research question 4). For instance, only the most optimistic workers may report their 
expected income. On the other hand both optimistic and cautious students may offer a 
response. In this scenario, my selection of workers would appear to be less realistic 
than a true random sample from the population. I have checked the robustness of the 
results I present in section 3.5 to this non-response by creating and applying a set of 
response weights, with estimates presented later in the chapter
68
.  
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 I also tested for an interaction between wage at 26, and whether the respondent was a student or 
worker at age 20. The coefficient was neither big nor statistically significant. 
67
 In a specification not presented, I entered students in groups depending on their subject area. I found 
no statistically significant differences 
68
 Note that the effectiveness of such weights in correcting bias is dependent upon the explanatory 
power of the underlying non-response model. Table 3.1 indicates that few of the covariates included in 
the logistic regression are statistically significant. Consequently, one may expect the results to appear 
no different as model used to create the response weights is relatively weak. 
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For those individuals with complete expectations data, Figure 3.1 presents the 
distribution of expected age 30 income. Notice firstly the large, positive skew of the 
data, with a mean (median) of $50,312 ($40,000) and standard deviation of $30,051. 
This result is driven by a number of large observations; the top percentile expect to 
earn over $200,000 per year at age 30 (in 1994 prices). One may ask whether this 
variable is truly reflecting individuals expectations (what they think will happen) 
rather than aspirations (what they hope will happen). In this chapter, I go on to assume 
the former, but one can not rule out some individuals adhering to the latter. I have 
excluded some very large observations, where the figures maybe reflecting children’s 
“aspirations” rather than their “expectations”. In section 3.5, I present a set of 
robustness checks using quantile (median) regression to see how results differ when I 
do not exclude these data. 
 
Figure 3.1 Distribution of expected age 30 income (in 1994 US $) for young US 
males 
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Notes: Diagram produced by using the NELS dataset. Sample size = 5,039.  
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A second feature of the distribution is the bunching of observations. Over half of all 
observations lie at five points: $30,000 (13%), $40,000 (14%), $50,000 (14%), 
$60,000 (7%) and $100,000 (3%). I describe a similar phenomenon for UK students 
in chapter 2. The general explanation is that respondents are rounding their responses 
to the nearest $5,000 or $10,000. This may reflect uncertainty about future income or, 
on the other hand, that individuals simply think in terms of round numbers. The 
implication is that there is some rounding error in individuals reported expectations. 
When considering expectations at the group or population level, it seems reasonable 
to assume that this rounding error will be on average zero (some individuals round up, 
others round down) 
69
. On the other hand, considering expectations at the individual 
level, this is a potentially important source of measurement error. 
 
The NELS also contains data on each respondents’ wage history. As part of the survey 
at age 26, they were asked: 
 
For your (current/most recent) job, about how much (do/did) you earn before taxes 
and other deductions? 
 
 Enter Amount   $....................................................................... 
Interviewer instruction:  Record the time scale of the amount (e.g. $30,000 per year) 
      1 = hourly, 2 = weekly, 3 = every two weeks, 4 = monthly,  5 = annually 
 
How many hours per week, in a typical week (do/did) you (currently) work for pay in 
your job as a/an [F4BOCTV (verbatim job-title)]? 
Enter hours per week:………………………Hours 
 
This clearly asks for gross earnings in their current or most recent job. However the 
respondent could choose the timescale to report this figure, with a breakdown 
provided in Table 3.2
70
. 
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 Obviously this assumes respondents round their expectations as would a mathematician, rather than 
another rule (for example, always rounding up to the next highest multiple of $5,000).  
70
 Note the difficulties when recording salary details because of measurement error, with results based 
on surveys often different to that held in administrative records. Indeed this measurement error could 
vary by the unit of time respondents’ answer in (see Cartenseen and Woltman 1979).  
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Table 3.2 Timescale used to report salary 
 
Timescale % of observations 
Hourly 10.4 
Weekly 12.3 
Twice monthly 3.4 
Monthly 8.6 
Annually 65.3 
Observations 3,475 
Notes: 
1 I have restricted this data to those who were working full-time year round at age 26.  
2 Authors calculations from the NELS dataset.  
 
 
For those who provided a weekly, fortnightly or monthly figure, I have scaled their 
pay up to the annual equivalent. All respondents were also asked how many hours 
they work in an average week. For those reporting an hourly wage, this was used to 
calculate their annual equivalent.   
 
Wages from previous years were also collected retrospectively at age 26 (the final 
survey wave)
71
. Respondents were asked: 
 
First, including all of the wages, salaries, and commissions you earned in 
(1997/1998/1999), about how much did you earn from employment before taxes and 
all other deductions? 
 
Again gross wages are recorded, containing details on all forms of employment 
related income, including all commissions, tips and bonuses. Therefore, the NELS 
data has reported wages for respondents between the ages of 23 and 26
72’73. 
Previously, I stated my assumption that respondents are providing their income 
expectation conditional on holding a full-time job. Thus I only consider realised 
wages when the respondent was working full-time
74
. Those with no history of full-
time work have been excluded from the analysis. Table 3.3 shows that, by doing this, I 
                                                          
71
 Measurement error due to recall bias poses a possible difficulty in using this data. See Bound et al 
(2001) for further details on the difficulty of recording historical wages with retrospective questions. 
72
 I deflate all information on actual wages and unearned income into 1994 prices using data from the 
Annual Wage Index, available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/awidevelop.html 
73
 For 80% of respondents, data on full-time wages is available for at least 3 of these 4 years.  
74
 Where gaps appear in individuals wage profiles (between 23 and 26), information from previous 
years (when they were working full-time) shall be extrapolated forward to estimate age 30 wages. 
Further details follow in section 3.4 and Appendix 3.2. 
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exclude a further 605 (12%) observations. 
 
Table 3.3 Missing data on expected income and reported salary 
 
Observations 
remaining  
All male respondents (Starting sample) 5,782 
Individuals with missing expected income data dropped 5,149 
Individuals with expected income below $6,000 dropped 5,110 
Individuals with expected income over $250,000 dropped 5,039 
Individuals with no full time wage observed between ages 23 and 26 dropped 4,434 
Final sample 4,434 
Notes:  
1 Two item non response models are presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.4 that try to explain what factors are 
associated with missing data. Specifically, Table 3.1 investigates the drop in observations from 5,782 to 
5,039 (missing or illogical expectations data). On the other hand, Table 3.4 looks at non-response to the 
actual salary data (i.e. the drop in observations from 5,039 to 4,434). 
2 Authors calculations from the NELS dataset.  
 
 
Of course, like the missing expectations data, this may introduce some selectivity into 
the sample. Individuals may choose not to work full-time between the ages 23 and 26. 
An obvious example is graduate students, many of whom remain in education 
throughout their early twenties. If these individuals are substantially more or less 
realistic than other groups, then some selection bias may be introduced into my 
results. Alternatively, there could be a direct relationship between income 
expectations and selection out of work. Those with unrealistically high income 
expectations may also have unrealistically high reservation wages. These individuals 
are less likely to receive a suitable wage offer, and therefore choose not to work. In 
this situation, I would be excluding the most unrealistic individuals from the analysis. 
In Table 3.4 I present a logistic regression that investigates this possible selectivity.  
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Table 3.4 Logistic regression of missing full-time wage history 
  Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 
 
Odds 
ratio 
Standard 
error 
Odds 
ratio 
Standard 
error 
Odds 
ratio 
Standard 
error 
Socio-economic status index (Ref: Lowest quartile)       
Second quartile 1.06 0.31 1.05 0.31 1.06 0.36 
Third quartile 0.93 0.24 0.88 0.22 0.96 0.28 
Top quartile 1.09 0.34 1.02 0.33 0.84 0.30 
Family income parents reported when respondent 
was age 18 (Ref: bottom quartile)       
Second quartile 0.77 0.16 0.79 0.16 0.80 0.19 
Third quartile 0.59* 0.14 0.61* 0.14 0.63 0.17 
Top quartile 0.32* 0.07 0.35* 0.07 0.37* 0.09 
Race (Ref: white)       
American Indian or Alaska Native 0.55 0.57 0.72 0.74 0.91 0.88 
Asian or Pacific Islander 2.86* 0.94 2.39* 0.73 1.59 0.44 
Black, not Hispanic 1.03 0.33 1.07 0.33 0.82 0.22 
Hispanic or Latino 0.85 0.24 0.86 0.25 0.79 0.24 
More than one race 1.15 0.45 1.12 0.46 0.87 0.30 
Reported health problems at 20 (Ref: Yes)       
No  0.37 0.16 0.41* 0.17 0.33* 0.22 
Labour force status at 20 (Ref: Student who does 
not have a job)       
Student who also has a job 1.01 0.20 1.07 0.21 0.98 0.24 
Working only 0.75 0.19 0.96 0.24 1.00 0.26 
Not student or working 1.76 0.55 2.04* 0.63 1.84* 0.50 
Housing tenure at 26 (Ref: Homeowner)       
Rent from someone, not a relative - - 2.25* 0.49 1.47 0.36 
Rent from a relative - - 2.29* 0.87 1.52 0.70 
Live in residence without paying rent - - 3.43* 0.82 1.82* 0.48 
Expected income - - 1.01 0.01 1.01 0.01 
Maths ability - - 1.27* 0.06 1.21* 0.07 
Drop out of university (Ref: No)       
Yes - - 1.04 0.23 0.76 0.20 
Working status at 26 (Ref: Working full-time)       
Work part time - - - - 4.57* 1.12 
Study only - - - - 24.15* 6.27 
Work full time & study - - - - 0.79 0.29 
Work part time & study - - - - 15.88* 3.98 
Neither work or study - - - - 18.93* 5.04 
Observations 5,039   5,039   5,039   
Notes: 
1 This table investigates the characteristics of the 605 young men who did not have a full time wage 
recorded at any point between the age 23 and 26 
2 An odds ratio greater than 1 means a greater chance of non-response than the reference 
3 See notes to Table 3.1 for details on the Socio-Economic Status Index and “Maths Ability” variables 
4 “Expected Income” is how much a $10,000 increase in expected wage influences the chance of 
response. 
5 * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level 
6 Authors calculations from the NELS dataset. Sample size in all specifications was 5,039. Dependent 
variable was a binary variable, taking a value of 0 if the respondent did not any information available 
on their actual wage history and 1 if they did 
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Respondents who have parents in the top quartile of the income distribution are three 
times more likely to respond than their peers whose family income is in the bottom 
quartile. Similarly, those with reported health problems are more likely to be excluded 
than those without. On the other hand, it seems that respondents who were students at 
age 20 are just as likely to be excluded as those who were working. However, those 
who were unemployed at age 20 are relatively unlikely to have a full-time wage 
recorded between the ages of 23 and 26. Reassuringly, there is little evidence that 
those with the highest wage expectations were the least likely to be working full-time 
between the ages 23 and 26. Interestingly, specification 3 and 4 show that low ability 
respondents were less likely to be excluded from the analysis because of missing 
income data. It seems the brightest sample members tend to either not report their 
salary or have selected out of full-time work up to age 26 (e.g. to continue their 
education). If individuals of high ability are more efficient at processing labour 
market information and thus hold more realistic expectations, then their exclusion 
may have an influence on my results. The final specification shows that those who are 
still studying at age 26 are the most likely to be excluded. Further analysis not 
presented indicated that around half the excluded observations came from individuals 
who were studying full-time at age 26. It is likely that these individuals have never 
left higher education, and hence have no full-time wage history. The main implication 
seems to be that certain groups of students are likely to be excluded from the analysis; 
particularly those who continue onto graduate school and remain in education through 
their early 20’s. If these individuals hold significantly more (or less) realistic 
expectations than other groups of students, then my results could again be influenced 
by their exclusion.  
 
I further investigate for selection from missing data in Table 3.5 by presenting a set of 
summary statistics. The left hand column illustrates the characteristics of the initial 
5,782 male observations in the complete NELS sample, while the column on the right 
shows the characteristics of the 4,434 individuals who are not missing any key 
information. Reassuringly, the distribution of observable characteristics remains 
reasonably similar. 
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Table 3.5 Summary statistics showing the NELS sample composition, before and 
after the exclusion of missing expectations and wage data 
  
Starting 
sample % 
Final 
sample % 
Labour force status at age 20   
Students who also have a job 26.6 26.0 
Students who do not have a job 27.0 28.4 
Working, not a student 35.0 35.8 
Neither student or working 11.3 9.8 
Highest qualification at age 26   
Less than high school 6.0 5.3 
High school 55.6 56.2 
Associates degree 7.1 6.9 
Bachelors 28.2 28.6 
MA/PhD 3.1 3.0 
Race   
White 66.6 68.5 
American Indian or Alaska Native 1.0 0.8 
Asian or Pacific Islander 5.5 5.1 
Black, not Hispanic 8.2 8.0 
Hispanic or Latino 13.1 13.1 
More than one race 3.0 2.6 
Other 2.6 1.8 
Family income student reported at age 18 ($1992)   
0-20000 18.5 18.1 
20000-35000 19.8 19.8 
35000-50000 17.7 18.4 
50000-75000 16.0 16.5 
75000+ 12.3 12.4 
Missing 15.7 14.9 
University subject at 20 years old (If reported being a 
student)   
Agriculture 1.9 2.3 
Accounting, Finance 6.1 6.2 
Business Management  12.7 13.1 
Journalism, Communication 3.3 3.6 
Computer Science, Maths 4.8 5.4 
Education 5.1 5.4 
Engineering, Physical Sciences 16.9 17.4 
Languages  1.8 1.7 
Health 6.8 6.2 
Law  4.2 3.9 
Biological Science 7.4 6.6 
Social Sciences, Humanities 9.1 9.1 
Arts 5.0 4.6 
Other 14.9 14.6 
Working full-time At age 26   
Yes 74.0 84.0 
No (e.g. unemployed, student, working part-time etc) 26.0 16.0 
Observations 5,782 4,434 
Notes:  
1 “Starting sample” refers to all men in the age 26 sweep of the NELS. “Final Sample” refers to the 
sample I use in my analysis, once I have excluded missing data 
2 Authors calculations from the NELS dataset.  
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Though the primary focus of this chapter is young men’s expected income, I present 
some additional results referring to other aspects of their anticipated labour market 
success as a robustness check. In particular, I put forward the argument that if students 
are unrealistic about their future income, they are also likely to be unrealistic about 
other aspects of the labour market, like their future occupation. Analogous to finding 
excessive income expectations, individuals may expect to be in a professional 
occupation when they turn 30, but actually end up working in a relatively low paying 
job. As part of the NELS survey at age 20, individuals were asked what occupation 
they thought they would be working in at age 30
75
. In the final survey wave (age 26) 
individuals were asked what occupation they currently hold. Therefore I also compare 
expected and realised occupation to support my main analysis surrounding young 
adults’ income expectations. 
 
At this point, however, one should note that there are two significant problems with 
comparing expectations and realisations using the NELS data: 
 
(a) At age 20, respondents were asked what they expect their income (and 
occupation) to be at age 30. However, data on labour market realisations is 
only collected between the ages 23 and 26. 
(b) Respondents are asked about their expected income. Data on realisations 
focuses on wages. 
 
I go on to discuss these points in section 3.4 and Appendix 3.2. Specifically, these 
sections cover how I use the information available to predict individuals age 30 
income. To conclude this section, I simply ignore such issues and compare 
expectations of income at age 30 to realised wages at age 26.  
 
 Figure 3.2 presents the distribution for age 26 (actual) wages.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
75
 The exact wording of the question was: “What job do you expect or plan to have when you are 30 
years old?” Respondents were asked to write in an occupational description into an open text field. 
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Figure 3.2a Distribution of age 26 actual income (in 1994 US $) for young US 
males 
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Figure 3.2b Distribution of log age 26 actual income (in 1994 US $) for young US 
males 
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Notes: 1 Source Authors calculations from the NELS dataset. Sample size = 4434 
101 
 
Comparing this to the expected income distribution at age 30 in Figure 3.1, there is 
significantly less bunching and positive skew. The standard deviation is much smaller 
($16,479 for the actual age 26 wage distribution compared to $30,051 for the age 30 
expected income distribution), though there is little difference in the decile ratio (3.4 
compared to 3.2). Further insights come from investigating the ratio of  the 10
th
 to 50
th
 
percentile (p10/p50) and the 90
th
 to 50
th
 percentile (p90/p50) . The bottom halves of 
the distributions (p10/p50) are very similar (0.6 in the actual distribution compared to 
0.625 in the expected). The difference is slightly bigger in the top half of the 
distribution, with the p90/50 for actual wage (1.8) below that in the expectations (2.0). 
There is also some initial evidence that young adults’ expectations may be somewhat 
optimistic. The median (mean) expected income at age 30, in 1994 prices, is $40,000 
($50,312). Comparatively, the median (mean) actual wage of 26 year olds stands at 
$23,079 ($26,210). For expectations to be realistic on average by age 30, I would 
need to find that either: 
 
(a) average annual real wage growth is around 15% between the ages 26 and 30.  
or 
(b) 30 year old men, on average, have large quantities of unearned income. 
 
I turn to these two topics in the following section. 
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3.4 Prediction of age 30 income 
 
Respondents are asked what they expect their annual income to be when they turn 30, 
but realised wage data is only available between ages 23 and 26.  In Appendix 3.2 I 
fully set out two methods of predicting age 30 income. In this section, I will provide 
the intuition behind these methods. Specifically, I separate this into two parts: (a) the 
estimation of wages, and (b) the estimation of unearned income.  
 
Wages 
 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the data observed for one particular individual in the NELS
76
. At 
age 26, this individual has a particularly large wage by his "historical" (age 23- 25) 
standards. This may be a permanent shift in his wage profile, for instance a change in 
career. In this case, previous earnings have little relevance for predicting future 
wages. In contrast this could be a temporary shock to his wage, for instance a 
salesman who has had a particularly good year. In future periods, his wage will revert 
to its historical average (i.e. the average of the previous 3 years). On the other hand, 
reality may lie somewhere in-between these two extremes, perhaps reflecting the fact 
that he happened to receive a large pay rise that year.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
76
 For this particular individual, the income they expect is significantly higher than their wages 
recorded at age 26. This is not typical of all other respondents in the dataset. Rather I have chosen this 
individual as he is a good example of the substantial points I make throughout this section.  
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Figure 3.3 Data on expected income and actual wages that can be observed for 
one particular individual in the NELS 
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Note: 
1 This individual reported zero unearned income at age 26; therefore his wages are equivalent to his 
income. Note that in these diagrams, I am simply trying to explain my extrapolation method for wages.  
This individual is not an example of a “typical” NELS respondent. Rather, I have chosen this 
observation as it provides a good example of the points I am tying to make. 
2 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS dataset.  
 
Given these possibilities, I use two methods to predict age 30 wages. The first method 
views large wage changes as a permanent shift in an individual’s earnings profile. 
Under this method, I simply take the most recently observed wage (age 26) for each 
individual and extrapolate it forward (to age 30). Figure 3.4 presents a hypothetical 
example. 
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Figure 3.4 Illustration of wage prediction method 1 for ID 7286532 in the NELS 
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Note:  
1 See notes to Figure 3.3 
2 The above is a hypothetical example of extrapolation method 1.  
 
To implement this method, I use estimates of the annual real wage growth for young 
workers provided by Rubinstein and Weiss (2007). Specifically they provide a table of 
average annual real wage growth rates broken down by labour market experience and 
educational attainment for three surveys; the Current Population Survey (CPS), Panel 
Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) and National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 
(NLSY 79)
77
. The growth rates they calculate from the CPS, PSID and NLSY are 
provided in Table 3.6, with further details available on page 14 and Appendix 5 of 
Rubinstein and Weiss (2007).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
77
 Rubinstein and Weiss restrict each of the above datasets to full-time, male, American workers, as I 
have done with the NELS. One should note, however, that these surveys all relate to different years. 
The CPS data relates to wages between 1998 and 2002, the PSID is for all years after 1968, while the 
NLSY draws its information between 1979 and 2000. 
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Table 3.6 Average, annual (real) wage growth rates for young workers:  
Rubenstein and Weiss estimates 
 
    
% Average (real) wage growth rate per annum by 
education level 
Number of years 
experience in the 
labour force 
Data 
source 
Below 
high 
school 
High 
school 
Some 
college 
College 
graduates MA/PhD 
0-10 CPS 2.4 3.2 3.3 3.6 2.9 
 PSID 2.8 3.0 3.8 3.9 3.2 
 NLSY 2.4 3.4 4.6 5.2 5.5 
11-15 CPS 1.6 2.2 - - - 
 PSID 1.9 2.0 - - - 
  NLSY 1.3 2.3 - - - 
Notes: 
1 Source: Table 1, page 14 of Rubinstein and Weiss (2007) Post Schooling Wage Growth: Investment, 
Search and Learning. Handbook of the Economics of Education, Volume 1 
 
These growth rates are applied to each individual in the NELS, depending on their 
highest qualification achieved by age 26
78
. From this point on, I shall call this 
prediction “Method 1”. Note that, for all groups, average real wage growth rates are 
under 6% per annum. This is well below the 15% per annum that I suggested NELS 
sample members needed in the unobserved period (i.e. between ages 26 and 30) for 
their expectations to be (on average) “realistic” (recall my brief discussion at the end 
of section 3.3).  
 
On the other hand, prediction “Method 2” views large changes in earnings as a 
temporary shift in an individual’s wage profile79. Thus individuals’ wage history, 
rather than just the most recent observation, is now informative for estimation of 
future wages. A hypothetical example is shown in Figure 3.5.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
78
 For example, an individual with college education, and who was earning $50,000 dollars at age 26, 
would be estimated to be earning $61,240 at age 30 (all in 1994 prices). This is calculated by $50,000 * 
(1.052
4
), using the NLSY data and “College graduates” column in Table 3.6. In the event that wages go 
unobserved at age 26 (e.g. the individual was unemployed) I extrapolate from their last observed full-
time wage. For example, if someone was earning $50,000 at age 25, and their wage was not recorded at 
age 26, I would predict their age 30 income to be $50,000 * (1.052
5
) = $64,577
 
79
 I am using the term “temporary” in a slightly different manner here compared to page 102. 
Specifically, for the illustrative individual in Figure 3.3 I do not assume that their wage growth reverts 
to their age 23-25 trajectory (and thus that his wage at age 26 contains no useful information in 
predicting age 30 wages at all). Rather I allow the age 26 wage to have some permanent impact on my 
prediction of his age 30 wage, but for it to be tempered by what they were earning between ages 23 and 
25. 
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Figure 3.5 Illustration of wage prediction method 2 for ID 7286532 in the NELS 
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Note:  
1 See notes to Figure 3.3 
2 The above is a hypothetical example of extrapolation Method 2.  
 
To implement this method, I use a fixed effects regression model following the 
methodology of Carneiro and Heckman (2003). Appendix 3.2 describes this 
prediction method in detail, including model specifications and robustness checks. I 
also show in Appendix 3.2 that this produces average age 30 wage estimates that are 
very similar to those from “Method 1” (though wage estimates from method 2 suffer 
from less variability)
80
. The similarity of average wage predictions across methods is 
due to the “shocks” that are incorporated in method 1 being both positive and negative 
(hence cancelling each other out on average). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
80
 This is because  outlying observations are moderated in Method 2 by the influence of previous wages 
(it is a time mean). This does not occur in Method 1, where it is only the most recent observation that is 
used for prediction. Hence if there is a large shock to the most recent observation, this gets carried 
forward to the future prediction in Method 1, as opposed to being averaged out in Method 2. 
107 
 
In Table 3.7 I compare my predictions from these two methods to similar information 
recorded for 30 year olds in an external data source (the 2003-2005 CPS March 
Annual Supplements
81
).  
 
Table 3.7 Predicted mean age 30 NELS wage compared to the mean age 30 
Current Population Survey (CPS) wage 
 
  
% of 
observations in  
NELS 
Predicted 
wage 
method 1 
($000)  
Predicted 
wage 
method 2 
($000) 
% of 
observations in 
CPS 
CPS wage 
($000) 
Highest qualification at 
age  26      
Below high school 5.4 20.9 20.8 12.4 15.8 
High school 56.4 27.0 25.5 47.8 24.7 
Associates degree 7.0 29.9 30.5 8.2 28.1 
Bachelors 28.0 37.7 37.8 24.6 38.1 
Masters degree / PhD 2.8 42.4 43.6 6.8 44.5 
Race      
White 69.8 31.4 31.3 60.6 31.5 
American Indian 0.1 23.6 24.6 0.2 NA 
 Asian or Pacific Islander 5.1 38.5 36.4 6.2 35.4 
Black (not Hispanic) 8.3 24.6 25.1 9.6 26.9 
Hispanic 13.3 27.4 27.1 21.7 20.7 
Other 4.6 27.1 26.6 1.7 NA 
All respondents 100.0 30.4 29.6 100.0 28.9 
Notes:  
1 All observations in 1994 $ 
2 See notes to Appendix Table A3.8 for further details 
3 The three left-hand most columns refers to authors calculations from the NELS dataset, the two 
columns on the right are based on data from the CPS taken from from 2002-2004 March Annual 
Supplement, restricted to men working full-time, all year round, at age 30 available from : 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstc/cps_table_creator.html. Total sample size in the NELS is 
4,434. In CPS, the total sample size is 1,412 
 
 
In general, average predicted age 30 wages appear similar to those in the external CPS 
data. I predict average wages to be $29,600 in the NELS, while in the CPS the 
equivalent figure is $28,900. Likewise, my predictions of average wages seem to be 
reasonably close to the CPS data for a number of sub-groups (e.g. those who are white 
or holding a bachelors degree), though there are instances where this is not the case 
(e.g. those with less than high school education and Hispanics)
82
. It is worth noting, 
                                                          
81
 The exact wording to collect income and wage data in the CPS is comparable to that used in the 
NELS. 
 
82
 I predict those with less than high school education to earn around $21,000 while the CPS figure 
stands at just over $15,000. My definition of “less than high school education” is those who made it 
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however, that both these groups only form a small part of the overall sample. The 
general message is that my prediction methods seem to generate a reasonable estimate 
of average age 30 wages. Further evidence of this can be found in Appendix 3.2. 
However, in Figure 3.6, I show that my two wage predictions for the illustrative 
NELS respondent are $15,000 (30%) apart. Anywhere between the two predictions, or 
even a figure outside of this range, could be possible. Thus a comparison of expected 
and actual wages at the individual level does not seem a sensible approach with the 
NELS data. On the other hand, when dealing with group averages, over-estimates of 
wage growth for some individuals will be compensated by underestimates for others.   
 
Figure 3.6 Comparison of wage prediction methods for ID 7286532 in the NELS 
Note:  
1 See notes to Figure 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
into the final year of high school but did not graduate. On the other hand the CPS represents the whole 
US population, and defines less than high school education as everyone who did not graduate from 
high school, including those who dropped out before their senior year. This is probably the reason why, 
in the NELS comparing to the CPS, my predicted wage is higher and there are a smaller proportion of 
respondents with below high school education. In a similar manner, I predict average wages for 
Hispanics to be around $27,000, while the CPS figure is closer to $20,000.  
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Unearned Income 
 
At age 26, respondents’ were asked about their non-wage income at age 25, with 74% 
of individuals reporting no unearned income
83
. Unearned income may make up a 
more significant proportion of total income at age 30 than at age 26. To investigate 
this, I compare mean wages to the mean total income for 30 year old men in the 2003-
2005 CPS March Annual Supplement
84
. Mean total income for this group is only $500 
higher than mean wages. This suggests that “other” sources of income make up only a 
small fraction (roughly 2%) of 30 year old men’s total income (on average). I also 
investigate the extent of unearned income reported in another American data source 
(the NLSY 1979), again finding that it has very little impact on the average individual 
(the median unearned income is zero)
85
. Therefore, to incorporate unearned income 
into my predictions, I simply use the value recorded at age 25 in the NELS. Given the 
minor contribution this makes to individuals total income, this should not introduce 
substantial bias at the group or population level (the same, however, is unlikely to be 
true if one were to try and make inferences at the individual level).  
 
Summary 
I have presented two methods to predict age 30 wages, both of which are comparable 
with external estimates from population level data. Moreover, even though age 30 
unearned income is difficult to predict, this makes up only a small proportion of total 
average income at the group or population level. I am therefore confident that the 
substantive inferences in section 3.5 regarding population and group level averages 
are robust to the data issues discussed throughout this section. However, inferences 
made at the individual level are likely to suffer from what may be quite severe biases. 
Thus I choose not to conduct such analysis in this chapter. For a more detailed 
discussion of these issues, I encourage the reader to turn to Appendix 3.2, where I 
present a full description and justification of the methods used. 
                                                          
83
 The exact wording of this question can be found in Appendix 3.2, and asks respondents to include 
income from savings, stocks and bonds along with any child support, family or disability payments. 
84
 Several questions about other (unearned) sources of income were asked in the CPS. This includes 
how much they received from benefits, welfare, assistance, dividends and interest. Hence the definition 
of “other income sources” seems largely comparable with that applied in the NELS (though an obvious 
difference is that the NELS asks for this information in a single question, compared to several 
component parts in the CPS). The data I use is drawn from the CPS “Table Creator”, available from 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstc/cps_table_creator.html I produce two values, one looking at 
men’s average wages, the other their total income. I assume that the difference between these figures 
(average wages and average income) equals total income from unearned sources.  
85
 Infact 62% of men report having no unearned income. 
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3.5 Results 
 
In this section, I will compare students’ expectations to my prediction of their income 
at age 30. Throughout this discussion, I will focus on the results using prediction 
“Method 2” (fixed effect extrapolation model) from the previous section. Results 
using “Method 1” are generally consistent to those presented, with a discussion in 
Appendix 3.3. 
 
Before investigating the relative accuracy of students’ and workers’ expectations,   
Figure 3.7 presents the distributions for expected and predicted age 30 income across 
all individuals (i.e. both students and workers). 
Figure 3.7 Distribution of log expected and log predicted income at age 30  
0
2
0
0
4
0
0
6
0
0
8
0
0
10,000 20,000 40,000 80,000 160,000
Income (in 1994 $)
Expected Income/Frequency Predicted Income/Frequency
 
Note:  
1 All data in 1994 prices 
2 Predicted Income refers to that estimated using prediction method 2.  
3 Dashed bars refers to distribution of expected income at age 30, solid bars refer to my predictions of 
actual income at age 30 
4 Source: Diagrams produced by the author using the NELS dataset. Sample size = 4,434  
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Expectations (dotted lines) are clearly to the right of the predicted age 30 income 
distribution (solid lines). Very few 20 year olds expect to earn less than $20,000 at age 
30, though I predict that almost a quarter do. Conversely, there is quite a significant 
minority (3%) expecting to earn $100,000 or more, though in reality very few (1%) 
reach this milestone. Indeed, the median predicted income is $26,695 compared to 
expectations of $40,000, an average overestimation of around 50%
86
. 
 
I check the robustness of this result in Table 3.8, which illustrates the proportion of 
adults expecting to be in each occupation by age 30, and the actual proportion in each 
by age 26
87
. The last column gives the median wage for workers of all ages in each 
occupational group in 2004, drawn from CPS data, to give an idea of the financial 
status of each occupation (note Table 3.8 is ordered by this column).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
86
 Note that here I am discussing the median. In Table 3.7, where I compared predicted age 30 wages to 
data from the CPS, I am discussing the mean. 
87
 Of course, some young adults are still in education at age 26, who are likely to be working 
professionals by age 30. However, this group is only relatively small, and are contained within the 
4.5% described as “not working/studying/homemaker”. Even if I assigned this group to a professional 
category, I would still find large overestimation in the results. 
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Table 3.8 Proportion of 20 year olds expecting to enter each profession by age 30, 
and the proportion who have actually entered that profession by age 26 
 
  
% expecting to be 
in the occupation 
at age 30  
% actually in 
each 
occupation at 
age 26 
Difference 
between 
expected and 
actual (% 
points) 
Average annual CPS 
wage for each 
occupation in 2004 
(deflated to 1994 $000) 
Homemaker, not working, studying 0.6 4.5 -3.9 0.0 
Farmer 2.1 0.8 1.2 12.5 
Labourer 2.0 9.3 -7.3 16.7 
Service 1.1 3.1 -2.0 17.0 
Skilled operative 3.1 7.7 -4.6 19.6 
Clerical 1.5 6.2 -4.7 19.9 
Craftsman 9.1 12.2 -3.1 20.6 
Sales 2.3 6.3 -4.0 22.7 
Protective services 7.7 3.7 4.0 24.9 
Arts, Entertainment, Writing 6.8 1.7 5.1 29.3 
Teacher 6.0 3.3 2.6 32.5 
Professional Medicine (not Doctor) 5.5 1.2 4.3 35.0 
Other Professional 11.8 6.0 5.9 35.6 
Engineer 8.4 4.0 4.4 38.7 
Computer technical 3.5 6.7 -3.1 39.2 
Manager 11.4 12.7 -1.2 41.3 
Legal 3.3 0.6 2.7 53.0 
Doctor 3.4 1.1 2.3 63.7 
Military 1.8 1.4 0.4 NA 
Proprietor 8.5 7.3 1.2 NA 
Observations 4,218 4,368     
Notes:  
1 The difference column is the expectation % minus the actual %. 
 
2 The number of observations differs due to missing data. In total, 4368 of the sample had an 
occupation recorded by age 26. Some of these individuals reported that they “did not know” what 
occupation they expected when asked at age 20 (hence a sample size of 4218) 
 
3 The average CPS wage relates to the mean wage in each occupation for all workers above age 16 in 
2004. This is the year the NELS sampled turned 30. I have included and ranked occupations by this 
information to give an objective measure of occupational status. Data is not available for military 
occupations and business owners Source: Table 39 http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsa2004.pdf The weekly 
wages have been converted to annual equivalents and deflated to 1994 prices, using data from the US 
government social security office http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/awidevelop.html.  
 
4 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS dataset and the CPS data (referred to above).  
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Although one can only make quite a crude comparison, as the data relate to 
expectations and realisations at different ages, it nevertheless illustrates that young 
adults also seem to be overly ambitious in their occupational expectations
88
. There are 
fewer individuals in the highest paying occupations (engineers, arts, doctors) and 
more in the less well paid (sales, services and clerical roles) than expected. Moreover, 
note that in the column labelled “Difference between expected and actual”, negative 
figures tend to sit near the top of the table and positive numbers at the bottom. This 
also suggests that young adults occupy lower paying jobs than they previously 
expected. 
 
To summarise Table 3.8, I derive an “expected” and “predicted” income from this 
occupational data. Specifically, I use the reported proportions in each occupation as 
weights (i.e. column 2 as weights for expected income, column 3 for actual income), 
which I multiply by the occupation specific CPS wage (column 4). Using this method, 
I find that young adults expect an income of $29,683, but I predict them to actually 
obtain $24,538. Hence they overestimate their future income by 20%. Though this 
figure is significantly below the 50% found above, one should remember that this 
method captures just one aspect of the underlying issue. Even though a young man 
may be able to predict his occupation, he may overestimate the general pay that is 
received in that profession, or expect to be further up the career ladder than he 
actually achieves (e.g. expecting to become an army Sergeant by age 30, but only 
ending up a Private).  
 
In general, this preliminary analysis strongly suggests that young men overestimate 
their future labour market success. They expect an average income of $40,000, but in 
reality I predict their annual earnings to be less than $30,000. Moreover, many young 
men expect professional work that they do not go on to achieve. 
 
 
 
                                                          
88
 Of course, there is an issue that I observe individuals at 26 rather than 30, and they could change 
occupation over the unobserved period. However, if respondents were asked what occupation they 
expected to have at age 26, would one really expect them to give a substantially different answer? I 
believe that expected occupation at 26 and expected occupation at age 30 would be highly correlated, 
and for this to be a reasonable proxy.   
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The accuracy of students and workers 
 
Figure 3.8 presents results, analogous to the above, for just those sample members 
who were still in education at age 20. 
 
Figure 3.8 Distribution of log expected and log predicted income at age 30 for 
students 
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Note:  
1 See notes Figure 3.7 
2 Source: Diagrams produced by the author using the NELS dataset. Sample size = 2,412 
 
 
Clearly, the results are very similar to those presented above. The median predicted 
income (using Method 2) is $30,187 compared to expectations of $45,000; students 
overestimate their future income by around 50%. Likewise, Table 3.9 illustrates how 
the career expectations of young men still in education match with their eventual 
occupational attainment by age 26.  
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Table 3.9 Proportion of 20 year old students expecting to enter each profession by 
age 30, and the proportion who have actually entered that profession by age 26 
 
Notes:  
1  See notes to Table 3.8  
2 4 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS dataset and the CPS data (referred to Table 3.8). 
 
As in Table 3.8, many students expect to work in professional careers, but end up in 
less prestigious jobs. For instance, whereas 8.5% expect to become artists or 
entertainers, only 2.5% work in these occupations by age 26.  Likewise, only 6.2% are 
engineers at age 26, though around 11% thought they would be working in this 
profession. Again, when using the data in columns 2 and 3 to weight column 4 (as on 
page 113), I find students expect to earn, on average, $33,465 but their actual average 
income is $27,097; overestimation of around 25%.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
% expecting 
to be in the 
occupation at 
age 30  
% actually in 
each 
occupation at 
age 26 
Difference 
between expected 
and actual (% 
points) 
Average CPS wage for 
each occupation in 
2004 (deflated to 1994 
$000) 
Homemaker, not working, studying 0.6 4.8 -4.2 0.0 
Farmer 2.0 0.7 1.2 12.5 
Labourer 0.3 5.1 -4.9 16.7 
Service 0.7 3.6 -2.8 17.0 
Skilled operative 0.7 3.4 -2.7 19.6 
Clerical 1.0 7.1 -6.0 19.9 
Craftsman 3.5 6.5 -3.0 20.6 
Sales 2.4 8.0 -5.6 22.7 
Protective services 6.0 3.7 2.3 24.9 
Arts, Entertainment, Writing 8.5 2.5 5.9 29.3 
Teacher 8.2 5.5 2.7 32.5 
Professional Medicine (not Doctor) 7.1 1.3 5.8 35.0 
Other Professional 14.5 8.0 6.5 35.6 
Engineer 11.0 6.2 4.8 38.7 
Computer technical 3.8 9.2 -5.4 39.2 
Manager 12.8 13.7 -0.9 41.3 
Legal 4.8 1.2 3.6 53.0 
Doctor 4.9 1.6 3.4 63.7 
Military 0.7 1.5 -0.8 NA 
Proprietor 6.5 5.8 0.7 NA 
Observations 2,306 2,410     
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There seems sufficient evidence to conclude that students overestimate their future 
success in the labour market. I find they overestimate their income at age 30 by, on 
average, 50%. Likewise, I find that many graduates are working in service, clerical 
and sales roles that as 20 year old students they did not anticipate doing for a career. 
These findings complement results from Smith and Powell’s (1990) study of two mid-
western universities. They found students overestimated their salary at age 30 by 
around 40%. It seems that this general result holds across the wider US student 
population. 
 
I now turn to the results for young adults who were already in the labour market when 
asked for their income expectations. In section 3.2, I argued that: 
 
(a) Workers may make more accurate predictions of future income than their 
student peers 
and 
(b) That their expectations may, on average, be realistic. 
 
Figure 3.9 shows little support for either of these hypotheses.  
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Figure 3.9 Distribution of log expected and log predicted income at age 30 for 
workers 
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Note:  
1 See notes to Figure 3.7 
2 Source: Diagrams produced by the author using the NELS dataset. Sample size = 1,587 
 
Those who were working at age 20 expected an age 30 mean income of $40,000. In 
reality, I predict their mean income to be $24,789. Workers are overestimating their 
wage, on average, by around 60%. This is similar to the overestimation made by 
students, where I found a figure of 50%. These results are supported by my 
investigation of workers’ occupational expectations in Table 3.10.  
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Table 3.10 Proportion of 20 year old workers expecting to enter each profession 
by age 30, and the proportion who have actually entered that profession by age 
26 
 
  
% expecting 
to be in the 
occupation at 
age 30  
% actually in 
each 
occupation at 
age 26 
Difference 
between expected 
and actual (% 
points) 
Average CPS wage for 
each occupation in 
2004 (deflated to 1994 
$000) 
Homemaker, not working, studying 0.6 3.9 -3.3 0.0 
Farmer 2.3 0.9 1.3 12.5 
Labourer 4.0 14.6 -10.6 16.7 
Service 1.9 3.2 -1.3 17.0 
Skilled operative 6.2 13.6 -7.4 19.6 
Clerical 2.1 4.7 -2.6 19.9 
Craftsman 16.6 19.4 -2.8 20.6 
Sales 2.1 2.8 -0.6 22.7 
Protective services 8.8 4.9 3.9 24.9 
Arts, Entertainment, Writing 5.5 0.6 4.9 29.3 
Teacher 3.2 0.6 2.5 32.5 
Professional Medicine (not Doctor) 3.3 1.0 2.3 35.0 
Other Professional 7.6 12.4 -4.7 35.6 
Engineer 4.7 0.9 3.8 38.7 
Computer technical 3.2 1.6 1.6 39.2 
Manager 11.0 11.8 -0.8 41.3 
Legal 1.6 1.2 0.4 53.0 
Doctor 1.5 0.5 1.0 63.7 
Military 1.4 1.2 0.2 NA 
Proprietor 12.5 3.1 9.4 NA 
Observations 1,459 1,595     
Notes:  
1 See the notes to Table 3.8 
2 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS dataset and the CPS data (referred to Table 3.8). 
 
Whereas 4.7% of workers expected to become an engineer, less than 1% were 
working in this occupation at age 26. On the other hand, around 1 in 20 thought they 
would be working as a labourer by age 30. Yet around an eighth held this job at age 
26. Calculating weighted average wages from this occupational data (see page 113), I 
find workers expect a wage of $29,263 but end up receiving $25,907; a difference of 
15%. Once again, this may appear to be small when compared to the 60% 
overestimation in wages. But I remind the reader that this method captures just one 
aspect of the underlying issue (as discussed previously on page 113). 
 
 
 
 
119 
 
Overall, there is little evidence that workers hold realistic expectations. In fact, on 
average they are just as unrealistic as their student peers. Both groups tend to 
overestimate their future income and occupation; many believe they will receive the 
financial rewards on offer in professional careers, but will ultimately not be able to 
obtain this goal. 
 
Comparing workers to different groups of students 
 
The above analysis has treated those in higher education at age 20 as a homogenous 
group. In reality, students differ in all manner of characteristics, including the subject 
they study, prior academic achievement, whether they also hold a job, and, looking 
into the future, whether they eventually graduate. I extend the above analysis by 
trying to answer three questions. Firstly, though workers may not hold more realistic 
expectations than the “average student”, they may make better predictions than 
particular groups. Do workers make better predictions than say Art and Humanities 
students, for instance, whom I found to be the least realistic over short time horizons 
in the UK? Secondly, are factors such as race, ability and social class influencing both 
enrolment in higher education and the accuracy of expectations? If so, is it these 
factors that are driving my results? Finally, can I provide any further evidence that 
experience in the labour market is unrelated to accuracy of expectations, as my 
findings so far suggest, by considering differences between students with and without 
a job? 
 
I investigate these questions by estimating an Ordinary Least Squares regression 
model
89
. I specify the dependent variable as the natural logarithm of the expected 
income divided by the predicted age 30 income: 
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89
 One might suggest that this looks like an individual level analysis that I ruled out in the previous 
section as inappropriate. On the other hand, another way of looking at this is that I am analysing 
conditional means (and thus that I am infact undertaking further analysis at the group level). 
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Webbink and Hartog (2004) use a similar specification in their analysis of Dutch 
students’ wage expectations. This specification is assumed to satisfy the condition that 
errors are normally distributed with constant variance
90
. It also allows a distinction 
between respondents who over and under estimate their future income, unlike the 
specification preferred by Betts (1996) and Wolter (2000). Later in this section, I also 
present quantile regression estimates as an alternative to test the robustness of my 
results
91
.  
 
In the first specification, I compare working 20 year olds to students defined by the 
subject that they study
92
. In other words, workers enter the regression model as the 
reference group, with 14 dummy variables representing students in different 
disciplines. I then add in a term reflecting the respondents’ cognitive ability in 
mathematics at age 18. Intelligent individuals are more likely to enter higher 
education. But they may also be particularly adept at processing the labour market 
information that they receive. Once I have controlled for students’ superior ability, do 
I find that workers (who may hold a greater quantity of information) hold more 
realistic expectations? 
 
Specification 3 controls for a series of other potentially confounding factors, including 
race and family background. Work from the sociological literature, for example Baird 
et al (2008), describes the importance of controlling for these characteristics when 
considering the accuracy of students’ expectations. I also include an indicator for 
whether the respondent was a student who also held a part-time job while at 
university. Previously, I argued that workers will have more accurate expectations 
than students as they hold more labour market information. In a similar manner, one 
would expect students in paid employment to hold more labour market information 
than their university peers without a job. I use this analogy in the final specification as 
an additional test of whether labour market experience is related to accuracy of 
                                                          
90
 Analysis of the OLS residuals was carried out thoroughly after estimation of each regression model. 
There was little evidence that the normality and constant variance assumptions were violated. 
91
 I choose to present the OLS results as I can easily take into account the complex survey design used 
in NELS. This is much trickier when using alternatives such as quantile regression. 
92
 Under both prediction methods, students in all subjects are assumed to have the same average annual 
real wage growth rate between 26 and 30. I also experimented with a prediction model that allowed 
wage growth to vary between graduates from different subjects. Results were largely the same to those 
presented. 
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income expectations. 
 
However, when making comparisons between students and workers, one should 
remember that some of those who enter higher education leave without obtaining a 
degree. In other words, even though these students were enrolled in a college 
programme at age 20, they may not have obtained a university level qualification by 
age 26. The OECD 1998 Education at a Glance report (OECD 1998) notes that the 
USA has a relatively low university completion rate (just over 60% of those who 
enter). This is reflected in the NELS data; around 30% of those who were students at 
age 20 had not obtained a degree by age 26
93
. I take this into account in my final 
specification by including a dummy variable that indicates whether the individual 
became a “college drop-out” (i.e. enrolled in university at age 20, but had not 
obtained a degree by age 26). Interpretation of the subject dummies will therefore 
change between the first three specifications and the fourth. In particular, the final 
specification will indicate the accuracy of students’ expectations compared to 
workers, conditional on successful degree completion by age 26. 
 
Formally, the final specification of the model is: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
93
 Morgan (2005) finds a similar proportion when he uses a different sample selection of the NELS 
data. 
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With: 
 
exp
ijY  = Expected income at age 30 
act
ijY  = Predicted income at age 30, using Method 2 
 R = Race 
 F = Parental income when respondent was 18 years old 
 S = Subject of study, working or unemployed at age 20 
 T = Measure of individual ability at age 18 
 D = Whether the respondent was a university student at age 20, but had not obtained  
a degree by age 26  
 W = An indicator of whether the individual was a student who also held a job at age   
20 
 ξij = Error term. Individuals were initially sampled by school clusters at age 14, which 
is accounted for by adjusting the standard errors. 
i = Individual i 
j = School j, that the individual was initially sampled from at age 14. All standard 
errors have been adjusted to take into account the complex sampling design 
(clustering of children within schools)
94
. 
 
Results are presented in Table 3.11.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
94
 I also experimented with a fixed effects regression model, including a dummy variable for each 
school that children were initially sampled from. Results were largely unchanged from those presented. 
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Table 3.11 Ordinary least squares regression results comparing the accuracy of 
students’ income expectations to workers 
  Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
  Co SE Co SE Co SE Co SE 
Work-student status at age 20 (Ref: 
Working)         
Agriculture student -0.27* 0.07 -0.20* 0.07 -0.21* 0.07 -0.29* 0.07 
Economics, Finance student -0.09 0.09 -0.02 0.09 -0.03 0.09 -0.14 0.09 
Business, Management student -0.03 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.06 -0.11* 0.06 
Journalism, Communication student 0.18* 0.08 0.22* 0.08 0.21* 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Computer Science, Maths student -0.18* 0.09 -0.11 0.09 -0.15 0.10 -0.29* 0.09 
Education student  -0.10 0.06 -0.05 0.06 -0.06 0.06 -0.15* 0.07 
Engineering, Physical sciences student -0.22* 0.05 -0.16* 0.06 -0.18* 0.06 -0.29* 0.06 
Language student -0.17 0.11 -0.10 0.11 -0.09 0.11 -0.22 0.12 
Health student 0.13* 0.07 0.19* 0.07 0.17* 0.08 0.06 0.08 
Law student 0.45* 0.19 0.45* 0.18 0.44* 0.18 0.26 0.17 
Biological science student 0.20* 0.09 0.27* 0.09 0.27* 0.09 0.16 0.09 
Social sciences, Humanities student 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.07 -0.03 0.07 
Art  student 0.26* 0.11 0.31* 0.11 0.31* 0.12 0.15 0.11 
Other student 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.06 -0.10 0.06 
Not student or working 0.12* 0.05 0.13* 0.05 0.11* 0.05 0.10* 0.05 
Missing 0.28* 0.07 0.30* 0.07 0.26* 0.07 0.27* 0.07 
Maths ability at age 18 - - -0.08* 0.02 -0.07* 0.02 -0.05* 0.02 
Race (Ref: White)         
American Indian or Alaska Native - - - - 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.09 
Asian or Pacific Islander - - - - 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.06 
Black, not Hispanic - - - - 0.20* 0.05 0.18* 0.05 
Hispanic or Latino - - - - 0.13* 0.05 0.11* 0.05 
More than one race - - - - 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.09 
Missing - - - - 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.07 
Family income parents reported when 
respondent was age 18 (Ref: Bottom 
quintile)         
2nd quintile - - - - -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.05 
3rd quintile - - - - 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.05 
4th quintile - - - - 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Top quintile - - - - -0.01 0.06 0.02 0.06 
Student at 20, who also held a part-
time job (Ref: No)         
Yes - - - - 0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.04 
College dropout (ref: No)         
Yes - - - - - - 0.31* 0.05 
Constant 0.41* 0.03 0.38* 0.03 0.34* 0.05 0.36* 0.05 
Notes: 
1 The response variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio of expected to actual income  
2 See notes to Table 3.1 for details on the “maths ability” variable 
3 * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level 
4 “Missing” dummy variables are included when the respondent has not provided information on any 
of the covariates. I do not present results for brevity.  
5 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS dataset. Sample size = 4,434. Dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of respondents expected age 30 income divided by their predicted actual age 30 
income. 
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Model 1 enters just the indictor of whether the respondent was working or a student, 
defined by the subject they were studying, at age 20. The results show workers sit 
somewhere in the middle of this ranking; they make better predictions than some 
students, but worse than others. Engineering, Physical Sciences, Maths, Education 
and Agriculture students are all more realistic on average than workers at the 5% 
level. Similarly, Art, Law, Journalism and Biological Science students are all less 
realistic than workers at the 5% level. Figure 3.10 shows this in more detail, 
highlighting by how much each group overestimates their age 30 income (on 
average)
95
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
95
 To calculate how much a person with given characteristics overestimates by, one must sum the 
relevant coefficients from Table 3.11, and then take the exponent of this value. For example, take a 
journalism student. I want to know how much they overestimate their future income by using 
specification 1. Firstly, I sum the relevant coefficients (0.41+ 0.18) to get 0.59. I then take the 
exponential of this value exp(0.59), to get a value of 1.80. If I then subtract 1 from this value (1 is 
where expectations equals realisation) and multiply by 100 (to get the value into percentage form), I 
arrive at the average % overestimation (80% shown in Figure 3.10). 
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Figure 3.10 Difference between expectations and realisations: Workers compared 
to students in different subjects 
0% 50% 100% 150%
Agriculture student
Engineering and Physical Sciences student
Computer science & Maths student
Languages/ language based studies student
Education student 
Economics/Accounting/Finance 
Business man/admin student
Worker
Other student
Social Sciences and Humanities student
Not Student or Working
Health student
Journalism & Communication student
Biological Science student
Art  student
Missing
% Overestimation
Notes: 
1 Thick bars refer to average overestimation of age 30 income for each group. These figures have been 
calculated from model specification 1, which just contains the subject dummy coefficients and no other 
explanatory variables. The thin black line running through the centre of each bar is the 95% confidence 
interval of this estimate. 
2 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS dataset. Sample size = 4,434.  
 
It appears that young adults who are studying vocational, financial and 
mathematically based courses hold reasonably realistic expectations. For instance, 
those studying Computer Science and Maths overestimate their age 30 income by a 
(comparatively) small 20%. Students in Agriculture are even more realistic, their 
expectations are only just statistically different to their predicted realisations. Yet 
those studying artistic and writing based courses, with the exception of Language 
students, expect almost double what I predict them to earn.  
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This ranking of subjects is very similar to my results for UK students’ starting salary 
expectations, presented in chapter 2. Thus across countries, over a long and short time 
horizon, it appears that vocational and mathematical students are the most realistic, 
while those in more creative subjects are the least. It is interesting to consider this 
result in light of studies that have investigated actual wage differentials by college 
major. Specifically, there are some quite striking consistencies with Black et al 
(2003). The authors of this study note that perspective students are provided with 
‘little concrete information’ about the labour market success of graduates from the 
array of different US subject majors. Hence they illustrate the wages of graduates in 
around 40 disciplines, relative to the earnings of those who have left university with 
an Economics degree. They find that Engineers receive the highest wages, just as I 
find them to be the most realistic. Likewise, I find Art students are amongst the least 
realistic, while Black et al show that this group earn the lowest wages. Some other 
patterns seem to hold too; for instance when drawing comparisons between Biologists 
(lower earners and less realistic) and Physicists, Mathematicians and Chemists (higher 
earners, more realistic).  
 
Some care does need to be taken, however, in drawing the above interpretation from 
my results. An alternative explanation for why I find students in certain subject to 
make better predictions is that most young people enrolled in higher education do not 
have any idea what they will be earning at age 30. Respondents may, consequently, be 
reporting only their quite vague view of what the average graduate salary is at this 
age, with little variation in this figure by the subject they study. When expectations 
are then compared to realisations, it seems that students in certain subjects (e.g. 
Maths, Engineering etc) make more accurate predictions than others. But the only 
reason for this is that they happen to be in a discipline that leads to high earning jobs 
(i.e. it is not so much to do with them having “more realistic” expectations, but rather 
that they just happen to be enrolled in a subject that leads to high later earnings). 
Hence the greater “accuracy” in their expectations is reflecting the fact that all 
students anchor their (quite vague) expectations around the same (rather hazy) point – 
but that some groups tend to earn more than others. Although descriptive statistics do 
suggest that there is at least some variation in income expectations between the 
different subject groups (i.e. they do not all anchor on exactly the same point) I can 
not rule this explanation out for why those in certain disciplines make better 
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predictions than those in others
96
. The reader can see the extent of differential age 30 
income expectations by discipline if they turn to Appendix Table A3.14. 
 
In the second model I control for respondents’ cognitive ability in maths on a test 
taken at age 18. Earlier, I suggested that those of higher ability maybe more realistic. 
This seems to be consistent with the data. A worker of average ability overestimates 
his future wage by 46%. However if their maths test score was two standard 
deviations above the mean, I predict they overestimate their future income by only 
25%. Notice that the subject dummy coefficients have slightly decreased, for instance 
from -0.22 to -0.16 for Engineering students and -0.09 to -0.02 for Economics. Hence, 
although it seems that cognitive maths ability is related to accuracy of young adults’ 
income expectations, there is little evidence to suggest this is why I find that some 
groups of students to make better predictions than workers.  
 
In model 3, I add additional controls for Race and Family background. As stated by 
Baird et al (2008), race influences the accuracy of expectations. Blacks, Hispanics and 
Latinos all make worse predictions than Whites. On the other hand family 
background, measured by parental income quintile, is statistically insignificant. 
Notice, however, that none of the substantial results from model 2 change. 
Differences in family backgrounds and ethnicity do not explain why I find no 
difference between students and workers. I also include a variable that indicates 
whether the respondent was a student who also held some sort of formal employment 
at age 20
97
. If work experience provides young adults with valuable labour market 
information, which they process rationally, one would expect this group to make 
better predictions than their student peers who do not have a job. Again, this does not 
seem to be the case. The coefficient is small and statistically insignificant, with this 
result holding across several specifications and unconditional estimates not presented. 
This supports my finding that labour market experience is unrelated to the accuracy of 
young adults’ long term income expectations. Not only do young adults working full-
time make no better predictions than students, but those enrolled in higher education 
                                                          
96
 For instance, Appendix Table A3.14 suggests that Education students’ expect their income at age 30 
to be on average $39,749 (mean), compared to $62,446 for those studying finance or accounting. The 
equivalent figures for the mean are $35,500 and $52,500. This variation may tend to suggest that the 
explanation given above is not the sole reason why I find differences across subjects in this chapter. 
97
 Around half of the students surveyed in the NELS fell into this category. 
128 
 
seem to receive little information about their long-term prospects in the labour market 
from holding a part-time job. 
 
The final specification enters a dummy variable for individuals who were students at 
age 20, but had not obtained a degree by age 26
98
. In other words, this group dropped 
out of university after reporting their income expectations. Firstly notice the large 
(0.31) and highly significant (t ≈ 6) coefficient. These students make particularly poor 
predictions of their future income, and are in fact significantly less realistic than their 
peers who entered the labour market straight from school
99
. For instance, workers 
overestimate their age 30 income by around 45%
100
, compared to 130% for a 20 year 
old Art or Journalism student who failed to complete their degree. This result can be 
interpreted in two ways. One possibility is that these students stated their income 
expectation on the assumption they would obtain a certain level of human capital and 
a valuable labour market signal. However, they did not go on to actually receive the 
outcomes they initially anticipated from their human capital investments, thus causing 
their apriori expectations to be incorrect.  Alternatively, these individuals could have 
dropped out of university because of their overly ambitious expectations. For 
instance, they may have gone to university thinking they would earn a high wage (i.e. 
their high expectation observed at age 20). But through their later experiences, they 
may have revised down their expectations substantially (i.e. If I were to observe 
expectations at age 21 say, they would be much lower). On the basis of this revision, 
they have decided that the benefits from obtaining a degree are not worth their 
continued investment, and hence leave university before the end of their course. 
Hence this variable is potentially endogenous; it could be these students 
unrealistically high expectations that is driving their decision to leave university, 
rather than their expectations being unmet because they drop out. 
   
 
 
                                                          
98
 This group makes up 17% of the 4,434 NELS sample members analysed in this paper. 
99
 For the prediction of age 30 income in section 3.4, I have treated this group the same as those with a 
high school qualification who never been to university at all. One may argue that college drop outs may 
have some wage premium over this group. All the results from specification 2 onwards still hold even 
if I make different assumptions (e.g. that this group have the same wage growth rate as those with an 
associate degree). 
100
 Note this is lower than before. Recall previously I focused on the median. Now I am using OLS 
regression, the measure of central tendency used is the mean.  
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Figure 3.11 illustrates how including this variable leads to a large change in the other 
parameter estimates. There is a particularly large effect on the subject dummy 
coefficients. Recall that these now compare the accuracy of students’ expectations to 
workers, conditional on whether they complete university by age 26. 
 
Figure 3.11 Difference between expectations and realisations: Specifications 3 
and 4 
 
Notes: 
1 Black bars refer to model specification 3, where I control for ethnicity, family income and ability in 
mathematics. The light grey bars refer to model specification 4, which also includes an indicator of 
whether the respondent had graduated from university by age 26. 
2 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS dataset. Sample size = 4,434.  
 
 
The light grey bars in Figure 3.11 are the estimated overestimation of age 30 income 
for each group, calculated using specification 4. These results add further weight to 
my finding that students are no less realistic than workers. Consider, for instance, 
Business students. In specification 1-3, they were statistically indistinguishable from 
workers, overestimating their age 30 income by around 45%. Now I find they are 
substantially more realistic, conditional on them having graduated by age 26, 
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overestimating their age 30 income by a comparatively small 30%. On the other hand, 
those who dropped out of Business school overestimate their future income by around 
75%. Similarly, the once statistically significant difference between Art, Law, Health 
and Journalism students and workers has now disappeared. There is even less 
evidence that workers are more realistic than students, and in fact quite the opposite 
may even be true.  
 
It is also interesting to note that, for some groups of students, the difference between 
expectations and later realisations is now statistically insignificant. This includes 
Agriculture, Computer Science, Maths, Engineering and Physical Science graduates, 
who overestimate their age 30 income by, on average, less than 10%. Hence, 
conditional on successful completion of an undergraduate degree, I find that some 
groups of students are actually quite realistic, even over a relatively long time 
horizon.  
 
In Table 3.12 I present various robustness tests that refer to the third specification of 
the regression model described above
101
. Specifically, model A refers to when I do not 
extrapolate the actual wage data, and simply compare age 26 income to expectations 
at age 30. Model B presents results when using “method 1” to predict age 30 wages, 
as described in section 3.4. Model C adjusts for the item non-response described in 
Tables 3.1 and 3.4, via the application of response weights I have created from a 
logistic analysis of missing data, while model D refers to quantile (median) regression 
estimates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
101
 I have chosen this specification as it controls for the largest number of pre-determined factors, 
without including the potentially endogenous “college dropout” variable. In analysis not presented, I 
ran each of these robustness tests for all specifications and found largely consistent results. 
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The results generally support those presented in Table 3.11. Notice that Blacks and 
Hispanics always make worse estimates than Whites, while family income is never 
statistically significant. Likewise, higher ability is always associated with more 
realistic expectations. The estimated subject dummy coefficients are also similar to 
before; Art, Biological Sciences and Journalism students make relatively poor 
predictions compared to both workers and their university peers who are studying 
Agriculture, Engineering or Physical Sciences. Likewise, in analysis not presented, I 
found the “college dropout” variable to be positive, strong and highly significant, 
while its inclusion again caused a relatively steep decline in the other model 
coefficients. 
 
To further test the robustness of my results, I estimate a binary logistic regression 
model of whether the respondent, at age 26, was working in the occupation he 
expected to be in at age 20. As argued previously, those who are the most realistic 
about their future occupation should also be the most realistic about their future 
income. Consequently, one would expect to see results from analysis of occupational 
data to be consistent with the above results regarding income. For instance, I should 
find that maths students make better predictions of their future occupation than those 
from creative subjects. Likewise, individuals who drop out of university should only 
rarely enter the occupation they expected at age 20. 
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Table 3.12 Robustness tests of accuracy of income expectations, using regression 
specification 3 
  Test A Test B Test C Test D 
  Co S.E Co S.E Co S.E Co S.E 
Work-student status at age 20 (Ref: 
Working)         
Agriculture student -0.07 0.07 -0.11 0.07 -0.23* 0.07 -0.27 - 
Economics, Finance student -0.04 0.09 -0.08 0.11 -0.02 0.10 -0.03 - 
Business, Management student 0.00 0.06 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.06 -0.02 - 
Journalism, Communication student 0.24* 0.09 0.19* 0.08 0.20* 0.08 0.39 - 
Computer Science, Maths student -0.01 0.10 -0.13 0.1 -0.13 0.11 -0.10 - 
Education student  0.10 0.07 -0.03 0.07 -0.06 0.07 -0.03 - 
Engineering, Physical sciences student -0.03 0.06 -0.17* 0.06 -0.19* 0.06 -0.14 - 
Language student 0.02 0.12 -0.04 0.13 -0.08 0.11 -0.10 - 
Health student 0.30* 0.07 0.19* 0.08 0.18* 0.07 0.17 - 
Law student 0.51* 0.18 0.42* 0.20 0.48* 0.24 0.40 - 
Biological science student 0.36* 0.08 0.25* 0.09 0.25* 0.09 0.43 - 
Social sciences, Humanities student 0.23* 0.08 0.14* 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.17 - 
Art  student 0.39* 0.13 0.32* 0.14 0.29* 0.12 0.43 - 
Other student 0.13* 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.13 - 
Not student or working 0.16* 0.05 0.12* 0.05 0.13* 0.05 0.10 - 
Missing 0.33* 0.07 0.27* 0.07 0.24* 0.07 0.42 - 
Maths ability at age 18 -0.04* 0.02 -0.07* 0.02 -0.06* 0.02 -0.10  
Race (Ref: White)         
American Indian or Alaska Native 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.1 0.11 - 
Asian or Pacific Islander 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.05 - 
Black, not Hispanic 0.22* 0.06 0.22* 0.05 0.20* 0.05 0.16 - 
Hispanic or Latino 0.13* 0.05 0.12* 0.05 0.14* 0.05 0.12 - 
More than one race 0.09 0.07 0.16* 0.08 0.06 0.09 -0.06 - 
Missing 0.16* 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.2 0.12 - 
Family income parents reported when 
respondent was age 18 (Ref: Bottom 
quintile)         
2nd quintile -0.09* 0.06 -0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 - 
3rd quintile -0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.05 -0.08 - 
4th quintile 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.01 - 
Top quintile 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.06 -0.03 0.06 0.03 - 
Student at 20, who also held a part-time 
job (Ref: No)         
Yes 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.04 - 
Constant 0.51* 0.05 0.36* 0.05 0.37* 0.05 0.34   
Notes: 
1 Test A refers to when I do not extrapolate the data, and simply compare age 26 income to 
expectations at age 30. 
2 Test B refers to when I extrapolate the income data using prediction “Method 1” (see section 3.4). 
3 In Test C, I re-weight the data to take into account the item non-response shown in Table 3.1 and 3.4.  
Robustness Test D presents the quantile (median) regression estimates. Note that standard errors have 
not been presented, due to the difficulties of providing accurate figures when using complex survey 
data (clustering and weighting) as in the NELS. 
4 * Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level 
5 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS dataset. Sample size = 4,434. Dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of respondents expected age 30 income divided by their predicted actual age 30 
income. 
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Specifically, I estimate a logistic regression using the binary indicator O as the 
response. This variable is assigned the value 1 if the respondent, at age 26, was 
working in the occupation he expected to be in at age 20. I enter the same covariates 
as in the model described on page 122 and Table 3.11.  Formally, this model is 
specified: 
 
iji5i4i3i2i1i0   W  D  A  S  F  R   
)(1
)(
log  
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
i
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Where: 
)( iO = Probability of respondent i entering the occupation they expected at age 20 
(by age 26) 
R = Race 
F = Parental income when respondent was 18 years old 
S = Subject of study, working or unemployed at age 20 
A = Measure of individual ability at age 18 
D = Whether the respondent was a university student at age 20, but had not obtained a 
degree by age 26  
W = An indicator of whether the individual was a student who also held a job at age 
20 
ξij = Error term. Individuals were initially sampled by school clusters at age 14, which 
is accounted for by adjusting the standard errors. 
i = Individual i 
j = School j, that the individual was initially sampled from at age 14 
 
Results are presented as odds ratios in Table 3.13. A coefficient greater than 1 
indicates a higher probability of the respondents’ occupational expectations being 
correct. 
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Table 3.13 Logistic regression results comparing how realistic students’ 
occupational expectations are to workers 
  Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
  OR SE OR SE OR SE OR SE 
Work-student status at age 20 (Ref: 
Working)         
Agriculture student 0.61 0.34 0.52 0.28 0.59 0.35 0.74 0.45 
Economics, Finance student 1.26 0.37 1.03 0.32 1.35 0.43 1.90* 0.60 
Business, Management student 0.80 0.22 0.71 0.20 0.92 0.27 1.25 0.38 
Journalism, Communication student 1.02 0.34 0.91 0.30 1.17 0.40 1.71 0.61 
Computer Science, Maths student 1.53 0.63 1.27 0.50 1.72 0.67 2.82* 1.25 
Education student  2.18* 0.57 1.92* 0.51 2.52* 0.73 3.41* 1.04 
Engineering, Physical sciences student 1.86 0.44 1.59* 0.39 2.07* 0.55 2.83* 0.77 
Language student 0.78 0.38 0.65 0.33 0.82 0.41 1.18 0.65 
Health student 0.47┼ 0.22 0.39* 0.19 0.56 0.27 0.78 0.38 
Law student 1.01 0.41 1.01 0.40 1.40 0.55 2.56* 1.05 
Biological science student 0.74 0.36 0.61 0.31 0.79 0.42 1.07 0.56 
Social sciences, Humanities student 0.67 0.22 0.56┼ 0.19 0.77 0.27 1.07 0.37 
Art  student 0.98 0.38 0.86 0.35 1.07 0.49 1.75 0.71 
Other student 1.33 0.32 1.23 0.31 1.66* 0.43 2.51* 0.68 
Not student or working 0.75 0.20 0.74 0.19 0.77 0.20 0.78 0.21 
Missing 1.31 0.38 1.23 0.35 1.85 0.56 1.78* 0.55 
Maths ability at age 18 - - 1.20* 0.06 1.17* 0.06 1.11 0.07 
Race (Ref: White)         
American Indian or Alaska Native - - - - 0.63 0.33 0.69 0.39 
Asian or Pacific Islander - - - - 0.76 0.24 0.72 0.23 
Black, not Hispanic - - - - 0.61 0.21 0.64 0.22 
Hispanic or Latino - - - - 0.90 0.21 0.97 0.23 
More than one race - - - - 0.85 0.29 0.89 0.32 
Missing - - - - 0.60 0.24 0.70 0.27 
Family income parents reported when 
respondent was age 18 (Ref: Bottom 
quintile)         
2nd quintile - - - - 0.90 0.21 0.93 0.21 
3rd quintile - - - - 0.94 0.22 0.92 0.21 
4th quintile - - - - 1.24 0.30 1.21 0.29 
Top quintile - - - - 0.96 0.26 0.87 0.24 
Student at 20, who also held a part-time 
job (Ref: No)         
Yes - - - - 0.58* 0.10 0.65* 0.11 
College dropout (ref: No)         
Yes - - - - - - 0.30* 0.06 
Notes:  
1 * Indicates statistical significance at the 5 % level, ┼ Indicates statistical significance at the 10% 
level. 2 A higher odds ratio indicates more realistic occupational expectations. 
 
2  Source: Authors calculations from the NELS dataset. Sample size = 4,218. Dependent variable is the 
whether the respondent was working at age 26 in the job they expected at age 20 (taking a value of 1 if 
they were and 0 otherwise). 
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There is reasonable agreement between these results and those presented in Table 
3.11. For instance, notice that mathematical and vocational students tend to make 
better predictions of their future occupation than workers, just as Table 3.11 showed 
they made better predictions of their income. However, it is also worth pointing out 
that, in some specifications, the coefficients only begin to approach traditional levels 
of statistically significance (though, qualitatively, they have the same sign). It is also 
interesting to note how the inclusion of the “college drop out” variable in 
specification 2 has the same effect in Tables 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13 (the subject 
coefficients all tend to increase, while the expectations of university drop-outs are 
particularly unlikely to become true). 
 
Qualitatively, other results from Table 3.11 also hold. Lower ability respondents are 
less likely to enter the occupation they expected at age 20, though this does not quite 
reach statistical significance, even at the 10% level. Likewise, Black respondents are 
less likely to enter their chosen occupation than Whites, but again this is not 
statistically significant. One interesting difference is that the coefficient on students 
holding a part-time job is now statistically significant at the 5% level. However, it is 
the opposite sign to what one would expect; those with a part-time job are less likely 
to enter the job they expected.  
 
Nevertheless, the directions of the parameter estimates are generally consistent with 
the results presented in Table 3.11. It seems that (qualitatively) these results support 
my substantial conclusions from the income expectations data. This gives me further 
confidence that my results are not being driven by my prediction methods for age 30 
income or assumptions I make about the income expectation data. 
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3.6. Discussion and conclusion  
 
The small US and European literature on young adults’ expectations has typically 
focused on how well university students can predict their first salary upon graduation. 
Though they sometimes deal with longer time horizons, results are normally shown to 
hold for only a very specific proportion of the US student population. Furthermore, 
existing work rarely compares the accuracy of different groups. There is little or no 
comparison of students versus workers, those studying for a mathematical degree 
versus a more creative subject, or those who successfully graduate versus those who 
do not. I try to resolve these issues by using rich, longitudinal data that has been 
drawn from across the US population of high school seniors. Hence I not only make a 
better attempt at representing the expectations of the US student population, but also 
tackle a set of new and interesting hypotheses that have not been previously 
considered in the literature.  
 
However, one should not ignore the difficulties I have encountered with the NELS 
data. Missing data, particularly the fact that age 30 income is not directly observed, is 
a notable problem. A second issue is whether the questions asked are accurately 
capturing young adults’ expectations (what they realistically believe will happen) 
rather than their aspirations (their hopes and dreams). The ordering and wording of 
the questions (given in section 3.3) should have guided respondents towards making a 
realistic assessment of their future income. Yet certain groups may have interpreted 
this question quite literally (e.g. Maths students report their expectations) while others 
have not (e.g. Art and Journalism students state their aspirations). This issue is not 
specific to this chapter, but rather the more general practice of collecting expectation 
data in economic research. As such, this seems an area that is ripe for future work. 
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Noting these caveats, my results suggest that, on average, students at age 20 have 
unrealistic expectations of their income at age 30. Yet this broad result needs 
qualification. Certain groups of students, conditional on successful completion of their 
degree, are actually quite realistic. For instance, Maths, Education and Engineering 
students overestimate their age 30 income by less than 10%. One may wish to view 
these results in light of Black et al (2003), who note that US students are provided 
with ‘little concrete information’ about the success of graduates in different subjects. 
Their paper tries to provide this information, illustrating the wages of graduates in 
around 40 disciplines. They find that Engineers receive the highest wages, just as I 
find them to be the most realistic. Likewise, Art students are amongst the lowest 
earners and least realistic. Even some quite specific patterns seem to hold. Biologists 
earn less than Physicists, Mathematicians and Chemists, though they do not seem to 
realise this when undertaking their human capital investments. Consequently, my 
results suggest there is certainly a need to provide prospective students with the type 
of information presented by Black and his co-authors (noting the caveat I placed on 
my interpretation of this result – that it could be reflecting students’ not having a clue 
what their wage will be at age 30 and hence those in all subject groups anchoring their 
expectation at some rough average point). 
 
On the other hand, there is substantial evidence that those young adults who are 
working at age 20 make quite poor predictions of their future income; overestimation 
is, on average, 50%. It is also interesting to consider again why workers seem to make 
no better predictions than students. As stated at the start of this chapter, it maybe that 
young workers are not focused on a particular career and hence suffer from a lack of 
direction in the labour market. Alternatively, it might be that young workers are 
myopic and choose to collect information from those who are closer to them in terms 
of age and the next rungs on the career ladder. Another possibility is that workers have 
both “accurate” and “inaccurate” sources of labour market information that they 
struggle to distinguish between. For instance, a manager may be keen to retain a 
particular staff member who is considering employment elsewhere. Thus the manager 
may overstate the chances of pay and progression within the firm. If the worker can 
not tell that this is “bad” information, it may lead him to raise his future income 
expectations. Indeed, in situations where workers only receive relatively poor quality 
information, one would expect them to be no more (and possibly even less) realistic 
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than their student peers. 
 
Finally, some young adults may not realise the value of the information that they hold, 
or how it applies to them and their future; they may discard (or give less weight) to 
some important information as they see it as irrelevant. For example, a young worker 
may know what a 30 year old employee in his organization is paid. But he (perhaps 
unrealistically) views his current job as a stop-gap solution, and believes he will have 
entered an entirely different industry in a few years time. He therefore does not fully 
incorporate the information he holds on the wages of 30 year olds into his income 
expectations. Indeed, this interpretation seems to be consistent with the findings of 
Smith and Powell (1990). They find that students can accurately estimate average 
graduate wages, but expect their own salaries to be a lot higher. Hence, although they 
are well informed about average wages (i.e. hold relatively good information), they do 
not necessarily incorporate this into their expectations (i.e. make good predictions of 
their own future salary). 
 
Linking these points back to my opening paragraphs, simplistic assumptions that 
young adults hold a combination of “full-information” and “rational expectations” 
may be based on a rocky foundation. It seems that young adults may be missing some 
important labour market information, making further research in the spirit of Black et 
al (2003) ever the more important. Yet economists must also develop a better 
understanding of how young adults use the labour market information that they hold. 
In many ways, it is difficult to believe they will give it the appropriate weight when 
making schooling decisions as is often assumed in a rational expectations framework; 
indeed, as the quote from Becker suggested at the start of this chapter, young adults 
probably do not realize their own limitations and tend to over-estimate their chances 
of good fortune
102
. Thus understanding exactly what information young adults hold, 
how they use it, and the effect this has on their schooling decisions should become an 
important area of future economic research. 
 
 
 
                                                          
102
 See Chevalier et al (2009) for some empirical evidence on this topic. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Disadvantaged children’s “low” expectations: Is the 
UK really so different to other industrialized nations? 
 
 
“Children who grow up in inferior environments may expect less 
of themselves and may not fully develop their academic 
potential because they see little hope for ever being able to 
complete college or use their schooling in any effective way” 
 
 
Cameron and Heckman (1999), Financing College Tuition: Government Policies & 
Educational Priorities, page 76-124 
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Educational attainment has risen dramatically across the developed world over the 
past 15 to 20 years, with particularly strong growth in university participation. For 
instance, the proportion of young adults obtaining a bachelors degree in Sweden has 
increased from 24% in 1995 to around 40% today (OECD 2009). Similar increases 
have been seen in Switzerland (9% to 30%), Japan (25% to 39%) and New Zealand 
(33% to 52%), amongst others. Despite this rising trend, access to tertiary education 
remains unequal. Children with well-educated, affluent parents are still over-
represented in higher education, with relatively limited opportunities for those from 
disadvantaged backgrounds. For instance, low socio-economic status children make 
up less than a quarter of university entrants in Sweden, despite representing over a 
third of the total population (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 2009). 
Likewise, the university entrance rate for disadvantaged children in the Republic of 
Ireland is half that of the national average. This issue has taken on particular 
prominence either side of the Atlantic, where worries mount over equality of 
educational opportunity and social mobility (see Blanden and Machin (2004), Machin 
and Vignoles (2004)). This is illustrated by the fact that only one in ten low income 
children from the US earn a degree by age 24 compared to almost three-quarters from 
wealthier families (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Research Paper 
2009). Likewise, Chowdry et al (2008) show that around one in three of all UK 
children enter higher education, compared to only 10% of those with the least 
educated parents.  
 
Consequently, several governments across the world have introduced policies to 
increase the number of disadvantaged children entering higher education. Ensuring 
children hold high expectations and aim for university from an early age is seen as a 
crucial step towards reaching this goal. In other words, there is a belief that future 
educational plans made during adolescence have a significant impact on later 
university attainment, and a concern that poor children’s low expectations may be 
limiting their opportunities to succeed. For instance, Khoo and Ainley (2005) suggest 
that children’s socio-economic background is linked to their educational intentions, 
which in turn influences their educational attainment. Likewise, Cowan (2009) finds 
that low educational expectations increase the probability of children engaging in 
“risky” behaviour. “Widening access” policies have thus emerged across the 
developed world that encourage children to hold high expectations for the future. 
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Such schemes are particularly prevalent in the US, with examples including the 
“Gear-up” and “I have a dream” programmes. Both try to encourage disadvantaged 
children to apply for university and aim towards a professional career. Similar 
initiatives have emerged during the last decade in the UK. This includes the “Aim 
Higher” and “Gifted and Talented” schemes, which give disadvantaged children near 
the end of compulsory schooling (around age 16) the chance to interact with 
professional workers and to be “mentored” by current university students. Hence the 
educational expectations of teenagers in the US and UK seem to be an on-going and 
prominent concern of academics and policymakers alike. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to gain a better understanding of the link between family 
background and children’s educational plans across the OECD. Specific research 
questions are set out in the following section, including whether advantaged children 
are more likely to expect entry into university than their disadvantaged peers, and if 
this is just reflecting differences in the schools they attend and test scores achieved 
during adolescence. I also consider how family background influences the educational 
expectations of the most academically able 15 year olds within each country; in 
particular, I investigate disadvantaged children who score high marks on an 
international assessment are more or less likely to plan for higher education than an 
affluent pupil who achieves a mark around the national average. In turn, I contemplate 
whether widening access schemes towards the end of compulsory schooling (age 15-
16) could play an important role in university access for the poor.  
 
This research is undertaken in a cross-nationally comparative framework, with a 
particular focus on countries within the UK (England, Scotland, Northern Ireland) and 
North America (US and Canada).  In doing so, I make an important addition to the 
existing literature by illustrating whether the socio-economic gap in children’s 
educational expectations is particularly 'big' in the aforementioned countries, and thus 
if these countries have a particular policy need to encourage disadvantaged children 
into considering higher education. It also allows me to explore whether age 15 test 
scores and school level factors explain more of the socio-economic gap in the UK 
than other developed countries.  Thus I add a comparative depth to studies such as 
Reynolds and Pemberton (2001), Chowdry et al (2009), Chevalier et al (2009) and 
Emmerson et al (2005) who all investigate adolescents’ educational expectations 
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within a single national setting (either the US or UK).   
 
I begin in section 4.2 by reviewing the relevant literature. This includes a discussion 
of how children's expectations differ to their aspirations, and how this concept is 
linked to their eventual educational attainment. Section 4.3 describes the Programme 
for International Student Assessment (PISA) data on 15 year old children that I 
analyse and my empirical methodology. During sections 4.4 and 4.5 I discuss the 
results. I conclude in sections 4.6 and 4.7 with a discussion of how my findings may 
inform educational policy in countries that encourage disadvantaged children to 'aim 
higher', like the UK. 
 
4.2. Motivation  
 
Obtaining a tertiary qualification offers substantial economic rewards, particularly in 
the US and UK. In the latter, the government often stresses that the average graduate 
earns £100,000 more over their lifetime than if they were to enter the labour market 
without a tertiary qualification (see Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
2008). Figure 4.1 illustrates that such returns are high by international standards; 
obtaining a tertiary level qualification seems to be a particularly good investment for 
young adults either side of the Atlantic. 
 
Friedman and Friedman (1980), amongst others, have argued that all young adults 
who can benefit from university should have access to the returns it offers, regardless 
of their family background. One reason is that this may lead to a more equitable 
society. Yet it is also important for economic efficiency. Labour is a scarce resource 
that needs to be allocated appropriately, but the brightest children may be excluded 
from the best jobs if they are unable to 'fully develop their academic potential'. 
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Figure 4.1. The (private) internal rate of return to obtaining a bachelors degree 
across a selection of OECD countries 
 
Notes: 
1 Figures refer to the ‘private internal rate of return’, which the OECD describes as an ‘investment 
approach’ to calculating the benefit of holding a degree. 
2 OECD (2008) states that the internal rate of return (IRR) is the discount rate required to equalise the 
financial benefits of a degree (mainly the lifetime wage premium) to the financial costs (mainly the 
opportunity cost of foregone wages).  Thus the higher the IRR, the greater the returns to university as a 
human capital investment. 
3 Source: Data drawn from OECD Education At A Glance Report (2008), Table A10.2, page 196 
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As noted in the introduction, the fact that disadvantaged children are under-
represented amongst the undergraduate population has become a particularly topical 
issue in the US and UK. Some argue, like Chowdry et al (2008), that this mainly 
reflects the underachievement of disadvantaged children at secondary school, and 
hence policymakers should concentrate on raising this group’s academic 
attainment
103. Yet various governments have introduced “widening access” schemes 
that tackle this issue more directly. This includes promoting university to “first 
generation” students, providing financial incentives to young adults and their 
institutions, distance or e-learning opportunities and setting targets for the proportion 
of adolescents who enter higher education (the current target being 50% in the UK).  
 
Part of this policy is to address the concern that disadvantaged children do not see 
university as a realistic possibility; that it is ‘not for the likes of them’ (Chowdry et al 
(2008), Shields and Mohan (2008)). As suggested by Cameron and Heckman (1999) 
at the start of this chapter, some disadvantaged children may perceive there to be a 
lack of opportunity to complete higher education, which stops them from applying
104
. 
Consequently, policymakers in the US and UK have introduced a series of 
programmes to raise disadvantaged children’s expectations of being able to obtain a 
tertiary level qualification. 
 
At this point, it is important to draw a distinction between children's “expectations” 
and their “aspirations”. The former implies a realistic assessment of future outcomes, 
while the latter reflects children’s hopes and dreams (Gutman and Akerman (2008)). 
So if a child expects to obtain a university qualification, they truly believe that they 
will go on to complete this level of education.  It is this concept that I attempt to 
explore in this chapter. However, one must consider whether 15 year old children (the 
age of children that I study) are able to make such realistic assessments of the future. 
Drawing from the developmental literature, Gottfredson (2002) notes that, around age 
14, children are beginning to recognize the need for compromise in their educational 
and occupational goals. Likewise, Gutman and Akerman (2008) suggest that at this 
                                                          
103
 The authors do note, however, that aspiration and expectation raising activity may encourage hard 
work in school, and thus help to close this gap in attainment. 
104
 For instance a report by the Sutton Trust (2008), a UK based charity, states: 'exam grades on their 
own will not necessarily lead to university if young people do not have a high level of expectation and 
make ill-informed decisions' 
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age young people 'relinquish their most preferred choices and settle for more 
acceptable, available choices', recognising the external constraints that they face. 
From a different prospective, Morgan (1998) finds that adolescents' educational 
expectations are not 'irrational fantasies'; rather, they are grounded in logical thinking, 
and vary with the marginal costs and benefits associated with such continued 
schooling. Hence there is evidence which suggests that young adults are able to 
distinguish between their aspirations and expectations. Accurately capturing such 
details in a social survey is, however, another matter. I shall further elaborate on this 
point when discussing the PISA data in the following section. 
 
It is also important to make clear that the value of any scheme that attempts to 'raise 
disadvantaged children's expectations' is based on the assumption that this will have a 
causal influence on their later behaviour and attainment. A conceptual model to 
illustrate this relationship is set out in Figure 4.2, drawing upon the work of Chowdry 
et al (2009). 
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Figure 4.2. A model linking family background to children’s aspirations, expectations and outcomes, based upon Chowdry et al (2009) 
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This framework recognizes the multi-dimensional nature of family background, based 
around measures of parental education, occupation (socio-economic status) and 
income. The authors then specify four “transition mechanisms” (schools, 
neighbourhoods, parental attitudes, material resources) by which family background 
influences children’s attitudes, behavior, beliefs (including their aspirations for the 
future) and outcomes at age 14. The main focus of this chapter is, however, on the 
next stage of the model – the transition from adolescence to young adulthood (i.e. 
from age 14 to 18). During this period, children may change their attitudes, 
behaviours and beliefs about the future, which, in turn, alters their academic 
trajectory
105
. Based on the work of Gottfredson (2002), I propose that one key 
development between these ages is that children begin to recognize the external 
constraints that they face, and thus start to develop expectations about their future 
(regarding, in particular, higher education). These expectations then become the key 
behavioral “transmission mechanism” that encourage greater effort and investment in 
school and less “risky” behaviour (drinking, drug use and early sexual activity) 
between ages 14 and 18 which, in turn, leads to higher educational attainment.  
 
 It is important to recognise, however, that this is not a static relationship; children 
will continually revise these expectations, based on their on-going attainment. Indeed, 
it is likely that higher expectations lead to higher attainment, which leads to continued 
high expectations, and so forth. Yet, as one can not identify the exact age at which 
such feedback begins, it has proven to be methodologically challenging to estimate 
the extent to which one factor is driving the other. Nevertheless, several authors have 
explored the association between these variables, with some attempt to address the 
direction of causality. For instance, Khoo and Ainley (2005) investigate the 
educational plans and achievement of a sample of Australian teenagers. Estimating a 
structural equation model, they show that children's expectations are strongly 
associated with their later outcomes, even after controlling for a host of potentially 
confounding factors. In a similar manner, Reynolds and Pemberton (2001) find that 
expecting to go to university at age 15 is almost a prequisite for actual later 
attendance in the US; they show that less than 3% of children who do not expect to go 
to university actually obtain a degree by the time they turn 30.  Likewise, Morgan 
                                                          
105
 This framework also recognises that family circumstances and parental characteristics will continue 
to play a role. 
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(2004) uses a regression based path analysis to investigate whether educational 
expectations held during the mid-teens determines entry into post-compulsory 
schooling in the US. In turn, he finds evidence of a strong and statistically significant 
association. Of course, economists may express concerns about the potential 
endogeneity of expectations in any regression based set-up, particularly due to 
omitted variable bias. Consequently, Morgan (2004) shows that expectations remain a 
highly significant predictor of later outcomes using an instrumental variable analysis. 
However he also recognizes the difficulties of identifying such models in this set-up. 
Brown et al (2004) use similar methods to Morgan, and find a strong and highly 
significant relationship between children's expectations and later attainment in the 
UK. Using panel data, with measurement of young adults' educational expectations at 
several ages, Morgan (2005) finds university plans are serially correlated across time. 
He suggests that this is consistent with an underlying dynamic causal relationship 
between expectations and attainment as described above. Similarly, Chowdry et al 
(2009) find that a number of disadvantaged children in England stop believing that 
they will enter university between ages 14 and 16, and that these teenagers 
subsequently make less academic progress than their peers who maintain high 
expectations. In a wider context, Cowan (2009) investigates the relationship between 
American teenagers' educational expectations and their chances of engaging in risky 
behaviour. Using an instrumental variable analysis, he finds that 'anticipated 
schooling has an effect on behaviour above and beyond the effect of realized 
schooling' and thus that raising children's expectations of completing university may 
prove to be an inexpensive way of reducing their tobacco, marijuana and alcohol 
consumption.  
 
Given the above, any difference between advantaged and disadvantaged children's 
educational expectations will lead to a division in their behaviour, attainment and 
eventual graduation rates. Indeed, the framework set out in Figure 4.2 suggests that 
such a divergence in beliefs may well occur; expectations are assumed to have six 
primary determinants (schools, neighbourhoods, parental attitudes, family resources, 
childhood attitudes and prior attainment) all of which are associated with family 
background. For instance, advantaged children will tend to go to better schools, where 
teachers may build their children’s academic confidence and emphasise their ability to 
complete this level of study. Similarly, it may be that only well-educated parents 
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stress the wider benefits of learning (meeting new people, broadening horizons, 
growing up) to their offspring, who become driven towards higher education as a 
result. Availability of resources will also determine children’s expectations; those 
from less fortunate households may believe they are credit constrained and thus do 
not have the necessary finance to complete higher education. There may also be peer 
and role model influences, both in school and the wider community, where 
disadvantaged children do not see university as a realistic goal because they do not 
know any adult who has completed higher education and have few friends who 
believe they can achieve the same. Attitudes may also be transferred between 
generations, such as ambition and work ethic, which could influence children’s 
educational plans via the extent they are willing to stretch themselves in the future. 
Finally, as expectations involve the recognition of external constraints, they will be 
tempered by children’s pre-existing skill, with large socio-economic differences in 
academic ability already evident at age 14 (see Hanushek and Woessmann (2010) for 
a survey of the international evidence). 
 
The analysis I undertake in this chapter is motivated by the theoretical framework and 
empirical analysis described above, which suggests that children’s expectations have 
an important influence on their later academic attainment, and that there are likely to 
be large differences in these expectations between socio-economic groups. But is this 
difference bigger in some countries than in others? 
 
In my first research question I consider the size of the socio-economic gap in 
children’s educational expectations across the OECD, focusing on results for the US 
and UK. Although concern has been expressed about the difference between 
advantaged and disadvantaged children's expectations in these countries, I have never 
seen it put into a comparative context. It is therefore difficult to know if the socio-
economic gap in expectations is especially 'big' within these countries, and if they 
have a particular need to encourage disadvantaged children into considering higher 
education. In making such comparisons, I emphasize similarities and differences 
between the US, Canada and constituent parts of the UK. Such countries share a 
number of common features (language, geographical location, broad political and 
labour market systems) but also contrast in many ways (schooling systems, levels of 
poverty, inequality and social mobility). Identifying differences between these 
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countries may therefore provide some insight into why the socio-economic gap in 
children's educational expectations varies across developed countries. In summary: 
 
Research Question 1. What is the absolute size of the gap between advantaged 
and disadvantaged children's expectations of completing university? Is this gap 
particularly large in the US and UK compared to other members of the OECD? 
 
Of course, one may argue that differences in test scores could be entirely responsible 
for the socio-economic gap in children’s educational expectations; the only reason 
why advantaged 15 year olds are more likely to expect entry into university than their 
disadvantaged peers is that they perform better on school assessments around this age 
(e.g. “outcomes at age 14” in Figure 4.2)106. On the other hand, sizeable differences 
may remain even after controlling for test performance at this point in time (as per the 
arguments made above). That is to say that disadvantaged 15 year olds may be less 
likely to expect a university education than their wealthy peers, even if they score 
equally well on assessments nearing the end of compulsory schooling. This may 
suggest that raising disadvantaged children's educational expectations is an important 
part of widening access policy. I again consider whether this is a specific problem to 
the US and UK, or if the situation here is comparable to other parts of the developed 
world. My second research question is therefore: 
 
Research Question 2. Do the higher educational expectations of advantaged 
children only reflect their better test performance at age 15? After controlling for 
scores on this assessment, is the socio-economic gap in the UK and US 
particularly large in comparison to other members of the OECD? 
 
In answering the question above, I am not able to make a causal statement about the 
relationship between children's test scores, socio-economic status and their 
expectations. As laid out in Figure 4.2, children are assumed to begin making firm 
educational plans between ages 14 and 16, yet the exact point in time is almost 
impossible to identify. It could be that children start thinking seriously about 
                                                          
106
 Consequently, if ones aim is to encourage disadvantaged children to make early university plans and 
raise their higher education participation, then the optimal policy would probably be to develop their 
earlier cognitive skills. Encouraging children to enter university at ages 15/16 would be of 
comparatively little use in closing the social class gap in university participation. 
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university from a younger age than I can measure (e.g. 14), which has already had an 
impact upon their motivation at school, and is thus reflected in their scores on the 
PISA test (taken at age 15)
107
. In other words, the process of educational expectations 
influencing motivation and behaviour has already begun, causing test scores to be 
endogenous in the models that I estimate. This may be a particularly big issue in 
countries like England where children have to make educational decisions at a young 
age, and who receive regular information of their performance in national 
assessments. 
 
 Likewise, one may argue that the measure of “ability” that I use (scores on a 
cognitive test at age 15) is likely to be endogenous to social background. In other 
words, the PISA data does not contain an indicator of children inert talent, but rather 
scores on a test that have probably been influenced by social background in 
themselves. Whenever I refer to this test scores as children’s “ability” it is imply for 
convenience. It is, however, vital for the reader to understand that this is measured at 
age 15 and hence highly likely to have already been affected by socio-economic 
background. I, nevertheless, argue that results controlling for this term is of interest 
despite this potential endogeniety with respect to family background. In particular, it 
will show the difference in expectations for advantaged and disadvantaged children 
who have managed to reach the same level on the PISA (although careful 
interpretation of what this result means is needed). I shall return to this point in the 
following sections. 
 
If socio-economic differences in children's expectations remain even when they score 
the same mark on this age 15 cognitive test, what other factors might be playing a 
role? As noted above, good schools are a valuable resource that affluent parents may 
provide their children, and which probably have an impact on adolescents’ 
educational plans
108
. In my third research question, I explore whether differences in 
school level factors can explain the socio-economic gap in children's expectations, 
above and beyond the influence they have on children’s age 15 test performance.  
                                                          
107
 In other words expectations at prior time points (that I am unable to control for) are confounding the 
relationships that I estimate. 
108
 For instance, advantaged children may receive more support and encouragement from teachers to 
apply to university, have more information about the benefits of higher education and application 
procedures, and be the subject of strong and positive peer effects. 
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Research Question 3. Do school level factors help to explain the socio-economic 
gap in teenagers' educational plans (after accounting for differences in age 15 
test performance?) Are such factors particularly important within the UK? 
 
Finally, an issue I have not considered thus far is that if childhood expectations really 
do help determine later attainment, then should government policy concentrate on 
raising all children’s expectations as high as possible? Such a policy faces two 
possible difficulties. Firstly, higher expectations have a greater chance of being 
unmet. Hence one must trade off the possible boost to attainment against the potential 
disappointment children may suffer. Secondly, a widening access policy that 
encourages all youngsters into considering university may lead to applications from 
some children who are not suited to this level of study. Thus one may actually harm 
some children’s long-run outcomes if policies to promote the benefits of higher 
education actually lead them into making inappropriate investment decisions.  
The above argument suggests that widening access schemes should be properly 
targeted, and that we should be particularly concerned if disadvantaged children who 
perform well in assessments at the end of compulsory schooling think ‘university is 
not for the likes of them’. In other words, it seems of obvious benefit that the most 
talented children in a country make early plans to enter higher education, regardless of 
their family background. Again, it is important to realize that the measure of 
“academic talent” that I use is children’s test scores at age 15 (which will have already 
been influenced by socio-economic background as discussed above). Nevertheless, I 
again argue that this remains an interesting question – do the few disadvantaged 
children who manage to overcome adversity up to age 15 and score highly on the 
PISA tests believe they have the means to obtain a university degree? I particularly 
focus on whether this is the case for disadvantaged children in the US and UK, where 
initiatives like the 'gifted and talented' programme specifically target the educational 
expectations of this academically able group
109
. Thus, my final research question is: 
 
 
 
                                                          
109
 A recent report by the Office for Fair Access (201) in the UK suggests that academically talented 
pupils should be identified no later than the end of year 9 ( age 14).  This is a slightly earlier age than 
the expectations measured within PISA (where children are typically aged 15).  
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Research Question 4. Are high scoring children on the PISA math’s assessment 
from disadvantaged backgrounds more or less likely to expect entry into 
university than their advantaged peers who receive a mark around the national 
average? Is this of particularly great concern in the US and UK compared to 
other developed countries? 
 
In answering these four research questions I make a number of contributions to the 
existing literature and current policy debate. Firstly, I do not know of any other study 
that has considered whether the socio-economic gap in British and American 
children's educational expectations is “big” or atypical in comparison to the other 
OECD countries. Secondly, no other study, to my knowledge, has considered whether 
advantaged children's higher expectations are reflecting anything other than this 
group’s higher test scores at age 15. Finally, I am unaware of any other paper that 
considers whether children who manage to overcome their disadvantaged background 
and score highly on cognitive tests at age 15 are more or less likely to expect entry 
into university than advantaged children who do not perform as well on such 
assessments.  
 
4.3. Data 
 
The data I use are drawn from the 2003 round of the Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA); a study of 15 year-olds’ cognitive skills held every three 
years. Although 46 countries took part, I restrict my analysis to 33 industralised 
nations
110
. In each country, a minimum of 150 schools were included in the sample, 
selected with probability proportional to size. Thirty students were then randomly 
selected from within. Average response rates of both schools (90%) and pupils (90%) 
were high, though this varies moderately between countries
111 
. Further details are 
available in the PISA 2003 technical report (OECD 2004b). A set of sampling weights 
are also provided by the survey organisers that tries to correct for the unit non-
                                                          
110
 Here I treat the constituent parts of the United Kingdom (England, Scotland and Northern Ireland) 
as separate countries. Likewise, I separate Flemish from French Belgium. 
111
 The lowest of which was England, at 64% for schools and 77% for pupils . Micklewright et al 
(2010) investigate this non-response, and create an alternative set of responses weights (as opposed to 
those provided in the dataset by the survey organisers) to try and correct for bias in the estimates. They 
show that the UK only moves one place in the PISA ranking of children’s test scores once these 
weights have been applied. 
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response. The achieved sample size, across the 33 countries I consider, is 224,094. 
 
As part of the study, children were asked to complete a questionnaire. This included 
the question: 
 
 “Which of the following do you expect to complete” [emphasis in original question] 
 
Lower secondary education (Middle or junior high school) 
Upper Secondary education (High school) 
Post-secondary non-tertiary (Vocational/technical certificate after high school) 
Tertiary “Type b” education (Associate’s degree) 
Tertiary “Type a” education of higher (Bachelors degree or higher) 
 
Country specific options were provided in the questionnaire. The phrases in brackets 
illustrate these for the US. The primary outcome I analyse in this chapter is whether 
the child ticked the top category (bachelors degree or higher). Response rates to this 
question were very high. Table 4.1 shows that almost 99% of children responded, 
from a low of 93% in France to a high of 100% in Poland. Consequently, I exclude 
the few (1%) observations where educational expectations are missing
112
. 
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 These observations are not a random selection from the population. Rather they tend to be children 
of lower ability, who also do not have complete information on family background.  
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Table 4.1. Sample sizes and missing expectations data across the OECD countries 
Country 
Starting 
sample 
size 
Complete 
educational 
expectation data 
% Missing 
expectations 
data 
Poland (POL) 4,383 4,381 0.0 
Finland (FIN) 5,796 5,793 0.1 
Italy (ITA) 11,639 11,631 0.1 
Japan (JAP) 4,707 4,700 0.1 
Korea (KOR) 5,444 5,440 0.1 
Spain (ESP) 10,791 10,776 0.1 
Turkey (TURK) 4,855 4,852 0.1 
Hungary (HUN) 4,765 4,756 0.2 
Slovakia (SLOV) 7,346 7,328 0.2 
Greece (GRE) 4,627 4,613 0.3 
Portugal (PORT) 4,608 4,594 0.3 
Switzerland (SWZ) 8,420 8,393 0.3 
Sweden (SWE) 4,624 4,605 0.4 
Australia (AUS) 12,551 12,492 0.5 
Mexico (MEX) 29,983 29,845 0.5 
Denmark (DEN) 4,218 4,191 0.6 
Scotland (SCO) 2,723 2,707 0.6 
USA (USA) 5,456 5,419 0.7 
Austria (AUT) 4,597 4,558 0.8 
Iceland (ICE) 3,350 3,324 0.8 
Ireland (IRE) 3,880 3,848 0.8 
Luxembourg (LUX)  3,923 3,892 0.8 
Northern Ireland (NI) 2,853 2,829 0.8 
Belgium(French) (BELFREN) 2,958 2,931 0.9 
Norway (NOR) 4,064 4,023 1.0 
New Zealand (NZ) 4,511 4,447 1.4 
Netherlands (NLD) 3,992 3,902 2.3 
Belgium(Flemish) (BELFLEM) 5,838 5,696 2.4 
England (ENG) 3,959 3,817 3.6 
Czech Republic (CZE)  6,320 6,076 3.9 
Germany (GER) 4,660 4,457 4.4 
Canada (CAN) 27,953 26,707 4.5 
France (FRA) 4,300 3,997 7.0 
TOTAL 224,094 221,020 1.4 
Notes: 
1 Missing data refers to item non-response only. Details on unit non-response can be found in the 
OECD (2004) Technical Report. 
2 Data sorted by the percentage of missing observations 
3 Source: Calculations by author using the PISA 2003 dataset 
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Recall that my concern in this chapter is children's expectations (realistic assessments 
of their future), not their aspirations (idealistic goals). As noted in section 4.2, the 
developmental literature suggests that by the time of the PISA study (approaching age 
16), children typically separate one concept from the other. Indeed, there has been 
work in the sociological literature that compares children's expectations to their 
aspirations around this age (see Patton and Creed (2007)). Such studies usually 
distinguish between the two concepts by altering and emphasizing the operative word 
(e.g. asking children what they would “like” to do, and then what they “expect”). Yet, 
to my knowledge, there has been little work on the validation of such questions in 
quantitative surveys. In particular, there seems scant evidence of whether such subtle 
phrases are able to elicit the appropriate information from respondents. Unfortunately, 
the question asked in PISA shares much of the same criticism. It emphasizes the word 
“expect” using bold, underlined letters, yet provides children with no further 
instruction. Hence this is the only guide they have towards reporting their 
expectations rather than their aspirations. Whether such subtle wording can be 
adequately translated into other languages, as required in this cross-national analysis, 
is a further concern. 
 
If this question is actually capturing children's aspirations, then the proportion 
reporting that they “expect” to complete university will be significantly higher than 
current graduation rates
113
. If this only occurs in certain countries, then these nations 
will out-lie from the rest. Indeed, if it is a translational issue that is causing this 
problem, language will be a common theme amongst these outlying nations. I search 
for such patterns in Figure 4.3. Specifically, in each country I compare the proportion 
of children who expect to obtain a degree (that I have calculated from the PISA data) 
with actual graduation rates drawn from OECD (2009).  The 45 degree line is where 
the proportion of children expecting to complete university equals actual graduation 
rates.  
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 Of course, such a finding may just reflect that children are not very good at predicting the future (the 
question does capture children’s expectations, it is just that these expectations are inaccurate). 
Nevertheless, if this pattern occurs consistently across all nations then one may question whether this is 
actually capturing adolescents’ expectations 
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Generally, Figure 4.3 suggests that responses are not out of touch with reality; 45% of 
OECD children expect to complete university against actual graduation rates of 40%. 
Indeed, several countries, including England, sit below the 45 degree line; the 
proportion of children expecting to enter university is below actual completion rates.  
I do note, however, that there are some countries where one may have concerns. For 
instance the proportion of Canadian and American children “expecting” to obtain a 
bachelor's degree is significantly higher than actual graduation rates. However, 
Reynolds and Pemberton (2001) point out that there are high drop out rates from 
university (at least in the US), and as such the proportion of US children expecting to 
complete university are at least in-line with current entrance rates
114
.  It is also 
interesting to see that the proportion of children expecting to complete university 
varies quite substantially across the English speaking countries, suggesting that this 
cross-national variation is not simply due to a difference in language.  
 
Thus, despite concerns with some countries, the overall pattern of response is quite 
encouraging, and generally seems to be consistent with a measure of children's 
expectations. Hence these data do seem to be of value in answering the research 
questions I set out in section 4.2. Yet I am unable to investigate (and thus rule out) 
other potential problems regarding measurement error. For instance, it might be that 
advantaged children have a tendency to report their expectations and disadvantaged 
children their aspirations, and that this particular response pattern varies across OECD 
countries. Likewise, I advise caution in interpreting results for less developed 
members of the OECD like Turkey, Greece and Mexico, where “expectations” often 
seem to be out of touch with reality.  
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 Reynolds and Pemberton (2001) noted a similar finding when using the American NLSY sample. 
OECD (2009)  suggests that 65% of US school leavers enter university, very similar to the number I 
find expecting to obtain a degree. Unfortunately this information is not available for Canada. 
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Figure 4.3. Proportion of children expecting to obtain a degree versus actual 
graduation rates 
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Notes: 
1 Data on the % of school leavers who obtain a degree (x-axis) has been drawn from OECD Education 
At A Glance Report (2009), Table A3.2, page 74. This refers to net graduation rates (i.e. as the sum of 
age-specific graduation rates). See Annex 1 of OECD (2009) for further details. Information on 
Mexico, Luxemburg, Korea, France and Belgium not available in this data. Data on the proportion of 
children who expect to obtain a degree (y-axis) is based on my calculations from the PISA 2003 data. 
 
2 Data is only available for the UK as a whole (not separately for England, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland) in the OECD (2009) report. Hence I use data on higher education participation for these 
countries Data taken from: http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/SFR/s000716/SFR10_2007v1.pdf 
for England 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2009/11/20112425/4 for Scotland 
http://www.delni.gov.uk/he-api0607.pdf for Northern Ireland 
 
3 To calculate statistical significance I have compared the proportion of children expecting to complete 
university (drawn from the PISA data) to the OECD ‘Education At A Glance’ figures of actual 
graduation rates. I assume the latter refer to the population, hence conduct a one sample test of the 
PISA figures against these values. 
 
4 Distance from the 45 degree line (where average expectations = actual graduation rates) are 
statistically significant in all countries at the 1% level except Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Slovakia, 
Czech Republic and Finland  
 
5 Source: Calculations by author using the PISA 2003 dataset of the y-axis and OECD Education at a 
Glance on y-axis.  For country by country sample sizes see Table 4.1 
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I now turn my attention to the variables that I use to distinguish between children 
from “advantaged” and “disadvantaged” backgrounds. The first such measure is 
parental education. As described in section 4.2, parents with more schooling might 
place greater emphasis on their children's education, or instill a taste for learning in 
their off-spring. Likewise, parents may be able to provide more information and 
encouragement about going to university if they hold a tertiary qualification 
themselves, and perhaps act as educational role models. Parental education will also 
be a key factor driving household income and children’s cognitive development. This 
is therefore a key distinguishing feature between children from advantaged and 
disadvantaged backgrounds.  
 
Information on parental education was captured through the sampled children as part 
of the PISA background questionnaire. Specifically, children were asked to report the 
level of education their mother and father completed at school and what type of 
tertiary qualifications they hold
115
. Schlutz (2005) and Jerrim and Micklewright 
(forthcoming) investigate possible measurement error in such reports using the PISA 
2006 wave, where parents and children were asked separately to report mother’s and 
father’s level of education116.  They gave the same category in two thirds of cases, 
though this was higher (around 86% of occasions) when the parents held a degree. 
 
These responses were then recoded by the survey organisers into ISCED levels of 
education, a measure designed by UNESCO to aid cross-national analysis (though 
some differences in definitions across countries may remain - Steedman (2001)). The 
highest ISCED level achieved by either parent is then used to create the “highest 
parental education” variable. Table 4.2 shows how this is distributed across each of 
the OECD nations, including a “missing” category where this information is 
unavailable (typically 5-10% of cases)
117
. 
                                                          
115
 Note that children were instructed to report this information for their mother and father like figures. 
Consequently, children living in a household with a complex family structure, for instance with a step-
mother or step-father, may not be reporting the education of their biological parents. I have 
experimented with including a variable that captures this in my analysis. However, I have chosen to 
exclude it as the estimated effect was usually small and statistically insignificant. 
116
 The parental questionnaire that contains this information was an “international option” in 2006.  
This information is therefore only available for 11 countries, and has relatively high rates of non-
response. I could not use the 2006 data for this analysis as it did not contain a question on children’s 
educational expectations. 
117
 These children are not a random sample from the population. Rather, they disproportionately come 
from children who performed poorly on the PISA test and come from less well-off families. One may 
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Table 4.2. Distribution of highest parental education across OECD countries 
  % None 
% 
ISCED 
1 
% 
ISCED 
2 
 
%ISCED 
3B or 3C 
% 
ISCED 
3A 
% 
ISCED 
4 
% 
ISCED 
5B 
% 
ISCED 
5A + 
% 
Missing 
Turkey 4 31 20 1 23 0 7 13 0 
Austria 0 1 5 34 9 6 29 14 2 
Poland 1 0 2 21 42 12 7 15 0 
Northern Ireland 0 1 11 24 4 19 17 17 7 
Portugal 19 20 16 3 15 0 7 17 2 
Mexico 8 18 25 3 13 0 14 19 1 
Switzerland 2 2 18 23 7 6 21 19 3 
Ireland 1 5 10 0 17 27 20 19 2 
England 1 1 6 22 5 20 18 20 9 
Denmark 1 0 8 8 12 10 36 20 4 
Italy 0 2 22 5 16 19 13 20 1 
New Zealand 3 1 5 13 9 18 20 20 12 
Luxembourg 4 9 2 6 8 13 24 20 13 
Germany 5 1 8 19 5 15 15 23 10 
Norway 0 0 3 4 6 22 36 24 4 
Hungary 0 0 7 20 16 24 7 24 1 
Slovakia 1 0 2 14 38 17 3 25 1 
France 2 2 12 22 21 0 11 25 6 
Iceland 0 2 10 9 11 26 14 26 2 
Spain 3 18 7 2 16 10 13 27 5 
Greece 0 8 12 4 18 16 13 27 0 
Czech Republic 0 0 1 21 37 7 2 28 4 
Korea 2 5 14 11 31 0 7 30 1 
Scotland 3 0 5 17 14 0 23 30 8 
Belgium(Flemish) 1 2 4 4 15 17 20 30 7 
USA 1 1 4 0 29 16 13 34 3 
Canada 0 1 4 0 19 15 21 34 6 
Finland 0 3 7 0 21 3 30 36 1 
Belgium(French) 2 3 4 4 12 10 21 36 8 
Sweden 2 1 7 7 21 0 21 37 5 
Australia 1 1 11 2 16 13 13 39 3 
Japan 0 3 3 6 30 0 17 41 0 
Netherlands 1 4 10 0 6 27 0 45 7 
OECD 3 6 10 8 17 11 16 26 4 
Notes: 1 Data sorted by the percentage of children who reported either parent as holding an ISCED 
level 5A+ qualification. 2 Figures refer to row percentages. 
3 ISCED level 0 refers to no formal school, level 1 is equivalent to primary education only, level 2 is 
lower secondary education, level 3B/3C refers to basic vocational education, 3A is upper secondary 
education, level 4 is post secondary education (either short vocational courses of preparation for 
tertiary education), level 5B is specialised vocational education, level 5A is a university education 
                                                                                                                                                                      
argue that this could be driving some of the cross-national differences observed. Given the relatively 
small non-response in the majority of countries, I do not attempt any correction for this issue. However,  
I do I include a “missing” dummy variable in all subsequent regressions to ensure these children are not 
dropped from the analysis. 
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(bachelors degree), while level 6 refers to doctorates. 
4 Source: PISA 2003 dataset.  For country by country sample sizes see Table 4.1 
 
As sample sizes become small for certain groups, I recode this information into three 
broad categories (low, medium and high) following a similar re-categorisation in the 
Luxemburg Income Study (a well known dataset often used in cross-national 
research). I define high as holding a tertiary qualification (ISCED 5B or 5A+), 
medium as post-secondary schooling but no experience of higher education (ISCED 
4) and low as completed secondary schooling or less (ISCED 0-3). This broad 
categorisation also helps to ensure that I have a sufficient number of observations 
within the “advantaged” and “disadvantaged” groups that I define later in this section. 
 
The second measure of family background that I use to distinguish between 
advantaged and disadvantaged children is parental occupation. This variable is 
probably the best proxy available for household income and financial resources 
(which are unfortunately not collected as part of the PISA study) that play an 
important role in the development of children's educational expectations as laid out in 
section 4.2. Parental occupation will also pick up relevant aspects of social class, such 
as the societies, cultures and communities the child has grown up in.  
 
As with parental education, information on mother's and father's occupation was 
collected directly from the sampled children. Specifically, they were asked the title of 
their mother's and father's main job and a description of the type of work this 
involves. Responses were coded by the survey organisers into four digit ISCO codes 
(the International Labour Organisation's occupational classification), which assigns 
the reported occupation to one of over 300 categories. Schulz (2005) investigates the 
potential measurement error in this data using the 2006 PISA field trial. He found that 
parents and children reported the same occupational group (defined in this fine level 
of aggregation) on roughly six out of ten occasions. My experimentations with the 
final 2006 PISA sample revealed similar results. 
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Children’s responses were then coded by the PISA survey organisers into the quasi-
continuous ISEI index of occupational status, designed by Ganzeboom et al (1992). 
This index assigns each occupation a score between 16 and 90, depending upon the 
relevant “inputs” (educational level required) and “outputs” (the salary commanded) 
from that particular job
118
. Hence this is an objective occupational scale which is 
designed to be correlated with income. Moreover, Ganzeboom et al (1992) 
specifically designed this scale to aid the type of cross-national analysis I undertake in 
this chapter, and have thus attempted to validate it as a measure of socio-economic 
status across a large number of developed countries (although some still question 
aspects of its validity – see Bukodi, Dex and Goldthorpe (forthcoming)). 
Nevertheless, the ISEI index remains an attractive measure against the possible 
alternatives (such as an aggregation of the 4 digit ISCO codes into the 9 major 
occupational groups). Summary statistics for the distribution of this variable across 
the OECD countries can be found in Table 4.3. It is interesting to note that the 
distribution of the ISEI index generally seems to be quite similar across countries, 
with very little cross-national variation in the 10
th
 and 90
th
 percentiles, and only 
slightly more at the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
118
 The OECD describes: “The index captures the attributes of occupations that convert parents’ 
education into income. The index was derived by the optimal scaling of occupation groups to maximise 
the indirect effect of education on income through occupation and to minimise the direct effect of 
education on income, net of occupation (both effects being net of age).” 
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Table 4.3. Distribution of highest parental occupation (ISEI index) across 
countries 
  Percentile       
      10th     25th      50
th
     75th     90th      mean          SD     % Missing 
Mexico 24 28 33 54 69 42 19 5 
Turkey 23 29 45 49 66 42 15 12 
Portugal 26 30 39 51 69 43 16 3 
Poland 23 33 43 53 67 45 15 2 
Spain 25 30 43 54 70 45 17 4 
Greece 26 31 46 56 69 46 17 6 
Korea 29 37 45 51 69 46 13 3 
Austria 27 34 45 56 69 47 16 4 
Hungary 30 38 45 56 69 48 15 6 
Ireland 29 34 49 57 69 48 16 4 
Italy 29 34 49 56 70 48 16 2 
Luxembourg 29 34 50 56 69 48 17 4 
Switzerland 29 34 48 55 69 48 16 3 
Northern Ireland 29 34 48 59 69 48 17 6 
Denmark 29 38 51 57 69 49 15 3 
France 29 34 51 59 70 49 17 4 
Belgium(French) 29 37 51 67 70 50 17 6 
Germany 30 38 51 59 70 50 16 9 
Japan 33 38 45 55 69 50 15 11 
Slovakia 30 37 50 64 69 50 16 4 
England 29 35 51 66 70 50 17 7 
Belgium(Flemish) 29 35 51 66 70 51 17 5 
Canada 29 38 51 65 69 51 16 7 
Finland 29 34 51 67 71 51 17 1 
Sweden 30 38 51 66 70 51 16 3 
Scotland 30 40 51 66 70 51 16 4 
Czech Republic 33 42 51 64 69 52 15 4 
Netherlands 30 39 51 67 70 52 16 7 
New Zealand 29 40 51 66 69 52 16 16 
Australia 30 43 52 69 69 53 16 5 
Iceland 29 43 53 67 71 54 17 2 
USA 30 40 56 67 71 54 16 6 
Norway 34 43 53 69 71 55 15 3 
OECD 28 34 49 59 69 48 17 5 
Notes:  
1 Data refers to points on the ISEI scale of occupational status, as described in this section. On this 
scale, higher values indicate a more prestigious occupation. 
2 Countries sorted by mean ISEI score 
3 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Country by country sample sizes in Table 4.1 
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The third variable that I use to measure family background is children's reports of the 
number of books at home. It has been argued that this is correlated with a number of 
aspects of family background including parental education, household income and 
social origin (Ammermueller and Pischke 2009, Schuetz et al 2008). Yet the same 
authors also suggest that it picks up factors like the value parents place on their 
children’s education and the encouragement they provide with regards to schooling. 
Likewise, the PISA survey organisers argue it is a measure of the 'home educational 
resources' available to the child. Hence this picks up such residual aspects of family 
background that are not fully captured within my measures of parental education and 
occupation, but are nevertheless likely to be important in the development of 
children's expectations. 
 
This information was also reported by the participating children in the background 
questionnaire. Specifically, they were asked 'how many books are there in your home' 
(excluding magazines, newspapers and textbooks) with six possible options. 
However, the two bottom and two top categories contain a rather sparse number of 
observations. Thus I combine the bottom (0-10, 11-25, 26-100), and top (101-200, 
201-500, above 500) three fields to form low and high groups, along with a 'missing' 
category, following a strategy similar to that used by the survey organisers (see OECD 
2004c page 283).  As with my re-categorisation of parental education, this also helps 
to ensure that I have sufficient observations within the “advantaged” and 
“disadvantaged” groups that I define later in this section. The distribution of this 
variable across the OECD countries can be found in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4. Distribution of the number of books in the home across OECD 
countries 
  % 0-100 books % Over 100 books % Missing 
Mexico 86 10 4 
Turkey 79 18 3 
Portugal 68 31 2 
Greece 65 34 2 
Belgium(Flemish) 59 38 4 
Scotland 58 40 2 
Northern Ireland 58 40 2 
USA 58 40 2 
Ireland 58 40 2 
France 57 41 2 
Poland 58 41 1 
Switzerland 56 41 2 
Netherlands 55 42 3 
Austria 56 42 2 
Luxembourg 54 44 2 
Italy 54 45 1 
Japan 54 45 1 
Denmark 52 45 3 
Slovakia 54 45 1 
England 50 45 5 
Belgium(French) 51 46 4 
Finland 52 47 1 
Germany 46 48 6 
Canada 43 49 8 
Korea 51 49 0 
New Zealand 47 51 3 
Spain 47 52 1 
Australia 41 56 2 
Sweden 40 58 2 
Hungary 41 58 1 
Norway 36 61 2 
Iceland 36 63 2 
Czech Republic 33 63 4 
OECD 55 42 3 
Notes:  
1 Data refers to row percentages  
2 Data sorted by % over 100 books 
3 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Country by country sample sizes in Table 4.1 
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Another key covariate in this chapter, which forms an integral part of my second, 
third and fourth research questions, is children's “academic performance”. As part of 
the PISA 2003 study, children sat a two hour test. The PISA consortia claim that this 
measures children's 'functional ability' (how well they can use the concepts examined 
in 'real life' situations) in three domains (reading, maths and science). In 2003, maths 
was assigned as the major domain, where the vast majority of questions children were 
asked were on this topic. All test questions were explicitly designed with cross-
national comparability in mind. Answers were summarized by the survey organizers 
into a single score for each of the three domains using an ‘item-response model’; the 
intuition being that true ability in each subject is unobserved, and must be estimated 
from the answers to the test. Consequently, five ‘plausible values’ are generated for 
each pupil, estimating their true proficiency in each subject. These scores were scaled 
by the survey organizers to have a mean (across all OECD countries) of 500 points 
and standard deviation of 100. Throughout my analysis, I use the first of these 
plausible values for the maths domain to control for children's cognitive skills at age 
15
119
. In doing so, I once again remind the reader that this variable requires careful 
interpretation – as it is measured at age 15, it does not reflect children’s inert ability or 
some sort of “natural” talent. Rather, it will reflect all the inputs into children’s 
education production function up to age 15 (e.g. time/goods input from parents, 
schooling resources, quality of peers) which will have been influenced by their socio-
economic background. Through the remainder of the paper, when I use the term 
“ability” I am doing so as a short-hand for their cognitive skills in the maths domain 
as measured at age 15 (and that this will in part reflect socio-economic background). 
Moreover, in the regression models that follow I only control for maths scores at age 
15 as the correlation between test scales is high (r≈0.8 between maths and reading, 
and the same between maths and science), with little change in my substantive results 
when I also include the reading and science scales
120
. The distribution of children's 
maths test scores across all the countries I consider can be found in OECD (2004a). 
 
 
                                                          
119
 I experimented using the other plausible values, and by running five separate models and averaging 
the estimated coefficients and standard errors. Results are very similar to those presented.  
120
 Note that only around half the children within each country actually answer questions in each of 
“minor” PISA domains (reading and science). Scores are estimated by the study organisers for the 
remaining children using a Rasch modelling approach. 
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Finally, measurement of school level factors has important implications regarding my 
penultimate research question. In this chapter, I simply use a fixed effect specification 
to eliminate all the between school variation. This will show whether all school level 
factors combined are able to explain a sizeable proportion of the advantaged-
disadvantaged gap. This will thus capture a broad array of differences between 
children at different schools, including the information, advice and guidance provided 
by staff about higher education, and the influence of peers on their choices. Yet using 
a fixed effect specification does limit my ability to identify what exactly at the school 
level is driving the results; for instance whether it is something that educational 
institutions actually provide (e.g. where teachers encourage and assist university 
applications) or some wider factor (e.g. the community in which the child has grown 
up).  
 
In the following section, I use the aforementioned variables in a logistic regression 
model of children's educational expectations. In all models, I also control for gender 
and whether the child was a first or second generation immigrant (as this group may 
be under different pressure from their family to complete higher education)
121
. 
Likewise, in all estimations I include 'missing' categories (dummy variables) to ensure 
children are not dropped from the analysis when pieces of information are 
unavailable. Thus the final form of this model is: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
121
 Children had to answer three questions regarding whether they, their mother or their father was born 
outside the country that they are taking the test in. I define a child as an “immigrant” if they answer yes 
to any of these three questions. 
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Where: 
)( ijE = Probability of the child expecting to graduate from university, where  
     E= 1 if the child expects to complete university, 0 otherwise 
 
Sex = A binary indicator of the child’s gender (0 = female, 1 =male). 
 
I= Whether the child is a first or second generation immigrant (0 = Native , 1 = 
Immigrant) 
 
SES = A vector of variables capturing the child’s socio-economic background. This 
includes: 
 Highest parental education – A set of two dummy variables, one referring to 
“some post-secondary education but no tertiary” (medium) the other “tertiary 
and above” (high). (Ref:  “compulsory schooling or less” – i.e. low) 
 Number of books in the home - A single dummy variable referring to whether 
there are “more than 100 books” (high) in the family home (Ref: “Less than 
100 books” - low) 
 Highest parental occupation measured on the ISEI scale - Entered as a 
piecewise linear term with knots at the 10
th
, 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
 and 90
th
 percentile 
of the national ISEI distribution 
 
Ab =  A vector reflecting children's cognitive skills at age 15 as measured by their 
scores on the PISA maths test. These measures are entered as piece-wise linear 
components, with knots at the 10
th
, 25
h
, 75
th
 and 90
th
 percentile of the national test 
score distribution. 
 
Sch = A school level fixed effect. In specifications where this is not included, I allow 
for the complex survey design (clustering of children within schools) by making the 
appropriate adjustment to the estimated standard errors. 
i = Child i 
j = School j 
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I then use this model to generate predictions of how likely a hypothetical child with 
given characteristics is to expect to complete university. Specifically, I create these 
predictions for: 
 
1. An “advantaged” child  
Defined as: 
 Either of their parents holds a tertiary qualification (“high” parental education) 
 There are over 100 books in the family home (“high” books) 
 The highest occupation of their parents sits at 75th percentile of the national 
ISEI distribution 
 Country native 
 Female 
 
2. A “disadvantaged” child  
Who I define as: 
 Neither parent has completed any post-compulsory schooling (“low” parental 
education) 
 There are less than 100 books in the family home (“low” books) 
 The highest occupation of their parents sits at 25th percentile of the national 
ISEI distribution 
 Country native 
 Female 
 
I then calculate the difference between these two predictions in order to compare the 
expectations of “advantaged” and “disadvantaged” groups. 
 
Three model specifications (and sets of predictions) are estimated to answer the first 
three research questions set out in section 4.2 (I return to my final research question, 
comparing the expectations of disadvantaged children who score highly on the PISA 
test to lower performing children from affluent backgrounds,  in the following 
section). Specifically, I use a sequential approach in building this model, first 
illustrating the “overall” expectations gap between advantaged and disadvantaged 
groups, then adding in terms (age 15 test scores and a school level fixed effect) to 
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highlight the extent of the expectations gap conditional on these factors. Hence in the 
first model I exclude the PISA test score and school measures (i.e. β5 and β6 are 
constrained to zero). This allows me to identify the absolute difference between 
advantaged and disadvantaged children's educational expectations, and whether this 
gap is particularly big in the US and UK compared to other developed nations:  
 
Model 1: iiiii
ij
ij
ESIISex
E
E
Sβ .SESβ 43 *...
)(1
)(
log 211 









  
 
In the second specification I include children’s scores on the PISA maths test, but do 
not control for school level factors (i.e. I now obtain estimates of the vector β5 , but β6  
is still constrained to 0). This allows me to address my second research question; is 
the difference between advantaged and disadvantaged children's expectations just 
reflecting differences in test performance at age 15 (again comparing the US and UK 
to other developed countries)?  
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The third model is the full specification as outlined above. This now also includes a 
school level fixed effect (β6) that will indicate the extent to which school level factors 
can explain the advantaged-disadvantaged expectation gap. 
 
Model 3: jiiiii
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In doing so, I note the work of Hsiao (1986) who states that fixed effect logistic 
regression models result in inconsistent parameter estimates when the number of 
observations within a higher level unit (e.g. observations in a panel or, in this case, 
children clustered within schools) is small. However, as the PISA study draws a 
sample of 30 children from each institution, this should not cause substantial bias in 
my results
122
.  
                                                          
122
 Hsiao (1986) notes that the bias in fixed effect logistic regression models become small when the 
number of observations clustered within a higher level unit (e.g. children within schools) is 
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I present all results mainly in terms of log-odds. This measure is more attractive than 
alternatives like the odds ratio and marginal effect (predicted probabilities) as they are 
not sensitive to the point on the logistic distribution on which they are estimated, and 
are therefore not influenced by differences between countries in the absolute 
proportion of children who expect to complete higher education. I illustrate this point 
in Table 4.5. The second and third columns present the proportion of children 
expecting to complete university depending on whether either of their parents holds a 
degree. Column 4 provides the marginal effect (the percentage point difference 
between columns 2 and 3) while column 5 illustrates the difference in terms of the log 
odds.  
 
Comparisons between countries can look very different depending on which measure 
is used. Take England, one of my countries of interest, and Korea. The difference 
between the second and third column is quite similar in terms of the log-odds (1.69 in 
Korea to 1.73 in England), but very different when considering the marginal effect (22 
percentage points compared to 39)
123
. This is being driven by the fact that, across the 
population, Korean children are generally more optimistic about their prospects of 
completing university than those in England (77% expect to obtain a degree in the 
former, compared to 29% in the latter). As my concern in this chapter is the 
expectations of disadvantaged children relative to their advantaged peers, I prefer the 
log-odds as it abstracts from the absolute proportion of the population believing that 
they will complete higher education. However, appreciating that this metric is rather 
cumbersome to interpret, I also occasionally present predicted probabilities to assist 
the reader’s understanding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
approximately greater than 20.  
123
  Across all countries, the estimated correlation between the marginal effect and log odds is 0.78.  
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Table 4.5. Children’s expectations of completing university, depending on 
whether either of their parents’ holds a bachelor’s degree 
  
% Expecting to 
complete university if 
either their mother or 
father holds a  degree 
% Expecting to 
complete university 
if neither their 
mother or father 
holds a  degree 
Marginal 
Effect 
Difference in 
log-odds 
Mexico 69 53 16 0.68 
Netherlands 56 31 25 1.04 
Finland 67 41 25 1.07 
Belgium(French) 48 23 25 1.13 
France 56 28 28 1.19 
Portugal 73 45 28 1.20 
Sweden 50 23 27 1.21 
Canada 80 54 26 1.23 
Ireland 76 48 29 1.23 
Greece 81 55 25 1.25 
Norway 45 19 26 1.25 
Italy 72 41 31 1.31 
USA 82 55 28 1.32 
Denmark 47 19 28 1.33 
Scotland 73 41 33 1.36 
Japan 69 36 34 1.38 
Spain 74 41 33 1.41 
Australia 80 49 30 1.43 
Turkey 93 75 18 1.49 
Belgium(Flemish) 59 24 35 1.52 
Switzerland 39 12 27 1.55 
New Zealand 70 32 38 1.60 
Luxembourg 71 33 39 1.60 
Slovakia 73 35 38 1.61 
Northern Ireland 64 26 37 1.62 
Iceland 64 26 38 1.62 
Korea 93 71 22 1.69 
England 60 21 39 1.73 
Austria 59 20 40 1.75 
Germany 44 12 32 1.75 
Czech Republic 73 31 42 1.79 
Poland 67 23 44 1.92 
Hungary 87 41 45 2.26 
OECD average 70 40 30 1.25 
Notes: 
1 The column labeled ‘marginal effect’ illustrates the percentage point difference between children’s 
expectations. This is the difference between the first two columns. Conversely, the final column 
illustrates the difference between the same figures, but in terms of the log-odds. 
2 The final row, labeled OECD average, refers to when one combines data across all 33 OECD 
countries considered. 
3 Countries sorted by the difference in terms of log-odds 
4 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Country by country sample sizes in Table 4.1 
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4.4. Results  
 
I shall now present results for the first three research questions set out in section 4.2. 
At times, I shall use phrases like 'effect' and 'influence'. I do not intend to imply 
causality when doing so; I am merely using this shorthand for convenience. A full set 
of parameter estimates can be found in Appendix 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the absolute gap between advantaged and disadvantaged 
children's expectations (i.e. the results from ‘Model 1’ as described in Section 4.3)124. 
In all countries, disadvantaged children are less likely to expect entry into university 
than their more affluent peers. This gap is generally big, around two and a half log 
odds, and is always significantly different from zero at the one percent level. To put 
this into perspective, if a hypothetical disadvantaged child had a 50% chance of 
expecting to complete university, the probability for their identical (but advantaged) 
peer would be closer to 90%
125
. Yet as I suggested when motivating this research, the 
US and parts of the UK stand out from the rest of the OECD - but for quite 
contrasting reasons.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
124
 A list of country abbreviations can be found in the left hand column of Table 4.1. 
125
  These probabilities were calculated using the formula: probability = exp(log[odds]) 
/(1+exp(log[odds])). Log odds of 0 correspond to a probability of 50%. Log odds of 2.5correspond to a 
probability of 92%. Hence, in this hypothetical example, a difference of  2.5 log odds (i.e. the 
difference between advantaged and disadvantaged groups)  leads to a 42% difference in the probability. 
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Figure 4.4. Estimated difference between advantaged and disadvantaged 
children's plans to complete higher education (based on model 1) 
 
Notes: 
1 Results are based upon predictions from the regression “model 1” that I describe on page 170. These 
predictions are based upon measures of highest parental education, highest parental occupation and 
number of books in the home. Other controls include gender, immigrant status and an interaction 
between immigrant status and the four measures of advantage listed above. Other controls include 
gender, immigrant status and an interaction between immigrant status and the three measures of 
advantage listed above. Note that these results are drawn from the first model specification and so do 
not include information on the children’s PISA test scores. 
2 The thick, solid bars represent the difference between advantaged and disadvantaged children’s 
expectations of completing university, as measured in log-odds. The thin black line at the ends of these 
bars illustrates the 95% confidence interval of this estimate.  
3 Country names corresponding to abbreviations can be found in the first column of Table 4.1 
4 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Country by country sample sizes in Table 4.1 
and Appendix 4.1. Dependent variable in regression was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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Starting with England, the difference in log odds between advantaged and 
disadvantaged children's expectations is roughly 3.0; the third largest estimate in the 
OECD.  Comparable gaps can be found in Germany, Switzerland and Austria; 
countries where access to university is restricted to children on the appropriate 
educational “track”126. Dustman (2004) shows that this “track” is strongly associated 
with family background, hence one would anticipate there to be large differences 
between advantaged and disadvantaged children's expectations in these countries. For 
the gap to be just as big in England, where such tracking does not take place, is quite a 
striking result. Likewise, England sits amongst a number of Eastern European 
countries (Hungary, Slovakia, Poland) that are well known for their educational 
polarisation (see Shavit and  Blossfeld 1993).  
 
England is also ranked noticeably higher than the other Anglo-Saxon countries. This 
includes Scotland and Northern Ireland (the other constituent parts of the UK) where 
the estimated difference in log odds is closer to the OECD average of around two and 
a half. However the 95% confidence interval (the thin black line running through the 
centre of each bar) suggests that caution is required when interpreting this result. One 
can only reject the null hypothesis that England is significantly different to Scotland 
at an unconventional threshold (15% level). A similar story emerges when making 
comparisons to other English speaking countries; the estimated socio-economic gap 
may be weaker in Australia, Ireland and New Zealand than in England, but one cannot 
rule out that this is just a reflection of sampling variation. Nevertheless, one should 
not lose sight of the comparison between England and the broader array of OECD 
countries; the association between family background and children's educational plans 
is stronger here than 12 other countries at the 5% and a further two at each of the 10% 
and 15% levels. Hence these initial estimates suggest that the difference between 
advantaged and disadvantaged children's expectations of completing university do 
seem quite big in parts of the UK (England) compared to other members of the 
OECD, though this cannot be generalised to the other constituent nations (Scotland 
and Northern Ireland).  
  
 
                                                          
126
 In these countries, children are sorted into different schools by their level of ability at a young age 
(known as “tracking”). 
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The US also stands out in Figure 4.4 - though in quite the opposite direction. The 
socio-economic gap here on the log-odds scale is under two; the third smallest out of 
the 33 countries considered. Moreover, this result is not just a matter of sampling 
variation; results for the US are statistically different to 16 other nations at the 5% 
level and a further 6 at the 10% level. This includes England, where there is obviously 
a stark contrast in the size of the socio-economic gap (a difference which is 
statistically significant at the 1% level), and Canada (which is itself relatively low 
down the international ranking). Hence it seems that the absolute gap between 
advantaged and disadvantaged children's educational expectations is actually quite 
“small” in the US – at least when compared to other members of the OECD. 
 
It is important to stress that these findings are unconditional on children's age 15 test 
score. Figure 4.5 illustrates how results change once I control for respondents’ scores 
on the PISA maths assessment
127
. Specifically, the estimates of the differences shown 
in Figure 4.4 (‘model 1’) are presented on the y-axis, with analogous figures after 
taking into account children's test scores (‘model 2’) along the x-axis. The distance 
each point is from the 45 degree line illustrates the difference between these two sets 
of results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
127
 Once again, any claim of causality faces the issue that ability is (potentially) endogenous. 
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Figure 4.5. Estimated difference between advantaged and disadvantaged 
children's plans to complete higher education, before and after controlling for 
differences in age 15 test scores 
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Notes: 
1 Figures on the y-axis correspond to the difference between advantaged and disadvantaged children’s 
educational expectations when I do not control for children’s scores on the PISA math’s tests (these are 
the results from Figure 4.4). Analogous figures, once I have included these measures of children’s age 
15 test performance, can be found along the x-axis. The 45 degree line illustrates where this leads to no 
change in results. Thus the further points are from this line, the more age 15 test performance ‘explains’ 
(in a statistical sense) the difference between children’s expectations. 
 
2 Results are based upon predictions from regression model 1 and 2 that I describe on page 170. These 
predictions are based upon measures of highest parental education, highest parental occupation and 
number of books in the home. Other controls include gender, immigrant status and an interaction 
between immigrant status and the four measures of advantage listed above. Other controls include 
gender, immigrant status and an interaction between immigrant status and the three measures of 
advantage listed above.  
 
3 Country names corresponding to abbreviations can be found in the first column of Table 4.1. 
 
4 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Country by country sample sizes in Table 4.1 
and Appendix 4.1. Dependent variable in regression was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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It is important to make clear the careful interpretation that needs to be placed on these 
results. Firstly, the measure of “ability” included is children’s test scores at age 15 
which, as discussed previously, is likely to be endogenous to social background (i.e. 
these scores are likely to have been heavily influenced by the circumstances the child 
has been born into). Hence when I describe “change” in the following results, it does 
not mean how much of the expectations gap is due to differences in “natural talent” or 
inert “ability” (as this is not what the PISA test captures). Rather, I am referring to 
“change” in a statistical sense only (i.e. how do the parameter estimates change when 
I include this extra term). In a similar manner, the conditional association between 
family background and expectations that I am left with after controlling for this term 
should not be considered the difference in educational plans for advantaged and 
disadvantaged children with the same “natural talent”128. Rather it is the difference in 
educational expectations between advantaged and disadvantaged children who have 
managed to score the same on the age 15 PISA maths assessment.  
 
It seems that age 15 test scores “explain” (in a statistical sense) only a modest amount 
of the difference between advantaged and disadvantaged children’s expectations; in 
most countries, the difference in log-odds has dropped by 20 to 30 percent. For 
instance, the estimated difference in log odds has dropped from 1.8 to 1.5 in the US 
and 2.2 to 1.9 in Canada – a pattern that is reflected across most of the OECD. The 
absolute change in England, however, is slightly greater – the log odds have fallen 
from 3.0 to 2.3. Nevertheless, in no country does it seem to be the case that 
advantaged children's higher expectations only reflect their superior performance on 
tests taken at age 15. Although this certainly plays a role, the majority of the socio-
economic gap in children's educational expectations remains unexplained. For 
instance, even after controlling for differences in age 15 test scores, an advantaged 
child from England is still over 30 percentage points more likely to expect completion 
of university than their disadvantaged (but equally able) peers
129
. 
                                                          
128
 The endogeniety of the PISA test scores with respect to socio-economic background probably leads 
to an underestimation of differences in expectations between advantaged and disadvantaged children of 
the same “natural” ability. Specifically, it is likely to be the case that advantaged children may have 
received more investment so end up scoring higher on cognitive assessments in the teenage years 
(compared to disadvantaged children who would have probably received less investment and hence 
will not score so highly on such tests). See Cunha et al (2006) for a discussion of life-cycle skill 
formation and further explanation of why disadvantaged children are likely to score lower on cognitive 
assessments taken in the teenage years.  
129
 I calculate this figure of 30 percentage points for England by converting the estimated difference in 
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Do England and the US still stand out in the international ranking once I have taken 
children's test scores into account? Table 4.6 suggests that cross-national patterns are 
indeed similar to before. 
 
The US is again placed towards the top of the table, while England is near the bottom. 
However, the socio-economic gap in the latter is now significantly stronger than in 
only six other OECD countries at the five percent level, and a further two at the ten 
percent level. Once again, this does not include Scotland and Northern Ireland, where 
the log of the odds ratio remains roughly around the OECD average of 1.9. 
Consequently, after controlling for age 15 test scores, there is only rather limited 
evidence that the difference between the educational expectations of advantaged and 
disadvantaged children is unusually large in the UK. On the other hand, the 
association between family background and children's expectations of completing 
university remains significantly weaker in the US than in other OECD countries (14 at 
the 5% level, with a further 4 at the 10% level). This, once more, includes Canada and 
England. Hence, while there is now only quite limited evidence that the socio-
economic gap is particularly big in the UK compared to other OECD countries (as in 
statistically significant differences can only be detected in comparison to a few 
countries – though I note the issue of potential Type II errors), there remains a strong 
suggestion that it is relatively small in the US. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
terms of log odds into an estimated marginal effect (in a similar manner to what I have shown in Table 
4.5) 
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Table 4.6. Difference between the expectations of advantaged and disadvantaged 
children after controlling for differences in age 15 test performance  
 
Difference between            
advantaged and   
disadvantaged                                          
(in log odds)             SE 
Significantly 
different 
from 
England? 
Significantly 
different 
USA? 
Finland 1.19 0.15 *** - 
Mexico 1.20 0.16 *** - 
Netherlands 1.25 0.26 *** - 
Turkey 1.41 0.31 *** - 
USA 1.45 0.19 ***   
France 1.58 0.26 ** - 
Portugal 1.69 0.17 * - 
Czech Republic 1.74 0.19 * - 
Italy 1.83 0.17 - - 
Northern Ireland 1.84 0.32 - - 
Iceland 1.88 0.19 - - 
Belgium (French) 1.88 0.35 - - 
Australia 1.89 0.25 - - 
Scotland 1.89 0.31 - - 
Canada 1.90 0.15 - * 
Spain 1.93 0.15 - ** 
Japan 1.94 0.22 - * 
Greece 1.94 0.24 - - 
Sweden 1.99 0.20 - ** 
Ireland 2.00 0.20 - ** 
Slovakia 2.03 0.19 - ** 
Luxemburg 2.04 0.31 - * 
New Zealand 2.05 0.27 - * 
Norway 2.13 0.25 - ** 
Germany 2.16 0.30 - ** 
Denmark 2.20 0.26 - ** 
Korea 2.24 0.24 - *** 
Belgium (Flemish) 2.25 0.25 - *** 
England 2.31 0.27 - *** 
Poland 2.34 0.19 - *** 
Austria 2.37 0.28 - *** 
Switzerland 2.39 0.38 - ** 
Hungary 2.55 0.25 - *** 
Notes: 
1 The final two columns illustrate whether the estimated difference in log odds are significantly 
different to those in England and the US. *, ** and *** indicate a statistically significant difference at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
2 Countries sorted by the difference in expectations of advantaged and disadvantaged groups 
3 Statistical significance calculated using a two sample t-test assuming independent samples are drawn 
between countries 
4 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Country by country sample sizes in Table 4.1 
and Appendix 4.1. Dependent variable in regression was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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In Figure 4.6 I investigate whether this also remains the case when I include a school 
level fixed effect (results from ‘model 3’)130.  Again, the distance each country sits 
above the 45 degree line illustrates how much of the remaining expectations gap is 
“explained” (in a statistical sense) by differences in school level factors (over and 
above the role schools play in developing children’s age 15 test scores). Caution is, 
however, require when interpreting these results. In particular, I am unable to identify 
whether the reduction in the expectations gap is being driven by something that 
educational institutions actually provide (e.g. advantaged children attending good 
schools where teachers encourage and assist university applications) or if this is 
capturing some wider factor (e.g. peer effects or the community in which the child has 
grown up). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
130
 Note that one faces certain difficulties when estimating such models. In particular, I must drop 4% 
of observations where all the children (or none of the children) in a particular school expect to 
complete university. This varies dramatically across countries. It is particularly high in countries where 
access to higher education is only available to children on a certain educational track. For instance, 
25% of all observations are dropped in Germany, 20% in Austria and 19% in Switzerland compared to 
less than 1% in England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Canada and the US. 
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Figure 4.6. Estimated difference between advantaged and disadvantaged 
children's plans to complete higher education, controlling for differences in age 
15 test performance, before and after including a school level fixed effect 
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Notes: 
 
1 Figures on the y-axis correspond to the difference between advantaged and disadvantaged children’s 
educational expectations when I do not include a school level fixed effect (i.e these are the results from 
“Model 2” that were presented on the x-axis in Figure 4.5).  Analogous figures, once I have included 
the school level fixed effect, can be found along the x-axis (i.e these are the results from model 3). Note 
that I have controlled for children’s scores on the PISA maths tests in BOTH sets of results. The 45 
degree line illustrates where including the fixed effect leads to no change in results.  
 
2 Results are based upon predictions from the regression model that I describe on page 170. These are 
based upon measures of highest parental education, highest parental occupation and number of books 
in the home. Other controls include gender, immigrant status and an interaction between immigrant 
status and the four measures of advantage listed above.  
 
3 Country names corresponding to abbreviations can be found in the first column of Table 4.1 
 
4 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Country by country sample sizes in Table 4.1 
and Appendix 4.1. Dependent variable in regression was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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The estimated difference in log-odds has declined dramatically in some countries, but 
not in others. As suggested earlier, school level factors play a particularly prominent 
role when access to university is restricted to only those children on a certain 
educational track (e.g. Switzerland, Italy and Austria)
131
. Yet there is also a non-trivial 
change in England – the difference in log-odds has declined by over 40% (from 2.3 to 
1.3). On the other hand, including the school level fixed effect has had only a more 
modest impact in Scotland, Northern Ireland and the US (a decline of less than 25%). 
Hence there is a tentative suggestion that schools, or at least something that is 
determined at the school level, may be a bigger part of the socio-economic gap in 
England than other Anglo-Saxon countries. However it is important to once again 
stress that, even after taking into account children's age 15 test performance and 
school level factors, large differences remain between advantaged and disadvantaged 
groups. For instance, in a hypothetical country where 50% of disadvantaged children 
believe they will complete university, roughly 70% of advantaged children would 
expect to attend (after accounting for differences in their test performance and 
schools). It is also worth noting that, after controlling for marks on the PISA 
assessment and school level factors, England sits below the OECD average. 
Moreover, the estimated difference in log-odds is now not significantly larger here 
than in any other country. 
 
In summary, initial estimates suggested that the socio-economic gap may be slightly 
bigger in England (but not Scotland and Northern Ireland) than some other OECD 
countries. However, once differences in age 15 test scores have been taken into 
account, the evidence in support of this finding is reduced. Yet it is important to 
remember that children from disadvantaged backgrounds remain 30 percentage points 
less likely to expect entry into university than their advantaged peers who score the 
same on the aforementioned assessment (based on predictions from my model).  
Schools, or rather something defined at the school level, can explain a much more 
substantial proportion of this remaining difference in England (almost a half) than in 
Scotland, Northern Ireland or the US. 
                                                          
131
 However, one should be cautious when interpreting results for these nations because of the large 
number of observations that have been dropped from the analysis (due to the outcome being 
“completely determined” by the school).  For instance, Austria and Switzerland stand out in Figure 4.7 
because of their distance from the 45 degree line – yet I have dropped almost 20% of observations in 
these countries between these two models.  
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4.5. Results – The expectations of disadvantaged children who score highly on 
the PISA test compared to their advantaged, but lower scoring, peers. 
 
I now turn to my final research question – do disadvantaged children who score 
highly on the age 15 PISA assessment hold higher expectations than their advantaged 
peers who do not perform so well? I face a problem, however, in that very few 
disadvantaged children (as per my definition in section 4.3) actually reach the upper 
tail of the age 15 maths test distribution. Hence I am in danger of addressing this 
question using an unreasonably small number of observations (i.e. there is an issue of 
“common support”). 
 
 To try and overcome this difficulty, I use a broader definition of advantage based 
upon the PISA “Economic, Social and Cultural Status” (ESCS) index; a continuous 
measure of family background (scaled to be mean 0 and standard deviation 1 across 
the OECD countries) that is contained within the provided dataset. Specifically, the 
survey organisers have produced a weighted average, via a principal component 
analysis, of three variables (highest level of parental education, parental occupation, 
and availability of items in the family home) to generate a measure of children’s 
socio-economic status. The first two of these variables (parental education and 
occupation) are as described in the earlier data section. The “availability of home 
possessions” is itself an index (from another principal components analysis) based 
upon children's reports of whether they have various items (e.g. computers, works of 
art, number of books) in their family home (details of which can be found in 
Appendix 4.2). According to OECD (2004), this provides an approximate measure of 
household wealth. Further details on the construction of the ESCS index are available 
in Appendix 4.2. 
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This index has several attractions as an alternative measure of family background. 
Firstly, it continues to capture the multi-dimensional nature (education, occupation, 
income/wealth) of “advantage”. Secondly, as this variable is continuous, I can easily 
widen the proportion of children contained within my definition of advantaged and 
disadvantaged groups (to, for instance, the top and bottom quartile). Also note that, by 
using this measure, I can ensure that the same relative proportion of the population is 
defined as advantaged and disadvantaged in each of the OECD nations. Indeed, it is 
implicitly for these reasons that other authors, such as Chowdry et al (2009), have 
constructed similar measures via the same technique. Yet this variable also has a 
number of limitations. As it is created via a principal components analysis, it is 
somewhat difficult to interpret. There is also likely to be some information loss from 
suppressing various measures into one, all-encompassing, continuous index. One may 
also have some doubts over the validity of using household items as a measure of 
family wealth. Whether a child grows up in a home with a dishwasher or works of art 
will to some extent reflect parental preferences, and thus may provide little insight 
into whether they truly come from an advantaged or disadvantaged background. 
Similarly, one may question the cross-national comparability of such measures
132
. Yet, 
despite these limitations, this remains an attractive alternative measure of socio-
economic status due to its flexible nature. The distribution of this index across OECD 
countries can be found in Table 4.7.  
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Indeed, it is for these reasons that I did not use this variable or include such information in my initial 
definition of advantaged and disadvantaged groups (described in section 4.3). 
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Table 4.7. Distribution of ESCS measure of family background across countries 
  Percentile       
  10th 25th 50
th
 75th 90
th
 mean SD % Missing 
Mexico -2.38 -1.78 -1.07 -0.09 0.67 -0.96 1.15 1 
Turkey -2.22 -1.76 -1.07 -0.29 0.59 -0.96 1.08 0 
Portugal -2.30 -1.63 -0.72 0.23 1.18 -0.65 1.27 1 
Poland -1.17 -0.79 -0.31 0.25 1.02 -0.21 0.82 0 
Greece -1.45 -0.91 -0.25 0.50 1.20 -0.19 1.00 0 
Spain -1.53 -0.88 -0.19 0.51 1.13 -0.19 0.98 1 
Korea -1.24 -0.66 -0.08 0.47 0.96 -0.12 0.85 0 
Switzerland -1.15 -0.64 -0.11 0.45 0.99 -0.10 0.83 1 
Hungary -1.12 -0.71 -0.18 0.51 1.18 -0.09 0.89 0 
Japan -0.98 -0.59 -0.10 0.43 0.94 -0.08 0.73 1 
Ireland -1.17 -0.68 -0.09 0.52 1.09 -0.07 0.88 1 
France -1.18 -0.69 -0.05 0.59 1.13 -0.05 0.92 1 
Italy -1.29 -0.73 -0.03 0.63 1.32 -0.02 0.97 0 
Slovakia -0.96 -0.60 -0.12 0.54 1.13 -0.02 0.81 0 
Northern Ireland -1.09 -0.69 -0.08 0.65 1.28 0.01 0.91 3 
Austria -0.95 -0.48 0.02 0.65 1.26 0.08 0.85 1 
Scotland -1.05 -0.50 0.10 0.76 1.26 0.09 0.91 2 
Netherlands -0.94 -0.47 0.10 0.76 1.20 0.11 0.86 3 
Belgium(French) -1.13 -0.54 0.17 0.84 1.38 0.13 0.98 2 
England -0.95 -0.47 0.09 0.79 1.38 0.14 0.89 5 
Belgium(Flemish) -0.92 -0.46 0.17 0.86 1.35 0.18 0.91 3 
Germany -0.94 -0.42 0.16 0.86 1.50 0.18 0.99 6 
Denmark -0.85 -0.39 0.19 0.79 1.31 0.19 0.85 1 
Luxembourg -1.40 -0.48 0.32 0.98 1.51 0.19 1.09 1 
Australia -0.83 -0.34 0.24 0.83 1.26 0.23 0.83 1 
New Zealand -0.91 -0.33 0.27 0.86 1.35 0.23 0.91 2 
Czech Republic -0.76 -0.33 0.17 0.87 1.39 0.26 0.81 3 
Finland -0.80 -0.34 0.29 0.87 1.32 0.26 0.83 0 
Sweden -0.80 -0.31 0.26 0.90 1.37 0.26 0.87 1 
USA -0.87 -0.33 0.29 0.93 1.41 0.28 0.90 1 
Canada -0.72 -0.25 0.33 0.97 1.50 0.35 0.84 5 
Norway -0.36 0.06 0.59 1.18 1.64 0.61 0.79 1 
Iceland -0.40 0.13 0.74 1.34 1.77 0.69 0.88 1 
OECD -1.44 -0.71 -0.02 0.68 1.26 0 1 2 
Notes: 
1 Data refers to points on the ESCS scale of family background, as described earlier in this section. On 
this scale, higher values means a more advantaged family background. 
2 Countries sorted by mean values.  
3 Source: PISA 2003 data. Country by country sample sizes in Table 4.1 and Appendix 4.1.  
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I proceed by dividing this variable in four equal groups (separately for each country) 
and defining: 
 
‘Advantaged’ = top quartile group of the national ESCS distribution 
‘Disadvantaged’ = bottom quartile group of the national ESCS distribution 
 
I then use this information in a fourth regression model as a set of dummy variables, 
with the bottom quartile (‘disadvantaged’) as the reference group.  Formally, this 
model is specified: 
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where: 
Adv = A vector of three dummy variables reflecting advantage, based upon quartiles 
the ESCS measure of family background described above (reference = bottom 
quartile) 
 
Ability = A vector of four dummy variables based upon quintiles of the (national) age 
15 maths test distribution (reference = bottom quintile group) 
 
All other variables are as described in section 4.3
133
. 
 
Note that “ability” (defined as performance on the PISA test at age 15) also enters this 
model as a set of dummy variables, reflecting quintiles of the (national) PISA maths 
test distribution (with the lowest quintile group as the reference group). I did this to 
allow for a straightforward interaction between advantage and test performance while 
retaining non-linearity in the latter. However, I chose not to include these interaction 
terms in the final specification as a likelihood ratio test (for the inclusion of these 
extra parameters) suggested they were statistically insignificant at the 10% level in 29 
of the 33 countries
134,135
.  In Appendix 4.3 I check the robustness of my results when 
                                                          
133
 Note that I do not control for school level factors in this specification as my interest is in the raw 
differences between groups, and not why such patterns occur. I thus allow for the complex survey 
design used in PISA by making appropriate adjustments to the estimated standard errors. 
134
 The countries where the likelihood ratio test was significant were Mexico, Canada, Northern Ireland 
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using an alternative specification, in which I include PISA test scores as a continuous 
term and interact this with an alternative measure of family background. 
 
From this model, I compare the predicted log odds of a high scoring, disadvantaged 
child (inside the top 20% of the maths test distribution and within the bottom 25% of 
the ESCS distribution) expecting to complete university to the predicted log odds for 
an advantaged, child scoring around the national average (inside the 40
th
 – 60th 
percentile of the maths distribution and within the top 25% of ESCS distribution). 
Table 4.8 illustrates that there are at least 50 children in every country fitting each of 
these criterion, suggesting there is adequate data to support such estimations. It also 
provides further motivation for this research; in most countries less than one in ten 
disadvantaged children reach the top quintile of the age 15 maths test distribution, 
compared to over one third of those from the most advantaged homes. To broaden the 
social composition of universities, the few disadvantaged teenagers who manage to 
overcome adversity up to age 15 must believe higher education is a realistic and 
obtainable goal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and France. However, one would expect to find a significant difference (at the 10% level) in three 
countries purely by chance.  
135
 Wald tests of individual parameters of interest (e.g. the interaction of the top ability quintile with the 
top ESCS quartile) were also largely insignificant. The coefficients on these interactions were positive 
in roughly half of the countries and negative in the others. 
189 
 
Table 4.8. Percentage of 15 year olds from the top and bottom quartile group of 
the ESCS distribution who are in the top quintile group of the national PISA 
math’s test distribution 
  
Number of 
observations 
defined as 
‘advantaged’/ 
’disadvantaged’  
Number of 
disadvantaged 
children who 
reach top 
quintile group 
of maths test 
distribution 
% of 
disadvantaged 
children who 
reach  top 
quintile group 
of maths  test 
distribution 
% of 
advantaged 
children 
who reach  
top quintile 
group of 
maths test 
distribution 
Belgium(French) 740 46 6 38 
Northern Ireland 715 46 6 37 
Hungary 1,192 49 4 43 
Scotland 681 50 7 36 
England 999 58 6 39 
New Zealand 1,129 61 5 35 
Ireland 972 66 7 34 
Luxembourg 981 66 7 36 
France 1,075 68 6 36 
Denmark 1,057 70 7 35 
Norway 1,016 70 7 35 
Poland 1,099 70 6 38 
Germany 1,166 72 6 33 
Netherlands 1,007 81 8 34 
Czech Republic 1,582 82 5 36 
Greece 1,159 83 7 38 
Japan 1,201 86 7 34 
Portugal 1,152 86 7 41 
Iceland 844 88 10 31 
USA 1,364 90 7 37 
Sweden 1,165 91 8 37 
Austria 1,198 97 8 33 
Slovakia 1,845 101 5 39 
Korea 1,366 105 8 36 
Turkey 1,214 107 9 40 
Belgium(Flemish) 1,460 108 7 34 
Finland 1,452 132 9 33 
Switzerland 2,109 159 8 34 
Australia 3,145 229 7 35 
Spain 2,698 254 9 35 
Italy 2,918 296 10 29 
Mexico 7,526 657 9 34 
Canada 6,989 687 10 31 
OECD 56,216 4,411 8 35 
Notes: 
1 Advantaged children in this table are defined as those within the top quartile group of the national 
ESCS distribution described earlier in this section. Similarly, disadvantaged children are those in the 
bottom quartile group of the national ESCS distribution. The second column from the left illustrates the 
number of observations within these groups. The two columns on the right give the proportion of 
advantaged or disadvantaged children who reach the top quintile group of the maths test distribution. 
 
2 Source: PISA 2003 data. Country by country sample sizes in Table 4.1 and Appendix 4.1.  
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Results are presented in Figure 4.7 (with the full set of parameter estimates provided 
in Appendix 4.1). The x-axis illustrates the predicted log odds of an advantaged, 
native girl scoring the national average mark on the PISA maths test (scoring between 
the 40
th
 and 60
th
 percentile) expecting to complete university. On the other hand, the 
y-axis demonstrates the equivalent figures for a disadvantaged, native girl scoring in 
the top 20% of the age 15 national PISA test distribution. The 45 degree line is where 
these children are equally likely to expect to obtain a bachelor's degree. If a country 
sits below this line, then children who score highly on cognitive assessment at age 15 
from disadvantaged backgrounds are less likely to expect completion of university 
than their advantaged peers who score around the national average.  
 
In almost every country, it seems that scoring highly on the PISA test (defined in this 
way) does not overcome the constraints of family background. 32 of the 33 countries 
considered sit below the 45 degree line (the Netherlands is the exception), with the 
difference being statistically significant at the 5% level on 28 occasions. Hence, it 
seems that children from disadvantaged backgrounds who score highly on age 15 
cognitive assessments do not hold higher expectations than their lower scoring, but 
more fortunate, peers. Indeed, in a number of countries, these children are less likely 
to believe they have what it takes to successfully complete higher education.  
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Figure 4.7. Predicted log-odds of a high scoring disadvantaged native girl 
expecting to complete university versus an average scoring advantaged native 
girl  
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Notes: 
1 Figures on the y-axis illustrate the predicted log-odds of a disadvantaged, high scoring native girl 
expecting to complete university. Similarly, the predicted log-odds for an advantaged native girl of 
average ability are presented on the x-axis. The 45 degree line represents where the predicted log-odds 
for the two groups described above are equal (they hold the same chance of expecting to complete 
university).  
 
2 Points sit significantly below the 45 degree line in all countries at the 5% level except in Northern 
Ireland, Scotland, New Zealand and the Netherlands (which is above the line and significant). 
I define advantage using the ESCS index described earlier in this section. Specifically, those in the top 
quartile group of this index were defined as advantaged, while those in the bottom quartile group were 
disadvantaged. High ability is defined as those in the top 20% of the national PISA math’s test 
distribution.  Average ability is defined as those in the 40
th
-60
th
 percentile. 
 
3 Variables in the model include the ESCS measure of family background, immigrant status, gender, 
children’s score on the PISA maths tests and an interaction between immigrant status and ESCS. 
Country names corresponding to abbreviations can be found in the first column of Table 4.1 
 
4 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Country by country sample sizes in Table 4.1 
and Appendix 4.1. Dependent variable in regression was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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England, the US and Canada are all part of this aforementioned group; each sits 
significantly below the 45 degree line at the 1% level. Yet Table 4.9 suggests that 
these countries do not particularly stand out from the rest of the OECD. The 
difference in both England and the US is around the OECD average, with little 
evidence that the expectations gap is any bigger or smaller here than other parts of the 
developed world. On the other hand, Scotland and Northern Ireland sit very near the 
45 degree line and are two of the four countries where one can not reject the null 
hypothesis that high scoring disadvantaged children are equally as likely to expect to 
attend university as their advantaged but lower scoring peers. Indeed, Table 4.9 
illustrates that the socio-economic gap is significantly weaker in Scotland than 19 
other countries (including England, Canada and the US). 
 
Nevertheless, the above results may still be a concern for British and American 
policymakers. This is perhaps more easily seen in Figure 4.8, where I convert the 
estimates from Figure 4.7 into predicted probabilities. In the US and Canada, an 
advantaged child of achieving the national average mark on the PISA maths 
assessment has a 85% chance of expecting to complete university. On the other hand, 
the probability for a high scoring child from a less fortunate background is closer to 
75%. In England, the analogous figures are 55% and 40%. Thus a large socio-
economic divide remains even when children from less fortunate families manage to 
surpass their more affluent peers academically. As stated in Section 4.2, most would 
argue that our best and brightest children should be aiming to obtain a degree, 
regardless of their family background. It should thus be a real concern in England 
that, of the few disadvantaged 15 year olds that manage to reach the top quintile of the 
maths test distribution at this age, only one in four believe that they will go on to 
obtain a tertiary qualification. 
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Table 4.9. Difference between the expectations of disadvantaged children scoring 
a high mark on the PISA maths assessment versus advantaged children with a 
mark around the national average 
 
  
‘Difference’ significantly greater/smaller than... 
Country 
Difference 
between 
advantaged and 
disadvantaged (in 
log odds) Scotland NI England US Can 
Netherlands -0.51 - *** *** *** *** 
Scotland 0.00 - - ** ** *** 
Northern Ireland 0.12 - - - - *** 
New Zealand 0.14 - - ** * *** 
Korea 0.21 - - - - ** 
Czech Republic 0.25 - - - - *** 
Finland 0.29 - - - - *** 
Slovakia 0.30 - - - - *** 
Japan 0.36 - - - - ** 
Portugal 0.40 - - - - ** 
Australia 0.42 - - - - ** 
Spain 0.43 - - - - ** 
France 0.56 - - - - - 
Austria 0.56 * - - - - 
Mexico 0.57 * - - - - 
Belgium (Flemish) 0.58 * - - - - 
England 0.60 ** - - - - 
USA 0.63 ** - - - - 
Germany 0.64 * - - - - 
Greece 0.69 ** - - - - 
Iceland 0.69 ** * - - - 
Denmark 0.70 ** * - - - 
Ireland 0.75 ** * - - - 
Belgium (French) 0.77 ** * - - - 
Canada 0.88 *** *** - - - 
Luxemburg 0.95 ** ** - - - 
Norway 1.01 *** *** - - - 
Switzerland 1.01 *** ** - - - 
Sweden 1.05 *** *** * - - 
Hungary 1.13 *** *** ** * - 
Poland 1.14 *** *** *** ** - 
Italy 1.43 *** *** *** *** ** 
Notes:1 The final five columns illustrate whether the estimated log odds are significantly different to 
those in England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Canada and the US. *, ** and *** indicate a statistically 
significant difference at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
2 Data sorted by the difference in expectations of advantaged and disadvantaged groups 
Statistical significance calculated using a two sample t-test assuming independent samples  
3 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Country by country sample sizes in Table 4.1 
and Appendix 4.1. Dependent variable in regression was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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Figure 4.8. Predicted probability of a high scoring disadvantaged native girl 
expecting to complete university versus an average scoring advantaged native 
girl 
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Notes: 
1 This figure presents the results given in Figure 4.7 in terms of predicted probabilities. See notes to 
Figure 4.7 above for further details. 
2 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Country by country sample sizes in Table 4.1 
and Appendix 4.1. Dependent variable in regression was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
 
 
4.6. Summary and policy discussion for the UK 
In all countries across the developed world, there are large and statistically significant 
differences between the educational expectations of children from different family 
backgrounds. This remains the case even after taking into account the fact that such 
groups attend different schools and achieves different marks on tests at age 15. A 
particularly important finding is that high achieving children from less fortunate 
homes hold lower expectations than their affluent but lower performing peers. A 
central theme amongst the research questions I set out in section 4.2 was whether such 
results are particularly prominent in the UK. Analysis of the PISA data has yielded 
little evidence that this is the case. Although the initial estimates suggested that 
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England sat near the top of the international ranking (third largest difference), one 
could not reject the hypothesis that a similarly large gap occurs in several other 
English speaking countries like Australia, New Zealand, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. In fact, after controlling for differences in age 15 test scores, the advantaged-
disadvantaged gap was only significantly bigger in England than in six of the 33 
OECD nations (recalling once more my discussion of how to interpret this finding and 
the possibility of type two errors). Once differences in school level factors were also 
taken into account, England stood below with the international average. A similar 
finding occurs when considering the expectations of English children from 
disadvantaged homes who scored highly on the age 15 PISA maths test. Although this 
group is significantly less likely to believe that they will complete higher education 
than those of lower scoring children from more affluent homes, this does not stand out 
as an issue that is specific to the UK. 
 
Aspects of these results conflict with evidence from the existing literature. For 
instance, Chevalier et al (2009) use the PISA 2003 sample for England and find that 
there are no social class differences in English children’s educational expectations 
once one has taken into account differences in the PISA test scores
136
. However, the 
authors investigate differences based only upon parental occupation, and have 
presented conditional estimates after controlling for several related factors (e.g. 
parental education and number of hours studying per week). Hence one possible 
reason for this apparent inconsistency is my focus on a broad, multi-dimensional 
measure of advantage rather than their specific interest on occupation. In accordance 
with my findings, Chowdry et al (2009) also find large socio-economic differences in 
14 and 16 year olds university plans when analysing the Longitudinal Study of Young 
People in England survey
137
. Although the authors do not explicitly explore the 
determinants of these educational intentions, there is an implicit suggestion that this is 
not entirely reflecting differences in academic attainment (as I also suggest in this 
chapter).  
                                                          
136
 Interestingly, they also find that although children’s academic perception is related to their social 
class, it does explain difference in these groups attainment.  
137
 Interestingly, they find that a lot higher proportion of English children expecting to attend university 
than in my analysis. For instance, they find half of the most disadvantaged quintile believe they are 
likely to apply to university and be accepted. One reason may be that the question used is very different 
in the PISA and LSYPE surveys, with the former perhaps better suited towards capturing children’s 
expectations and the latter their aspirations.  
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A final consideration is what can be implemented, in a cost-effective manner, to 
address the large socio-economic gaps I have highlighted in this chapter. Emmerson et 
al (2005) suggest that widening access schemes like “Aim Higher” have had some 
success in increasing disadvantaged children’s intentions of completing higher 
education.  However, given the limited resources currently available, one must decide 
the age group at which it is most efficient to target such initiatives. Chowdry et al 
(2008) suggest moving widening participation schemes away from those enrolled in 
post-compulsory education (ages 16 to 18) to children in the earlier stages of 
secondary school. Given that I find such large socio-economic gaps in children's 
perceptions of higher education at age 15, I am inclined to agree with these authors. 
Rather than focusing on those in post 16 education, widening access initiatives to 
raise expectations should perhaps be targeted at younger age groups (as children are 
turning 14) to try and stop disadvantaged children forming negative pre-conceptions 
about university.  
 
4.7. Conclusion 
 
There is a concern in many countries that children from disadvantaged backgrounds 
are under-represented amongst the undergraduate population. In particular, policy-
makers are worried that some young adults who could benefit from higher education 
decide not to seek out the returns that this investment can offer. “Widening access” 
schemes that try to address this issue have thus become common across the developed 
world. A particular feature of such programmes in the US and UK is that they 
explicitly aim to raise disadvantaged children's expectations of completing university. 
It is claimed that, in doing so, such policies will reduce the socio-economic divide in 
tertiary graduation rates. 
 
By considering the size of this expectation gap in the US and UK, and how it 
compares to other developed countries, I have made a number of contributions to the 
existing literature and current policy debate. Firstly, this is the only study (that I am 
aware of) to place the socio-economic divide in British and American children's 
educational expectations into an internationally comparative perspective. Secondly, 
this is the first study, to my knowledge, to consider whether the gap between 
advantaged and disadvantaged children's educational expectations can be fully 
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explained by differences in their test scores at age 15. Finally, other studies within this 
literature have typically focused upon the educational intentions of the “average” 
child. In contrast, I explicitly consider whether young adults from disadvantaged 
backgrounds who score highly on the age 15 PISA maths assessment hold higher or 
lower expectations than their advantaged, but lower scoring, peers. 
 
My results show that there are large differences between advantaged and 
disadvantaged children's educational plans, and that this holds true across all countries 
in the developed world. There is little evidence that the UK stands out when 
compared to other members of the OECD, particularly once differences in age 15 test 
performance and school level factors have been taken into account. On the other hand, 
there is some evidence that the socio-economic gap is atypically small in the US. 
However, perhaps my most concerning finding is that a significant proportion of 15 
year olds who score high marks on the PISA assessment do not expect to complete 
university. In both England and the US, an advantaged child who scores the national 
average mark is more likely to expect to complete higher education than a 
disadvantaged child who reaches the top quintile of the test distribution. Indeed, I 
predict that from my regression model that little over a third of high-performing 
disadvantaged children in England believe they will obtain a bachelor’s degree if they 
come from a disadvantaged family background. Yet one should bear in mind this is 
not a unique British trait, and that similar patterns can be found across the developed 
world. 
 
It is of course important to note the limitations of this study and, in doing so, aspects 
of the wider literature. To begin, I remind the reader that the estimates presented 
should not be treated as causal. In particular, it is again worth pointing out that I have 
not explored differences in expectations between children of the same “natural” or 
inherent talent. Rather, I have only been able to investigate differences in expectations 
conditional on test performance at age 15 (which is, in itself, likely to reflect 
differences in socio-economic background). On a related issue, I have undertaken this 
research based on the assumption that adolescents' educational expectations have an 
important influence on their later behaviour and schooling attainment. Although there 
is evidence supporting this from a broad range of disciplines, including sociology, 
social psychology and economics, further work in this area still needs to be done. In 
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particular, future research should focus on untangling the relationship between these 
variables and whether such associations vary across different national settings. 
Finally, all my analyses and subsequent inferences are based on the assumption that 
children are reporting their educational expectations, rather than their aspirations, in 
the PISA survey. Although general patterns within the data are consistent with this 
view, formal validation of this type of question would represent a significant forward 
step for the wider literature. 
 
Despite these caveats, this research should make an important contribution to debates 
on widening university participation in the UK. Given the large socio-economic gap 
in English children's expectations, I suggest that policymakers should continue to 
promote the benefits of higher education to disadvantaged groups (particularly those 
with the greatest academic potential), though perhaps targeting slightly younger age 
groups. Of course, within the current financial climate, it is also important that such 
schemes represent an efficient allocation of finite government resources. Recent work 
by the Sutton Trust (2010) vehemently argues that this is the case. Yet it also seems 
prudent to stress the need for future research which thoroughly investigates the 
assumptions on which such policies are based. In particular, social scientists need to 
confirm that raising adolescents' educational expectations has a causal influence on 
later attainment (and possibly other behaviour as per Cowan 2009). The main 
conclusion that this chapter draws is that, although the socio-economic gap in 
children's educational expectations is large in all countries within the UK, it is not 
atypically big with respect to other developed nations. Nevertheless, the low 
expectations of children from disadvantaged backgrounds remain one plausible reason 
why our undergraduate population has such an unbalanced social mix.   
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusions 
This thesis began by explaining the role of young adults' expectations in social 
scientists' models of schooling choice. Firstly, I considered the approach favoured by 
economists, where adolescents' educational decisions are driven by what they expect 
the costs and benefits of this investment to be. In doing so, I made clear my concern 
that information on children's expectations is not routinely collected within this 
discipline. Likewise, I noted the worries of others, such as Manski (1993, 2004), that 
traditional economic models of schooling behaviour rely heavily on the assumption 
that there are no systematic differences between young adults’ (ex-ante) expected 
returns to education and later (ex-post) realisations. Using these concerns as 
motivation, this thesis has explored the variation in young adults' labour market 
expectations, and whether such beliefs about the future are (on average) realistic. In 
chapter 2 I considered this in reference to undergraduates’ expected starting salaries 
within the UK. This was followed in chapter 3 by an analysis of whether 20 year old 
American men were able to make realistic predictions of their labour market 
outcomes at age 30. On the basis of this research, I have reached the following seven 
conclusions: 
 
 The wage expectations of UK students vary significantly with how far they 
have progressed through university, their views on the graduate labour market 
and quality of institution they attend. On the other hand, they are not strongly 
associated with ethnicity. 
 
 Part-time students in the UK are, on average, quite realistic about their starting 
wage. On the other hand, those studying full-time tend to overestimate their 
starting salary by an average of just under 15% (roughly £2,000). This result 
contrasts with Webbink and Hartog (2004), the only other European study 
using a balanced sample of students, who found that young adults in the 
Netherlands could make reasonable predictions of their first wage. 
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 The accuracy of UK students’ wage expectations depend, however, on the 
subject they are studying. Whereas those who are enrolled in Maths, 
Engineering, Computer Science and Education courses hold, on average, 
reasonably realistic expectations, their peers studying for an Art, Business or 
Humanities qualification make particularly poor predictions (overestimating 
their starting salary by an average of almost 20%). 
 
 Many of these results also hold over a longer time horizon for young men in 
the US, who overestimate their income 10 years into the future by (on 
average) over 40%. Consistent with my findings for the UK, those studying 
Mathematics, Engineering and Physical Sciences make better predictions than 
their peers completing an Art, Humanities or Social Science degree.  
 
 There is, however, little evidence that young American men in employment 
are more realistic about the labour market than their peers who are enrolled in 
higher education. Both groups vastly overestimate their future salary and 
chances of entering a professional career. 
 
 On the basis of such results, I suggest the simplistic assumptions that are often 
made by economists (that young adults’ expectations do not systematically 
differ from their later realizations) are based on a rocky foundation. In 
particular, it seems that young adults, both those enrolled in higher education 
and their peers in employment, maybe lacking some important information on 
the labour market. 
 
 Consequently, I advise US and UK policymakers to increase the availability of 
data on graduate and non-graduate wages. Specifically, information on 
graduate employment outcomes and wages should be set out separately by 
discipline and institution. Moreover, although I have focused on average 
outcomes in this thesis, one may argue that this should be in the form of entire 
wage distributions (given the central role of wage variability and risk aversion 
in economic models of choice). Likewise, such wage profiles should be made 
available for those undertaking alternative training routes (e.g. 
apprenticeships). Ideally, this should be accompanied by estimates of 
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counterfactual outcomes under a set of alternative scenarios – for instance 
what a graduate would have earned if he/she chose to undertake an 
apprenticeship instead. 
 
 
In the penultimate chapter, I turned to the role of children’s educational expectations 
in determining their later schooling behaviour. Specifically, I discussed how 
educational expectations may differ between advantaged and disadvantaged groups, 
and how this may lead to different rates of educational attainment. I thus explored the 
gap between advantaged and disadvantaged children's educational plans, focusing on 
whether such differences are greater in the US and UK than other parts of the 
developed world. This has brought me to the following three additional conclusions: 
 
 There are large and statistically significant differences between the educational 
expectations of advantaged and disadvantaged children. In fact, high achieving 
children from less fortunate homes hold lower expectations than their affluent 
but lower achieving peers. This holds true across almost every country in the 
developed world.  
 
 Yet there is little evidence that the difference between advantaged and 
disadvantaged children’s educational expectations stands out as particularly 
big in the UK (compared to other members of the OECD).  On the other hand, 
there is some evidence that this socio-economic gap is atypically small in the 
US. 
 
 I thus suggest that, although widening access schemes should still continue to 
be a prominent part of UK higher education policy, such initiatives should be 
of no more concern here than in other parts of the developed world.  
 
Although these conclusions have partly addressed my concerns with the current 
literature, set out in chapter one, there are limitations to this work and (consequently) 
the results that I have found. Three particular limitations that I wish to highlight are: 
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 The lack of information on counter-factual outcomes. In section 1.2 I set out 
an economic framework of the HE decision making process. This model 
stipulates that a young person will be more likely to go to university the higher 
their expected economic return (the wages they expect to get if they obtain a 
degree versus the wages they expect if they don’t). However, in chapters 2 and 
3 I only analysed expected and actual wages conditional upon obtaining a 
degree – I do not have any information on students’ views of outcomes under 
the counterfactual (not obtaining a degree). It is important to consider the 
limitations that this puts on the approach taken in this thesis. It is possible that, 
although young people overestimate their wage post-university by a certain 
percentage, they may also overestimate outcomes under the counterfactual 
(e.g. not going to university) by the same amount. In this situation their 
expected return to higher education (and hence their decision of whether to go 
to university) would remain completely unchanged. More generally, over-
estimation of post-university wages is only important in the HE decision 
making process if it takes the expected return to that choice (e.g. going to 
university) above that of the counterfactual (e.g. not going to university). 
Hence young people can still rationally decide to enter higher education even 
when overestimating their future wage. Without information on young 
peoples’ views of outcomes under the counterfactual (e.g. what they would 
earn had they not gone to university) I am unable to make a firm statement as 
to whether this group are just generally over-optimistic about the future (i.e. 
over-estimate all outcomes) or if their mistaken views on post-university 
wages is actually altering the educational choices that they make. 
 
 One of the main findings in this thesis is that students in certain subjects 
(mainly those in Maths and Science based courses) make better predictions of 
future employment outcomes than others (mainly Social Science, Language 
and Humanities degrees). However, as noted in chapter 3, some care needs to 
be taken when drawing this interpretation from my results. An alternative 
explanation for this finding is that most students do not have any idea what 
they will be earning in the future (particularly when looking over a relatively 
long time horizon). Consequently, all higher education students may be 
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reporting only some rough idea of an average graduate salary, which may not 
vary much by the subject they study. When expectations are then compared to 
realisations, it seems that students in some subjects (e.g. Maths, Engineering 
etc) make more accurate predictions than others. But the only reason for this is 
that they happen to be in a discipline that leads to high earning jobs (i.e. it is 
not so much to do with them having “more realistic” expectations, but rather 
that they just happen to be enrolled in a subject that leads to high later 
earnings). Hence the greater “accuracy” in their expectations is reflecting the 
fact that all students anchor their expectations around the same point – but that 
some groups tend to earn more than others. As shown in Table 2.12, Table 
A3.14 and discussed in chapter 3, there is reasonable variation in average 
wage expectations by subject studied – suggesting that the above interpretation 
is not the sole factor driving my results. Nevertheless, I can not rule the above 
out as at least a partial reason for why I find students in certain subjects 
making better predictions than others.  
 
 A final limitation that I wish to highlight is that, for the majority of this thesis, 
I have worked within the constraints of human capital theory and a mainly 
economic paradigm (though with some attempt to integrate sociological and 
social psychological views in the penultimate chapter). As set out in section 
1.3, there are a number of valuable models and theories from other disciplines 
that attempt to explain the educational decision making process, in which 
wage expectations play only a minor (if any) role. A fine example is the Breen 
and Goldthorpe (1997) model described in the introduction to this thesis. In 
this set-up, it is not wages and economic returns that drove young peoples’ 
decision to enter higher education, but their relative risk aversion and the 
desire to not suffer downward mobility (i.e. to minimise their risk of entering a 
lower social position than that of their parents). As noted by Davies (2002), 
this is also a “rational action theory”, but where young people are assumed to 
optimise something other than their future wages and economic returns. Future 
work should take such alternative perspectives into account. There seems, in 
particular, much to be gained by greater integration and interaction amongst 
the economic and sociological literatures. The work of Morgan (2005) is one 
explicit example that attempts such a synthesis of human capital theory, 
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relative risk aversion and status attainment research. This needs to be built 
upon for our understanding of educational behaviour to progress.  
 
On the basis of my finding and the limitations cited above, I have identified four areas 
that I believe are a priority for future research: 
 
1 Developing empirical models of schooling choice that do not rely on data 
collected “ex-post” 
 
I opened this work by stating my scepticism over economists’ use of data collected 
after schooling decisions have been made (“ex-post”) to make inferences about the 
decision making process itself; and thus the assumption that young adults' ex-ante 
expectations do not systematically differ to their later ex-post realisations. Yet there 
are, to my knowledge, very few examples of schooling choice models that relax these 
constraints and use data on young adults' subjective expectations as an alternative
138
. 
This must change in order for the literature on young adults’ schooling choice to 
progress. 
 
2 Better measurement, and further validation, of expectation data 
 
On a number of occasions, I have raised concerns about the quality of data available. 
This includes whether such information actually captures individuals’ expectations 
rather than their aspirations, whether respondents account for inflation in their 
estimates and the bunching of observations at particular points on the distribution. 
Manski (2004) has recently devised a range of methods, whereby respondents make 
probabilistic assessment of possible future events, to try and resolve such issues
139
. 
Yet these techniques are still in their infancy, and are rarely found within British or 
European surveys. Likewise, these methods have been the subject of little 
independent validation, with most evidence on this issue having been presented by 
Manski himself. Further testing and development of these methods is fundamental for 
                                                          
138
 Although, with the emergence of recent working papers in the US (Kaufmann and Attanasio 2009, 
Arcidiacono et al 2010), there is evidence that this may be changing, such advances, to my knowledge, 
have not been made in Europe. 
139
 Though, to my knowledge, there are no examples that use these methods within educational research 
in the UK or Europe. 
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this literature to develop. 
 
3 Further evidence of a causal relationship between adolescents’ educational 
expectations and later outcomes 
 
As suggested within chapter four, the evidence that educational expectations have a 
causal impact on later attainment is not yet conclusive. This issue of causality needs 
to be addressed before further policy initiatives to ‘raise children’s expectations’ are 
introduced. Further developing the theory and empirical methods set out by Morgan 
(2004) seems like an ideal place to start. Likewise, establishing how the strength of 
association between expectations and outcomes varies across countries, and whether 
there is a causal association in some nations but not others, would be of great interest 
to all those actively involved in research on social mobility and university access. 
 
4 Collecting longitudinal data on educational and financial expectations in order 
to investigate how children’s views develop over time. 
 
As economists and sociologists believe that expectations influence behaviour, both 
groups should have shown great interest in how such beliefs develop. Yet empirical 
evidence on this issue, particularly within economics, is scant. Collection of large-
scale, longitudinal data is thus required to provide a detailed insight into how children 
and young adults make plans for the future. This would enable researchers to identify 
the stability of expectations over time, how they are related to progress at school and 
whether adolescents’ views are actually altered by policy initiatives such as 
AIMHIGHER (as per Emmerson et al (2005)). One could also thoroughly investigate 
the impact of careers advice on young adults’ expectations and how this, in turn, 
influences the educational decisions they make. Likewise, further information on 
young adults’ wage expectations should be collected, with a view over longer time 
horizons and under various counterfactual options. Both would help economists to 
understand whether the assumptions often used to identify their models are correct. 
Such insights also highlight why future research into children’s expectations should 
not only be a concern of academics, but also stimulate thought and debate within 
policy environments.  
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There is, evidently, still much ground to be covered in developing this literature. 
Indeed, despite almost half a century of the social science theory stressing the 
importance of children's expectations on their later behaviour and attainment, 
empirical evidence on this matter remains limited. This thesis has taken a step towards 
resolving some of the issues that this literature has faced. In doing so, I have 
attempted to open up several avenues for future work that may bring about a better 
understanding of adolescents' educational behaviour. Indeed, the next decade is likely 
to see further advancement in this area, to which this thesis will hopefully provide 
some insight. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 2.1 Definition of part-time and dependant students
140
 
 
The SIES (Finch et al 2006a) used the following definition for whether a student is 
classed as a dependant or independent student: 
 
Dependant Student:  
 
These are full-time students who: 
(a) Had applied for student support and their parents, step parent or legal 
guardian’s income taken into account 
(b) Were aged under 25 years, were unmarried and had not applied for student 
support 
 
Independent Students:  
 
All those not in the above two groups. 
 
I also contacted The National Centre for Social Research to clarify the definition used 
for a dependant student. The questions asked and answers given appear below.  
 
Q: Is a person, who has applied for student support, unmarried, under 25, but has not 
had their parent’s income taken into account classed as a dependant or independent 
student? 
 
A: Independent student 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
140
 Note a version of this Appendix was also included in my 2007 University of Southampton MSc 
thesis. 
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Q: Is a person, who has applied for student support, unmarried, under 25, had their      
parents’ income taken into account, but is above the threshold for any further support 
other than the basic level, a dependant or independent student? 
 
A: Dependant student 
 
This highlights that whether parents’ income has been taken into consideration is 
important to deciding how the student is classed. Anyone who is 25 or over, married 
or has not had their parents’ income taken into account is classed as an independent 
student. Those whose parent’s income has been taken into account are dependant 
students. One problem identified from the responses may be that parents know they 
are above the income threshold for any further support and hence do not disclose this 
information on the UCAS application form. Therefore it is possible that some 
respondents, who are actually dependant students, are mistakenly classified as 
independent.  
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Appendix 2.2 Construction and difficulties in measuring parental income
141
 
 
Annual parental income in the SIES has been recorded in band widths of £5,000 or 
£10,000, though the respondent could decide whether to report the information in a 
gross or net amount. I decided to put all net data onto the gross scale (as this was the 
most commonly recorded). To do this, I adjust the “net” band limits upwards to their 
gross equivalent, taking into account income tax and national insurance rates for the 
2004/05 financial year (under the assumption that all individuals are contracted into 
the state earnings-related pension system). The modifications to the data are shown 
below. 
 
Table A2.1 Conversion between net and gross parental income 
Net value £ Gross value  £ Category generated £ 
0-5,000 0-5,000 20,000 and below 
5001-10,000 5,000-12,000 20,000 and below 
10,001-15,000 11,900-19,400 20,000 and below 
15,001-20,000 19,400-27,000 20,001-40,000 
20,001-25,000 27,000-34,000 20,001-40,000 
25,001-30,000 34,000-41,000 20,001-40,000 
30,001-40,000 41,000-58,000 40,001+ 
40,001-50,000 58,000-75,000 40,001+ 
50,001+ 75,001+ 40,001+ 
Notes: 1 Author’s own calculations 
There are some limitations to this technique. The choice of groups is largely dictated 
by the data. For instance a net salary of £15,000 is roughly equal to a gross salary of 
£20,000. As £15,000 and £20,000 are both cut off points, it is sensible to create a 
category of income £20,000 or below to minimize overlap between groups. With the 
categorizations used, there should be little overlap, though this can not be totally 
avoided. For instance a student may know that their parents’ net earnings are £15,100, 
equivalent to £19,500 gross, per year. However this student would be put into the 
group £20,000-£40,001 gross per annum because of the overlap problem. It is 
reasonable to suggest that the analysis will not be severely affected by this, as the 
overlap is small.  
 
 
Some other assumptions must be made about this variable. The question asked is 
                                                          
141
 Note a version of this Appendix was also included in my 2007 University of Southampton MSc 
thesis. 
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about the total income of parents. This may complicate the conversion between net 
and gross. In particular the tax, if only one parent is earning the income, is greater 
than if two parents are working. For example, consider two households with £30,000 
net income. Household A has one parent working who earns the whole £30,000. The 
gross equivalent is £41,000 per year. Household B however has two parents earning 
£15,000, with gross equivalent being £38,800. Hence there is a difference between the 
gross equivalence due to the tax system, which would put household A into the 
£40,000+ bracket and household B into the £20,001-£40,000 group. Furthermore 
there is an issue that some forms of income are not taxable, such as child benefit. For 
simplicity, it has been assumed that all parental income is taxable and has been 
generated by one adult in the household. With the boundaries chosen the effect is 
probably quite small, but it is still important to note this difficulty.  
 
It is also important to recognize that this variable may suffer a reasonably large degree 
of measurement error, as it relies on students reporting their parents’ income. A further 
point to note is that some (36) students failed to state whether they were reporting 
figures in gross or net terms. In this instance it has been assumed that students are 
reporting gross figures.  
 
It should also be noted that there are other ways in which one may re-code this 
variable. One drawback in what I have done is that it results in quite a coarse 
measurement of parental income (i.e. there are only three groups). An alternative is to 
take the midpoint of the groups, and create a quasi-continuous variable. This would 
have the benefit of providing a broader sense of parents’ income, though the difficulty 
of conversion between net and gross figures would still exist. Likewise, there would 
be the issue of an undefined upper threshold for the top earning group. In both ways 
of handling the data there is a significant chance of measurement error. Thus the 
variable should be viewed as an approximate measure of parents’ income. 
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Appendix 2.3 Interval regression results  
 
Students’ wage expectations in the SIES tend to bunch around round numbers, despite 
an open text field allowing precise estimates to be recorded. One can take this into 
account when estimating regression coefficients by assuming that students do not 
expect to get exactly the salary they report, but give a “ball-park” figure. As an 
example, a student predicting a salary of £13,000 may be presenting their midpoint 
estimate or reporting to the nearest thousand. In reality they expect a salary between 
£12,500 and £13,499. Hence their actual estimate is unknown, but lies within a 
interval.  
 
If it is hence assumed that: 
 
  Students who do not report their expected salary on a multiple of £5,000 (i.e. 
they report a figure of say £22,000 rather than a value such as £15,000, 
£20,000, £25,000 etc) round their estimate to the nearest thousand. So I 
assume someone who reports £22,000 really means between £21,500 and 
£22,499. For the few observations (roughly 5% of the sample) that give a very 
precise figure (e.g. £22,300) I place them within the most appropriate interval 
(e.g. I would place someone reporting £22,300 into the £21,500 to £22,499 
interval). 
  Students who report an expected wage which is a multiple of £5,000 (e.g. 
£15,000, £20,000, £25,000, £30,000 and £35,000) report their expected wage 
to the nearest £5,000. Hence I assume someone who reports £25,000 is 
actually expecting somewhere between £22,500 and £27,499 
 
I make these different assumptions to try and account for the large number of 
observations at certain points in the expected salary distribution. In particular, 
examination of the data suggests that extra clustering occurs at numbers that are 
rounded to the nearest £5,000 (see Table 2.2). Consequently it seems appropriate to 
assume that students who are reporting these figures are exercising a greater degree of 
rounding and have a wider anticipated salary range. It is also necessary to assume that 
the unobserved response (expected starting wage) is normally distributed. 
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Results for the censored regression model appear in the Table A2.2 below. Compared 
to the original OLS regression (Table 2.4), little changes with the introduction of the 
censoring assumption and use of interval regression. Most coefficients alter by around 
0.2 to 0.3% suggesting that, even when assuming quite extreme rounding by students, 
there are limited differences compared to using ordinary least squares. 
 
Table A2.2 Interval regression results  
  Specification 4 
 Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Future plans (Ref: Career Job Only)     
Temporary job only -0.228 0.025 
Either a career or temporary job -0.096 0.023 
Further study or travel -0.005 0.013 
Hard to get graduate job (Ref: Agree)     
Neutral 0.021 0.018 
Disagree 0.059 0.012 
Missing 0.081 0.033 
Proximity to graduation (Ref: Final year)     
1 year 0.014 0.014 
2 or more years 0.035 0.017 
University type (Ref: Post-1992)     
Other Pre-1992 -0.031 0.018 
Russell group -0.024 0.026 
Parents earnings (Ref: Below £20,000)     
£20,001-£40,000  0.031 0.019 
£40,001+ 0.053 0.020 
Independent student or missing data 0.087 0.030 
How parents earns (Ref: Work)     
Benefits -0.067 0.043 
Investments 0.116 0.029 
Ethnic group (Ref: White)     
Black/Asian 0.055 0.025 
Mixed/Other 0.019 0.023 
Notes:   
1* Significant at 5% level 
2 Source: Authors calculations using the SIES data. Sample size in all regressions is 2,659. Dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of students’ expected wages 
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Table A2.2 Interval regression results continued 
 
  Specification 4 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Total income     
Mean centred (per £0000) 0.036 0.017 
Study mode (Ref: Full-time)     
Part-time student -0.033 0.025 
Earnings from work     
Mean centred (per £0000) 0.030 0.021 
Part-time student *Earnings from work 0.141 0.032 
Subject area (Ref: Medicine)     
Allied To Medicine -0.162 0.032 
Sciences -0.183 0.032 
Maths, Computer Science -0.141 0.035 
Engineering, Technology -0.111 0.034 
Architecture, Building -0.182 0.036 
Social Studies -0.155 0.029 
Law -0.114 0.043 
Business  -0.149 0.036 
English, Languages, Classics -0.225 0.036 
History, Philosophy -0.235 0.046 
Arts -0.285 0.035 
Education -0.181 0.028 
Combined -0.199 0.038 
Other -0.215 0.048 
Entry qualification (Ref: A-levels)     
GNVQ/AVCE -0.072 0.023 
Other -0.013 0.015 
Age     
 Mean centred 0.013 0.005 
University location (Ref: Other 
England)     
London   0.105 0.021 
Wales  -0.036 0.022 
Gender (Ref: Male)     
Female -0.052 0.013 
University dummies     
Constant 10.009 0.040 
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Appendix 2.4 Probit results for salary non-response in the DLHE 
Table A2.3 Results for probit model of non-response 
 Group Coefficient          SE 
Domicile (Ref: London) North East 0.221* 0.027 
 North West  -0.092* 0.019 
 Yorkshire  0.005 0.021 
 East Midlands  0.027 0.021 
 West Midlands  -0.009 0.020 
 East   -0.054* 0.020 
 South East 0.011 0.018 
 South West 0.009 0.021 
 
Isle of Man/ Channel 
Islands -0.391* 0.110 
 Unknown -0.072* 0.024 
University location (Ref: England) Wales  -0.240* 0.021 
Term-time accommodation (Ref: University 
maintained property) Parental home -0.136* 0.016 
 Own home -0.043* 0.014 
 Other -0.090* 0.019 
 Unknown -0.025 0.021 
Degree class (Ref: 1st) 2.1 -0.082* 0.017 
 2.2 -0.180* 0.018 
 3rd -0.276* 0.027 
 Unclassified -0.166* 0.046 
 Not applicable -0.107* 0.024 
UCAS score mean centred (100 point increase)   0.039 0.006 
University type (Ref: Post-1992) Russell Group -0.097* 0.014 
 Pre-1992 -0.133* 0.013 
Subject (Ref: Medicine) Allied to Medicine 0.126* 0.040 
 Biology 0.174* 0.043 
 Physical Sciences 0.227* 0.042 
 Maths 0.183* 0.046 
 Computer Science 0.165* 0.040 
 Engineering 0.249* 0.042 
 Social Sciences 0.210* 0.039 
 Law 0.139* 0.046 
 Business  0.202* 0.038 
 Mass Communication 0.067 0.044 
 Languages 0.102* 0.040 
 History 0.069 0.042 
 Art -0.117* 0.039 
 Education 0.012 0.042 
 Combined 0.050 0.071 
 Psychology 0.223* 0.043 
 Sports Science 0.144* 0.044 
 Other 0.089 0.049 
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Table A2.3 Results for probit model of non-response (continued) 
 
 Group Coefficient          SE 
Graduate level job (Ref: Yes) Non-graduate job -0.115* 0.030 
Degree required for job (Ref: Formal 
requirement) Expected -0.066* 0.018 
 Advantageous -0.075* 0.015 
 No -0.271* 0.015 
 Don't know -0.702* 0.034 
Job type (Ref: Managerial) Professional 0.042* 0.020 
 Associate professional 0.059* 0.018 
 Administrative 0.100* 0.033 
 Skilled labour -0.090 0.059 
 Personal services -0.064 0.039 
 Sales or customer service -0.053 0.036 
 Construction 0.042 0.074 
 Elementary -0.366* 0.043 
Ethnicity (Ref: Asian) Black 0.015 0.039 
 Other/ Mixed 0.135* 0.037 
 Unknown 0.035 0.036 
 White 0.148* 0.018 
Disabled (Ref: No) Yes -0.072* 0.019 
Gender (Ref: Male) Female -0.098* 0.010 
  Constant 0.308 0.052 
Notes:   
1 * indicates significance at the 5% level 
2 Figures refer to marginal effects. A negative coefficient suggests a lower probability of reporting 
salary 
3 UCAS score refers to student performance on tests typically taken at age 18 in England and Wales, 
that largely determine university entry. 
4 Source: Authors calculations using the DLHE dataset. Total sample size in the regression was 87,327. 
Dependent variable in the regression model these figures were based upon was a binary indicator of 
whether the graduate reported their salary (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did). 
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Appendix 2.5 The difference between HESA’s official average graduate wage and 
the figures used in chapter 2 
 
HESA report the average graduate wage for the 2004/2005 year group as £19,000, 
calculated from the DLHE survey used in chapter 2
142
. This is in fact the starting 
wage calculated from the data (£18,531), rounded to the nearest thousand. The 
average graduate wage presented in chapter 2 is lower than this official figure. The 
table below shows how the figures presented in chapter 2 relate to the official HESA 
average. As can be seen, the difference in graduate salaries is largely due to the 
different samples being considered.  
 
Among the most important points is that I have calculated wages separately for those 
who studied part-time and those who studied full-time (selection rule 1). In 
comparison, the official HESA figure relates to when these groups are analysed 
together. An important result, shown in section 2.7, is that part-time students, on 
average, are actually quite realistic in their wage expectations. It is full-time students 
who, on average, overestimate their starting wage and this should be made explicitly 
clear when reporting results. 
 
A further adjustment is that I have scaled the HESA data back to 2005 prices using 
RPI inflation, recorded as 2.8% in 2005 (selection rule 4). As explained in section 2.6, 
the SIES was conducted in January to March 2005, whereas the DLHE for this cohort 
was conducted in early 2006. The existing academic literature suggests that 
individuals report their wage expectations in current prices. Since data on actual 
wages has been collected a year later than expectations, it is necessary to account for 
the inflation over this period. It should be noted, however, that this has only a 
moderate influence on the results, and the general findings of chapter 2 would still 
hold if it is not made. 
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  See http://www.hesa.ac.uk/index.php/content/view/126/161/ 
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Other points to note are that I have excluded medical students (selection rule 5) and 
those over 25 from the study of full-time students (selection rule 3). Medics have been 
excluded due to the different proportion of these students in the SIES compared to the 
DLHE. Although by excluding medics the DLHE starting salary is reduced, the same 
selection rule has been applied to the SIES, with an even sharper fall in expectations. 
Furthermore, only students under 25 have been considered in my analysis. My 
intention in studying full-time and part-time students separately was to investigate 
how realistic “traditional” university students are, who have little pre-existing 
experience of the labour market. Again this restriction has a largely negligible 
influence on results.   
 
A final point is that the official HESA data does not take into account the large 
number of graduates not reporting their salary, who are generally working in non-
graduate jobs and have 2.2 or 3
rd
 class degrees. When this is taken into account (via 
the weights I produce as part of chapter 2), I estimate that HESA’s official figure is 
upwardly biased by around 3%, or £500 (see rule 6).  
 
Table A2.4 Comparison between the average graduate salary reported by HESA 
and the average graduate salary used in this chapter 
 
  Average salary £ Selection rule 
Raw HESA data 20,314   
1st degree students Only 18,381  
Only those in full-time jobs 18,540  
Only those employed in UK * 18,531  
Only those who were studying full-
time when at university 17,720 1 
English and Welsh universities only 17,743 2 
Under 25 years old only 17,336 3 
Scaled to 2005 prices 16,788 4 
Medics excluded ** 16,455 5  
Weighting for non-response 15,996 6 
Notes:  
1 The figures in the average salary column relate to the cumulative effect of all the sample selection 
rules. 
2 * Official HESA figure 
3 ** Figure used in this chapter 
4 Authors own calculations using DLHE data 
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Appendix 3.1 NELS sample design
143
 (Source: Curtin et al 2002) 
 
This bulk of this Appendix has been taken (on occasion word for word) from Curtin et 
al (2002). These authors explain the NELS sample design at great length. I reproduce 
their work to help the reader understand some of the technicalities of the NELS 
sampling process. Although I have rephrased and edited part of their text, it should be 
noted that I claim none of Appendix 3.1 to be my own independent work. 
 
The sample for NELS: 88/94 (i.e. age 20 sampling frame) was created by dividing the 
NELS:88/92 (i.e. age 18) sample into 18 groups based on their response history, 
dropout status, eligibility status, school sector type, race, test scores, socioeconomic 
status, and freshened status. Each sampling group was assigned an overall selection 
probability. Cases within a group were selected such that the overall group probability 
was met, but the probability of selection within the group was proportional to each 
sample member's second follow-up (age 18) design weight. Assigning selection 
probabilities proportional to the second follow-up (age 18) design weight, reduced the 
variability of the NELS:88/94 (age 20) raw weights and consequently increased the 
efficiency of the resulting sample from 40.1 percent to 44.0 percent. The groups were: 
 
0. Excluded from age 20 follow-up 
The age 20 follow-up sample is a spring defined sample. Therefore students who had 
been brought in through the freshening process, but who had dropped out by the time 
of data collection, as well as the age 14 dropouts were assigned to this group. As these 
groups have been excluded from the age 20 follow-up, they have a sampling 
probability of zero. In addition, sample members who were ineligible or out of scope 
(dead or out of country) for the age 18 follow-up were also assigned to this group. 
 
1. Nonresponders 
These sample members had never completed a questionnaire in any round  
 
2. Poor responders 
These are sample members who did not complete a age 18 questionnaire (but had 
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 See http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2002/2002323.pdf for more details 
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responded at either age 14 or 16) 
 
3. Ever dropped out 
Sample members for whom Curtin et al (2002) have evidence that they ever dropped 
out of school (including those who were in school during periods of data collection) 
were included in this group. 
 
4. Ineligible to participate (due to language barriers or mental or physical 
impairment) prior to age 18 
 
5. Attended a private school at age 14 
 
6. Attended a private school in either age 16 or 18 
 
7. Hispanic 
 
8. Asian or Pacific Islander (API) 
 
9. Native American 
 
10. Black, top quartile in cognitive tests 
 
11. Black, other test scores 
12. White, lowest socioeconomic quartile 
 
13. White, highest socioeconomic quartile 
 
14. White, middle socioeconomic quartiles 
 
15. Freshened in at age 16 
 
16. Freshened in at age 18 
 
17. Other 
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The Table below lists the groups, their selection probabilities and their age 16 and 18 
follow-up distributions. While some sample members qualified for more than one of 
the sample groups, each member was assigned to only one group. The groups were 
created in order of priority, so that each sample member was assigned to the first 
group for which they qualified. For example, if someone was both a dropout (group 3) 
and was in a private school at age 14 (group 5), he or she was assigned to group 3. 
 
The data used to assign the students to groups was drawn from a variety of possible 
sources, including questionnaire data for variables such as race and school sector type. 
If status at time of data collection was relevant and was not determined at the time of 
data collection, the imputed status developed during the age 18 weighting process was 
used. 
 
Table A3.1 Sampling frame and selection probabilities NELS age 18 and 20 
follow-up 
Notes: 1 Source Curtin et al 2002 
 
 
  
Selection Probability of 
being included in age 20 
sample 
N (Age 18 
Sample)  
N (Age 20 
Sample) 
TOTAL 
 
21635 15964 
Excluded 0 731 0 
Non-responders 0.15 288 43 
Poor responders 0.25 2383 596 
Ever dropped out 1 2351 2351 
Ineligible to participate 0.9 212 191 
Attended private school at age 14 0.8 2984 2387 
Attended private school at either age 16 or 18 0.8 122 98 
Hispanic 0.9 1629 1466 
Asian or Pacific Islander 1 874 874 
Native American 1 132 132 
Black, top quartile of cognitive tests 1 79 79 
Black, other 0.9 1238 1114 
White, lowest socio-economic group 1 1295 1295 
White, highest socio-economic group 0.6 2536 1522 
White, middle socio-economic group 0.8 4763 3810 
Brought into sample at age 16 0.3 4 1 
Brought into sample at age 18 0.3 6 2 
Other 0.4 8 3 
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Table A3.2 Sampling frame and response rates – NELS age 20 follow-up 
  
Sampling frame 
age 20 
Respondents to 
survey age 20 
   Gender 
  Male 7,895 7,354 
Female 7,980 7,561 
Race/Ethnicity 
  Asian 1,151 1,088 
Hispanic 2,288 2,107 
Black 1,840 1,681 
White 10,303 9,787 
Native American 230 211 
Missing 63 41 
Age 18 test quartile 
  Lowest 2,669 2,497 
2
nd
 2,850 2,710 
3
rd
 2,836 2,746 
4
th
 2,982 2,923 
Missing 55 53 
Did not complete test 4,483 3,986 
Socio-economic status 
  Lowest 4,062 3,788 
2
nd
 3,784 3,587 
3
rd
 3,742 3,570 
4
th
 3,635 3,507 
Missing 652 463 
Drop out Status 
  Never dropped Out 13,337 12,654 
Ever dropped out 2,538 2,261 
Age 14 school type 
  Public  13,383 12,540 
Catholic 1,355 1,292 
NAIS private 595 568 
Other private 542 515 
Total 15,875 14,915 
Notes: 1 Source Curtin et al 2002 
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Appendix 3.2 Methods to predict age 30 income 
 
I now return to the two problems with the NELS data that I highlighted at the end of 
section 3.3, and briefly overviewed in section 3.4. To begin, consider Figure A3.1
144
. 
This illustrates the data observed for one particular individual in the NELS.  
 
Figure A3.1 Observable wage and income expectation data for ID 7286532 in the 
NELS 
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Note:  
1 All data in 1994 wages 
2 This individual reported zero unearned income at age 26; therefore his wages are equivalent to his 
income. Note that in these diagrams, I am simply trying to explain my extrapolation method for wages. 
3 Discussion of unearned income can be found later in this Appendix.  
4 This individual is not an example of a “typical” NELS respondent. Rather, I have chosen this 
observation as it provides a good example of the points I am tying to make. Most respondents see a 
gradual increase in their wage between 23 and 26, and not such a large increase at age 26. 
5 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS dataset.  
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 For this particular individual, the income they expect is significantly higher than their predicted 
income at age 30. This is not necessarily typical of all other respondents in the dataset. Rather I have 
chosen this individual as he is a good example of the substantial points I make throughout this section.  
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Respondents are asked what they expect their annual income to be when they turn 30. 
However, information on realisations is only available for wages between the ages of 
23 and 26. Using the available data, I must make a prediction of each individual’s age 
30 income. I separate this into two parts: (a) the estimation of wages, and (b) the 
estimation of unearned income.  
 
Wages 
On average, wages grow quite substantially with the first ten years of labour market 
experience. Yet the path of wages for a given individual between 26 and 30 may be 
quite unstable. Both upwards and downwards shocks are possible due to job or career 
changes (promotion or redundancy), different family and location choices and 
preferences (prefer leisure to work due to the birth of a child) or simply 
macroeconomic conditions and “luck” (a particularly large bonus or commission in a 
given year). Given the factors described above, one may or may not wish to consider 
an individual’s labour market history in predicting their age 30 wage. For instance, a 
sudden job change may make the information conveyed in past wages irrelevant. 
Recall Figure A3.1. At age 26, this individual has a particularly large wage by his 
"historical" (age 23- 25) standards. This may be the result of him changing job, 
perhaps into a much more lucrative career, where his labour market history is 
irrelevant for his future wages. Indeed, I do not know the reason for this potential 
change of job, but it could be a change in his preferences. For instance, this could be a 
graduate who took a low intensity job to enjoy life when young, though at age 26 
made the decision to start a career. One may view this as a permanent shift in his 
wage profile. What he was previously earning, before this permanent shift, is 
irrelevant in predicting his future wage. 
 
In contrast, it is equally possible for this to be a temporary increase in his wage, for 
instance from sheer good (or bad) luck. Take a 26 year old salesman who has had a 
particularly good year. For the salesman, the jump in wages could reflect a large 
bonus. However, in the future things may not be so good, with his wage reverting to 
his historical average (e.g. the average of the previous three years). Hence this 
observation at 26 may be treated more as an outlier, a sudden (but temporary) change 
in income.  
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Given the range of possibilities, I use two methods to predict age 30 wages. Method 1 
views large changes in wages as a permanent shift in an individual’s circumstance. 
Therefore, his previous wage profile is treated as irrelevant; it is only the most 
recently observed (e.g. age 26) wage that contains any useful information about his 
wage at age 30. Under this method, I simply take the most recently observed wage for 
each individual and extrapolate it forward, using external estimates of wage growth 
for young workers. Figure A3.2 presents a hypothetical example for the illustrative 
individual in Figure A3.1, assuming a real growth rate of 5% per annum. Observe that 
only the wage at age 26 influences my prediction, and that the large shock at age 26 
gets carried forward. The previous income profile of the individual (between 23 and 
25) has no influence at all.  
 
Figure A3.2 Illustration of wage prediction method 1 for ID 7286532 in the NELS 
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Note: 1See notes to Figure A3.1 
2 The above is a hypothetical example of extrapolation Method 1. I assume that his wage will grow at 
5% per annum between the ages 26 and 30. His previous wage history (the wages he received between 
23 and 25) play no part in the age 30 income prediction 
3 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS dataset.  
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To implement this method, I require an external estimate of the annual real wage 
growth for young workers. Rubinstein and Weiss (2007) provide a table of average 
annual real wage growth rates, as implied by a Mincer wage equation, broken down 
by labour market experience and educational attainment for three surveys; the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) and National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY 79) 
145
. Furthermore, Rubinstein and 
Weiss restrict each of the above datasets to full-time, male, American workers (as I 
have done with the NELS). One should note, however, that these surveys all relate to 
different years
146
. The growth rates they calculate from the CPS, PSID and NLSY are 
provided in Table A3.3, with further details available on page 14 and Appendix 5 of 
Rubinstein and Weiss (2007). 
 
Table A3.3 Average, annual (real) wage growth rates for young workers:  
Rubenstein and Weiss estimates 
 
    
% Average (real) wage growth rate per annum by 
education level 
Number of years 
experience in the 
labour force 
Data 
source 
Below 
high 
school 
High 
school 
Some 
college 
College 
graduates MA/PhD 
0-10 CPS 2.4 3.2 3.3 3.6 2.9 
 PSID 2.8 3.0 3.8 3.9 3.2 
 NLSY 2.4 3.4 4.6 5.2 5.5 
11-15 CPS 1.6 2.2 - - - 
 PSID 1.9 2.0 - - - 
  NLSY 1.3 2.3 - - - 
Notes: 
1 Source: Table 1, page 14 of Rubinstein and Weiss (2007) Post Schooling Wage Growth: Investment, 
Search and Learning. Handbook of the Economics of Education, Volume 1 
 
2 CPS: Current  Population Survey Annual March Supplement 
3 PSID: Panel Survey of Income Dynamics 
4 NLSY: National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 
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 It should be noted that Rubinstein and Weiss provide two sets of growth rates, one based on a 
Mincer quadratic specification (experience and experience squared), and the other based on cell means. 
Their justification for the latter method is based on work by Murphy and Welch (1990), who claim the 
quadratic specification fits the age-earnings profile poorly, especially at the early stages of workers 
careers. One may worry that using the growth rates implied by a Mincer equation here could lead to 
underestimation of future wages. However, the paper by Murphy and Welch shows that the error in the 
quadratic wage specification is small after 3 years labour market experience and reaches zero at around 
5 years. This means that for the period I am trying to extrapolate to, the quadratic Mincer specification 
fits the actual data quite well. 
146
 The CPS data relates to wages between 1998 and 2002, the PSID is for all years after 1968, while 
the NLSY draws its information between 1979 and 2000. 
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These growth rates are applied to each individual in the NELS, depending on their 
highest qualification achieved by age 26. For example, an individual with college 
education, and who was earning $50,000 dollars at age 26, would be estimated to be 
earning $61,240 at age 30 (all in 1994 prices) 
147
. In the event that wages go 
unobserved at age 26 (e.g. the individual was unemployed) I extrapolate from their 
last observed full-time wage
148
. From this point on, I shall call this prediction 
“Method 1”149. 
 
As suggested, this may not be an appropriate method if wage shocks (as for the 
respondent in Figure A3.1) are only temporary (e.g. a salesman with a large bonus). If 
this is the case, an individual’s future wage will be randomly scattered around his time 
mean. The wage history, rather than just the most recent observation, is now 
informative. In prediction “Method 2” I take this into account. A hypothetical example 
is shown in Figure A3.3. To make the difference absolutely clear, contrast this with 
Figure A3.2 (that uses prediction Method 1). Even though both assume the same real 
growth rate (5% per annum) they generate quite different predictions of wages at age 
30. 
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 $50,000 * (1.052
4
), using the NLSY data and “College graduates” column in Table A3.3. 
148
 For example, if someone was earning $50,000 at age 25, and their wage was not recorded at age 26, 
I would predict their age 30 income to be $50,000 * (1.052
5
) = $64,577 
149
 Rubenstein and Weiss provide growth estimates for young workers using three separate surveys 
(PSID, CPS and NLSY). I shall therefore use the notation “Method 1a” for my predictions when using 
their CPS growth estimates, “Method 1b” for their PSID estimates and “Method 1c” for their NLSY 
estimates. 
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Figure A3.3 Illustration of wage prediction method 2 for ID 7286532 in the NELS 
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Note:  
1See notes to Figure A3.1 
2The above is a hypothetical example of extrapolation Method 2.  
3 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS dataset.  
 
Hence "Method 2" uses individual’s wage history, rather than just the most recent 
observation, to predict future income. To implement Method 2 I use a fixed effects 
regression model, following the methodology of Carneiro and Heckman (2003)
150
.  
The natural logarithm of wages is the dependent variable, with age and age-squared as 
(time varying) explanatory terms that capture wage growth
151
. Other specifications, 
such as including a cubic age term or using a set of age dummies as an alternative, 
were also estimated. However results did not differ significantly from the 
parsimonious quadratic specification. I run separate regressions for five different 
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 Carneiro and Heckman (2003) faced a similar problem in having to estimate wages up to age 65 for 
a sample whose last observed wage was at age 35. In particular, they pool their data with an additional 
source, and use a similarly specified fixed effects model to estimate wages into the future. However, 
unlike Carneiro and Heckman,  I run separate regressions for each educational group. Moreover, they 
specify an autoregressive error term, whereas I assume it to be random. In other words, they allow the 
particularly large wage  shown in Figure A3.3 to revert to the mean (estimated fixed effect) over a 
series of years, whereas I assume it returns there instantly in the next period. Hence the method of 
Carneiro and Heckman is a sort of middle ground between the two extrapolation methods that I am 
proposing here. I also experimented with an auto-regressive error term, but found no change to my 
substantial results.  
151
 Age enters as a  quadratic term to allow for flattening of the age-earnings wage profile.  
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educational groups, based on highest qualification achieved by age 26
152
. This allows 
the age coefficients, and therefore wage growth, to vary between groups with different 
levels of human capital. I have also experimented with alternative specifications that 
allowed wage growth to vary within these educational groups, and found similar 
results
153
. In all models, I assume the error term is independent and identically 
distributed, scattered randomly around each individual’s fixed effect. Formally, this 
model can be expressed as: 
 
  E       A  A    Y iai
2
ia1ia0ia    
 
Where:  
Yia = log earnings of individual i at time a 
Aia = Age of individual i at time a 
ηi = Individual (or fixed) effect 
ia  = Error term, assumed to be normally distributed 
E = Five education groups (Less than high school, high school, associates degree, 
bachelors degree, MSc/PhD) 
 
In this model, it is the estimated fixed effect, ηi , that captures the influence of all 
wages for individual i between 23 and 26. Note that this specification is quite 
different to a “standard” wage equation, where the aim is to estimate the impact of 
various regression coefficients on the outcome (wages). My concern, on the other 
hand, is not in estimating the importance or effect sizes of various explanatory 
variables, but in predicting future wages. Therefore I allow the individual fixed effect 
to capture all the factors that are usually included on the right hand side of “standard” 
wage equation. This includes geographic location, individual ability and socio-
economic background
154
.  
 
                                                          
152
 Minicozzi (2003) suggests using separate regressions for different education-occupation 
combinations. Here, separate regressions are estimated only for different educational groups. 
Considering occupation would have lead to vastly reduced sample sizes and imprecisely estimated 
coefficients. 
153
 In particular, I estimate a model where I allow wage growth to differ between college students who 
study different subjects. All the results presented in section 3.5 are robust to these additional 
specifications. 
154
 However, I do account for human capital separately by estimating five regressions based on each 
individual’s highest educational attainment at age 26. 
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The estimated coefficients from the five regressions enter a prediction equation for 
age 30 wages, formally specified as: 
 
E            A  A    Y i30
^
i
^
2
i301
^
i300
^
i30
^
   
  
With  
^
Y =  Predicted log wage at age 30 
 
A= Age 
 
^
 = Individual fixed effect 
 
^
 30= Random draw from the distribution of errors at age 26 (assumed 
to be normally distributed) 
 
  E = Achieved education at age 26 
 
This prediction includes an error term. I assume the errors at age 30 are normally 
distributed with mean zero and variance equal to that in the estimated error 
distribution at age 26. I then take a random draw from this normal distribution for 
each individual.  
 
One could estimate the preceding model, and form predictions, based solely on the 
NELS data. However this would have some fairly significant disadvantages. The age 
coefficients, which reflect wage growth, would be estimated solely from data in the 
observed period (wages recorded between the ages of 23 and 26). One would be 
assuming that the annual wage growth rate between 26 and 30 is the same as the wage 
growth rate between 23 and 26. This seems unlikely. Murphy and Welch (1990) show 
that earnings between 23 and 26 grow substantially faster than between 26 and 30. 
Moreover, with wages recorded at only 4 time points in the NELS, the quadratic age 
function would be poorly defined. On the other hand, using just a linear age function 
would miss an important empirical feature (flattening) of the age-earnings profile.  
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Thus the NELS data must be complemented with additional information on how 
wages grow in the unobserved period (27 to 30 years old). One method, used by 
Carneiro and Heckman (2003), is to pool the truncated survey (the NELS, which only 
contains wages until 26), with a second comparable data source that follows 
individuals to the point of interest (up to age 30). This pooled dataset will therefore 
contain information on wages between 23 and 30. However, certain criteria must be 
checked and some assumptions must be made. In particular, one implicit assumption 
is that the (unobserved) wage growth rate experienced by NELS sample members 
between the ages of 26 and 30 will be the same as the (observed) growth rate 
experienced by sample members from the second pooling survey. A further 
assumption is that structural differences in the economy, and between the two 
samples, do not lead to differences in wage growth
155
. It is also vital the two surveys 
are collecting comparable data, with similar wording of key questions. 
 
The survey chosen is the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY) 1979
156
. The 
survey began in 1979, with 12,686 men and women surveyed who were between the 
ages of 14 and 22. These individuals were then followed each year, and have 
information on their income at age 30 collected between 1987 and 1995. I make 
similar restrictions in the NLSY as I have done in the NELS (I have excluded women 
and only consider the wages of individuals when they are working full-time).  
 
The NLSY has numerous attractions as a source to pool with the NELS. Critically, 
wages are collected for individuals between the ages of 23 and 30, providing 
information on wage growth during the period not observed (between 26 and 30) in 
the NELS. Secondly, the wording of the questions regarding wages is broadly similar. 
Whereas the NELS asks: 
 
 
                                                          
155
 Of course, overall wage levels are likely to be higher for cohorts from later periods. However this 
general rise in the wage level should be captured by the person specific fixed effect. 
156
 The United States Department of Labor describes “The NLSY79 is a nationally representative 
sample of 12,686 young men and women who were 14-22 years old when they were first surveyed in 
1979”.  The National Bureau of Economic Research describe the quality of this survey, and the high 
response rate. In particular, it notes that 87% of those selected for interview responded in the base year 
(1979), while 86.7% of eligible respondents took part in 1996. Further details can be found at 
www.nber.org/~kling/surveys/NLSY79.html and 
http://www.nlsinfo.org/nlsy79/docs/79html/79text/front.htm 
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First, including all of the wages, salaries, and commissions you earned in 
(1997/1998/1999), about how much did you earn from employment before taxes and 
all other deductions? 
 
The NLSY uses the similar phrase: 
 
Not counting any money you received from your military service during (YEAR), how 
much did you receive from wages, salaries, commissions or tips from all jobs, before 
deductions for taxes or anything else? 
 
Although the NLSY excludes military wages in this question, this has been recorded 
separately in another item. Thus this is easily added in to also include those who were 
working in the military. Otherwise, the comparability seems good. Both ask for gross 
wages, before tax or other deductions. Moreover, it is made clear that the respondent 
should be taking into account all aspects of employment related income, including all 
wages and commissions, from all employment held.  
 
It is also important to check that during the observable period (ages 23 to 26), wages 
in the two surveys grow at a similar rate. If wage growth is vastly different during the 
period observed in both surveys, it would be difficult to justify the assumption that the 
NELS will have similar wage growth to the NLSY in the unobserved (ages 27 to 30) 
period. Appendix Figure A3.4 presents the median wage recorded at each age in the 
NELS and NLSY. Although the median wage in the NELS is above that in the NLSY, 
the growth in wages between 23 and 26 is similar. For instance, mean (median) wages 
grew by 23% (17%) in the NELS between the ages 23 and 26, compared to 23% 
(22%) in the NLSY. In terms of the mean, this difference is very small. Though the 
gap is larger for the medians (around 1% per year), it still seems that the growth rate 
in the two surveys is reasonably similar. This, hopefully, means the wages that go 
unobserved in the NELS, between 27 and 30, will also follow a similar growth pattern 
to the NLSY.  
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Figure A3.4 Log median wages in the NELS and NLSY between the ages 23 and 
26 
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Notes 1 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS and NLSY datasets.  
 
To further investigate this point, I conduct a Chow test to investigate whether the age 
coefficient (which reflects wage growth) differs between the NELS and NLSY for 
wages observed between 23 and 26. Since wages are only available for four time 
points, age is kept as a linear function. Separate regressions are ran for each education 
group, and takes the form: 
 
E       S*A A   Y iaiiia1ia0ia    
Where:  
iaY  = log earnings of individual i at time a 
Aia = Age of individual i at time a 
S i = Dummy variable indicating respondent was part of the NELS survey (NLSY 
reference group) 
i  = Individual (fixed) effect 
ia  = Random error term 
E = One of five education groups (Less than high school, high school, associates 
degree, bachelors degree, MA/PhD) 
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The test is formally specified as: 
 
HO: 1  = 0 
HA: 1  ≠ 0 
 
The results are given in the Table A3.4. As expected, all age terms are significant. 
However the real interest rests on the Age-Survey interaction terms (the column 
labelled “Difference”). These show whether growth in average wages, for each 
schooling group, differs between the NELS and NLSY between the ages of 23 and 26. 
Out of the five regressions, two are statistically significant. However, these are for the 
two smallest education groups, which in total make up only around 10% of the NELS 
sample. Indeed the coefficient for MSc/PhD graduates is likely to be poorly defined 
due to the limited number of wage observations in the NELS for these individuals. In 
the other three regressions, which account for 90% of observations, the age-survey 
coefficient is very small. Indeed, if the Chow test is performed on the sample as a 
whole, with no distinction between education groups, the results suggest a difference 
in wage growth rates of under 1% per year. This is consistent with my claim that the 
NELS and NLSY cohorts experience similar wage growth patterns between 23 and 26 
years of age. The assumption, based on this result, is that the NELS and NLSY 
samples also experience similar growth rates between 26 and 30.  
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Table A3.4 Chow test to investigate whether wage growth is similar for young 
men between the ages 23 and 26 for the NELS and NLSY surveys 
 
Education group 
Average per 
annum real 
wage growth 
NLSY  
Average per 
annum real 
wage growth 
NELS  Difference  
Below high school 0.049 (0.0055) 0.047 -0.002 (0.0128) 
High school graduate  0.057 (0.003) 0.051 -0.006 (0.006) 
Associates degree  0.093 (0.0061) 0.072 -0.021 (0.010)* 
Bachelors degree  0.145 (0.0067) 0.141 -0.004 (0.008) 
MSc/PhD 0.155 (0.0155) 0.250 0.095 (0.025)* 
Notes: 
1 The difference column relates to the Chow test of whether wage growth differs between the ages of 
23 and 26 for each education group in the two surveys. In other words, this is the test of Ho: β0 = 0 in 
the hypothesis test specified above.  
2 Standard errors are presented in parenthesis 
3* Indicates statistical significant at the 5% level 
4 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS and NLSY datasets. NELS sample size 4,434. 
Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of each individual at each time point (between ages 23 and 
26) that they have data available. 
 
 
A final issue may be that structural changes in the economy led to differential growth 
rates in real wages between the two surveys. However between 2000 and 2004 (the 
period unobserved in the NELS) average annual real wage growth in the US was 
around 3.2%. Between 1987 and 1995 (when members of the NLSY were turning 30) 
wage growth averaged around 4%. Although there is a difference, it appears to not be 
substantial, though it could lead to a slight overestimation of the predicted age 30 
NELS wage. 
 
Having established the comparability of the two surveys, I proceed to pool the 
information from these two datasets together (which, from this point on, I will call the 
NELS-NLSY pooled data).  Using this data, I predict age 30 wages by estimating the 
fixed effect regression specified on pages 235-236. Table A3.5 provides the regression 
coefficients for the age and age squared terms from the five estimated models (recall I 
estimate five separate regressions based on educational attainment by age 26).  
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Table A3.5 Estimated age coefficients from prediction method 2 (fixed effects 
regression model) 
 
Education level at age 
26 Variable Coefficient            SE 
Below high school Age 0.051 0.0071 
 Age
2
 -0.003 0.0010 
High school Age 0.053 0.0037 
 Age
2
 -0.003 0.0005 
Associates degree Age 0.091 0.0072 
 Age
2
 -0.004 0.0010 
Bachelors Age 0.171 0.0051 
 Age
2
 -0.011 0.0008 
MA/PhD Age 0.200 0.0152 
 Age
2
 -0.011 0.0020 
Notes: 
1These are the estimated age coefficients from the fixed effects regression model described above. 
2These coefficients reflect the estimated wage growth between 26 and 30. Table A3.6 converts these 
coefficients into estimated annual wage growth for ease of interpretation and comparison to the wage 
growth rates suggested by Rubenstein and Weiss. 
3 All coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level 
 4 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS and NLSY datasets. NELS sample size 4,434. 
Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of each individual at each time point (between ages 23 and 
26) that they have data available. 
 
All coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level, capturing the quadratic 
effect of age and the flattening of the age-earnings profile. For interpretation 
purposes, however, it is easier to convert these coefficients into estimated annual 
growth rates (as per Rubinstein and Weiss). I present these in the final column of 
Table A3.6, which also contains the average annual wage growth estimates from 
prediction Method 1 for comparison.  
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Table A3.6 Predicted average, annual real wage growth rates for young 
American men between the ages 26 and 30 
 
  Estimated % real growth rate per annum  
  Method 1 Method 2 
 
(a) 
CPS  
(b) 
PSID  
(c)    
NLSY 
NELS-NLSY 
Pooled 
Below high school 1.6 1.9 1.3 1.6 
High school 2.7 3.6 2.8 2.5 
Associates degree 3.3 3.8 4.6 5.2 
Bachelors 3.6 3.9 5.2 5.0 
MA/PhD 2.9 3.2 5.5 6.6 
Notes:  
 1“Below high school” annual growth rate is taken from the 11-15 years experience row in Rubenstein 
and Weiss, under the assumption that they would have (potentially) entered the labour market at 16/17. 
For annual growth rates of high school graduates, I use a simple average of the Rubenstein and Weiss 
0-10 years experience and 11-15 years experience columns. The assumption is that high school 
graduates enter the labour market at 18, and thus have around 8 years labour market experience at age 
26 increasing to 12 years experience at age 30. 
2 Individuals in all other educational groups (associates degree, bachelors degree and MA/PhD) are 
assumed to have 0-10 years labour market experience between 26 and 30. 
3 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS dataset. NELS sample size 4,434.  
 
 
 
It appears predicted wage growth is similar across all methods for each of the 
educational groups. As expected, the estimated growth rates from Method 2 are the 
best aligned with Method 1c (Rubenstein and Weiss’s estimated wage growth when 
they use the NLSY data), though are slightly higher (lower) for the top (bottom) 
educational group
157
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
157
 The Rubenstein and Weiss growth rate “Method 1” is based upon an average for the first ten years 
labour market experience. On the other hand, in the NELS, those with MSc/PhD level education are 
only likely to have up to 5 years experience between 26 and 30. Likewise, those with high school 
education in the NELS will have between 8-12 years experience. This is the most likely reason for the 
slightly differences, and that Method 1 growth rates are slight under (over) estimates for the most 
(least) educated.   
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I also present the average predicted age 30 wage for the two methods in Table A3.7. 
Predicted age 30 wages are similar across estimation methods, with differences 
typically less than 5% for both the mean and the median. However, the spread of 
Method 2 (the fixed effect model) is smaller. Indeed this is as expected; outlying 
observations get moderated in Method 2 by the influence of previous wages (it is a 
time mean). This does not occur in Method 1, where it is only the most recent 
observation that is used for prediction. Hence if there is a large shock to the most 
recent observation, this gets carried forward to the future prediction in Method 1, as 
opposed to being averaged out in Method 2.  
 
Table A3.7 Predicted annual wage at age 30 for NELS sample members  
 
Prediction 
method Dataset 
Median predicted 
wage $000  
Mean predicted wage 
$000 (standard 
deviation) 
1 CPS 25.7 (3.4) 29.4 (19.2) 
1 PSID 25.5 (3.4) 29.5 (19.3) 
1 NLSY 26.1 (3.4) 30.4 (20.1) 
2 NELS-NLSY Pooled 26.7 (3.3) 29.6 (14.8) 
Notes:   
1 All figures presented in 1994 wages 
2 Figures in parenthesis represent the spread of the data (p90/p10 for median, standard deviation for the 
mean) 
3 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS dataset. Sample size = 4,434.. 
 
 
I also compare my predictions of average age 30 wages for different groups to similar 
information recorded for 30 year olds in an external data source (the 2003-2005 CPS 
March Annual Supplement)
158
. The results appear in Table A3.8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
158
 The exact wording in the CPS is as follows: “How much did (name/you) earn from this employer 
before taxes and other deductions during (Year)?”. This is supplemented with other questions to check 
the robustness of answers and to calculate other wage sources. In particular, respondents are asked 
“How much did (name/you) earn in tips, bonuses, overtime pay or commissions from this employer in 
(Year)” and “What is your best estimate of (name's/your) correct total amount of earnings from all 
other employers during (Year)?”. All of these responses are used to calculate respondents earned 
income, making the definition comparable to the other surveys in question (NELS, NLSY, PSID). 
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Table A3.8 Predicted mean age 30 NELS wage compared to the mean age 30 
Current Population Survey (CPS) wage 
 
  
% of 
observations in  
NELS 
Predicted 
wage 
method 1c 
($000)  
Predicted 
wage 
method 2 
($000) 
% of 
observations in 
CPS 
CPS wage 
($000) 
Highest qualification at 
age  26      
Below high School 5.4 20.9 20.8 12.4 15.8 
High school 56.4 27.0 25.5 47.8 24.7 
Associates degree 7.0 29.9 30.5 8.2 28.1 
Bachelors 28.0 37.7 37.8 24.6 38.1 
Masters degree / PhD 2.8 42.4 43.6 6.8 44.5 
Race      
White 69.8 31.4 31.3 60.6 31.5 
American Indian 0.1 23.6 24.6 0.2 NA 
 Asian or Pacific Islander 5.1 38.5 36.4 6.2 35.4 
Black (not Hispanic) 8.3 24.6 25.1 9.6 26.9 
Hispanic 13.3 27.4 27.1 21.7 20.7 
Other 4.6 27.1 26.6 1.7 NA 
All respondents 100.0 30.4 29.6 100.0 28.9 
Notes:  
1 All observations in 1994 $ 
2 Total sample size in the NELS is 4,434. In CPS, the total sample size is 1,412 
3 CPS Wages for American Indian and Other ethnic groups are not reported due to the small sample 
size. 
4 CPS data from 2002-2004 March Annual Supplement, restricted to men working full-time, all year 
round, at age 30 available from : http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstc/cps_table_creator.html 
5 The proportion of respondents with below high school education is lower in the NELS than CPS. 
This is because CPS is a general population survey. The NELS data I am using represents the 
population who were in high school as seniors in 1992. Hence the NELS and CPS cover slightly 
different populations, particularly regarding those with less than high school education. On the other 
hand, the CPS contains a lot more individuals with MA or PhD level qualifications. This is due to the 
last NELS wave being conducted at age 26. Some of the NELS cohort would still be in higher 
education, and are still studying for these qualifications. 
6 The three left-hand most columns refers to authors calculations from the NELS dataset, the two 
columns on the right are based on data from the CPS taken from from 2002-2004 March Annual 
Supplement, restricted to men working full-time, all year round, at age 30 available from : 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstc/cps_table_creator.html. Total sample size in the NELS is 
4,434. In CPS, the total sample size is 1,412 
 
In general, predicted age 30 wages are similar to those in the external CPS data. I 
predict average wages to be $29,600 in the NELS, while in the CPS the equivalent 
figure is $28,900. Even when looking at subgroups of the population, differences tend 
to be quite small. For example, I predict the mean wage of those with a Bachelors 
degree to be $37,800, while in the CPS the average wage for those with a degree is 
$38,100. Likewise, I predict White respondents to earn a mean wage of $31,300, 
while in the CPS the figure is $31,500. Nevertheless, there are some groups where 
predicted wages are quite different from average wages in the CPS. For instance, I 
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estimate the average wage of those with less than high school education to be around 
$21,000 while the CPS figure stands at just over $15,000. This may be because the 
NELS data represents the population of high school seniors in the spring of 1992. 
Hence my definition of “less than high school education” is those who made it into 
the final year of high school but did not graduate. On the other hand the CPS 
represents the whole US population, and defines less than high school education as 
everyone who did not graduate from high school, including those who dropped out 
before their senior year. This is probably the reason why, in the NELS compared to 
the CPS: 
 
(a) my predicted wage is higher  
and  
(b)  there are a smaller proportion of respondents with below high school 
education 
 
In a similar manner, I predict average wages for Hispanics to be around $27,000, 
while the CPS figure is closer to $20,000. This again could be due to slight 
differences in wording or response to the question regarding race and ethnicity in the 
CPS and NELS surveys. However, it is worth noting that both these groups only form 
a small part of the overall sample. The general message is that my prediction methods 
seem to generate a reasonable estimate of average age 30 wages. 
 
In Figure A3.5, however, I show my two predictions for the illustrative NELS 
respondent. This highlights the difficulty of analysis at the individual level.  
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Figure A3.5 Comparison of wage prediction methods for ID 7286532 in the 
NELS 
 
 
Notes: 
1 See notes to Figure A3.3, A3.4 and A3.5 
2 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS dataset.  
 
The two predictions of his age 30 wage are $15,000 (30%) apart. Given my discussion 
at the start of the section about whether the large jump in wages is temporary or 
permanent, anywhere between the two predictions, or even a figure outside of this 
range, could be possible. When dealing with group averages, over-estimates of wage 
growth for some individuals will be compensated by underestimates for others. 
However a comparison of expected and actual wages at the individual level is 
troublesome, as there is a large range of possible values for each individual’s 
predicted age 30 wage.   
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Unearned Income 
 
Thus far I have only considered wages; I now turn my attention to how other sources 
of finance contribute to total age 30 income. Some details were collected in the NELS 
about respondents’ non-wage income at age 25 (the full previous year, 1999, prior to 
the survey). They were asked: 
 
Without considering the earnings from employment that you just reported, 
approximately how much did you and your (spouse/partner) receive from other 
sources of income in 1999? $................................................................... 
These sources might include stocks and bonds, savings interest, insurance, alimony or child support, 
amily members, and disability payments 
       
 
As this information is collected in just one question, measurement error may be a 
concern. Another difficulty is that the question asks for joint unearned income for the 
respondent and their partner (if married or cohabiting). Fortunately, the majority of 
those who did report a figure were not in a marriage or marriage like partnership. 
Appendix Table A3.9 presents the distribution of unearned income by marital status. 
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Table A3.9 Distribution of unearned income by marital status, for those 
reporting a value above zero  
 
Percentiles of unearned income 
distribution  Single Married/Cohabiting 
1 30 100 
5 200 200 
10 500 500 
25 1,200 1,100 
50 4,000 3,250 
Mean 8,528 7,335 
75 10,000 7,000 
90 20,000 15,000 
95 30,000 30,000 
99 60,000 65,000 
Standard Deviation 16,045 13,298 
% of observations where reported 
unearned income >0 25.7 19.0 
% of observations missing 2.6 8.9 
Observations ( including 0’s) 3,924 510 
Notes: 
1 Around 75% (80%) of single (married or cohabiting) individuals report 0 unearned income. The 
distributions above relate only to those who reported some form of unearned income (a value greater 
than 0) 
2 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS dataset.  Sample size 4,434 
 
 
The reported distributions of unearned income by married and single individuals are 
quite similar, though the former are more likely to not respond and the latter more 
likely to report 0. 
 
The first question to ask is how much unearned income do young adults receive, and 
what proportion of total income does it make up at (a) the group and (b) the individual 
level? The second column of Table A3.10 provides details of the unearned income 
distribution at age 26 for NELS respondents. One striking feature is that the majority 
of individuals (74%) report no unearned income. It would appear that, even though 
unearned income is important conceptually, empirically it has relatively little 
influence on average total income (at least at the group level). 
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To investigate this proposition further, I again turn to the NLSY where, as opposed to 
the NELS, respondents are asked several questions about each aspect of their non-
earned income. For instance, they were asked about their income from businesses, 
public support, educational grants and any other sources in a series of separate 
questions
159
. Table A3.10 compares the distributions of unearned income for NELS 
and NLSY sample members at age 26, for those reporting a value above 0. 
 
Table A3.10 Distribution of unearned income at age 26 in the NELS and NLSY, 
for those reporting a value greater than 0 
 
Percentiles of 
unearned income 
distribution 
Reported 
unearned 
income in 
NELS  
Reported 
unearned 
income in 
NLSY  
Reported unearned 
income in NLSY for 
those reporting a value 
greater than $500 
1 50 4 510 
5 200 14 578 
10 500 29 662 
25 1,200 116 1,156 
50 3,876 578 2,553 
Mean 8,079 3,347 6,202 
75 9,000 2,753 6,314 
90 20,000 7,967 14,287 
95 30,000 14,571 26,893 
99 70,000 42,563 57,150 
% reporting>0 26% 38% 20% 
Notes: 
1 All data are for individuals at age 26 in 1994 prices 
2 Distribution is for respondents reporting a value greater than 0 
3 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS and NLSY datasets. NELS sample size 4,434 (1,153 
observations with unearned income greater than 0)  
 
 
 
Notice firstly the NLSY has a greater proportion (38% compared to 26%) of people 
reporting positive unearned income. However, the distribution shows almost a quarter 
of these observations are less than $100. It seems that the NELS, by recording this 
data in a single question, misses many individuals who have a small quantity of 
unearned income. In any case, both the NELS and NLSY suggest that unearned 
income, on average, has only a small influence on total income at age 26. The median 
respondent indicates they have no unearned income. Even of the minority that do 
report a figure above 0, unearned income (on average) is relatively small compared to 
wages in most cases. 
 
                                                          
159
 Note in the NLSY, respondents were asked separate questions about their spouses unearned income 
aswell. 
251 
 
One may suggest that unearned income may make up a more significant proportion of 
total income at age 30 than at age 26. To investigate this, I compare mean wages to 
the mean total income for men in the 2003-2005 CPS March Annual Supplement
160
. 
On average (mean), unearned sources of finance contribute only $500 (2%) to total 
income. I performed a similar analysis on the NLSY 79 sample when they turned age 
30, and found a similar result (unearned income makes a very small contribution to 
total income at the group or population level). 
 
Overall it seems that, on average, unearned income makes up only a very small part of 
total age 30 incomes. Hence it should be of limited importance when one compares 
expectations to realisations at the group level. Therefore, to incorporate unearned 
income into my predictions, I simply use the value recorded at age 25 in the NELS. 
Implicitly this means that anyone with zero unearned income at 25 will also have zero 
predicted unearned income at age 30. Given its minor role, this should not introduce 
substantial bias at the group or population level. 
 
On the other hand, unearned income is a non-trivial matter at the individual level. 
Table A3.10 shows some individuals to report a figure over $10,000 at age 25 in the 
NELS data. But this could be a one-off inheritance from a relative dying, or sudden 
good luck with a stock option (especially given the technology boom at the time of 
the survey in 2000). There is no indication about how this unearned income may 
change in the future. Hence predicting unearned income at age 30 for a given 
individual is an even harder task than for wages. Thus the NELS simply does not 
contain the data to make estimation of unearned income at the individual level a 
realistic possibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
160
 Several questions about other (unearned) sources of income were asked in the CPS. This includes 
how much they received from benefits, welfare, assistance, dividends and interest. The data I use is 
drawn from the CPS “Table Creator”, available from 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstc/cps_table_creator.html I produce two values, one looking at 
men’s average wages, the other their total income. I assume that the difference between these two 
figures (average wages and average income) equals total income from unearned sources.  
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Summary 
 
Drawing together the results from this appendix, it seems that inferences at the group 
and population level should be reasonably robust to the problems identified with the 
NELS data. I have presented two methods to predict age 30 wages, which provide 
similar estimates of average wages at age 30, and that are comparable with external 
estimates from population level data. Moreover, even though age 30 unearned income 
is difficult to predict, I have shown that this makes up only a small proportion of total 
average income. I am therefore confident that the substantive inferences in section 3.5 
regarding population and group level averages are robust to the data issues discussed 
throughout this section.  
 
However, my concerns for analysis at the individual level remain. Figure A3.5 
illustrates how two very different predictions, over $15,000 (30%) apart, can be made 
for any one individual. I have also assumed this person has no unearned income at age 
30, as he did not report any at age 25. This would be quite a bold assumption to make. 
The implication is that inferences made at the individual level are likely to suffer from 
what may be quite severe biases. Consequently, I focus on group level analysis (mean 
and median outcomes), that I believe are robust to the assumptions I have made about 
the data. Though analysis at the individual level would be of great interest, I do not 
believe this to be sensible with the NELS data.  
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Appendix 3.3 Comparison of OLS results using Method 1 to Method 2 
 
Tables A3.11 to A3.13 provide regression results, analogous to these in Table 3.11, 
except that I now predict age 30 income using “Method 1”. This method is described 
in more detail in section 3.4 and Appendix 3.2.  Note that I implement Method 1 three 
ways, using different estimates of young adults wage growth from different surveys. 
 
Comparing the results to those in Table 3.11, it seems that most of the patterns I 
describe in section 3.5 still hold. For example, specification 1 consistently shows that 
workers hold more realistic expectations than Art, Biology and Communication 
students. And, as described in section 3.5, the inclusion of the college drop-out 
dummy in specification 4 causes the subject coefficients to drop dramatically. 
However, it is worth noting that statistical significance has been lost for some groups 
of students in comparison to Table 3.11. For example, using the PSID to extrapolate 
wage growth (“Method 1b”), the coefficient estimates for Accounting, Finance and 
Biological Science groups are now only statistically significant at the 10% level 
(compared to the 5% level in Table 3.11). This seems to be a result of both a decrease 
in the estimated coefficient, and more variability in the data (recall my discussion of 
Table A3.7, where I show the standard deviation of predicted wages to be lower in 
Method 2 than Method 1). Nevertheless, I can confidently say that, on average, there 
is still little evidence that workers hold more realistic expectations of their future 
income than students. Moreover, although some of the coefficients have been reduced 
to lower levels of statistical significance, the general patterns found regarding specific 
groups of students still seem to hold. In particular, engineering, maths and computer 
science students hold more realistic expectations than workers (and those in creative 
disciplines) across all results. Likewise, I always find those who drop out of 
university have the least realistic expectations. 
 
Turning to the other coefficients, there is again strong agreement across the prediction 
methods. Family income, and whether the student also holds a job at age 20, is rarely 
of statistical significance at any of the conventional levels. On the other hand, 
cognitive maths ability and the Black race dummy are always significant at the 5% 
level. Hence the general message from these tables is that the results presented in 
section 3.5 seem relatively robust to the prediction method that I use. 
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Table A3.11 OLS regression results comparing how realistic students are to 
workers (Prediction “Method 1a” using CPS wage growth estimates) 
  Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
  Co SE Co SE Co SE Co SE 
Work-student status at age 20 (Ref: 
Working)                 
Agriculture student -0.10 0.08 -0.05 0.08 -0.07 0.07 -0.12 0.08 
Economics, Finance student -0.09 0.10 -0.02 0.11 -0.05 0.10 -0.12 0.10 
Business, Management student 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.05 0.05 
Journalism, Communication student 0.20* 0.08 0.24* 0.08 0.21* 0.08 0.13 0.08 
Computer Science, Maths student -0.11 0.09 -0.06 0.09 -0.10 0.10 -0.20* 0.09 
Education student  -0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.07 -0.06 0.07 
Engineering, Physical sciences student -0.16* 0.05 -0.11* 0.05 -0.14* 0.05 -0.21* 0.06 
Language student -0.08 0.13 -0.02 0.13 -0.02 0.13 -0.10 0.14 
Health student 0.19* 0.08 0.24* 0.08 0.22* 0.08 0.15* 0.08 
Law student 0.44* 0.20 0.44* 0.19 0.44* 0.20 0.32 0.19 
Biological science student 0.24* 0.08 0.30* 0.08 0.29* 0.08 0.21* 0.08 
Social sciences, Humanities student 0.17* 0.07 0.22* 0.07 0.18* 0.07 0.10 0.08 
Art  student 0.31* 0.13 0.36* 0.13 0.35* 0.14 0.25* 0.13 
Other student 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 -0.03 0.06 
Not student or working 0.15* 0.06 0.16* 0.06 0.12* 0.05 0.12* 0.05 
Missing 0.30* 0.07 0.33* 0.07 0.28* 0.07 0.30* 0.07 
Maths ability at age 18 - - -0.07* 0.02 -0.06* 0.02 -0.05* 0.02 
Race (Ref: White)         
American Indian or Alaska Native - - - - 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.08 
Asian or Pacific Islander - - - - 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 
Black, not Hispanic - - - - 0.22* 0.05 0.20* 0.05 
Hispanic or Latino - - - - 0.11* 0.05 0.10* 0.05 
More than one race - - - - 0.18* 0.07 0.17* 0.07 
Missing - - - - 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.08 
Family income parents reported when 
respondent was age 18 (Ref: Bottom 
quintile)         
2
nd
 quintile - - - - -0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.05 
3
rd
 quintile - - - - -0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.05 
4
th
 quintile - - - - 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.05 
Top quintile - - - - 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.06 
Student at 20, who also held a part-time 
job (Ref: No)         
Yes - - - - 0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.04 
College Dropout (ref: No)         
Yes - - - - - - 0.21* 0.05 
Constant 0.44* 0.03 0.41* 0.03 0.38* 0.05 0.39* 0.05 
Notes: 
1 These results refer to when I use Rubenstein and Weiss (2007) CPS estimates of wage growth (see 
Table 3.6) to predict NELS sample members age 30 income. 
2 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS dataset. Sample size = 4,434. Dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of respondents expected age 30 income divided by their predicted actual age 30 
income. 
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Table A3.12 OLS regression results comparing how realistic students are to 
workers (Prediction “Method 1b” using PSID wage growth estimates) 
 
  Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
  Co SE Co SE Co SE Co SE 
Work-student status at age 20 (Ref: 
Working)                 
Agriculture student -0.12 0.08 -0.07 0.08 -0.09 0.07 -0.15* 0.08 
Economics, Finance student -0.09 0.10 -0.03 0.11 -0.05 0.10 -0.14 0.10 
Business, Management student 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.06 
Journalism, Communication student 0.20* 0.08 0.24* 0.08 0.21* 0.08 0.12 0.08 
Computer Science, Maths student -0.12 0.09 -0.06 0.09 -0.11 0.10 -0.22* 0.09 
Education student  -0.03 0.06 0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.07 -0.08 0.07 
Engineering, Physical sciences student -0.17* 0.05 -0.11* 0.05 -0.15* 0.05 -0.22* 0.06 
Language student -0.08 0.13 -0.02 0.13 -0.02 0.13 -0.11 0.14 
Health student 0.18* 0.08 0.23* 0.08 0.21* 0.08 0.13 0.08 
Law student 0.44* 0.20 0.44* 0.19 0.44* 0.20 0.30 0.19 
Biological science student 0.22* 0.08 0.28* 0.08 0.27* 0.09 0.19* 0.08 
Social sciences, Humanities student 0.15* 0.07 0.21* 0.07 0.16* 0.07 0.07 0.08 
Art  student 0.30* 0.13 0.35* 0.13 0.34* 0.14 0.23 0.13 
Other student 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.06 -0.05 0.06 
Not student or working 0.14* 0.06 0.15* 0.06 0.12* 0.05 0.12* 0.05 
Missing 0.31* 0.07 0.33* 0.07 0.28* 0.07 0.29* 0.07 
Maths ability at age 18 - - -0.08* 0.02 -0.06* 0.02 -0.05* 0.02 
Race (Ref: White)         
American Indian or Alaska Native - - - - 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.08 
Asian or Pacific Islander - - - - 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.07 
Black, not Hispanic - - - - 0.22* 0.05 0.21* 0.05 
Hispanic or Latino - - - - 0.12* 0.05 0.10* 0.05 
More than one race - - - - 0.16* 0.08 0.14 0.08 
Missing - - - - 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.08 
Family income parents reported when 
respondent was age 18 (Ref: Bottom 
quintile)         
2
nd
 quintile - - - - -0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.05 
3
rd
 quintile - - - - -0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.06 
4
th
 quintile - - - - 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.05 
Top quintile - - - - 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.06 
Student at 20, who also held a part-time job 
(Ref: No)         
Yes - - - - 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.04 
College Dropout (ref: No)         
Yes - - - - - - 0.23* 0.05 
Constant 0.43* 0.03 0.40* 0.03 0.37* 0.05 0.38* 0.05 
Notes: 
1 These results refer to when I use Rubenstein and Weiss (2007) PSID estimates of wage growth (see 
Table 3.6) to predict NELS sample members age 30 income. 
2 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS dataset. Sample size = 4,434. Dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of respondents expected age 30 income divided by their predicted actual age 30 
income 
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Table A3.13 OLS regression results comparing how realistic students are to 
workers (Prediction “Method 1c” using NLSY wage growth estimates) 
 
  Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
  Co SE Co SE Co SE Co SE 
Work-student status at age 20 (Ref: 
Working)                 
Agriculture student -0.15* 0.08 -0.09 0.08 -0.11 0.07 -0.18* 0.08 
Economics, Finance student -0.12 0.11 -0.05 0.11 -0.08 0.11 -0.17 0.10 
Business, Management student -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.06 -0.10 0.06 
Journalism, Communication student 0.18* 0.08 0.22* 0.08 0.19* 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Computer Science, Maths student -0.14 0.09 -0.08 0.09 -0.13 0.10 -0.25* 0.09 
Education student  -0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.07 -0.03 0.07 -0.11 0.07 
Engineering, Physical sciences student -0.19* 0.05 -0.13* 0.05 -0.17* 0.06 -0.26* 0.06 
Language student -0.11 0.12 -0.04 0.12 -0.04 0.13 -0.15 0.14 
Health student 0.16* 0.08 0.21* 0.08 0.19* 0.08 0.10 0.08 
Law student 0.43* 0.20 0.43* 0.20 0.42* 0.20 0.26 0.19 
Biological science student 0.20* 0.08 0.26* 0.09 0.25* 0.09 0.16* 0.08 
Social sciences, Humanities student 0.13* 0.07 0.19* 0.07 0.14* 0.07 0.04 0.08 
Art  student 0.28* 0.13 0.34* 0.13 0.32* 0.14 0.20 0.13 
Other student 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.06 -0.08 0.06 
Not student or working 0.14* 0.06 0.15* 0.06 0.12* 0.05 0.12* 0.05 
Missing 0.30* 0.07 0.32* 0.07 0.27* 0.07 0.28* 0.07 
Maths ability at age 18 - - -0.08* 0.02 -0.07* 0.02 -0.05* 0.02 
Race (Ref: White)         
American Indian or Alaska Native - - - - 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.08 
Asian or Pacific Islander - - - - 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.07 
Black, not Hispanic - - - - 0.22* 0.05 0.21* 0.05 
Hispanic or Latino - - - - 0.12* 0.05 0.10* 0.05 
More than one race - - - - 0.16* 0.08 0.15* 0.08 
Missing - - - - 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.08 
Family income parents reported when 
respondent was age 18 (Ref: Bottom 
quintile)         
2
nd
 quintile - - - - -0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.05 
3
rd
 quintile - - - - -0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.06 
4
th
 quintile - - - - 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.05 
Top quintile - - - - 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.06 
Student at 20, who also held a part-time job 
(Ref: No)         
Yes - - - - 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.04 
College Dropout (ref: No)         
Yes - - - - - - 0.26* 0.05 
Constant 0.42* 0.03 0.38* 0.03 0.36* 0.05 0.37* 0.05 
Notes: 
1 These results refer to when I use Rubenstein and Weiss (2007) NLSY estimates of wage growth (see 
Table 3.6) to predict NELS sample members age 30 income. 
2 Source: Authors calculations from the NELS dataset. Sample size = 4,434. Dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of respondents expected age 30 income divided by their predicted actual age 30 
income 
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Table A3.14 Expected wages at age 30 in the NELS (raw figures as reported by 
students) 
  N 
Expected wage 
(mean) 
Expected wage 
(median) 
Education 122 39,749 35,500 
Agriculture 51 44,000 35,000 
Computer science/ Maths 123 46,852 40,000 
Engineering/Physical sciences 397 48,101 45,000 
Arts 105 49,600 40,000 
Other 330 50,198 45,000 
Languages 38 50,342 40,000 
Journalism 81 51,604 45,000 
Law 90 56,000 50,000 
Business/Management 295 59,368 50,000 
Social science/ Humanities 205 60,202 50,000 
Health 90 61,428 50,000 
Finance/Accounting 140 62,446 52,500 
Biological sciences 147 64,242 50,000 
 
 
Appendix 4.1. Full set of model parameter estimates 
 
This appendix provides the full set of parameter estimates for the models presented in 
chapter four. 
 
Model 1 -3 
 
For models 1-3, I present the difference between the educational expectations of a 
hypothetical “advantaged” and “disadvantaged” child (in terms of log-odds). Recall 
that these hypothetical children differ in terms of highest parental education, highest 
parental occupation and number of books in the home as described in section 4.3.  
 
Parental education and books in the home are dummy variables, where the reference 
group refers to characteristics of the disadvantaged child (less than 100 books, neither 
parent completed any more then compulsory schooling). One must sum the relevant 
coefficients (those on the “high” books and “high” education dummies) to form this 
part of the prediction of the difference between the hypothetical advantaged and 
disadvantaged children. 
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Adding in the contribution of parental occupation to these predictions is a little 
trickier. Recall that parental occupation is based upon the continuous ISEI index. Also 
recall that I define my hypothetical “advantaged” child as having a parent at the 
(national) 75
th
 percentile of this continuous index, while a “disadvantaged” child is 
defined as having highest parental occupation at the (national) 25
th
 percentile. Hence 
to add this into the predicted difference between “advantaged” and “disadvantaged” 
groups, one needs to know: 
 
(1) How many ISEI points there are between the 25th and 75th national 
percentile 
(2) How a one point increase in ISEI changes a child’s expectations 
 
Note that BOTH of these factors may differ across countries.  
 
If the ISEI index had been entered as a single, simple linear term, one would simply 
multiply (1)*(2) to calculate the contribution parental occupation makes to the 
difference between advantaged and disadvantaged groups. However, I have entered 
the ISEI index as a series of piece-wise linear components, with a knot at the 50
th
 
percentile. Hence one must break point (1) and point (2) above into two further 
components: 
 
(1a) How many ISEI points there are between the 25
th
 and 50
th
 percentile of 
the national ISEI distribution 
(1b) How many ISEI points there are between the 50
th
 and 75
th
 percentile of 
the national ISEI distribution 
(2a) How a one point change in ISEI between the 25
th
 and 50
th
 national 
percentile alters a child’s expectations  
(2b) How a one point change in ISEI between the 50
th
 and 75
th
 national 
percentile alters a child’s expectations  
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Now, to calculate the contribution of occupation to the advantaged-disadvantaged 
expectation gap, once must sum {(1a*2a) + (1b*2b)}. Information on 1a and 1b (i.e. 
percentiles of the ISEI distribution) can be easily calculated from Table 4.3 (1a is, for 
example, simple the 50
th
 percentile minus the 25
th
 percentile- for England this is 51 - 
35). Details on 2a and 2b are provided in the following Tables (e.g. under the label 
“occupation spline 26-50th percentile coefficient” for 2b).  
 
To summerise, to get the difference between the expectations of advantaged and 
disadvantaged children for models 1-3, one must sum
161
: 
 
Parental education “high” coefficient 
+ 
Books in the home “high” coefficient 
+ 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile coefficient * Number of ISEI points between 
25
th
 and 50
th
 percentile 
+ 
Occupation spline 51-75th percentile coefficient * Number of ISEI points between 
50
th
 and 75
th
 percentile 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
161
 The coefficients in the tables below refer to a one point increase in the ISEI index over the relevant 
range (e.g. so the coefficient for “Occupation spline 26-50th percentile” refers to how the log-odds of 
expecting to go to university change with a one point increase in the ISEI scale that occurs between the 
26
th
 and 50
th
 national percentile). 
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A worked example for England is given below: 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coefficient on High (over 100) Books (Ref: 
Low) 0.803 0.437 0.404 
+ 
   Coefficient on High (tertiary) Parental 
Education (Ref: Low) 1.300 1.295 0.678 
+ 
   Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 
coefficient * Number of ISEI points 
between 25th and 50th percentile 0.025*16 0.012*16 0.010*16 
+ 
   Occupation spline 51-75th percentile 
coefficient * Number of ISEI points 
between 51th and 75th percentile 0.034*15 0.026*15 0.006*15 
= 
   Difference (in log odds) between 
advantaged and disadvantaged children's 
expectations 3.014 2.314 1.332 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 3,817. Dependent variable in 
regression was whether respondent expected to obtain a degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they 
did) 
 
 
 
Model 4 
 
In model 4, I change specification (with details provided in section 4.5) and compare 
the predicted log-odds of expecting to complete university for an advantaged children 
of average ability to a disadvantaged child of high ability. Recall that, in this model, 
“advantaged” is based upon quartiles of the ESCS distribution described in section 
4.5. Likewise, ability enters the model as a set of dummy variables reflecting quintiles 
of the (national) PISA math’s ability distribution. 
 
To calculate the predicted log-odds of an advantaged child of average ability 
expecting to go to university, one must sum the coefficients of the relevant dummy 
variables: 
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ESCS Highest Quartile "Advantaged" coefficient 
+ 
Maths Ability third quintile coefficient 
+ 
Constant 
 
To calculate the predicted log-odds of a disadvantaged child of high ability expecting 
to go to university, one must sum the coefficients: 
 
Maths Ability Highest  quintile coefficient 
+ 
Constant 
 
An example for England is given below (figures correspond to those presented in 
Figure 4.7 and Table 4.10): 
 
Advantaged child of average ability 
  Model 4 
  Advantaged 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
 Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.838 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
 Third Quartile 1.214 
Constant -2.898 
Predicted log odds for average ability, advantaged child 0.154 
 
 
Disadvantaged child of high ability 
  Model 4 
  Disadvantaged 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
 Highest Quartile  2.449 
Constant -2.898 
Predicted log odds for high ability, disadvantaged child -0.449 
Notes: 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 3,817. Dependent variable in 
regression was whether respondent expected to obtain a degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they 
did) 
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Australia 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.665 0.061 -0.809 0.063 -0.866 0.058 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.745 0.062 0.458 0.065 0.424 0.066 
Missing -0.050 0.232 0.101 0.256 0.021 0.250 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.334 0.072 0.330 0.076 0.275 0.092 
High 1.086 0.085 0.988 0.087 0.720 0.078 
Missing -0.777 0.310 -0.592 0.325 -0.469 0.320 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile 0.021 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.012 0.016 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.031 0.010 0.020 0.010 0.015 0.011 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.011 0.012 -0.001 0.012 -0.014 0.013 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.036 0.011 0.029 0.012 0.033 0.011 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile -0.185 0.163 -0.183 0.178 -0.201 0.173 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.004 0.014 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    1.040 0.584 1.160 0.595 0.709 0.591 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.493 0.093 -0.417 0.099 -0.358 0.104 
Missing Books, Immigrant -0.866 0.411 -0.918 0.442 -0.800 0.443 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant -0.330 0.112 -0.372 0.120 -0.391 0.150 
High Education, Immigrant 0.146 0.134 0.175 0.139 0.074 0.130 
Missing Education, Immigrant 0.629 0.416 0.677 0.435 0.747 0.447 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant 0.007 0.021 0.003 0.021 0.002 0.021 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant -0.044 0.015 -0.042 0.016 -0.036 0.017 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant 0.029 0.020 0.022 0.020 0.039 0.021 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant -0.034 0.016 -0.031 0.018 -0.026 0.018 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant 0.345 0.253 0.267 0.284 0.304 0.280 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant 0.020 0.021 0.009 0.023 0.012 0.023 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.002 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.002 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.009 0.002 0.010 0.002 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.010 0.002 0.009 0.002 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.012 0.003 0.013 0.003 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.015 0.003 0.013 0.003 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 12,492 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 11,794 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.770 0.058 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.571 0.109 
Third Quartile 1.081 0.084 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.768 0.110 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.463 0.069 
Third Quintile 1.001 0.080 
Fourth Quintile 1.483 0.097 
Highest Quintile 2.348 0.100 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    0.873 0.127 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -0.300 0.148 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -0.388 0.165 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -0.356 0.190 
Constant -1.081 0.083 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.411 0.063 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.564 0.113 
Third Quartile 1.035 0.087 
Highest Quartile  1.682 0.108 
Maths Ability 0.934 0.079 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.028 0.103 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.085 0.118 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.104 0.128 
Constant -0.261 0.083 
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Austria 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.095 0.125 -0.337 0.118 0.073 0.105 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.939 0.107 0.524 0.108 0.247 0.114 
Missing -0.123 0.610 -0.278 0.674 -0.384 0.716 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.340 0.088 0.479 0.090 0.402 0.205 
High 1.145 0.140 1.295 0.149 0.500 0.094 
Missing 0.027 0.617 0.510 0.761 0.183 0.668 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile -0.025 0.036 -0.047 0.042 -0.052 0.038 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile -0.024 0.044 -0.006 0.047 -0.064 0.051 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.070 0.025 0.037 0.025 0.034 0.028 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.018 0.017 0.013 0.017 -0.005 0.020 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.034 0.013 0.019 0.014 0.020 0.015 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.019 0.012 0.030 0.014 0.032 0.014 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    1.992 1.368 2.255 1.424 0.892 1.530 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.019 0.245 -0.088 0.271 -0.065 0.283 
Missing Books, Immigrant -0.182 0.858 -0.371 0.811 -0.113 0.903 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant -0.084 0.252 -0.296 0.254 -0.591 0.502 
High Education, Immigrant 0.159 0.289 -0.114 0.309 -0.093 0.273 
Missing Education, Immigrant -0.432 0.969 -0.726 1.169 -0.693 1.181 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant -0.052 0.059 -0.044 0.064 -0.017 0.069 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant 0.004 0.081 -0.010 0.087 0.039 0.105 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant -0.053 0.042 -0.040 0.043 -0.056 0.053 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant 0.046 0.044 0.053 0.050 0.089 0.046 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant -0.013 0.035 -0.008 0.040 -0.018 0.036 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant -0.027 0.033 -0.037 0.041 -0.022 0.042 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - -0.009 0.006 -0.011 0.006 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.007 0.006 0.000 0.007 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.014 0.003 0.005 0.004 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.016 0.002 0.011 0.003 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.009 0.003 0.005 0.003 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.010 0.002 0.009 0.002 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 4,558 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 3,530 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.312 0.121 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.518 0.165 
Third Quartile 1.082 0.177 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 2.108 0.170 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.481 0.221 
Third Quintile 1.207 0.201 
Fourth Quintile 1.891 0.194 
Highest Quintile 2.754 0.191 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    0.864 0.263 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -0.085 0.347 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -0.137 0.306 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -0.140 0.325 
Constant -3.772 0.238 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy 0.314 0.129 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.359 0.168 
Third Quartile 0.950 0.165 
Highest Quartile  1.898 0.163 
Maths Ability 1.003 0.248 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.183 0.276 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.002 0.269 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.013 0.266 
Constant -2.526 0.158 
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Belgium (French) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.293 0.118 -0.421 0.114 -0.212 0.116 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.983 0.136 0.685 0.142 0.689 0.150 
Missing 0.004 0.570 0.642 0.568 0.639 0.613 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.545 0.175 0.426 0.190 0.201 0.276 
High 0.878 0.192 0.852 0.196 0.567 0.187 
Missing -1.000 0.382 -0.571 0.412 -0.415 0.455 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile 0.027 0.046 0.026 0.053 0.030 0.059 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.039 0.041 0.029 0.044 0.025 0.045 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.024 0.020 0.007 0.022 -0.011 0.021 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.011 0.021 0.017 0.020 0.030 0.021 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.079 0.089 0.006 0.090 -0.050 0.090 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.005 0.018 -0.003 0.019 -0.007 0.020 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    0.365 1.535 1.159 1.687 1.250 1.830 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.443 0.218 -0.485 0.242 -0.454 0.253 
Missing Books, Immigrant -0.693 1.008 -0.436 0.974 0.201 0.951 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant 0.259 0.257 0.256 0.268 0.663 0.420 
High Education, Immigrant 0.224 0.276 0.162 0.289 0.314 0.270 
Missing Education, Immigrant 0.101 0.653 -0.235 0.671 -0.351 0.697 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant 0.002 0.057 -0.012 0.063 -0.030 0.068 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant -0.027 0.059 -0.023 0.063 0.000 0.064 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant -0.024 0.030 -0.034 0.032 -0.028 0.033 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant 0.028 0.036 0.016 0.039 0.011 0.041 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant -0.105 0.169 -0.053 0.182 -0.056 0.189 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant 0.013 0.032 0.024 0.034 0.031 0.033 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.006 0.009 -0.002 0.011 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.005 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.015 0.003 0.013 0.003 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.002 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.003 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.014 0.003 0.011 0.003 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 2,931  in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 2,598 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
 
 
 
 
267 
 
  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.339 0.113 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.660 0.215 
Third Quartile 1.117 0.206 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.875 0.206 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.936 0.246 
Third Quintile 1.607 0.236 
Fourth Quintile 2.051 0.252 
Highest Quintile 2.711 0.241 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    0.606 0.263 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -0.370 0.354 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -0.108 0.312 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -0.793 0.326 
Constant -3.444 0.292 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.005 0.122 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.588 0.194 
Third Quartile 1.075 0.191 
Highest Quartile  1.773 0.189 
Maths Ability 0.803 0.224 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.235 0.249 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.167 0.281 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.118 0.264 
Constant -1.856 0.173 
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Belgium (Flemish) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.419 0.107 -0.742 0.097 -0.430 0.093 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.744 0.082 0.567 0.092 0.507 0.100 
Missing -0.753 0.395 -0.215 0.501 0.020 0.462 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.162 0.105 0.262 0.107 0.180 0.133 
High 0.963 0.110 1.039 0.120 0.650 0.112 
Missing -1.519 0.369 -0.825 0.394 -0.713 0.414 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile 0.031 0.035 0.006 0.039 0.011 0.039 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.011 0.035 -0.013 0.037 -0.037 0.039 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.050 0.012 0.030 0.012 0.015 0.012 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.026 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.020 0.013 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.122 0.064 0.131 0.072 0.080 0.076 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile -0.011 0.013 -0.010 0.015 0.003 0.015 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    -0.346 1.658 0.229 2.243 -0.314 2.426 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.039 0.194 -0.377 0.236 -0.228 0.246 
Missing Books, Immigrant 1.732 0.911 1.919 1.232 1.437 1.684 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant 0.123 0.283 0.154 0.331 0.104 0.462 
High Education, Immigrant 0.097 0.281 0.330 0.326 0.528 0.337 
Missing Education, Immigrant -0.320 0.877 -0.221 0.834 0.288 0.838 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant 0.029 0.064 0.034 0.084 0.038 0.088 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant -0.056 0.073 -0.041 0.088 -0.048 0.095 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant -0.007 0.028 -0.010 0.030 0.012 0.033 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant -0.046 0.026 -0.046 0.032 -0.055 0.034 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant 0.222 0.186 0.240 0.221 0.289 0.234 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant 0.019 0.036 -0.014 0.040 -0.042 0.037 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.007 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.011 0.004 0.006 0.005 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.016 0.002 0.011 0.003 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.017 0.003 0.013 0.003 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.025 0.005 0.023 0.005 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 5,696 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 5,279 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.677 0.099 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.669 0.137 
Third Quartile 1.358 0.134 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 2.149 0.150 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.986 0.186 
Third Quintile 1.914 0.172 
Fourth Quintile 2.768 0.165 
Highest Quintile 3.480 0.177 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    1.154 0.220 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -0.404 0.298 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -0.269 0.333 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -0.593 0.307 
Constant -3.528 0.185 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.161 0.105 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.924 0.139 
Third Quartile 1.617 0.141 
Highest Quartile  2.322 0.149 
Maths Ability 1.619 0.142 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.288 0.175 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.449 0.179 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.336 0.184 
Constant -2.070 0.138 
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Canada 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.680 0.047 -0.847 0.048 -0.867 0.054 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.566 0.055 0.380 0.060 0.328 0.061 
Missing -0.043 0.130 -0.165 0.142 -0.048 0.145 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.290 0.061 0.213 0.062 0.123 0.083 
High 1.163 0.080 1.136 0.082 0.683 0.070 
Missing -0.047 0.307 0.372 0.314 0.261 0.313 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile -0.012 0.018 -0.017 0.019 -0.005 0.019 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.032 0.009 0.021 0.009 0.015 0.010 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.016 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.007 0.010 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.025 0.009 0.020 0.009 0.028 0.010 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.033 0.044 -0.007 0.046 0.006 0.049 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile -0.007 0.012 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.015 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    0.640 0.922 0.909 0.910 1.178 0.954 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.269 0.121 -0.345 0.124 -0.293 0.129 
Missing Books, Immigrant -0.110 0.290 0.060 0.275 -0.006 0.279 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant -0.176 0.144 -0.043 0.140 -0.020 0.199 
High Education, Immigrant -0.143 0.179 -0.098 0.183 -0.044 0.157 
Missing Education, Immigrant 0.605 0.429 0.331 0.453 0.267 0.448 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant 0.023 0.033 0.014 0.032 -0.001 0.035 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant -0.024 0.019 -0.015 0.019 -0.002 0.020 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant -0.029 0.022 -0.045 0.022 -0.049 0.023 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant 0.009 0.019 0.021 0.020 0.016 0.021 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant 0.065 0.095 0.040 0.099 0.041 0.096 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant -0.003 0.025 -0.007 0.026 -0.019 0.025 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.002 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.010 0.002 0.011 0.002 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.009 0.002 0.010 0.002 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.009 0.003 0.010 0.003 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.007 0.003 0.008 0.003 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 26,707 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 25,619 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.755 0.047 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.624 0.067 
Third Quartile 1.304 0.068 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.880 0.114 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.401 0.065 
Third Quintile 0.902 0.077 
Fourth Quintile 1.260 0.075 
Highest Quintile 1.900 0.088 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    1.083 0.114 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -0.269 0.130 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -0.490 0.153 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -0.342 0.222 
Constant -0.997 0.076 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.452 0.055 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.619 0.065 
Third Quartile 1.306 0.068 
Highest Quartile  1.919 0.118 
Maths Ability 0.564 0.055 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.016 0.073 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.119 0.081 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.044 0.120 
Constant -0.367 0.060 
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Czech 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.511 0.088 -0.880 0.095 -0.688 0.095 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.810 0.085 0.367 0.087 0.347 0.091 
Missing -0.253 0.332 -0.365 0.339 -0.286 0.360 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.152 0.113 0.163 0.136 0.147 0.171 
High 1.044 0.098 0.957 0.119 0.704 0.129 
Missing -0.868 0.412 -0.469 0.497 -0.699 0.516 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile 0.039 0.038 0.006 0.042 0.015 0.046 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.055 0.022 0.048 0.022 0.037 0.024 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.047 0.013 0.031 0.015 0.025 0.015 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.018 0.030 0.015 0.032 0.024 0.035 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.026 0.011 0.015 0.013 0.021 0.015 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.025 0.013 0.023 0.015 0.010 0.017 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    -2.463 2.665 -3.414 2.434 -1.305 2.570 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.746 0.331 -0.565 0.335 -0.542 0.394 
Missing Books, Immigrant 0.497 1.341 1.181 0.852 0.401 0.871 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant 0.273 0.538 0.174 0.536 0.092 0.651 
High Education, Immigrant 0.284 0.313 0.273 0.338 0.409 0.406 
Missing Education, Immigrant 1.244 1.122 1.748 1.192 1.445 1.164 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant 0.105 0.092 0.141 0.083 0.066 0.090 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant -0.049 0.063 -0.063 0.070 -0.065 0.081 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant -0.052 0.044 -0.037 0.050 -0.016 0.053 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant 0.066 0.103 -0.040 0.109 -0.056 0.111 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant 0.022 0.045 0.056 0.045 0.066 0.050 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant -0.059 0.041 -0.089 0.062 -0.134 0.062 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.013 0.008 0.012 0.009 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.015 0.006 0.017 0.006 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.012 0.003 0.012 0.003 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.012 0.002 0.010 0.002 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.020 0.003 0.017 0.004 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.010 0.004 0.008 0.005 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 6,076 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 5,398 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.898 0.093 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.507 0.116 
Third Quartile 1.124 0.114 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 2.063 0.127 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.876 0.185 
Third Quintile 1.534 0.176 
Fourth Quintile 2.221 0.188 
Highest Quintile 3.345 0.192 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    0.239 0.323 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -0.475 0.467 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -0.128 0.443 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -0.477 0.465 
Constant -2.849 0.188 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.282 0.091 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.491 0.115 
Third Quartile 1.096 0.114 
Highest Quartile  2.113 0.127 
Maths Ability 1.489 0.161 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.349 0.180 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.335 0.183 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.419 0.193 
Constant -1.336 0.118 
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Denmark 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.191 0.077 -0.324 0.075 -0.259 0.076 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.615 0.098 0.392 0.100 0.426 0.102 
Missing 0.157 0.347 0.094 0.352 0.050 0.324 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.553 0.123 0.413 0.126 0.286 0.170 
High 1.411 0.147 1.375 0.148 0.665 0.135 
Missing -0.593 0.436 -0.295 0.426 -0.386 0.380 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile -0.039 0.037 -0.049 0.036 -0.048 0.035 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.002 0.028 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.028 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.038 0.017 0.025 0.017 0.027 0.018 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.014 0.027 0.013 0.028 0.005 0.031 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.007 0.023 -0.010 0.024 0.008 0.025 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.017 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.029 0.017 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    -2.503 1.855 -1.334 1.938 -2.454 2.140 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.495 0.232 -0.568 0.244 -0.438 0.246 
Missing Books, Immigrant -0.270 0.780 -0.090 0.805 0.156 0.742 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant -0.184 0.296 -0.323 0.303 -0.577 0.552 
High Education, Immigrant -0.397 0.339 -0.426 0.370 0.018 0.339 
Missing Education, Immigrant -0.196 0.886 -0.348 0.975 0.366 0.891 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant 0.136 0.071 0.107 0.074 0.136 0.079 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant 0.037 0.060 0.040 0.064 0.011 0.065 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant -0.123 0.041 -0.127 0.044 -0.133 0.045 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant 0.142 0.064 0.149 0.073 0.227 0.072 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant -0.033 0.052 -0.024 0.058 -0.066 0.058 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant -0.046 0.032 -0.039 0.035 -0.052 0.039 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.004 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.017 0.005 0.016 0.005 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.003 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.011 0.003 0.010 0.003 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.009 0.003 0.010 0.003 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.000 0.003 -0.001 0.003 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 4,191 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 4,033 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.274 0.075 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.263 0.171 
Third Quartile 0.831 0.153 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.669 0.153 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.790 0.162 
Third Quintile 1.018 0.169 
Fourth Quintile 1.595 0.162 
Highest Quintile 1.991 0.157 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    1.624 0.249 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -0.505 0.321 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -1.282 0.339 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -1.111 0.343 
Constant -3.105 0.187 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy 0.061 0.084 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.315 0.172 
Third Quartile 0.753 0.162 
Highest Quartile  1.747 0.159 
Maths Ability 1.010 0.173 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.039 0.192 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.270 0.197 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.399 0.197 
Constant -2.176 0.138 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
276 
 
England 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.470 0.098 -0.605 0.098 -0.617 0.103 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.803 0.107 0.437 0.103 0.404 0.108 
Missing 0.363 0.512 0.408 0.489 0.235 0.464 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.041 0.129 0.135 0.131 0.109 0.169 
High 1.300 0.141 1.295 0.144 0.678 0.130 
Missing -0.531 0.350 -0.184 0.350 -0.125 0.344 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile 0.071 0.032 0.076 0.036 0.102 0.038 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile -0.003 0.048 -0.034 0.048 -0.031 0.048 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.025 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.010 0.013 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.035 0.017 0.027 0.018 0.007 0.017 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile -0.015 0.049 -0.049 0.053 0.052 0.053 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.017 0.015 0.021 0.017 0.017 0.018 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    4.726 2.093 7.297 2.288 7.415 2.186 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.493 0.223 -0.719 0.248 -0.434 0.246 
Missing Books, Immigrant -0.146 0.888 0.419 1.122 0.200 1.191 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant 0.036 0.276 0.141 0.317 0.125 0.363 
High Education, Immigrant 0.106 0.275 0.103 0.318 0.203 0.270 
Missing Education, Immigrant 0.594 0.605 0.268 0.658 -0.040 0.669 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant -0.119 0.078 -0.206 0.085 -0.226 0.082 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant 0.100 0.111 0.086 0.129 0.089 0.134 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant -0.056 0.026 -0.040 0.031 -0.045 0.033 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant -0.035 0.029 -0.033 0.034 0.009 0.035 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant 0.011 0.086 -0.005 0.093 -0.108 0.101 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant -0.024 0.028 -0.028 0.034 -0.017 0.036 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.024 0.008 0.026 0.009 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - -0.005 0.005 -0.007 0.006 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.019 0.003 0.021 0.003 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.003 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.014 0.003 0.012 0.003 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.014 0.005 0.014 0.005 
School FE - - 
  
Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 3,817 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 3,655 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.569 0.096 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.419 0.161 
Third Quartile 0.762 0.161 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.838 0.138 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.252 0.198 
Third Quintile 1.214 0.180 
Fourth Quintile 1.550 0.178 
Highest Quintile 2.449 0.183 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    1.620 0.226 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -0.510 0.340 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -0.485 0.304 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -1.700 0.251 
Constant -2.898 0.180 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.235 0.106 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.420 0.176 
Third Quartile 0.747 0.177 
Highest Quartile  1.681 0.169 
Maths Ability 1.275 0.219 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.257 0.254 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.171 0.279 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.127 0.253 
Constant -1.998 0.143 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
278 
 
Finland 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.158 0.059 -0.236 0.062 -0.200 0.064 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.403 0.067 0.232 0.070 0.280 0.072 
Missing -0.847 0.360 -0.892 0.383 -0.997 0.426 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.328 0.073 0.291 0.077 0.066 0.196 
High 0.949 0.084 0.931 0.087 0.525 0.073 
Missing -0.309 0.351 -0.200 0.354 -0.127 0.357 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile 0.005 0.024 0.010 0.025 0.012 0.025 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.032 0.031 0.025 0.032 0.023 0.033 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile -0.001 0.007 -0.006 0.007 -0.005 0.008 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.024 0.010 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.066 0.034 0.046 0.035 0.037 0.036 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile -0.011 0.015 -0.012 0.015 -0.002 0.016 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    3.162 4.595 3.179 5.031 3.179 4.772 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.246 0.274 -0.216 0.273 -0.160 0.269 
Missing Books, Immigrant 1.366 1.197 0.957 1.040 1.323 0.983 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant -0.011 0.377 -0.065 0.390 -0.628 1.348 
High Education, Immigrant -0.146 0.396 -0.238 0.402 -0.211 0.356 
Missing Education, Immigrant 1.930 1.569 1.800 1.478 1.093 1.447 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant -0.104 0.168 -0.097 0.182 -0.093 0.173 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant 0.031 0.137 0.037 0.143 0.051 0.147 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant -0.004 0.032 -0.012 0.033 -0.018 0.034 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant 0.039 0.040 0.056 0.041 0.046 0.039 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant -0.085 0.124 -0.100 0.131 -0.128 0.121 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant -0.022 0.040 -0.011 0.044 -0.006 0.045 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - -0.003 0.002 -0.004 0.002 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.010 0.003 0.008 0.003 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.002 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.011 0.003 0.011 0.003 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.003 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 5,793 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 5,706 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.196 0.058 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.278 0.098 
Third Quartile 0.677 0.087 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.281 0.098 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.303 0.102 
Third Quintile 0.405 0.108 
Fourth Quintile 0.663 0.106 
Highest Quintile 1.393 0.108 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    0.583 0.270 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -0.550 0.363 
Third Quartile, Immigrant 0.279 0.371 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -0.342 0.373 
Constant -0.966 0.102 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy 0.049 0.060 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.321 0.100 
Third Quartile 0.693 0.093 
Highest Quartile  1.330 0.101 
Maths Ability 0.296 0.068 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.046 0.094 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.090 0.098 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.195 0.097 
Constant -0.591 0.081 
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France 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.536 0.087 -0.741 0.096 -0.696 0.101 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.757 0.093 0.431 0.099 0.358 0.108 
Missing 0.296 0.395 0.191 0.494 0.049 0.542 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.270 0.153 0.422 0.169 0.000 0.000 
High 0.775 0.101 0.810 0.104 0.584 0.105 
Missing -0.270 0.225 0.094 0.231 0.089 0.275 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile 0.006 0.031 0.007 0.036 0.029 0.039 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.022 0.058 -0.009 0.063 -0.021 0.067 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.039 0.012 0.025 0.013 0.017 0.013 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile -0.007 0.029 -0.011 0.031 -0.023 0.034 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.044 0.020 0.030 0.021 0.042 0.024 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.013 0.016 0.005 0.016 -0.002 0.015 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    1.889 1.090 2.808 1.176 3.057 1.326 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant 0.006 0.175 0.100 0.186 0.142 0.205 
Missing Books, Immigrant -0.769 0.910 -0.137 1.119 0.523 1.169 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant -0.382 0.296 -0.372 0.345 0.000 0.000 
High Education, Immigrant -0.364 0.207 -0.376 0.217 -0.297 0.213 
Missing Education, Immigrant -0.314 0.419 -0.374 0.461 -0.369 0.467 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant -0.039 0.043 -0.057 0.046 -0.079 0.052 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant -0.072 0.080 -0.057 0.089 -0.013 0.099 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant -0.002 0.022 -0.027 0.025 -0.033 0.026 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant -0.012 0.054 -0.004 0.063 0.054 0.065 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant -0.012 0.038 -0.002 0.044 -0.041 0.045 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.035 0.055 0.039 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.017 0.008 0.019 0.008 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.015 0.005 0.007 0.006 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.014 0.003 0.010 0.003 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.009 0.003 0.004 0.003 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.015 0.003 0.014 0.003 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.004 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 3,997 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 3,489 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.752 0.093 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.744 0.168 
Third Quartile 0.844 0.163 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.846 0.181 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 1.039 0.175 
Third Quintile 1.687 0.183 
Fourth Quintile 2.205 0.180 
Highest Quintile 2.973 0.175 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    1.158 0.215 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -0.690 0.254 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -0.618 0.269 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -0.908 0.270 
Constant -3.171 0.215 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.256 0.109 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.709 0.168 
Third Quartile 0.897 0.161 
Highest Quartile  1.868 0.177 
Maths Ability 1.509 0.171 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.340 0.230 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.700 0.196 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.645 0.201 
Constant -1.629 0.155 
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Germany 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.168 0.103 -0.351 0.105 -0.147 0.116 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 1.026 0.133 0.678 0.137 0.665 0.140 
Missing 0.682 0.534 1.202 0.560 1.567 0.631 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.315 0.122 0.193 0.122 0.188 0.169 
High 1.158 0.125 0.966 0.132 0.463 0.118 
Missing -1.145 0.467 -1.012 0.462 -1.211 0.497 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile 0.038 0.046 0.044 0.052 0.072 0.061 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.043 0.044 0.007 0.048 -0.029 0.051 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.027 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.020 0.018 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.047 0.030 0.035 0.033 0.031 0.032 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.007 0.022 0.007 0.024 0.009 0.023 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.041 0.012 0.036 0.013 0.043 0.014 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    3.719 1.790 4.815 1.992 5.828 2.088 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.161 0.254 -0.296 0.278 -0.550 0.300 
Missing Books, Immigrant 0.906 0.873 0.780 0.976 -0.119 1.040 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant 0.411 0.300 0.511 0.314 -0.082 0.460 
High Education, Immigrant -0.168 0.293 0.148 0.311 0.611 0.298 
Missing Education, Immigrant -0.087 0.916 0.325 0.933 0.494 1.155 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant -0.114 0.066 -0.136 0.073 -0.169 0.077 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant 0.042 0.080 0.021 0.089 0.041 0.097 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant -0.063 0.035 -0.061 0.037 -0.054 0.039 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant 0.161 0.082 0.161 0.086 0.112 0.086 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant -0.069 0.055 -0.091 0.059 -0.059 0.063 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant -0.035 0.034 -0.035 0.034 -0.066 0.036 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.000 0.006 -0.002 0.008 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.007 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.015 0.004 0.011 0.004 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.010 0.003 0.006 0.003 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.015 0.004 0.012 0.004 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 4,457 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 3,298 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
 
 
 
283 
 
  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.363 0.108 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.393 0.248 
Third Quartile 1.137 0.233 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 2.155 0.218 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.449 0.279 
Third Quintile 1.374 0.261 
Fourth Quintile 1.987 0.259 
Highest Quintile 2.892 0.252 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    0.732 0.331 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant 0.167 0.463 
Third Quartile, Immigrant 0.019 0.407 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -0.492 0.381 
Constant -4.250 0.333 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.256 0.109 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.709 0.168 
Third Quartile 0.897 0.161 
Highest Quartile  1.868 0.177 
Maths Ability 1.509 0.171 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.340 0.230 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.700 0.196 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.645 0.201 
Constant -1.629 0.155 
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Greece 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.693 0.093 -1.136 0.096 -0.907 0.084 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.768 0.089 0.591 0.098 0.488 0.124 
Missing -0.588 0.291 -0.519 0.349 -0.118 0.352 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.487 0.096 0.543 0.102 0.509 0.149 
High 0.809 0.143 0.938 0.145 0.651 0.130 
Missing 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile -0.079 0.039 -0.087 0.048 -0.107 0.061 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.092 0.049 0.068 0.056 0.147 0.070 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.038 0.014 0.024 0.016 0.000 0.019 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.004 0.026 0.007 0.028 -0.003 0.028 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.079 0.017 0.051 0.018 0.041 0.020 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.016 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.012 0.025 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    -1.604 1.566 -2.696 1.937 -1.788 2.385 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant 0.227 0.192 -0.027 0.248 -0.198 0.319 
Missing Books, Immigrant -0.109 0.891 0.982 1.169 0.702 0.882 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant -0.289 0.237 -0.190 0.263 -0.205 0.333 
High Education, Immigrant 0.140 0.269 0.085 0.291 0.355 0.298 
Missing Education, Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant 0.049 0.067 0.098 0.081 0.087 0.099 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant -0.066 0.111 -0.109 0.130 -0.139 0.156 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant 0.011 0.037 0.015 0.044 -0.001 0.051 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant 0.016 0.059 0.052 0.061 0.104 0.079 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant -0.058 0.044 -0.064 0.050 -0.065 0.057 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant 0.048 0.041 0.034 0.044 0.007 0.043 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.015 0.003 0.012 0.004 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.012 0.003 0.008 0.004 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.016 0.003 0.010 0.004 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.013 0.003 0.008 0.004 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.016 0.005 0.012 0.005 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.019 0.010 0.019 0.010 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 4,613 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 4,195 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -1.106 0.098 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.800 0.122 
Third Quartile 1.180 0.133 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 2.468 0.193 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 1.103 0.120 
Third Quintile 1.711 0.132 
Fourth Quintile 2.492 0.150 
Highest Quintile 3.491 0.194 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    -0.503 0.220 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant 0.247 0.262 
Third Quartile, Immigrant 0.411 0.316 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -0.131 0.305 
Constant -1.324 0.172 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.490 0.104 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.742 0.120 
Third Quartile 1.354 0.146 
Highest Quartile  2.616 0.220 
Maths Ability 0.891 0.107 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.097 0.143 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.111 0.144 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.192 0.163 
Constant 0.006 0.162 
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Hungary 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.864 0.101 -1.213 0.107 -0.731 0.122 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.992 0.091 0.502 0.093 0.230 0.100 
Missing -0.589 0.306 -0.429 0.470 -0.582 0.464 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.219 0.080 0.322 0.087 0.148 0.116 
High 1.518 0.143 1.418 0.138 0.691 0.131 
Missing -0.614 0.625 0.340 0.525 0.266 0.483 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile 0.051 0.027 0.072 0.030 0.077 0.034 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.062 0.025 0.044 0.026 -0.018 0.031 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.014 0.022 0.006 0.025 0.023 0.031 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.068 0.014 0.042 0.014 0.034 0.016 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile -0.012 0.019 -0.004 0.019 -0.010 0.020 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.022 0.020 0.009 0.024 0.009 0.023 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    6.744 2.459 6.518 3.272 5.560 2.622 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant 0.447 0.418 0.346 0.471 0.806 0.579 
Missing Books, Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant -0.033 0.523 -0.123 0.567 -0.555 0.740 
High Education, Immigrant -0.970 0.601 -0.533 0.696 -1.370 0.805 
Missing Education, Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant -0.219 0.093 -0.198 0.124 -0.168 0.104 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant -0.005 0.125 -0.073 0.150 -0.003 0.161 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant 0.008 0.152 0.067 0.171 0.074 0.215 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant -0.077 0.067 -0.087 0.071 -0.145 0.095 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant 0.121 0.093 0.067 0.100 0.198 0.129 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant -0.081 0.057 -0.095 0.060 -0.149 0.066 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.010 0.005 0.000 0.006 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.017 0.005 0.010 0.005 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.018 0.003 0.012 0.003 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.011 0.003 0.004 0.003 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.013 0.004 0.005 0.005 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.022 0.006 0.018 0.007 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 4,756 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 3,728 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -1.194 0.108 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.786 0.129 
Third Quartile 1.554 0.127 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 2.671 0.165 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 1.250 0.149 
Third Quintile 1.929 0.141 
Fourth Quintile 2.568 0.170 
Highest Quintile 3.469 0.194 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    1.496 0.348 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -1.409 0.509 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -1.496 0.534 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -1.950 0.564 
Constant -2.270 0.165 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.700 0.105 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.834 0.122 
Third Quartile 1.608 0.131 
Highest Quartile  2.835 0.159 
Maths Ability 1.107 0.123 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.061 0.164 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.037 0.160 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.023 0.169 
Constant -0.772 0.135 
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Iceland 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.572 0.091 -0.542 0.101 -0.522 0.099 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.537 0.099 0.280 0.101 0.325 0.102 
Missing -0.029 0.450 0.410 0.465 0.326 0.434 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.431 0.099 0.349 0.103 0.209 0.120 
High 1.651 0.121 1.562 0.121 1.056 0.113 
Missing -0.941 0.703 -1.024 0.692 -1.021 0.661 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile 0.022 0.045 0.029 0.047 -0.026 0.047 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.006 0.015 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.007 0.016 0.001 0.016 -0.006 0.016 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.002 0.011 0.002 0.011 0.010 0.011 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.032 0.049 -0.005 0.051 -0.027 0.050 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.010 0.017 0.019 0.018 0.028 0.018 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    5.646 4.115 3.125 4.210 2.871 4.099 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.472 0.303 -0.424 0.314 -0.299 0.318 
Missing Books, Immigrant -0.068 1.110 -0.162 1.207 -0.091 1.547 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant 0.114 0.352 0.172 0.375 0.606 0.407 
High Education, Immigrant 0.431 0.345 0.534 0.344 0.203 0.344 
Missing Education, Immigrant - - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant -0.186 0.153 -0.092 0.155 -0.094 0.152 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant -0.048 0.058 -0.041 0.057 -0.029 0.057 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant 0.086 0.064 0.053 0.064 0.061 0.066 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant -0.027 0.035 -0.036 0.035 -0.028 0.035 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant 0.150 0.154 0.204 0.168 0.163 0.160 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant -0.065 0.036 -0.075 0.037 -0.049 0.042 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.012 0.005 0.010 0.004 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.010 0.003 0.010 0.003 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.010 0.003 0.012 0.003 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.004 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.008 0.004 0.011 0.004 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 3,324 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 3,223 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.535 0.091 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.558 0.134 
Third Quartile 0.935 0.147 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.638 0.148 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.609 0.169 
Third Quintile 1.026 0.156 
Fourth Quintile 1.544 0.145 
Highest Quintile 1.971 0.130 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    0.685 0.302 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -1.289 0.531 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -0.283 0.343 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -0.451 0.384 
Constant -2.271 0.144 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.238 0.096 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.626 0.143 
Third Quartile 1.054 0.162 
Highest Quartile  1.827 0.158 
Maths Ability 1.099 0.143 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.213 0.172 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.464 0.187 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.508 0.150 
Constant -1.532 0.115 
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Ireland 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.752 0.074 -0.969 0.081 -1.086 0.081 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.786 0.083 0.543 0.090 0.552 0.093 
Missing -1.770 0.522 -1.673 0.540 -1.921 0.624 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.383 0.092 0.303 0.098 0.299 0.108 
High 1.037 0.122 0.993 0.130 0.466 0.111 
Missing -0.584 0.550 -0.354 0.505 -0.446 0.513 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile -0.014 0.035 -0.016 0.035 -0.016 0.032 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile -0.069 0.037 -0.081 0.038 -0.095 0.036 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.057 0.012 0.046 0.013 0.047 0.013 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile -0.025 0.025 -0.032 0.029 -0.025 0.029 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.030 0.012 0.021 0.014 0.029 0.014 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile -0.003 0.018 -0.012 0.019 -0.019 0.017 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    -2.751 1.605 -2.454 1.662 -2.199 1.708 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.293 0.188 -0.235 0.193 -0.219 0.206 
Missing Books, Immigrant 2.206 0.857 2.131 1.010 2.360 1.062 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant 0.052 0.231 0.070 0.237 0.238 0.275 
High Education, Immigrant 0.182 0.335 0.258 0.344 0.231 0.253 
Missing Education, Immigrant -0.552 0.875 -0.565 0.917 -0.261 0.861 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant 0.114 0.060 0.101 0.063 0.085 0.064 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant 0.016 0.095 0.032 0.099 0.052 0.099 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant -0.054 0.034 -0.055 0.036 -0.058 0.037 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant 0.113 0.067 0.118 0.072 0.137 0.070 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant -0.065 0.037 -0.073 0.041 -0.076 0.039 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant 0.037 0.036 0.055 0.035 0.064 0.036 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.011 0.005 0.011 0.005 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.017 0.003 0.017 0.003 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.003 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.004 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 3,848 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 3,698 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.929 0.081 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.355 0.116 
Third Quartile 0.785 0.115 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.430 0.132 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.499 0.133 
Third Quintile 1.282 0.126 
Fourth Quintile 1.584 0.135 
Highest Quintile 1.959 0.137 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    0.293 0.211 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -0.014 0.276 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -0.151 0.259 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -0.364 0.301 
Constant -1.109 0.124 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.560 0.073 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.294 0.114 
Third Quartile 0.684 0.115 
Highest Quartile  1.349 0.126 
Maths Ability 0.823 0.101 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.025 0.151 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.068 0.148 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.144 0.138 
Constant -0.178 0.092 
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Italy 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.812 0.092 -0.975 0.096 -0.592 0.097 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.678 0.075 0.486 0.076 0.346 0.084 
Missing -0.275 0.240 -0.073 0.244 0.205 0.263 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.157 0.070 0.241 0.073 0.187 0.105 
High 0.468 0.107 0.522 0.111 0.276 0.089 
Missing -1.501 0.689 -1.422 0.579 -1.437 0.779 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile -0.022 0.022 -0.041 0.024 -0.061 0.028 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile -0.032 0.024 -0.038 0.024 0.011 0.030 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.067 0.010 0.060 0.011 0.023 0.012 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.012 0.014 0.005 0.015 0.021 0.016 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.064 0.010 0.059 0.010 0.026 0.012 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.025 0.013 0.024 0.013 0.013 0.016 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    -3.618 1.888 -4.349 1.936 -4.407 1.961 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant 0.317 0.215 0.386 0.224 0.372 0.239 
Missing Books, Immigrant -0.229 0.756 -0.265 0.795 -0.167 0.822 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant -0.482 0.297 -0.490 0.308 0.001 0.377 
High Education, Immigrant -0.284 0.330 -0.325 0.335 -0.318 0.308 
Missing Education, Immigrant -0.201 1.388 0.264 1.310 0.740 1.437 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant 0.168 0.081 0.193 0.082 0.192 0.085 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant -0.200 0.098 -0.203 0.102 -0.139 0.111 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant 0.080 0.048 0.086 0.049 0.100 0.057 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant -0.013 0.056 -0.018 0.059 -0.083 0.052 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant -0.068 0.035 -0.056 0.037 -0.005 0.032 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant -0.029 0.034 -0.014 0.034 -0.058 0.048 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.008 0.003 0.005 0.004 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.003 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.007 0.002 0.003 0.002 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.002 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.003 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.002 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 11,631 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 10,783 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -1.032 0.095 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.389 0.092 
Third Quartile 1.081 0.102 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 2.110 0.105 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.473 0.157 
Third Quintile 0.793 0.156 
Fourth Quintile 0.992 0.164 
Highest Quintile 1.472 0.173 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    0.192 0.268 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -0.316 0.327 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -0.326 0.335 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -0.760 0.350 
Constant -1.033 0.190 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.718 0.099 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.407 0.095 
Third Quartile 1.017 0.100 
Highest Quartile  2.050 0.103 
Maths Ability 0.527 0.082 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.175 0.103 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.017 0.105 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.060 0.104 
Constant -0.268 0.118 
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Japan 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy 0.264 0.134 0.224 0.136 0.813 0.115 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.497 0.075 0.293 0.078 0.309 0.090 
Missing -0.942 0.528 -0.822 0.476 -1.207 0.920 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.362 0.103 0.315 0.109 0.000 0.000 
High 1.189 0.099 1.064 0.101 0.351 0.000 
Missing 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile -0.008 0.024 -0.028 0.026 -0.036 0.032 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.039 0.035 0.051 0.035 0.032 0.041 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.103 0.022 0.073 0.021 0.042 0.024 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile -0.004 0.017 0.006 0.019 0.007 0.019 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.043 0.011 0.028 0.012 0.015 0.013 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile -0.044 0.015 -0.024 0.017 -0.011 0.019 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    
  
1.170 0.582 1.346 0.515 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Missing Books, Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
High Education, Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Missing Education, Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.004 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.016 0.004 0.012 0.004 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.003 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.015 0.002 0.006 0.003 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.008 0.005 -0.003 0.005 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.034 0.007 0.030 0.009 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
Notes: 1 Immigrant interaction figures not given due to very small numbers (less than 1% of the 
sample) reporting that they area first or second generation immigrant. Hence no data to support these 
estimations 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 4,700. Dependent variable in all 
models was whether respondent expected to obtain a degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy 0.284 0.132 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.773 0.100 
Third Quartile 1.514 0.107 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.945 0.140 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.983 0.141 
Third Quintile 1.501 0.145 
Fourth Quintile 2.108 0.156 
Highest Quintile 3.090 0.205 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    1.048 0.761 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant 0.892 1.065 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -1.575 1.185 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant 0.527 0.865 
Constant -2.746 0.164 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy 0.548 0.136 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.713 0.093 
Third Quartile 1.480 0.109 
Highest Quartile  1.998 0.137 
Maths Ability 0.925 0.109 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.055 0.117 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.168 0.131 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.143 0.141 
Constant -1.355 0.125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
296 
 
Korea 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy 0.065 0.176 -0.174 0.162 -0.332 0.133 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.906 0.080 0.459 0.073 0.379 0.090 
Missing -0.248 0.673 0.371 0.964 0.686 1.173 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.270 0.144 0.448 0.154 0.000 0.000 
High 1.250 0.121 1.182 0.113 0.664 0.115 
Missing 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile 0.008 0.024 0.012 0.023 0.020 0.027 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.020 0.029 -0.017 0.031 -0.014 0.033 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.044 0.025 0.053 0.026 0.031 0.028 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.031 0.024 0.029 0.025 0.024 0.027 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile -0.010 0.010 -0.013 0.010 -0.009 0.012 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile -0.001 0.028 -0.018 0.032 -0.017 0.035 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    
  
0.215 1.278 0.783 1.007 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Missing Books, Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
High Education, Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Missing Education, Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.013 0.003 0.012 0.003 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.008 0.003 0.004 0.003 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.013 0.002 0.008 0.002 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.014 0.003 0.007 0.003 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.007 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.015 0.008 0.010 0.008 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
Notes: 1 Immigrant interaction figures not given due to very small numbers (less than 1% of the 
sample) reporting that they area first or second generation immigrant. Hence no data to support these 
estimations 
Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 5,440. Dependent variable in all 
models was whether respondent expected to obtain a degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.184 0.159 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
 Second Quartile 0.530 0.096 
Third Quartile 1.066 0.110 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.696 0.137 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability 
Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.736 0.116 
Third Quintile 1.470 0.137 
Fourth Quintile 2.171 0.166 
Highest Quintile 2.955 0.216 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    19.410 1.174 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -20.401 1.506 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -22.009 0.000 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant 0.000 0.000 
Constant -0.426 0.132 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy 0.344 0.163 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.655 0.098 
Third Quartile 1.222 0.115 
Highest Quartile  1.990 0.152 
Maths Ability 0.787 0.090 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.257 0.115 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.284 0.118 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.567 0.157 
Constant 0.511 0.140 
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Luxemburg 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.102 0.105 -0.348 0.103 -0.156 0.094 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.907 0.141 0.618 0.136 0.514 0.127 
Missing 0.435 0.618 0.501 0.729 0.552 0.759 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.121 0.113 0.287 0.120 0.106 0.135 
High 0.841 0.135 1.047 0.171 0.469 0.121 
Missing -0.358 0.204 -0.001 0.193 -0.006 0.203 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile -0.042 0.039 -0.016 0.053 -0.011 0.054 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.072 0.067 0.043 0.067 0.031 0.067 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.046 0.015 0.027 0.017 0.013 0.018 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile -0.002 0.037 -0.008 0.043 -0.023 0.046 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.055 0.019 0.040 0.020 0.041 0.019 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.026 0.021 0.032 0.022 0.040 0.019 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    0.168 1.204 1.225 1.542 1.012 1.606 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.186 0.189 -0.249 0.196 -0.344 0.190 
Missing Books, Immigrant -0.624 0.623 -0.445 0.783 -0.669 0.808 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant 0.088 0.153 -0.109 0.164 -0.229 0.248 
High Education, Immigrant 0.199 0.232 -0.158 0.250 0.023 0.171 
Missing Education, Immigrant 0.116 0.273 -0.074 0.253 -0.126 0.258 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant 0.024 0.046 0.001 0.062 0.006 0.064 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant -0.141 0.081 -0.142 0.088 -0.127 0.091 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant 0.012 0.023 0.017 0.027 0.014 0.025 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant -0.020 0.054 -0.024 0.065 -0.023 0.070 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant -0.005 0.025 0.012 0.029 0.018 0.032 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant -0.034 0.021 -0.056 0.022 -0.069 0.022 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.011 0.004 0.013 0.005 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.016 0.002 0.015 0.003 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.013 0.002 0.009 0.002 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.004 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.009 0.004 0.005 0.004 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 3,892 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 3,748 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.308 0.097 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.843 0.227 
Third Quartile 1.321 0.259 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 2.207 0.248 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.821 0.141 
Third Quintile 1.539 0.135 
Fourth Quintile 2.176 0.125 
Highest Quintile 2.795 0.153 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    1.226 0.240 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -0.878 0.260 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -0.556 0.312 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -0.762 0.301 
Constant -3.302 0.249 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy 0.352 0.160 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.600 0.215 
Third Quartile 1.153 0.176 
Highest Quartile  2.002 0.194 
Maths Ability 1.152 0.218 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.352 0.239 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.283 0.291 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.189 0.267 
Constant -1.652 0.210 
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Mexico 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.674 0.057 -0.811 0.060 -0.733 0.067 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.532 0.122 0.376 0.132 0.283 0.149 
Missing -0.311 0.194 -0.086 0.198 0.118 0.203 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.747 0.100 0.571 0.104 0.000 0.000 
High 0.489 0.089 0.572 0.097 0.462 0.084 
Missing -0.678 0.443 -0.445 0.397 -0.344 0.455 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile -0.034 0.029 -0.005 0.030 -0.047 0.028 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.459 0.167 0.111 0.178 0.125 0.170 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile -0.010 0.016 -0.010 0.017 0.004 0.018 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.020 0.005 0.013 0.005 0.008 0.005 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.027 0.009 0.023 0.009 0.010 0.010 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.022 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.010 0.013 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    1.871 2.157 2.761 2.257 0.597 2.395 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.079 0.457 -0.175 0.454 -0.219 0.510 
Missing Books, Immigrant 0.064 0.849 -0.171 0.860 -0.738 0.813 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant 1.643 0.549 1.512 0.526 0.000 0.000 
High Education, Immigrant -0.814 0.346 -0.990 0.354 -0.754 0.273 
Missing Education, Immigrant -1.631 1.170 -1.855 1.191 -2.025 1.082 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant -0.131 0.110 -0.155 0.112 -0.059 0.120 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant -0.619 0.620 -0.415 0.642 -0.329 0.766 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant 0.280 0.086 0.301 0.094 0.285 0.106 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant -0.006 0.025 -0.023 0.026 -0.032 0.029 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant -0.041 0.049 -0.021 0.045 0.058 0.061 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant 0.069 0.048 0.072 0.043 -0.001 0.051 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.008 0.003 0.006 0.003 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.003 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.012 0.002 0.008 0.002 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.008 0.002 0.007 0.002 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.011 0.003 0.008 0.003 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.003 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 29,845 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 28,336 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.797 0.058 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.332 0.112 
Third Quartile 0.920 0.102 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.564 0.127 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.317 0.120 
Third Quintile 0.756 0.118 
Fourth Quintile 1.130 0.113 
Highest Quintile 1.748 0.122 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    -0.160 0.298 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant 0.173 0.424 
Third Quartile, Immigrant 0.029 0.464 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -0.222 0.367 
Constant -1.153 0.147 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.592 0.056 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.302 0.102 
Third Quartile 0.924 0.093 
Highest Quartile  1.540 0.119 
Maths Ability 0.528 0.087 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.054 0.117 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.038 0.110 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.101 0.121 
Constant -0.304 0.091 
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Netherlands 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.201 0.084 -0.369 0.090 -0.212 0.096 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.855 0.097 0.392 0.096 0.249 0.113 
Missing 0.039 0.433 -0.202 0.434 -0.226 0.547 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.186 0.157 0.288 0.172 0.542 0.169 
High 0.624 0.156 0.734 0.157 0.829 0.168 
Missing -1.185 0.389 -0.490 0.433 -0.669 0.563 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile 0.035 0.036 0.045 0.040 0.045 0.040 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.072 0.029 0.049 0.028 0.028 0.032 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.023 0.017 0.010 0.019 0.010 0.021 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.019 0.010 0.000 0.011 -0.007 0.011 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.107 0.067 0.102 0.076 0.084 0.085 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.003 0.017 0.014 0.025 0.014 0.023 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    2.115 1.609 3.982 1.669 3.952 1.812 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.230 0.198 -0.283 0.259 -0.042 0.293 
Missing Books, Immigrant 0.405 0.788 1.279 0.791 1.061 0.765 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant -0.393 0.284 -0.489 0.332 -0.607 0.345 
High Education, Immigrant -0.540 0.302 -0.683 0.324 -0.857 0.325 
Missing Education, Immigrant 1.078 0.662 0.413 0.636 0.469 0.801 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant -0.031 0.060 -0.069 0.062 -0.093 0.065 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant -0.031 0.061 -0.033 0.058 0.024 0.058 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant -0.024 0.032 -0.012 0.034 -0.016 0.036 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant -0.007 0.027 -0.028 0.027 -0.016 0.033 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant -0.129 0.174 -0.145 0.216 -0.120 0.239 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant 0.082 0.044 0.079 0.054 0.038 0.056 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.007 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.012 0.005 0.010 0.006 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.012 0.003 0.004 0.003 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.026 0.003 0.018 0.003 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.011 0.004 0.003 0.005 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 3,902 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 3,645 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.364 0.084 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.542 0.153 
Third Quartile 1.064 0.169 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.598 0.170 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.653 0.178 
Third Quintile 1.479 0.183 
Fourth Quintile 2.716 0.187 
Highest Quintile 3.585 0.192 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    1.536 0.225 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -0.567 0.284 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -0.905 0.308 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -1.167 0.321 
Constant -3.082 0.223 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy 0.066 0.113 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.534 0.171 
Third Quartile 1.068 0.173 
Highest Quartile  1.616 0.194 
Maths Ability 1.621 0.224 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.067 0.253 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.175 0.260 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.098 0.282 
Constant -1.467 0.171 
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New Zealand 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.266 0.086 -0.385 0.090 -0.378 0.105 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.770 0.103 0.530 0.107 0.478 0.115 
Missing 0.116 0.381 0.050 0.429 0.091 0.445 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.362 0.116 0.312 0.119 0.359 0.149 
High 1.455 0.138 1.353 0.139 0.804 0.119 
Missing -0.004 0.180 0.149 0.180 0.255 0.204 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile -0.041 0.038 -0.033 0.036 -0.048 0.037 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.041 0.026 0.030 0.025 0.034 0.027 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.018 0.017 0.006 0.017 0.003 0.017 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.013 0.012 0.006 0.013 0.004 0.013 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile -0.014 0.065 -0.024 0.065 0.005 0.066 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.043 0.018 0.046 0.019 0.044 0.018 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    0.827 1.622 0.853 1.729 0.513 1.808 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.369 0.154 -0.430 0.162 -0.278 0.165 
Missing Books, Immigrant 0.177 0.656 0.344 0.661 0.590 0.736 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant -0.188 0.173 -0.115 0.178 0.022 0.231 
High Education, Immigrant -0.151 0.218 -0.095 0.235 -0.078 0.188 
Missing Education, Immigrant 0.117 0.277 0.069 0.295 -0.048 0.305 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant 0.013 0.061 0.014 0.065 0.012 0.067 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant -0.043 0.037 -0.039 0.038 -0.033 0.041 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant 0.001 0.026 0.001 0.027 0.011 0.028 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant -0.001 0.023 0.009 0.024 0.001 0.024 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant 0.025 0.101 -0.053 0.111 -0.003 0.110 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant -0.029 0.023 -0.034 0.025 -0.024 0.024 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.006 0.002 0.007 0.003 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.010 0.003 0.010 0.003 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.003 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.015 0.004 0.014 0.005 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 4,447 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 3,759 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.273 0.080 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.282 0.127 
Third Quartile 0.711 0.134 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.402 0.140 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.408 0.128 
Third Quintile 0.700 0.128 
Fourth Quintile 1.158 0.123 
Highest Quintile 1.960 0.124 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    0.863 0.162 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -0.083 0.201 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -0.287 0.205 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -0.560 0.198 
Constant -2.082 0.128 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy 0.053 0.100 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.263 0.132 
Third Quartile 0.646 0.135 
Highest Quartile  1.278 0.152 
Maths Ability 0.571 0.113 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.198 0.158 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.108 0.153 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.405 0.163 
Constant -1.427 0.109 
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Northern Ireland 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.4921 0.1041 -0.6963 0.1003 -0.8667 0.1272 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.7221 0.0967 0.3711 0.1110 0.4054 0.1161 
Missing 0.4382 0.4811 0.4365 0.4477 0.2688 0.4998 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.2116 0.1187 0.3334 0.1227 0.2923 0.1556 
High 1.1619 0.1617 1.1871 0.1735 0.7528 0.1325 
Missing -0.9841 0.3254 -0.4590 0.3455 -0.3149 0.3736 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile 0.0427 0.0413 0.0451 0.0482 0.0367 0.0471 
Occupation spline 11-25th 
percentile 0.0283 0.0533 -0.0144 0.0601 -0.0073 0.0617 
Occupation spline 26-50th 
percentile 0.0046 0.0264 -0.0037 0.0271 -0.0001 0.0276 
Occupation spline 50-75th 
percentile 0.0425 0.0206 0.0250 0.0214 0.0226 0.0230 
Occupation spline 76-90th 
percentile -0.0081 0.0217 -0.0088 0.0230 -0.0107 0.0234 
Occupation spline 91-100th 
percentile 0.0074 0.0131 -0.0085 0.0135 0.0042 0.0131 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    1.2150 2.2502 0.7569 2.5032 1.0527 2.5710 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.2614 0.3212 -0.3487 0.3546 -0.3103 0.3458 
Missing Books, Immigrant - - 
  
0.0000 0.0000 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant -0.2544 0.3600 -0.2493 0.3613 -0.3209 0.4595 
High Education, Immigrant -0.2433 0.5781 -0.5712 0.6461 -0.2634 0.4327 
Missing Education, Immigrant 0.3244 0.8291 0.2908 0.8435 0.3580 1.0803 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant -0.0153 0.0836 -0.0074 0.0933 -0.0121 0.0963 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant 0.2021 0.1455 0.3285 0.1513 0.2341 0.1550 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant -0.0793 0.0769 -0.1075 0.0750 -0.0834 0.0740 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant -0.0821 0.0657 -0.0732 0.0629 -0.0868 0.0636 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant 0.2433 0.0704 0.2720 0.0745 0.2639 0.0745 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant -0.1185 0.0428 -0.1044 0.0499 -0.0944 0.0448 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.0181 0.0072 0.0223 0.0083 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.0019 0.0065 0.0007 0.0066 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.0172 0.0040 0.0160 0.0040 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.0075 0.0031 0.0054 0.0033 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.0111 0.0038 0.0097 0.0038 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.0161 0.0047 0.0155 0.0048 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 2,829 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 2,614 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.641 0.093 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.320 0.195 
Third Quartile 1.030 0.166 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.394 0.183 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.688 0.254 
Third Quintile 1.347 0.222 
Fourth Quintile 1.856 0.199 
Highest Quintile 2.624 0.222 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    0.176 0.367 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant 1.323 0.513 
Third Quartile, Immigrant 0.677 0.457 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant 0.344 0.455 
Constant -2.735 0.197 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.355 0.103 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.310 0.199 
Third Quartile 1.059 0.173 
Highest Quartile  1.313 0.195 
Maths Ability 1.262 0.178 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.259 0.251 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.399 0.227 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.039 0.210 
Constant -1.615 0.149 
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Norway 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.415 0.081 -0.549 0.085 -0.516 0.088 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.718 0.105 0.460 0.106 0.473 0.115 
Missing 0.890 0.352 0.817 0.377 1.028 0.402 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.605 0.167 0.514 0.169 0.305 0.211 
High 1.345 0.178 1.389 0.186 0.841 0.176 
Missing -0.110 0.328 0.000 0.332 0.004 0.338 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile 0.029 0.033 0.033 0.034 0.011 0.035 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.044 0.030 0.023 0.031 0.034 0.032 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.047 0.017 0.043 0.017 0.033 0.018 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.003 0.009 -0.009 0.010 -0.009 0.010 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.251 0.082 0.219 0.083 0.217 0.090 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.010 0.016 0.010 0.017 0.033 0.016 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    3.380 1.767 3.843 1.721 3.544 1.787 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.435 0.243 -0.486 0.252 -0.343 0.265 
Missing Books, Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant -0.871 0.384 -0.838 0.382 -0.970 0.434 
High Education, Immigrant -0.784 0.418 -0.759 0.420 -0.675 0.399 
Missing Education, Immigrant -0.385 1.000 -0.369 0.918 -0.207 0.927 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant -0.059 0.058 -0.075 0.057 -0.070 0.062 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant 0.040 0.069 0.065 0.073 0.037 0.075 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant -0.073 0.052 -0.080 0.054 -0.070 0.052 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant 0.059 0.027 0.068 0.027 0.071 0.027 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant -0.647 0.220 -0.666 0.249 -0.609 0.255 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant 0.057 0.039 0.053 0.042 0.043 0.042 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.000 0.004 -0.001 0.004 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.005 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.009 0.003 0.010 0.003 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.011 0.003 0.009 0.003 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.010 0.003 0.010 0.003 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 4,023 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 3,888 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.502 0.084 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.695 0.159 
Third Quartile 1.058 0.162 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.808 0.160 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.367 0.138 
Third Quintile 0.801 0.151 
Fourth Quintile 1.161 0.148 
Highest Quintile 1.603 0.146 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    0.950 0.231 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -0.743 0.297 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -0.377 0.314 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -0.556 0.319 
Constant -2.799 0.169 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.146 0.087 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.737 0.168 
Third Quartile 1.066 0.159 
Highest Quartile  1.844 0.163 
Maths Ability 0.948 0.187 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.347 0.216 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.380 0.220 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.326 0.201 
Constant -2.193 0.145 
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Poland 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.794 0.069 -0.986 0.081 -0.979 0.083 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.814 0.075 0.546 0.082 0.638 0.085 
Missing 0.119 0.486 0.682 0.537 1.078 0.499 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.259 0.102 0.237 0.102 0.278 0.120 
High 1.368 0.121 1.432 0.130 0.805 0.128 
Missing 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile -0.130 0.061 -0.180 0.059 -0.148 0.064 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.092 0.025 0.090 0.026 0.085 0.028 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.009 0.013 0.003 0.014 0.005 0.015 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.060 0.017 0.039 0.019 0.033 0.020 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.004 0.012 -0.009 0.013 0.015 0.013 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.012 0.015 0.002 0.015 0.016 0.016 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    1.206 0.656 1.521 0.745 1.301 0.861 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Missing Books, Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
High Education, Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Missing Education, Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.007 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.015 0.004 0.015 0.004 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.011 0.003 0.011 0.003 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.011 0.003 0.012 0.003 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.007 0.003 0.008 0.003 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.006 0.003 0.007 0.003 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 4,381 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 4,281 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
 
2 Immigrant interaction figures not given due to very small numbers (less than 1% of the sample) 
reporting that they area first or second generation immigrant. Hence no data to support these estimation 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.950 0.076 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.868 0.146 
Third Quartile 1.385 0.143 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 2.247 0.137 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.663 0.155 
Third Quintile 1.240 0.165 
Fourth Quintile 1.805 0.163 
Highest Quintile 2.342 0.162 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    0.000 0.000 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant 0.000 0.000 
Third Quartile, Immigrant 0.000 0.000 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant 0.000 0.000 
Constant -3.049 0.172 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.591 0.075 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.930 0.144 
Third Quartile 1.483 0.143 
Highest Quartile  2.342 0.142 
Maths Ability 1.013 0.132 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.125 0.178 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.346 0.164 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.306 0.161 
Constant -2.071 0.125 
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Portugal 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.825 0.072 -1.142 0.081 -1.082 0.089 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.903 0.095 0.590 0.109 0.633 0.109 
Missing -0.343 0.328 -0.005 0.468 0.085 0.505 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium -0.401 0.174 -0.185 0.188 0.000 0.000 
High 0.329 0.155 0.455 0.165 0.172 0.130 
Missing -1.057 0.323 -0.612 0.351 -0.715 0.414 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile 0.035 0.037 0.005 0.039 -0.001 0.040 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.001 0.051 0.011 0.053 0.025 0.056 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.056 0.016 0.033 0.017 0.033 0.018 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.036 0.011 0.027 0.012 0.023 0.012 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.042 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.020 0.014 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile -0.022 0.015 -0.017 0.016 -0.012 0.017 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    -2.722 1.879 -2.201 2.050 -2.137 1.963 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.147 0.196 -0.437 0.256 -0.582 0.258 
Missing Books, Immigrant - - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant 0.512 0.374 0.645 0.399 0.000 0.000 
High Education, Immigrant -0.022 0.284 0.121 0.340 0.186 0.300 
Missing Education, Immigrant -0.907 0.982 -0.975 1.271 -0.959 1.285 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant 0.115 0.082 0.098 0.090 0.104 0.087 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant -0.071 0.147 0.057 0.153 0.044 0.153 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant -0.054 0.046 -0.078 0.056 -0.074 0.057 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant 0.055 0.030 0.034 0.037 0.029 0.039 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant -0.060 0.024 -0.035 0.029 -0.029 0.030 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant 0.090 0.060 0.097 0.109 0.082 0.095 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.005 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.021 0.004 0.019 0.004 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.014 0.002 0.011 0.002 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.012 0.003 0.010 0.003 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.012 0.005 0.011 0.005 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.017 0.006 0.016 0.006 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 4,594 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 4,454 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -1.190 0.079 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.662 0.113 
Third Quartile 1.111 0.113 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.841 0.139 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 1.223 0.100 
Third Quintile 1.835 0.120 
Fourth Quintile 2.362 0.131 
Highest Quintile 3.278 0.129 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    0.443 0.251 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -0.609 0.310 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -0.294 0.313 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -0.771 0.364 
Constant -2.049 0.122 
 
 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.632 0.081 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.668 0.117 
Third Quartile 1.052 0.119 
Highest Quartile  1.911 0.134 
Maths Ability 1.145 0.149 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.051 0.176 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.234 0.171 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.163 0.195 
Constant -0.603 0.102 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
314 
 
Scotland 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.4920 0.0950 -0.7187 0.1061 -0.6928 0.1053 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.9840 0.1287 0.6296 0.1395 0.7088 0.1350 
Missing -0.5581 0.4914 -0.3666 0.5088 -0.5102 0.5454 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.0551 0.1373 0.0571 0.1544 0.0000 0.0000 
High 0.7051 0.1448 0.7619 0.1605 0.2692 0.1364 
Missing -0.5504 0.2381 -0.2084 0.2231 -0.2948 0.2386 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile 0.0655 0.0373 0.0684 0.0406 0.0853 0.0392 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile -0.0440 0.0268 -0.0546 0.0256 -0.0640 0.0258 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.0863 0.0195 0.0716 0.0197 0.0713 0.0207 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile -0.0160 0.0182 -0.0194 0.0194 -0.0094 0.0196 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.1318 0.0748 0.0872 0.0766 0.0729 0.0797 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.0223 0.0242 0.0075 0.0244 -0.0003 0.0258 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    5.2185 1.9042 5.6132 2.0079 6.3493 2.0849 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.3205 0.2411 -0.5329 0.2573 -0.5193 0.2704 
Missing Books, Immigrant 0.2073 0.7220 -0.2553 0.6556 -0.2264 0.6524 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant -0.2308 0.2814 -0.4335 0.3089 0.0000 0.0000 
High Education, Immigrant 0.0989 0.2785 -0.2064 0.3119 -0.1909 0.2558 
Missing Education, Immigrant -0.3703 0.5001 -0.7655 0.5085 -0.7769 0.5788 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant -0.1746 0.0691 -0.1828 0.0743 -0.2139 0.0773 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant 0.0535 0.0621 0.0480 0.0671 0.0800 0.0694 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant 0.0036 0.0356 0.0235 0.0404 0.0128 0.0410 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant 0.0304 0.0347 0.0087 0.0397 0.0036 0.0382 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant -0.1596 0.1432 -0.0986 0.1619 -0.0706 0.1637 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant -0.0178 0.0471 0.0043 0.0562 0.0122 0.0588 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.0151 0.0066 0.0136 0.0070 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.0099 0.0051 0.0100 0.0052 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.0117 0.0031 0.0127 0.0031 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.0168 0.0038 0.0168 0.0038 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.0160 0.0057 0.0166 0.0058 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.0101 0.0062 0.0114 0.0060 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 2,707 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 2,602 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.722 0.104 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.401 0.159 
Third Quartile 0.875 0.145 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.746 0.184 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.678 0.184 
Third Quintile 1.264 0.164 
Fourth Quintile 1.964 0.172 
Highest Quintile 3.012 0.194 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    0.254 0.241 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant 0.399 0.336 
Third Quartile, Immigrant 0.210 0.357 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -0.181 0.326 
Constant -1.777 0.166 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.366 0.107 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.230 0.155 
Third Quartile 0.740 0.155 
Highest Quartile  1.533 0.172 
Maths Ability 0.987 0.174 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.047 0.218 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.037 0.227 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.382 0.245 
Constant -0.641 0.128 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
316 
 
Slovakia 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.536 0.088 -0.943 0.085 -0.799 0.087 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.948 0.074 0.562 0.080 0.449 0.089 
Missing 0.600 0.488 1.042 0.620 0.751 0.659 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium -0.095 0.080 0.083 0.103 -0.035 0.110 
High 0.858 0.096 0.709 0.098 0.431 0.102 
Missing -1.282 0.635 -1.122 0.759 -0.883 0.675 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile 0.040 0.022 0.036 0.023 0.031 0.026 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.080 0.040 0.043 0.044 0.066 0.044 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.028 0.011 0.007 0.013 -0.004 0.014 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.063 0.014 0.055 0.016 0.053 0.016 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile -0.010 0.016 -0.009 0.018 -0.007 0.018 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.018 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.008 0.014 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    0.027 2.771 -0.640 3.144 -1.344 2.755 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant 0.306 0.257 0.249 0.286 0.174 0.277 
Missing Books, Immigrant - - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant -0.566 0.389 -0.803 0.398 -0.667 0.427 
High Education, Immigrant -0.246 0.333 -0.323 0.395 -0.134 0.373 
Missing Education, Immigrant - - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant -0.008 0.097 0.018 0.110 0.041 0.100 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant -0.188 0.137 -0.166 0.158 -0.124 0.169 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant 0.093 0.043 0.081 0.051 0.086 0.049 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant -0.016 0.062 0.012 0.072 -0.030 0.065 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant -0.045 0.057 -0.076 0.079 -0.049 0.073 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant 0.054 0.046 0.066 0.041 0.104 0.045 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.016 0.007 0.015 0.007 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.014 0.005 0.014 0.005 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.012 0.003 0.008 0.003 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.019 0.003 0.017 0.003 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.010 0.003 0.006 0.004 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.010 0.003 0.006 0.003 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 7,328 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 6,661 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.955 0.088 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.797 0.105 
Third Quartile 1.371 0.107 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 2.149 0.123 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 1.025 0.184 
Third Quintile 1.538 0.169 
Fourth Quintile 2.465 0.182 
Highest Quintile 3.386 0.201 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    -0.296 0.350 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant 0.326 0.432 
Third Quartile, Immigrant 0.392 0.444 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant 0.185 0.405 
Constant -2.735 0.177 
 
 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.282 0.087 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.728 0.110 
Third Quartile 1.237 0.111 
Highest Quartile  2.134 0.127 
Maths Ability 1.384 0.167 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.123 0.194 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.103 0.197 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.207 0.187 
Constant -1.293 0.112 
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Spain 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.806 0.074 -1.094 0.081 -1.145 0.086 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.955 0.079 0.579 0.086 0.555 0.087 
Missing -0.167 0.368 0.094 0.429 0.186 0.460 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.280 0.085 0.279 0.092 0.259 0.132 
High 0.935 0.107 0.869 0.116 0.617 0.110 
Missing -0.979 0.194 -0.718 0.210 -0.569 0.248 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile 0.008 0.025 -0.001 0.027 -0.016 0.030 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.026 0.060 0.068 0.067 0.107 0.067 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.024 0.011 0.013 0.012 0.007 0.012 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.038 0.013 0.032 0.014 0.029 0.014 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.025 0.009 0.026 0.010 0.031 0.010 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.012 0.013 0.006 0.016 0.000 0.017 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    1.598 1.818 2.936 2.062 2.263 1.991 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.428 0.262 -0.770 0.309 -0.587 0.330 
Missing Books, Immigrant -0.653 0.852 -1.342 0.862 -1.586 0.801 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant -0.426 0.298 -0.167 0.321 -0.452 0.484 
High Education, Immigrant -0.129 0.286 0.085 0.365 -0.079 0.329 
Missing Education, Immigrant -0.909 0.677 -0.963 0.685 -1.419 0.669 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant -0.020 0.075 -0.064 0.085 -0.038 0.084 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant -0.340 0.199 -0.232 0.221 -0.248 0.250 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant 0.053 0.044 0.052 0.048 0.047 0.051 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant -0.044 0.052 -0.057 0.060 -0.059 0.065 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant -0.017 0.029 -0.028 0.033 -0.031 0.035 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant 0.007 0.039 0.005 0.052 0.027 0.062 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.013 0.004 0.015 0.005 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.012 0.003 0.015 0.003 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.016 0.002 0.017 0.002 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.013 0.002 0.014 0.003 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.014 0.004 0.014 0.004 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.005 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 10,776 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 10,365 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -1.056 0.078 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.443 0.103 
Third Quartile 1.028 0.106 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.959 0.116 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 1.031 0.139 
Third Quintile 1.689 0.133 
Fourth Quintile 2.296 0.130 
Highest Quintile 3.215 0.140 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    0.813 0.242 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant 0.140 0.278 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -0.627 0.321 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -1.148 0.373 
Constant -2.143 0.128 
 
 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.492 0.076 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.418 0.103 
Third Quartile 1.052 0.106 
Highest Quartile  2.065 0.116 
Maths Ability 1.148 0.103 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.030 0.141 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.045 0.132 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.209 0.141 
Constant -0.684 0.092 
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Sweden 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.432 0.068 -0.524 0.071 -0.468 0.073 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.602 0.096 0.357 0.103 0.389 0.099 
Missing 0.290 0.301 0.192 0.290 0.340 0.293 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.419 0.121 0.370 0.126 0.000 0.000 
High 1.120 0.106 1.182 0.109 0.811 0.100 
Missing -0.348 0.278 -0.084 0.293 -0.113 0.318 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile -0.027 0.041 -0.046 0.043 -0.023 0.041 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.021 0.026 0.010 0.026 -0.004 0.026 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.031 0.013 0.027 0.013 0.028 0.013 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.016 0.010 0.007 0.011 0.015 0.011 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.054 0.045 0.036 0.046 0.015 0.049 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.022 0.014 0.018 0.014 0.032 0.015 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    -1.077 1.604 -1.768 1.742 -1.568 1.616 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.619 0.176 -0.675 0.192 -0.618 0.190 
Missing Books, Immigrant 0.359 0.590 0.349 0.643 0.488 0.614 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant -0.680 0.264 -0.592 0.263 0.000 0.000 
High Education, Immigrant -0.472 0.190 -0.405 0.208 -0.450 0.185 
Missing Education, Immigrant -0.138 0.507 -0.160 0.520 -0.083 0.527 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant 0.084 0.058 0.109 0.062 0.094 0.057 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant 0.020 0.047 0.041 0.047 0.074 0.048 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant -0.041 0.026 -0.049 0.027 -0.051 0.027 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant 0.023 0.022 0.029 0.023 0.022 0.023 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant -0.175 0.098 -0.203 0.099 -0.166 0.104 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant 0.028 0.030 0.027 0.031 0.011 0.032 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.003 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.003 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.009 0.004 0.010 0.004 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003 
School FE - - 
  
Yes Yes 
Constant             
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 4,605 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 4,488 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.518 0.070 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.430 0.122 
Third Quartile 0.836 0.131 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.806 0.128 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.191 0.115 
Third Quintile 0.641 0.122 
Fourth Quintile 0.849 0.115 
Highest Quintile 1.398 0.124 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    1.228 0.185 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -0.490 0.229 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -0.459 0.240 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -0.985 0.251 
Constant -2.151 0.137 
 
 
 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.273 0.084 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.392 0.122 
Third Quartile 0.879 0.122 
Highest Quartile  1.787 0.128 
Maths Ability 0.490 0.116 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.301 0.152 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.100 0.150 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.079 0.139 
Constant -1.608 0.108 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
322 
 
Switzerland 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.123 0.115 -0.397 0.104 -0.284 0.077 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.968 0.112 0.590 0.120 0.346 0.105 
Missing 0.393 0.347 0.370 0.370 0.598 0.338 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.406 0.162 0.431 0.156 0.070 0.235 
High 1.333 0.166 1.311 0.177 0.573 0.109 
Missing -0.422 0.487 -0.021 0.601 -0.180 0.442 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile 0.129 0.084 0.183 0.085 0.079 0.060 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile -0.028 0.051 -0.062 0.047 -0.009 0.036 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile 0.033 0.020 0.034 0.020 0.015 0.016 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.028 0.054 0.010 0.054 0.029 0.042 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.023 0.016 0.022 0.015 0.017 0.013 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile 0.006 0.017 -0.004 0.021 0.008 0.016 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    3.544 2.359 5.735 2.433 2.712 1.779 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.303 0.189 -0.428 0.192 -0.295 0.164 
Missing Books, Immigrant 0.290 0.549 0.536 0.655 -0.021 0.534 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant -0.085 0.247 0.087 0.240 0.107 0.379 
High Education, Immigrant 0.044 0.238 0.084 0.282 0.407 0.175 
Missing Education, Immigrant -0.159 0.613 -0.219 0.734 0.328 0.613 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant -0.118 0.091 -0.175 0.092 -0.071 0.068 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant 0.015 0.064 -0.005 0.060 -0.053 0.047 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant 0.000 0.035 0.003 0.038 0.021 0.027 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant 0.025 0.090 0.029 0.100 0.010 0.073 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant -0.012 0.027 -0.026 0.026 -0.019 0.022 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant 0.005 0.028 0.004 0.034 -0.009 0.025 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - -0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.004 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.014 0.003 0.014 0.003 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.010 0.003 0.008 0.002 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.014 0.003 0.014 0.003 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.012 0.003 0.010 0.003 
School FE - -     Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 8,393 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 6,529 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.274 0.100 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.784 0.283 
Third Quartile 1.582 0.253 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 2.583 0.261 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.431 0.236 
Third Quintile 1.116 0.216 
Fourth Quintile 1.724 0.233 
Highest Quintile 2.685 0.208 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    1.370 0.319 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant -0.672 0.381 
Third Quartile, Immigrant -0.813 0.400 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant -0.903 0.342 
Constant -4.716 0.310 
 
 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy 0.250 0.155 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.661 0.283 
Third Quartile 1.261 0.234 
Highest Quartile  2.313 0.259 
Maths Ability 0.641 0.300 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.274 0.338 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.604 0.318 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability 0.326 0.319 
Constant -3.463 0.217 
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USA 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
      Boy -0.358 0.071 -0.418 0.073 -0.3915 0.0756 
Books (Ref: Low) 
      High 0.538 0.082 0.298 0.085 0.3317 0.0885 
Missing -0.066 0.315 -0.037 0.316 -0.2473 0.3321 
Parental Education (Ref: Low) 
      Medium 0.206 0.089 0.240 0.092 0.0756 0.1208 
High 1.266 0.091 1.256 0.094 0.8694 0.0919 
Missing 0.056 0.286 0.218 0.288 0.2054 0.2860 
Occupation spline 0-10th percentile 0.009 0.028 -0.009 0.029 -0.0092 0.0278 
Occupation spline 11-25th percentile 0.036 0.014 0.030 0.014 0.0235 0.0143 
Occupation spline 26-50th percentile -0.001 0.012 -0.007 0.012 -0.0115 0.0124 
Occupation spline 50-75th percentile 0.005 0.013 -0.001 0.013 0.0093 0.0137 
Occupation spline 76-90th percentile 0.111 0.058 0.068 0.059 0.0491 0.0603 
Occupation spline 91-100th percentile -0.013 0.017 -0.003 0.017 -0.0033 0.0178 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
      Immigrant    -0.389 1.467 -0.654 1.445 -0.9607 1.3500 
Books*Immigrant 
      High Books, Immigrant -0.122 0.203 -0.136 0.217 -0.0693 0.2193 
Missing Books, Immigrant - - 
  
0.0000 0.0000 
Parental Education*Immigrant 
      Medium Education, Immigrant 0.281 0.187 0.262 0.194 0.3059 0.2498 
High Education, Immigrant 0.117 0.265 0.103 0.273 0.2597 0.2237 
Missing Education, Immigrant -0.422 0.593 -0.578 0.620 -0.5835 0.6117 
Occupation 0-10 * Immigrant 0.023 0.053 0.035 0.052 0.0380 0.0493 
Occupation 11-25 * Immigrant 0.002 0.029 0.003 0.029 0.0009 0.0300 
Occupation 26-50 * Immigrant 0.014 0.024 0.009 0.024 0.0102 0.0254 
Occupation 51-75 * Immigrant -0.048 0.034 -0.038 0.034 -0.0429 0.0364 
Occupation 76-90 * Immigrant 0.153 0.132 0.141 0.137 0.1337 0.1445 
Occupation 91-100 * Immigrant -0.033 0.037 -0.040 0.037 -0.0300 0.0370 
Ability spline 0-10th percentile - - 0.005 0.003 0.0035 0.0026 
Ability spline 11-25th percentile - - 0.006 0.003 0.0084 0.0029 
Ability spline 26-50th percentile - - 0.006 0.002 0.0063 0.0023 
Ability spline 50-75th percentile - - 0.005 0.002 0.0061 0.0024 
Ability spline 76-90th percentile - - 0.009 0.003 0.0099 0.0034 
Ability spline 91-100th percentile - - 0.001 0.004 0.0031 0.0043 
School FE - - - - Yes Yes 
1 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Sample size = 5,419 in models 1,2, 4 and 5. 
Sample size = 5,117 in model 3 where some observations are dropped due to the fixed effect perfectly 
predicting the response. Dependent variable in all models was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
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  Model 4 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.3371 0.0712 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  
"Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.3373 0.1029 
Third Quartile 0.9455 0.0982 
Highest Quartile "Advantaged" 1.5095 0.1208 
Maths Ability (Ref: Lowest Ability Quintile) 
  Second Quintile 0.5015 0.1012 
Third Quintile 0.7648 0.1043 
Fourth Quintile 0.9400 0.1064 
Highest Quintile 1.6460 0.1226 
Immigrant Status (Ref: Native) 
  Immigrant    0.1995 0.1255 
ESCS*Immigrant 
  Second Quartile, Immigrant 0.2918 0.2306 
Third Quartile, Immigrant 0.2589 0.2186 
Highest Quartile, Immigrant 0.2217 0.2934 
Constant -0.6758 0.1104 
  Model 5 
  Beta SE 
Gender (Ref: Girl) 
  Boy -0.235 0.106 
ESCS  (Ref: Lowest Quartile  "Disadvantaged") 
  Second Quartile 0.420 0.176 
Third Quartile 0.747 0.177 
Highest Quartile  1.681 0.169 
Maths Ability 1.275 0.219 
ESCS*Maths Ability 
  Second ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.257 0.254 
Third ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.171 0.279 
Highest ESCS Quartile*Maths Ability -0.127 0.253 
Constant     
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Appendix 4.2. The PISA 2003 index of economic, social and cultural status 
(ESCS) (Source: modified versions of PISA 2004a, PISA 2004b) 
 
The PISA 2003 index of economic, social and cultural status (ESCS) is derived from 
three variables related to family background: the index of highest level of parental 
education in number of years of education according to the ISCED classification 
(PARED), the index of highest parental occupation status (HISEI) and the index of 
home possessions (HOMEPOS). Missing values for these three variables are imputed.  
The available data for each variable is then transformed to an international metric 
with OECD averages of 0 and OECD standard deviations of 1. These OECD-
standardised variables were used for a principal component analysis in order to obtain 
ESCS scores applying an OECD population weight giving each OECD country a 
weight of 1000. 
 
Computation of ESCS 
The rationale for using these three components is that socio-economic status is usually 
seen as based on education, occupational status and income. As no direct income 
measure is available from the PISA data, the existence of household items is used as 
an approximate measure of family wealth.  
 
The first two of these three measures have been described in section 4.3. The other 
variable included in the principle components analysis is the availability of certain 
household possessions.  Using data about household possessions as an indicator of 
family wealth has received much attention in recent international studies in the field 
of education (Buchmann, 2000). Data about household assets are believed to capture 
wealth better than income because they reflect a more stable source of wealth. In 
PISA 2003, students reported the availability of 13 different household items at home. 
Specifically, children were asked: 
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In your home, do you have: 
 
a) A desk for study  
b) A room of your own  
c) A quiet place to study  
d) A computer you can use for school work  
e) Educational software 
f) A link to the Internet  
g) Your own calculator  
h) Classic literature (e.g. <author>)  
i) Books of poetry  
j) Works of art (e.g. paintings)  
k) Books to help with your school work  
l) A dictionary  
m) A dishwasher  
n) More than 100 books (recoded)  
 
These items were then converted into a scale of home possession, as described on 
page 279 of OECD (2004c).  
 
Missing values for students with one missing response and two valid responses (out of 
parental education, parental occupation and the index of home possessions) were 
imputed with predicted values plus a random component based on a regression of the 
variable with missing responses on the other two variables. Variables with imputed 
values were then transformed to an international metric with OECD averages of 0 and 
OECD standard deviations of 1. These OECD standardised variables were used for a 
principal component analysis applying an OECD population weight giving each 
OECD country a weight of 1000. The ESCS scores were obtained as factor scores for 
the first principal component with 0 being the score of an average OECD student and 
1 the standard deviation across equally weighted OECD countries.  
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Using principal component analysis (PCA) to derive factor loading for each 
participating country provides insight into the extent to which there are similar 
relationships between the three components. Table 17.55 in OECD (2004c) shows the 
PCA results for the participating countries and the scale reliabilities for the z-
standardised variables. Comparing results from within-country PCA reveals that 
patterns of factor loadings are generally similar across countries. All three 
components contribute more or less equally to this index with factor loadings ranging 
from 0.65 to 0.85. Internal consistency ranges between 0.56 and 0.77, the scale 
reliability for the pooled OECD sample with equally weighted country data is 0.69. 
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Appendix 4.3.  Alternative results for the expectations of high ability 
disadvantaged children compared to their average but advantaged peers 
 
In section 4.5, I investigate the expectations of disadvantaged children scoring high 
marks on the PISA maths test, drawing a comparison to those scoring substantially 
lower marks from advantaged homes. I base this analysis on ‘model 4’, of which a 
description can be found in the main text. In this, I discuss the possibility of an 
Ability*Advantaged interaction, though do not include this term in the final model 
based on evidence provided by a likelihood ratio test. In this Appendix I test the 
robustness of the main conclusion drawn from section 4.5 – that high ability children 
from disadvantaged homes hold lower expectations than their affluent but less able 
peers. I do this by estimating an alternative model specification. Specifically, in 
contrast to model 4, I: 
 Drop immigrants from the analysis and focus on natives 
 Enter ability as a single continuous variable, defining “high ability” as 
children who sit at the 85
th
 percentile of the national PISA maths 
distribution
162
 
 Include an interaction between ability and advantage163 
 
This is defined formally as ‘model 5’ below: 
Model 5: iiii
ij
ij
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Where: 
SES = A vector of four dummy variables reflecting children’s socio-economic status, 
based upon quartiles the ESCS measure of family background described in section 4.5 
(reference = bottom quartile) 
 
Ab = A single, continuous variable reflecting children’s score on the PISA math’s test. 
I standardise this variable within each country by subtracting from each child’s score 
the national mean and dividing by the national standard deviation. Hence the 
                                                          
162
 I have also experimented with enter ability more flexibly with a series of splines. Results do not 
differ substantially to those presented. 
163
 Although I include this interaction to test for robustness of my results, the likelihood ratio test still 
found only 6 countries where this substantially improved model fit at the 5% level 
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estimated coefficients refer to a one standard deviation increase from the mean. 
Using this model, I re-estimate the predicted probabilities that are presented in Figure 
4.8 (full parameter estimates can be found in Appendix 4.1 as “Model 5”) . Note that, 
as previously, all points sit below the 45 degree line (significant on 30 out of 32 
occasions). In other words, I still find that high scoring disadvantaged children are 
less likely to believe they will complete university than lower scoring children from 
more affluent homes. The cross-national pattern is broadly similar to before, although 
England now sits closer to the 45 degree line than many other countries (infact, it is 
only just on the boarder of statistical significance at the 5% level). Hence it seems that 
this may, if anything, be less of a concern in England than other developed countries.  
 
Appendix Figure 4.1. Predicted probability of a high ability disadvantaged girl 
expecting to complete university versus an advantaged girl of average ability 
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4 Source: Author’s calculations using PISA 2003 data. Country by country sample sizes in Table 4.1 
and Appendix 4.1. Dependent variable in regression was whether respondent expected to obtain a 
degree (coded 0 if they did not and 1 if they did) 
 
